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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Since the official establishment of the first stock exchange in 1990, the Chinese 
securities market has gone through fewer than three decades of development. 
In 2017, the Shanghai Stock Exchange ranked fifth and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange ranked eighth among the biggest stock exchanges in the world.1 
Despite its huge success, Chinese securities market also faces various 
challenges, in particular minority shareholder expropriation. As of April 2018, 
there were 138 million individual investors in China, and 95% of them were 
small-and-medium investors with a share capital of less than 500 thousand 
RMB(around $71,365).2 These millions of investors’ interests are closely 
related to the stability of the securities market. Yan Qingmin, vice president of 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission, announced that “investor 
protection, especially protection of small-and-medium investors, is the 
fundamental task of the Commission”.3 In the Chinese context, the disparity 
between the numbers and the powers of minority shareholders creates a risk 
of minority expropriations, which may further interrupt the stability and the 
growth of Chinese listed companies. Responding to this challenge, a 
comparative research of minority shareholder protection has both theoretical 
and practical values.  
 
 
1 See: https://dollarsandsense.sg/10-biggest-stock-exchanges-world-heres-much-theyve-gained-2017/. Last 
visited February 2019. 
2 See: 投资者保护再添新渠道 (New Channel of Investor Protection), interpretation of policies, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-05/25/content_5293507.htm. Last visited February 2019. 
According to Shanghai Stock Exchange’s data, the percentage of market capital held by individual shareholders 
dropped from 48.3% in 2007 to 21.2% in 2017. It is estimated that individual shareholders own a higher 
percentage of market capital on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange than on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. However, 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange does not disclose such specific data. See: 李立峰(Li Lifeng), 2018 年 A 股投资者
结构全景图 (A Panorama of A Shares’ Investor Structure in 2018), available at 
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1621048711329385867&wfr=spider&for=pc. Last visited February 2019. 
3 Ibid. 
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1.1 The problem and its origins 
Different from Western countries, listed companies in China are a relatively 
new concept, due to the country’s past planned economy system of socialist 
public ownership. Before the 1978 reform of this system, private business was 
forbidden, and businessmen were morally condemned as opponents of the 
communist motto “property should belong to all rather than a small group of 
people”. The 1978 “reform and opening-up” policy, started by Deng Xiaoping, 
gradually transformed such ways of thinking about private commercial 
activities, which had been in place since the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China (hereinafter PRC) in 1949. Progressively, the transition to a 
socialist market economy, initiated by the 1978 reform, brought about three 
main changes, which in turn made the emergence of listed companies possible 
in China.  
The first change was the formation of the Chinese securities market, the 
process of which began in October 1984 when the Decision on the Economic 
System Reform4 put into operation the shareholding system pilot project (股
份制).5 From this first pilot phase followed the establishment of both the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (hereinafter SSE)6 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(hereinafter SZSE)7 in 1990. In 1993, the Chinese Company Law8 made its 
debut, and the Chinese Securities Law9 was later enacted in 1998. In 2002, the 
 
4 《中共中央关于经济体制改革的决定》 (Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China on Reforming the Economic System), issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
date of issue 20th October 1984. 
5 Ma Qingquan (ed.), History of Chinese Securities 1978-1998 (Beijing: Citic Publishing House, 2003), p. 35. 
6 The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was founded on November 26th 1990 and started operating on December 
19th of the same year. It is a membership institution directly governed by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), available at http://english.sse.com.cn/aboutsse/sseoverview/brief/. Last visited February 
2019. 
7 The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), which was found on 1st December 1990, is a self-regulated legal entity 
supervised by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), available at 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/AboutSZSE/SZSEOverview/. Last visited February 2019. 
8 Chinese Company Law was originally promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on 29th December 1993, amended on 25th December 1999, amended on 28th February 2004, 
amended on 27th October 2005, amended on 28th December 2013 and amended on 26th October 2018. The 
latest version came into effect on 26th October 2018. 
9 The Chinese Securities Law was originally promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on 29th December 1998, amended on 28th August 2004, on 27th October 2005, on 29th June 2013 and 
31st August 2014. The latest amendment was on 28th December 2019 and will come into effect on 1st March 
2020. This PhD thesis was conducted based on its then valid law, i.e. the 2014 Chinese Securtities Law. 
However, relevant updates of the 2020 amendment have been timely incorporated into this thesis. 
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China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereinafter CSRC)10 issued the 
Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies.11 It 
could be argued that from this moment, the basic foundations of the Chinese 
securities market were in place. 
The second change refers to the reform of state-owned enterprises 
(hereinafter SOEs). State monopoly began to open up as a result of the “reform 
and opening-up” policy, as experimenting with a socialist market economy 
demanded the introduction of elements of privatisation and private 
economy.12 As a result, SOE reform went through three phases. A first 
“enterprisation” phase (1979-1992) aimed at transforming SOEs into business 
entities, whilst a second “corporatisation” phase (1992-2002) attempted to 
convert SOEs into shareholding companies. A third “concentration” phase 
(since 2003-) has seen the state concentrating its exclusive control in several 
important industries, such as defence, petroleum, telecommunications and 
coal.13 
The third change is the split share structure reform. After the establishment of 
the securities market and the aforementioned SOE reforms, the main 
remaining obstacle to the growth of listed companies in China was their split 
share structure, inherited from the previous system. Under this structure, 
shares in a Chinese listed company were divided into tradable and 
non-tradable shares,14 the latter comprised both state shares and legal person 
 
10 The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), a ministerial-level public institution under the direct 
control of the State Council, was established in October 1992 as the regulatory institution for the Chinese 
securities and futures market, available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/intro/200811/t20081130_67718.html. Last visited February 2019. 
11上市公司收购管理办法 (Measures for the Administration on Acquisition of Listed Companies) was originally 
promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on 28th September 2002, and it was appealed on 
31st July 2006. The new legislation was passed on 17th May 2006, amended on 27th August 2008 and on 14th 
February 2012, with the latest amendment on 23rd October 2014.  
12 Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Xin Li, ‘SOE Reform in China: Past, Present and Future’, 31 (2014) The Copenhagen 
Journal of Asian Studies, pp. 54-78. 
13 Ibid. 
14 “Non-tradable shares” are shares that are not listed on the stock market, and their transfer requires official 
approval by the CSRC. The division of non-tradable and tradable shares in this research specifically refers to A 
shares. Shares in China mainly consist of five categories: A shares, which could only be originally purchased by 
Chinese citizens but can now be owned by foreigners under certain conditions; B shares (purchased with 
foreign currency),which used to be exclusively issued to foreign investors but can now be owned by Chinese 
citizens; H shares, which refer to shares listed on the Hong Kong exchange market; N shares, which refer to 
shares listed on the New York exchange, and, finally, S shares, which refer to shares listed on the Singapore 
exchange.  
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shares.15 For the purposes of state control, non-tradable shares accounted for 
two-thirds of a listed firm’s entire equity on average.16 This split share 
structure triggered many problems in practice, such as an inactive securities 
market, conflicts of interest between holders of tradable and non-tradable 
shares and inefficient monitoring.17 To solve these problems, a split share 
structure reform was launched in 2005 to transform non-tradable shares into 
tradable ones. It has been claimed that the reform was completed in 2007 and 
covered 98% of all Chinese listed companies.18 Theoretically speaking, the 
former non-tradable shares became tradable after the reform. However, not 
all converted shares are currently listed on the stock exchange, for a company 
is free to decide how many will be circulated on the securities market.19 The 
latest available data illustrate this situation: at the time of reporting, there 
were about 3792.89 billion (90.66%) tradable shares and 390.76 billion (9.34%) 
non-tradable shares on the SSE,20 and about 1371.32 billion (75%) tradable 
shares and 454.92 billion (25%) non-tradable shares on the SZSE.21 
Up to the end of 2018, there were 1450 listed companies on the SSE22 and 
2134 listed companies on the SZSE.23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 “State shares” are shares that are directly owned by the state or designated state organs. “Legal person” 
shares are normally shares indirectly owned by the state through SOEs. 
16 Joyce, Lee Suet Lin, ‘From Non-Tradable to Tradable Shares: Split Share Structure Reform of China’s Listed 
Companies’, 8 (2008) Journal of Corporate Law Studies, pp. 57-78. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Chen, Daisong, Legal Development in China’s Securities Market during Three Decades of Reform and 
Opening-Up (2009), Asian Law Institute Working Paper Serious No.005, available at 
https://law.nus.edu.sg/asli/working_paper_d.aspx?sno=WPS005. Last visited February 2019. 
19 In addition, to avoid price chaos on the market, converted shares (from non-tradable to tradable) suffer 
from the legislative restriction of various “lock-up periods”. 
20 Data up to 31st October 2017, available at: http://www.sse.com.cn/market/stockdata/structure/overview/. 
Last visited November 2017. 
21 Data up to 7th November 2017, available at: http://www.szse.cn/main/marketdata/tjsj/jbzb/. Last visited 
November 2017. 
22 Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics Annual 2019 (data up to the end of 2018), available at 
http://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/tjnj_2019.pdf.pdf. Last visited August 2019. 
23 Data up to the end of 2018, see: http://www.szse.cn/market/subject/P020181228724258906714.pdf. Last 
visited August 2019. 
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Table 1.1 Numbers of Listed Companies on the SSE (2002-2018) 
 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics Annuals24 
Table 1.2 Numbers of Listed Companies on the SZSE (2004-2018) 
 
Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange Statistics25 
Despite the reform, shares of Chinese listed companies remain highly 
concentrated in the hands of the state as the controlling shareholder.26 
 
24 Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics Annuals, available at 
http://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/. Last visited October 2019. 
25 Shenzhen Stock Exchange Statistics, available at http://www.szse.cn/market/subject/index.html. Last 
visited October 2019. 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2002 2010 2018
SSE Listed Companies 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2004 2010 2018
SZSE Listed Companies
8B_BW_Fu_stand.job
6 
 
According to the latest SSE statistics, the top 10 companies with the largest 
tradable share values, and the top 10 companies with the largest market 
capitals, are all state-owned.27 Moreover, in 2013, the capital value of 
state-owned listed companies accounted for 51.4% of the entire market capital 
at an amount of 13,710 billion RMB.28 Moreover, the state has absolute 
control (more than 50% shares) in 33.33% of central state-owned listed 
companies29 and in 28.15% of local state-owned listed companies.30  
In contrast with this state dominance, there were 212.137 million individual 
accounts and 662,000 institution accounts on the SSE as of 2018.31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Junyeop Lee, State-Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence, OECD Working Group on 
Privatization and Corporate Governance of State Owned Assets Occasional Paper, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/42095493.pdf. Last 
visited February 2019. 
27 China’s largest market capital companies include: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China National 
Petroleum Corporation, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, Kweichow Moutai Group, Ping’an Insurance, 
China Life Insurance, Sinopec Group, China Merchants Bank and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. Data up 
to 8 November 2017, available at http://www.sse.com.cn/market/stockdata/marketvalue/. Last visited 
November 2017. A definition of “state-owned” can be found in section 1.5 of this chapter. 
28 According to information disclosed on 10th January 2013 at the state-owned assets supervision and 
administration meeting, there were 953 state-controlled listed companies at the end of 2012, which accounts 
for 38.5% of all the A shares listed companies. However, the capital value of the state-controlled listed 
companies occupied 51.4% of the entire market capital at 13,710 billion RMB. See: 全国国有资产监督管理工
作会议(State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Meeting), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2013-01/29/content_2321997.htm. Last visited February 2019. In addition, the 
amounts of shares of state-owned listed companies accounted for 68.35% of the entire A shares market at the 
end of 2013. See: Li Yongjun, 纵览国内上市公司股权结构 (An Overview of the Share Structure of Chinese 
Listed Companies), available at http://www.csteelnews.com/xwzx/djbd/201407/t20140728_250851.html. Last 
visited February 2019.  
29 Among central state-owned listed companies, 22.3% of companies with 40%-50% shares are owned by the 
biggest shareholder; 15% of companies whose controller held 30%-40% shares; 20.8% companies with 20%-30% 
shares dominated by the biggest shareholder; 8.3% companies with the biggest shareholder owned fewer than 
20% shares. See: ibid. 
30 Among local state-owned listed companies, 18.92% companies with 40%-50% shares owned by the biggest 
shareholder; 21.85% companies whose controller held 30%-40% shares; 21.08% companies with 20%-30% 
shares dominated by the biggest shareholder; 10% companies with the biggest shareholder owned less than 
20% shares. See: supra. 28.. 
31 Data of Shareholder Accounts of the A shares up to 31 December 2018, Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics 
Annual 2019, available at http://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/tjnj_2019.pdf.pdf. 
Last visited October 2019. 
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Table 1.3 A-Shares Shareholder Account Numbers (10K) 
 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics Annual 201932 
Given such large numbers of individual shareholders in a highly concentrated 
market, investor protection has become one of the prime concerns of the 
Chinese government. In fact, the notion of “strengthen the protection of 
investors, small investors in particular” has been promoted as a basic principle 
on the CSRC’s official website.33 In addition, in 2013, the State Council General 
Office issued an Opinion on Further Enhancing the Protection of Legitimate 
Rights and Interests of Small and Medium-sized Investors in the Capital Market 
(hereinafter Small- and Medium-sized Investors Opinion),34 which puts 
minority shareholder protection into the spotlight. The Small- and 
Medium-sized Investors Opinion acknowledges that small and medium-sized 
investors (that is, minority shareholders) are the main participants in the 
Chinese capital market35 and that they face huge risks of infringement due to 
their weak position in terms of information availability, anti-risk capability and 
 
32 Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics Annual 2019, available at 
http://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/tjnj_2019.pdf.pdf Last visited October 2019. 
33 中国证券监督管理委员会 (China Securities Regulatory Commission), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/. Last visited November 2017. 
34 国务院办公厅关于进一步加强资本市场中小投资者合法权益保护工作的意见 (Opinion on Further 
Enhancing the Protection of Legitimate Rights and Interests of Small- and Medium-sized Investors in the Capital 
Market), the State Council General Office, date of issue December 27th 2013.  
35 Ibid. 
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self-protection. As a result, the Opinion sets objectives to improve their level of 
protection.36  
 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
Chinese economic reforms gradually gave rise to a special ownership structure, 
namely highly concentrated and dominated by the state. Generally speaking, a 
concentrated structure has both advantages and disadvantages. On the one 
hand, a controlling shareholder may have a positive influence on the company 
through enhanced monitoring. On the other hand, a controlling shareholder 
may seek private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.37 When 
the state is a controlling shareholder, minority shareholders may face different 
challenges.38 
Various company scandals in China have demonstrated the dangers of minority 
expropriations. A notable example is that of Hou Wang (HW 猴王), a 
SZSE-listed company that produced welding materials and equipment. HW’s 
ownership consisted of 37.84% state-owned shares, 25.92% legal person 
shares and 36.24% individual shares. Hou Wang Qi Ye (HWQY 猴王企业), a 
state-owned enterprise, was the controlling shareholder of HW. However, 
after listing HW, the controlling shareholder HWQY abused HW’s listed status 
for direct funding and then redirected the raised money to help its subsidiaries 
(other SOEs).39 Eventually, HW faced a financial loss of 67.7020 million RMB 
 
36 Supra. 34.  
37 Zheng Zhigang and Sun Juanjuan, ‘我国上市公司治理发展历史与现状评估(Historical Development of 
Corporate Governance of Chinese Listed Companies and Evaluation on the Present Situation)’, 10 (2009) 金融
研究 (Journal of Financial Research), pp. 118-132. See Chapter 2 of this research for further discussion. 
38 More discussion can be found in section 2.4 of Chapter 2. 
39 HWQY, the controlling shareholder, applied various approaches to the expropriation. First, it appropriated 
through bank loans; for example, 193.67 million RMB of HW’s bank loans were under the control of HWQY. 
HW’s assets were also used to provide guarantees for HWQY. Second, HWQY successfully embezzled 930.54 
million RMB from HW through related-party transactions. For instance, HW tried to take over 11 subsidiaries 
from HWQY with a transaction price which equated to the overdue debts that HWQY owed to HW. At the 
same time, renting contracts had been signed between the two parties so that the 11 subsidiaries were still 
under the control of HWQY. As a result, HW was declared bankrupt in 2002. See: Liao Li (ed.), 公司治理与独
立董事案例 (Cases on Corporate Governance and Independent Directors) (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 
2003), p. 172. 
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and subsequent bankruptcy. This incident caused great losses to the company, 
particularly to its individual investors.40 
In another well-known case, Zhengzhou Baiwen (ZBW 郑州百文), which 
started in stationary wholesale, went from being a successful state-owned 
listed company during the SOE reform to a complete failure with more than 1.5 
billion RMB losses and 2.5 billion RMB overdue bank loans. Reporters’ 
investigations revealed that the ZBW “legend” was nothing but balance sheet 
manipulation and fraudulent financial accounting. In spite of its excessive 
debts, however, ZBW was very generous to its managers, and many of those in 
senior positions sat on private fortunes of more than a million or even 10 
million RMB. Even a manager from one of ZBW’s local branches possessed 
luxury cars worth millions, as well as luxury villas. In this case, too, ZBW’s 
minority shareholders’ economic interests were severely damaged.41 
Different from the two cases just mentioned, the Zhong Ke Chuang Ye (ZKCY 中
科创业) stock manipulation case happened in a non-state-owned listed 
company that produced fodder and raised chickens. Lv Liang (LL 吕梁), after 
becoming the de facto controller of ZKCY, successfully appointed seven out of 
11 members of the board of directors during a re-election.42 By establishing a 
“Zhong Ke” group with other listed companies, LL manipulated ZKCY’s share 
price through mutual guarantees among listed companies, bank loans and 
other capital accumulation approaches. Unsurprisingly, this “artificial” share 
price could not last for long, and so ten months later, it dropped dramatically 
and two-thirds of ZKCY’s assets were lost.43 As a result, countless individual 
investors suffered great losses, due to the stock manipulation of the company 
controller. 
 
40 Liao Li (ed.), 公司治理与独立董事案例 (Cases on Corporate Governance and Independent Directors) 
(Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 2003), p. 172. 
41 A bankruptcy lawsuit of ZBW was filed at court in 2000. Xie Dengke, 郑百文：假典型巨额亏空的背后
(Zheng Baiwen: Behind the Fraudulent Financial Losses), available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel3/24/20001030/292544.html.  
Also available at http://finance.qq.com/zt2010/zbw/. Last visited February 2019. 
42 Zhang Xudong, 崩裂的 54 亿元资金链-中科创股价事件始末 (The Broken Capital Chain of 5.4 Billion 
Yuan-Details of the Zhong Ke Chuang Share Price Incident), available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper2086/7316/704942.html. Last visited February 2019. 
43 In 2002, the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court opened a hearing into the ZKCY case. 中科创业股票操纵
案 (Zhongke venture stock manipulation case), available at http://baike.baidu.com/view/11579443.html. Last 
visited February 2019. 
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These scandals vividly depict the typical conflicts of interest in Chinese listed 
companies, namely between the state as the controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders, between management and minority shareholders and 
between private controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The first 
two scandals emerged in the context of state-owned listed companies. The HW 
case has shown that the state controller may inflict heavy damage on minority 
shareholders by misappropriating the assets of a listed company for other SOEs. 
The ZBW case demonstrates that without proper monitoring of the state 
controller, managers can easily abuse their management powers and place 
minority shareholders into great danger. In the third case, the ZKCY scandal 
illustrates the conflict which may arise between a private controller and 
minority shareholders.  
Accordingly, this research will explore and answer the following key question: 
how could minority shareholder protection in Chinese listed companies be 
improved in comparison to that in the US and the Dutch systems? 
To answer the main research question, four sub-research questions are raised. 
First, how are minority shareholders protected by shareholder rights according 
to the law in China, the US and the Netherlands?  
Second, how are minority shareholders protected by monitoring mechanisms, 
focusing on disclosure and independence, in China, the US and the 
Netherlands? 
Third, how are minority shareholders protected in takeovers, especially by 
courts, in China, the US and the Netherlands? 
Fourth, what can China learn from the US and the Netherlands to improve 
minority shareholder protection in Chinese listed companies?  
1.3 Methodology 
This research mainly builds on the comparative methodology, which consists of 
six typical methods.44 The functional method pinpoints two elements of a 
shared societal problem and legal solutions in different jurisdictions, in order 
to seek better solutions.45 The analytical method intends to identify 
 
44 Mark van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’, 12 (2015) Law and Method, pp. 1-35. 
45 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Introduction to comparative law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 15. 
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similarities and differences by analysing legal concepts and rules in different 
jurisdictions and by evaluating these concepts and rules based on “ideal 
types”.46 The historical method underlines how a nation’s past background 
shapes its law and explains how historical roots are related to the similarities 
and differences among different legal systems.47 The structural method 
provides an approach whereby the researcher inspects an observed 
phenomenon through its hidden structures, which can be systematically 
related or simply interrelated.48 The law-in-context method broadens the 
examination to cover also social reality, legal context, institutional context, 
implied patterns and other implicit factors.49 The common core method 
attempts to name commonalities of solutions within a certain area and 
amongst various jurisdictions, and to discuss the possibility of harmonisation.50 
These methods are not strictly separated from each other, but they do 
correlate with one another. Applying the functional method, this research 
targets the problem of minority shareholder expropriation and examines 
solutions provided in three different jurisdictions. In order to achieve this goal, 
the work draws on the experiences of two other countries, namely the US and 
the Netherlands, to make proposals which could improve the protection of 
minority shareholders in Chinese listed companies. The US has been selected 
for this comparison for two main reasons: first, Chinese Company Law has 
absorbed many legal rules from the US model, and second, US corporate law, 
specifically Delaware corporate law, is currently one of the most advanced 
systems in the world.  
Although not holding the same primacy as the US, the case of the Netherlands 
has been selected for its growing “attractiveness” to foreign listed companies 
that increasingly decide to relocate to the country, due to the favourable 
business environment put in place by Dutch corporate law. It has been further 
reported that the Dutch securities market seems to become more 
“concentrated”.51 These recent developments make the Netherlands an 
 
46 Mark van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’, 12 (2015) Law and Method, pp. 1-35. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Geoffrey Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Oxford: Hart Publishing: 2014), 
pp. 81-82. 
49 Supra. 46. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Eumedion, ‘Position of Minority Shareholders in Companies with A Controlling Shareholder’, available at 
https://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/position-papers/2016-06-position-paper-minority-sh
areholders-final-version.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
11B_BW_Fu_stand.job
12 
 
interesting case for a comparison with China. Besides, since this PhD research 
is conducted in the Netherlands, the practical concern is one of the reasons 
behind the choice.  
Applying the structural method, this research employs the principal-agent cost 
as well as the principal-principal cost52 as structures through which to analyse 
the phenomenon of minority shareholder expropriation. Specifically, conflicts 
of interest are investigated by following the rights of the principal and 
monitoring of the agent structures, to explain and assess how a country’s 
corporate governance system balances the power between the “principal” and 
the “agent”.  
Applying the analytical method, this research focuses on both first and 
secondary legal sources, and thus legislation, case law, legal and economic 
research and commentaries. The main Chinese legal sources of investigation 
include the Chinese Company Law, the Chinese Securities Law and the Chinese 
Corporate Governance Code. The main US legal sources encompass federal 
securities regulations and Delaware state corporate law (both statutory and 
case law), while the main Dutch legal sources cover the Dutch Civil Code, the 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code, the Financial Supervision Act and Dutch 
case law.  
These legal sources provide the foundations on which to conduct “doctrinal” 
legal analysis. Despite the absence of a universal definition, three essential 
characteristics of doctrinal legal analysis are summarised herein: first, 
arguments are based on authoritative sources, such as legislation, case law and 
academic publications, second, the law is examined as a coherent system and 
third, discretion in individual cases should be limited by the consistency of the 
system.53 By applying doctrinal legal analysis with a broad scope, this research 
mainly examines legal sources of statutory laws, case laws and legal studies, 
but it also refers to other relevant sources, such as statistics, surveys, empirical 
research, economic research and social scientific evidence, to deepen its 
understanding on the research subject.  
 
52 The traditional understanding of the principal-agent cost refers to the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and management, while the principal-principal cost refers to the conflicts of interest between 
minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder. More details can be found in Chapter 2. 
53 Namely, judges’ interpretation of law in a case-by-case analysis should be bounded by precedents and 
should be consistent with the legal system. See: Rob Van Gestel and Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal 
Legal Research in Europe: What About Methodology?’ 5 (2011) EUI Working Papers, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/16825. Last visited February 2019. 
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By inspecting the legislations of the three studied countries, the research first 
individuates how each country’s company law designs the power between the 
principal and the agent. Second, the research examines how monitoring 
mechanisms of disclosure and supervision are deployed in each country to 
even out the power discrepancy between the principal and the agent. Third, 
the research maps out the judicial remedies in place to protect minority 
shareholders in mergers and acquisitions in each selected country. Applying 
the law-in-context method, this thesis pays particular attention to the 
implementation and practical effects of legal measures in each of the selected 
countries by drawing on secondary academic sources, such as legal, economic 
and empirical studies.  
These methodologies and comparative approaches allow this thesis to 
contribute to existing research in at least three fundamental ways. First, the 
subjects of comparison connect three key countries that represent common 
law, European continental civil law and East Asian civil law. Second, and 
different from most of the legal research on minority shareholder protection, 
which focuses on one specific minority-friendly legal rule or one particular area, 
this thesis endeavours to explore protection that could be provided to minority 
shareholders by establishing a balanced corporate governance system in China. 
Third, through comparisons, this thesis strives to analyse the discrepancy 
between law in the books and law in action in China and further make 
recommendations to meet the practical need of consolidating corporate 
governance with Chinese characteristics. However, also due to its design, this 
thesis unavoidably has some limitations; for instance, the compared countries 
have different legal and institutional contexts, the comparison structures make 
it impossible to cover all details, the evidence of law in action mainly relies on 
secondary legal sources and the study of Dutch law is primarily based on 
English-language sources.  
1.4 Structure of the research 
This work consists of seven chapters. The first chapter presents the problem 
statement, research questions, methodologies, the research structure and key 
notions of the research. The second chapter begins with an introduction to the 
agency theory, ownership structure and legal strategies for minority 
shareholder protection, as well as how these theories play out in the context of 
minority shareholder protection in China. The third chapter discusses minority 
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shareholder protection in Chinese listed companies from the perspectives of 
shareholder rights, disclosure, supervision and judicial remedy in mergers and 
acquisitions. The fourth chapter follows a similar structure to analyse minority 
shareholder protection in the US, and likewise, the fifth chapter provides an 
outline of the Dutch legal context on the subject of protection of minority 
shareholders. 
Drawing on the detailed and descriptive analyses of the previous chapters, the 
sixth chapter summarises and discusses the outcomes of the thesis’ 
comparative account on how the law protects minority shareholders in China, 
the US and the Netherlands. Subsequently, the chapter draws on such analyses 
to elaborate a list of proposals relating to minority shareholder protection in 
the Chinese context. The findings of this work are discussed in the light of 
China’s differences and similarities with the US and Dutch contexts. The last 
chapter summarises and concludes the research. 
 
1.5 Key concepts of the research 
This thesis defines the main concepts as follows, in order to smooth out the 
process of comparison. 
There are two types of companies in China, namely the limited liability 
company and the company limited by shares (also known as the “joint stock” 
company).54 Of the two, only the company limited by shares, whose stocks are 
listed and traded on a securities exchange, is qualified to become a listed 
company.55 The “Chinese listed companies” in this research refer to 
companies which are established according to the Chinese Company Law and 
 
54 Article 2, Chinese Company Law. 
55 Article 120, Chinese Company Law. Concerning shares of Chinese listed companies, generally two types of 
shares, namely A shares and B shares, are listed on the SSE and the SZSE. With the establishment of the 
‘Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Interconnection’ on November 17th 2014, it is now possible for certain H shares to 
be traded through the SSE. Specifically, A shares refers to shares issued by Chinese listed companies, 
denominated in, subscribed for and traded in RMBs, and B shares covers shares denominated in RMBs but 
subscribed for and traded in foreign currencies. H shares refer to shares of Chinese companies that are listed 
on the Hong Kong exchange. 
13A_BW_Fu_stand.job
15 
 
listed on either the SSE or the SZSE pursuant to the Chinese Securities Law, 
stock exchange regulations and other related rules.56 
Furthermore, this research divides Chinese listed companies into state-owned 
listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies. Before going into 
detail, it is necessary to clarify related notions from the outset. Though 
expressions such as “state-owned enterprises” (SOEs) and “state-owned 
companies” (SOCs) have been widely used, there is no uniform legal definition 
regarding either of these concepts. In fact, the meanings of these concepts in 
different legislations are still a matter of debate. The narrow interpretation 
exclusively limits the concept of “a state-owned company” to “a wholly 
state-owned company”.57 The medium definition extends “state-owned 
companies” to also include the “absolute state control”, in which the state 
holds more than 50% of the company shares.58 The broad definition covers 
both “absolute control”, with a 50% or a more than 50% shareholding, and 
“relative control”, with a less than 50% shareholding but with the possibility to 
impose a material influence on the general meeting through voting rights.59 
Specifically, the controlling right of a listed company has been defined by any 
of the following five situations: absolute control with more than 50% shares, 
actual control of more than 30% of voting rights, the possibility to elect more 
than half of the directors through his or her actual control of voting rights, the 
possibility to exert significant influence on the general meeting through the 
actual control of voting rights and any situation recognised by the CSRC.60 
 
56 The concept of ‘listed companies’ in this research only refers to companies that are listed in the country of 
incorporation.  
57 最高人民法院关于如何认定国有控股、参股股份有限公司中的国有公司、企业人员的解释
(Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Identification of Employees of State-Owned Companies or 
Enterprises at Companies in Which the State Has a Controlling or Non-controlling Stake), Supreme People's 
Court, date of issue August 1st 2005. 
Similarly, the OECD working paper also adopts the narrow definition of ‘state-owned enterprises’, which only 
refers to “wholly state-funded firms”. See: Junyeop Lee, ‘State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the 
Evidence’, OECD Working Group on Privatization and Corporate Governance of State-Owned Assets Occasional 
Paper, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/42095493.pdf. Last 
visited February 2019. 
58财政部关于国有企业认定问题有关意见的函 (Opinions of the Ministry of Finance on the Determination of 
State-owned Enterprises), Ministry of Finance, date of issue April 23rd 2003. 
59 Article 216, Chinese Company Law. 
60 Article 84,上市公司收购管理办法 (The Administrative Measures for the Takeover of Listed Companies), 
was enacted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on 17th May 2006, subsequently amended on 27th 
August 2008, 14th February 2012 and most recently on 23rd October 2014. 
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This research follows the broad definition of both absolute and relative control, 
i.e. a controlling shareholder is someone who owns 50% or more shares, or 
who owns fewer than 50% shares but in fact dominates more than 30% voting 
rights, or in fact elects more than half of the board, or is capable to 
significantly impact the general meeting or fits into other situations 
determined by the CSRC. Subsequently, the term “state-owned listed 
companies” in this research equates to “state-controlled listed companies”, i.e. 
a listed company that is under the absolute or relative control of the state.61 
Moreover, the state shareholder can be represented by the State Council, local 
government, the state-owned assets supervision and administration bodies 
under the State Council or local governments, departments or bodies 
authorised by the State Council or local governments, wholly state-owned 
enterprises, or a limited liability company or company limited by shares whose 
investors are all wholly state-owned enterprises, or a limited liability company 
or company limited by shares62 and which is controlled by the state.63 
Likewise, existing Chinese legislation does not provide an explicit concept of 
minority shareholders, and there is no special international definition for 
small- and medium-sized investors. The classification of investors is mainly 
based on the needs of regulatory supervision and market risk management.64 
As opposed to the legislative definition of “controlling shareholders”,65 
“minority shareholders” in this research refer to “non-controlling shareholders” 
 
61 Correspondingly, “non-state-owned listed companies” is the opposite of “state-owned listed companies”, 
i.e. a listed company that is not under the absolute or relative control of the state. 
62 Includes companies limited by shares that are listed on the stock exchange, i.e. listed companies.  
63 See: Article 4 and Article 11,中华人民共和国企业国有资产法 (Law of the People's Republic of China on 
the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises), Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, date of issue 
October 28th 2008. 
《关于施行〈上市公司国有股东标识管理暂行规定〉有关问题的函》(Letter on Related Issues regarding 
Implementation of the Provisional Regulation on Management of State-owned Shareholder Indication of Listed 
Companies), State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, date of 
issue March 4th 2008. 
Accordingly, the state-owned listed company can be categorised as a “central state-owned listed company” 
and a “local state-owned listed company”, depending on whether the role of the contributor is performed by 
the state council or local government. 
64 Bearing Protection of the Legitimate Rights and Interests of Small- and Medium-sized Investors in Mind 
when Implementing Regulatory Activities-Speech by Chairman Xiao Gang at the CSRC’s Working Conference on 
the Protection of Small- and Medium-sized Investors (January 6, 2014), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/Informations/phgall/201402/t20140211_243678.html. Last visited 
February 2019. 
65 Article 216, Chinese Company Law. 
Article 84,上市公司收购管理办法 (The Administrative Measures for the Takeover of Listed Companies), was 
enacted by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on 17th May 2006, subsequently amended on 27th 
August 2008, 14th February 2012 and most recently on 23rd October 2014. 
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i.e. a shareholder who is incapable of exercising any form of company control. 
Normally, a Chinese listed company’s capital aligns with its control,66 and a 
minority shareholder owns a small or medium amount of shares. Exceptionally, 
when a shareholder with only a small or medium amount of shares can in fact 
dominate with more than 30% voting rights, or in fact elects more than half of 
the board, or in fact has a big influence on the general meeting or is found by 
the CSRC to be the company controller, this shareholder is not regarded as a 
minority but a controlling shareholder. Moreover, this research divides 
minority shareholders into “retail minority shareholders”, also be known as 
“individual minority shareholders”, and “qualified minority shareholders”, also 
known as “relatively big minority shareholders”, i.e. they may either 
individually or jointly exert certain influence on the company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 Article 103 of the Chinese Company Law follows the “one share, one vote” principle 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Chapter 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Minority shareholders, due to their weak positions, face a high risk of 
expropriation in many circumstances. In modern companies, the infringement 
of minority shareholders’ rights is no longer a simple issue that involves only 
minority interests. As a matter of fact, insufficient minority shareholder 
protection distorts the investor-company relationship and also discourages 
external financing from the securities market.  
As an emerging challenge for modern companies, minority shareholder 
expropriation has drawn substantial academic attention. Particularly in the 
field of corporate governance, some of the literature appears to agree on the 
need to strengthen minority shareholder protection. To address this issue, 
existing studies have often applied the theoretical “agency costs” framework67 
to analyse conflicts of interest in listed companies. Another recurring theme in 
the literature is the interconnectedness of a country’s ownership structure and 
the situation of minority shareholder protection.68 Based on such insights, 
scholars have also proposed various legal strategies for minority shareholder 
protection.69 This chapter’s main aim is to review these works, in order to 
 
67 The “separation of ownership and control” concept was introduced by Berle and Mean, while “agency cost” 
caused by the separation of ownership and control was elaborated by Jensen and Meckling. Subsequently, 
agency costs have been widely used in the literature to analyse the conflicts of interest that exist in a modern 
company. This theory will be explored in more detail later in this chapter. See: Adolf Augustus Berle, and 
Gardiner Coit Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction Publishers, 1991), pp. 10-18; 
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 (1976) Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 305-360. 
68 See for example Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership 
around the World’, 54 (1999) Journal of Finance, pp. 471-517. 
69 See for example Reiner Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard 
Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mariana Pargendler, Wolf-Georg Ringe and Edward Rock, The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 29-37. 
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build a theoretical framework with which to understand a comparative 
investigation of minority shareholder protection in China, the US and the 
Netherlands. This chapter will examine the existing literature from four angles, 
starting with a discussion on the agency cost framework, which unfolds 
conflicts of interest between both the principal and the agent, and between 
the principal and the principal. Second, it will provide an overview of the main 
theories in use, to explain the dynamics at play in matters of minority 
shareholder protection: the legal origin theory, the path dependence theory, 
the political determinant theory, the minority expropriation theory, the 
optimal reward theory and the idiosyncratic vision theory. Third, it will review 
the existing literature and summarise different legal strategies for the 
principal-agent and the principal-principal conflicts. Since these theories and 
literature are mainly based on evidence from the Western context, the fourth 
part of this chapter will focus on how these theories can apply to the case of 
minority shareholder protection in Chinese listed companies.  
 
2.2 Agency costs 
The notion of agency cost, generally understood as the agent pursuing its own 
interests at the expense of the principal, has been applied in the academic 
literature to corporate governance. Three types of agency costs in modern 
companies are normally discussed: the first type occurs between shareholders 
and management, type two is between controlling and minority shareholders 
and type three is between the company and other stakeholders. Due to its 
focus on minority shareholder protection, this chapter will only discuss the first 
two types of agency cost, i.e. the “principal-agent” and the 
“principal-principal”.  
The “principal-agent” cost refers to the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and management. Berle and Mean first elucidated that with the 
development of modern companies, especially dispersed listed companies, it 
has become impractical to submit every company decision to a general 
meeting, which consists of hundreds and thousands of shareholders. As a 
 
Marina Martynova and Luc Renneboog, ‘A Corporate Governance Index: Convergence and Diversity of National 
Corporate Governance Regulations’, CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-17; TILEC Discussion Pare No. 
2010-012, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557627. Last visited February 2019. 
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solution, in modern companies, shareholders’ controlling powers are devolved 
to the board of directors. In turn, the board, as the “agent”, is tasked with 
serving the interests of the “principal”, i.e. the shareholders. The effect of this 
“division of powers” is a “separation of ownership and control”.70  
Jensen and Meckling’s work further elaborates on the agency cost.71 As their 
argument goes, if a manager enjoys 100% ownership of a company, he or she 
has no incentive to conduct an expropriation considering the alignment of 
personal and company interests. However, if the manager transfers part of his 
or her shares to outside investors, then he or she will have to share the 
company’s interests with others. The act of sharing ownership with other 
shareholders may give rise to a conflict of interest between the manager and 
outside investors. Due to such conflicts of interest, the agency cost between 
the management and the shareholders will consequently grow.72 
Based on their observations of US practices, Baums and Scott show how a 
principal-agent cost can be imposed in a direct manner, such as embezzlement 
and misappropriation, or in a less direct manner, such as self-dealing, excessive 
management compensation and the appropriation of company 
opportunities.73 The authors note that among all of these indirect ways of 
imposing a principal-agent cost, self-dealing is the most significant example in 
the US.74  
In contrast, a concentrated ownership structure breeds a “conflicts of interest” 
between controlling and minority shareholders. The company controller may 
pursue what have been defined as “private benefits of control”, understood as 
those parts of interests that are exclusively enjoyed by the controlling 
shareholder at the expense of minority shareholders.75 Academic studies have 
illustrated the significance of this “principal-principal” cost owing to the 
prevalence of the concentrated ownership structure. Sampling on large 
companies from 27 wealthy countries, La Porta et al. demonstrated, for 
 
70 Adolf Augustus Berle and Gardiner Coit Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction 
Publishers, 1991), pp. 10-18. 
71 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’, 3 (1976) Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 305-360. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Theodor Baums and Kenneth E. Scott, ‘Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in 
the United States and Germany’, 53 (2005) American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 31-75. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison’, 59 (2004) The 
Journal of Finance, pp. 537-600. 
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example, that widely-held companies often exist in countries with advanced 
shareholder protection, while concentrated ownership structure is more 
popular in the rest of the world.76 Shleifer and Vishny confirm this worldwide 
prevalance of large shareholders.77 In practice, controlling-minority 
expropriation can be conducted in various ways. Wolfenzon, for instance, 
shows how a pyramid management structure is usually correlated with weak 
shareholder protection,78 and apart from a pyramid structure, La Porta et al. 
illustrate other devices for expropriation: management appointment 
manipulation, cross-ownership and dual-class shares.79 Johnson et al. draw 
attention to the tunnelling that is carried out through methods such as 
related-party transactions, the expropriation of company opportunities, loan 
guarantees and the dilution of minority shareholdings.80 
What crucially emerges from the abovementioned scholarship is that different 
structures of ownership may entail different agency cost problems related to 
minority shareholder protection. These differences may also entail different 
solutions for the protection of minority shareholders. The next section will 
elaborate on this matter and attempt to identify those factors which may 
influence the effectiveness of minority shareholder protection. As will be 
further seen, such strategies very much vary across different countries.  
 
2.3 Theories on and strategies of shareholder protection 
A number of academic studies have tried to map the elements influencing 
shareholder protection in different contexts. In 1989, Eisenhardt evaluated the 
 
76 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’, 
54 (1999) Journal of Finance, pp. 471-517. 
77 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Large Shareholders and Corporate Control’, 94 (1986) Journal of 
Political Economy, pp. 461-488. 
78 Daniel Wolfenzon, ‘A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership’, Unpublished Working Paper, Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, MA (1999), available at 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f60d/6eff454e77461370946d733c8479c6f49b85.pdf. Last visited February 
2019. 
79 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’, 106 
(1998) Journal of Political Economy, pp. 1113-1155. 
80 Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Tunneling’, 90 (2000) The 
American Economic Review, pp. 22-27. 
More discussion on tunelling can be found in section 2.4 of this chapter. 
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agency theory and confirmed its value in analysing the corporate 
principal-agent issue.81  
Based on their survey of various corporate governance mechanisms, Shleifer 
and Vishny identified two essential approaches in corporate governance across 
their surveyed countries.82 The “extra care” approach refers to the existence 
of legal protection that empowers shareholders, while the “self-strengthening” 
approach, which could resemble a “self-help” method employed by 
shareholders, is instead characterised by ownership concentration.83 
According to such a method, shareholders endeavour to accumulate their 
shares in order to achieve larger shareholdings, from which they strengthen 
their control over the company. The evident advantage of shareholding 
concentration is that large or controlling shareholders have the incentive to 
collect information, in order to monitor management, and the controlling 
power to make a difference. Shleifer and Vishny further clarify that the 
concentration of shareholding is never a one-sided story, and despite the 
benefits of better monitoring, ownership concentration may in fact create 
greater risks of minority shareholder expropriation.84  
Scholars have further tried to establish the basis of these two different 
approaches in the world of corporate governance. According to a study by La 
Porta et al., ownership structure is one of the most important factors behind 
shareholder protection discrepancies in different countries. This issue is 
addressed by their so called “legal origin theory”.85 Based on the observation 
 
81 Eisenhardt raises 10 propositions, mainly from five aspects, to apply behaviour-based or outcome-based 
contracts to regulate agency costs. In a nutshell: (1) an outcome-based contract is more efficient in regulating 
agents’ actions; (2) second, the information system plays a significant role in regulating the agent, namely the 
more well-informed the principal, the better the agent behaves. And the information strategy works better in 
behaviour-based contracts; (3) if the outcome is difficult to predict, then the behaviour-based contract is more 
popular. Similarly, if the task is easy to program, then the behaviour contract prevails; (4) an outcome-based 
contract can transfer risks to the agent, and it may be adopted in less agent-risk-aversion situations and (5) if 
the principal-agent relationship is a short-term one, then an outcome-based contract is more beneficial to 
protect the principal from opportunistic agent. 
See: Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review’, 14 (1989) Academy of Management 
Review, pp. 57-74. 
82 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, 52 (1997) Journal of Finance, pp. 
737-783. 
83 It is clarified here that the terms “extra care” and “self-strengthening” were adopted by this research in 
order to provide a clear explanation. Shleifer and Vishny’s research merely mentioned the two approaches to 
the legal protection of investors and ownership concentration. 
84 Supra. 82. 
85 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’, 106 
(1998) Journal of Political Economy, pp. 1113-1155. 
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of different ownership structures, the authors argue that there exists a 
negative relationship between concentrated ownership and investor 
protection.86 Their idea is that in a poorly protected environment, large 
shareholders are able to shield themselves from managerial costs by 
accumulating shares. This accumulation of shares directly contributes to the 
formation of concentrated ownership. Meanwhile, minority shareholders are 
either unwilling to purchase shares, considering the high expropriation risk, or 
only purchase when the cost is low. As a result, companies have fewer 
incentives to issue new shares. In turn, this inactive issuance of new shares 
indirectly strengthens the concentrated ownership structure. Namely, 
concentrated ownership becomes the market’s plan B in confronting the 
failure of shareholder protection law.87  
In a subsequent study, the same authors illustrate how the concentration 
structure further increases the difficulties of legal reform. First of all, 
controlling shareholders are very cautious about the sale of shares and will do 
everything to guarantee the control of the company out of fear of becoming a 
minority shareholder and being exploited. Second, the private benefits of 
control constitute a substantial part of the entire fortune of a controlling 
shareholder. Unsurprisingly, the controllers reject any reform to enhance 
minority shareholder rights.88 In this context, a “minority expropriation theory” 
has been proposed by Goshen and Hamdani to describe the controlling 
shareholder as the expropriator seeking private benefits of control at the 
expense of minority shareholders.89 Normally, senior managers are affiliated 
to the controlling shareholder, and they also have the power and incentives to 
exploit minority shareholders.90  
 
La Porta et al. conducted an empirical study on listed companies in 49 countries and found that common law 
countries have the most investor-friendly laws, German and Scandinavian civil law countries rank in between, 
while French civil law countries provide the least protection. However, when it comes to enforcement, the 
order was moderately changed, i.e. the German and Scandinavian civil law countries ranked the first, followed 
by the common law countries, and the French civil law countries still remained at the bottom. 
86 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’, 106 
(1998) Journal of Political Economy, pp. 1113-1155. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership around the World’, 
54 (1999) Journal of Finance, pp. 471-517.  
89 Zohar Goshen and Assaf Hamdani, ‘Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision’, 125 (2016) Yale Law Journal, 
pp. 560-617.  
90 Supra. 88.  
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By comparing common law countries with civil law countries, the advocates of 
the “legal origin theory”91 find that the former provides better legal protection 
to their shareholders than the latter. Legal traditions determine the different 
approaches chosen by either legal system. When it comes to problem-solving, 
common law countries are found to prefer a “market-oriented” approach 
under judicial supervision, while civil law countries tend to emphasise the role 
of the government. According to the legal origin theory, this distinction has led 
to opposing results, in that government-influenced ownership and regulation 
in civil law origin are negatively related to market performance and cause 
side-effects such as corruption, unemployment and an immature economy. In 
contrast, the judicial system of a common law country, entailing less 
procedural formalism and higher independence, is the origin of better property 
protection and more efficient contract enforcement, each of which supports 
the functioning of the market-oriented approach.92 Instruments such as 
“private contracting, market discipline and standardized disclosure”, as well as 
“market-friendly” liability standards and better-founded private litigation 
systems, further contribute to the success of the market-oriented approach in 
common law countries.93 Compared with strong government interference, 
extensive disclosure obligations and clear liability standards result in the better 
protection of minority shareholders.94  
For advocates of the legal origin theory, the solution for the better protection 
of minority shareholders lies in three fundamental matters: disclosure, liability 
standards and anti-director rights.95 More specifically, for La Porta et al. the 
prospectus disclosure should uncover management compensation, insider 
ownership, irregular contracts and related-party transactions. The authors 
recommend that the name and the shareholding of a large shareholder who 
holds more than 10% voting shares should be revealed to the public. They also 
identify three-level liability standards relating to misleading statements in a 
prospectus. The “friendliest” standard only requires shareholders to 
demonstrate the existence of any misleading statements, while the medium 
 
91 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins’, 46 (2008) Journal of Economic Literature, pp. 285-332. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, 61 (2006) 
Journal of Finance, pp. 1-32. 
94 Empirical evidences have proven that disclosure and liability standards are positively related to developed 
financial markets. See: ibid. 
95 Supra. 93. 
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standard additionally commands shareholders to prove their reliance on 
misleading information and the causation between the damage and the 
misleading information. The strictest standard, over and above the medium 
one, also entails director negligence. Last, based on a previous study,96 La 
Porta et al. propose an anti-director index, which should consist of “proxy 
voting, no deposition of shares before the general meeting, cumulative voting 
or proportional minority representation on the board of directors, remedial 
mechanisms of oppressed minority shareholders, the right to call for an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting with less than or equal to 10% shares, a 
pre-emptive right that only can be abandoned by shareholders themselves”.97 
Addressing the same aim of reducing the principal-agent cost, based on 
empirical observation, Kraakman et. al mapped five strategies.98 First, the 
“decision right strategy” authorises the principal to introduce proposals to the 
board of directors, intervene in decisions made by the board of directors and 
ratify managerial decisions in certain circumstances. Second, the “appointment 
right strategy” advocates legal instruments such as cumulative voting and 
mandatory minority shareholder representation on the board of directors. 
Third, the “trusteeship strategy” emphasises the participation of independent 
trustees, such as independent directors. Fourth, the “transparency strategy” 
aims at reducing information asymmetry by imposing specific disclosure 
obligations on the agent, particularly in related-party transactions. Last, the 
“affiliation strategy” calls for a fair entry and exit for the principal, such as the 
appraisal right.99 
Moving on from this five strategies model, Martynova and Renneboog have 
argued that two general legal strategies can be identified, namely 
“incentive”100 and “monitoring”,101 to regulate the principal-agent cost.102 
 
96 La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, ‘Legal determinants of 
external finance’, 52 (1997) Journal of Finance, pp. 1131–1150. 
97 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, 61 (2006) 
Journal of Finance, pp. 1-32. 
98 The five strategies mentioned above were summarised by this research based on Kraakman et al.’s work. 
See: Reiner Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, 
Hideki Kanda, Mariana Pargendler, Wolf-Georg Ringe and Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 79-88. 
99 Ibid. 
100 For example, the “incentive” can be achieved by teaming up the interests of management with those of 
shareholders through instruments, for example the executive compensation contract. 
101 “Monitoring” refers to both better internal supervision of management and external supervision, for 
instance through the takeover market. 
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According to these scholars, shareholders’ decision right should be limited in 
certain circumstances, to avoid unnecessary interference in managerial 
decision-making.103 Martynova and Renneboog propose to integrate the 
appointment right strategy with “facilitating” and “removing obstacle” 
approaches.104 The facilitating approach covers various instruments, from 
participation in general meetings, to exercising voting rights.105 The 
removing-obstacle approach argues instead that co-determination dilutes 
shareholders’ representation on the board; cross-shareholding between a 
company and its subsidiary can easily be abused by management and should 
be restricted by regulations, whilst a short-term employment contract can 
regularly examine directors and also pressurise them into performing better. 
Moreover, the authors emphasise that the separation between executive and 
non-executive officers is the key to the trusteeship strategy. In the one-tier 
board system, independence between managing directors and independent 
directors would be essential, while in a two-tier board system, it would be the 
the supervisory board that keeps an eye on management.106 Transparency 
requirements would also be key in this respect, particularly concerning four 
aspects: disclosure of management compensation, related-party transactions, 
financial reports and “comply or explain” rules. 
Yet, not all scholars agree with the argument that a concentrated ownership 
structure is simply caused by weak minority shareholder protection law – as 
posited by the legal origin theory. According to Bebchuk and Roe, a country’s 
 
102 Marina Martynova and Luc Renneboog, A Corporate Governance Index: Convergence and Diversity of 
National Corporate Governance Regulations, CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-17; TILEC Discussion 
Pare No. 2010-012, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557627. Last visited February 2019. 
103 For example, in takeovers, for the sake of job-saving, management may oppose any offer regardless of 
shareholders’ interests. Accordingly, it is necessary to grant shareholders the approval right on anti-takeover 
measures. Besides, in less extreme situations, when shareholders notice any unusual patterns in managerial 
decisions, shareholders should have the right to initiate an extraordinary general meeting to discuss the 
disputed issue. And the shareholding requirement to exercise such a right should not be too high. Moreover, 
the research clarifies its opposition to voting caps. One of the advantages brought about by big block holders is 
the continuous better monitoring of management. However, if instruments such as voting caps are permitted, 
then management can easily mitigate large shareholders’ monitoring. 
104 The terms “facilitating” and “removing obstacle” are adopted by this research in order to provide a clear 
explanation. Martynova and Renneboog’s research did not use the exact terms. 
105 For instance, before the general meeting, no extra limitation, i.e. registration or deposition, should be 
imposed on the shares. And in the voting process, proxy voting by mail should be allowed, in order to 
guarantee shareholders’ voting rights. 
106 In some countries, an additional auditory board has been established to provide an extra guarantee for 
disclosure quality. 
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ownership structure depends on how it was originally set up.107 This argument 
has been developed into what they frame as a “path dependence theory”, 
whereby “path dependence” can be divided into “structure-driven”108 and 
“rule-driven”.109 If a country initially has a concentrated ownership structure, 
due to what they describe as a “structure-driven dependence”, the country 
maintains this concentration for “efficiency” and “rent-seeking” reasons. In 
other words, the transformation from concentrated to dispersed ownership 
will inevitably generate huge costs, and the controlling shareholder will 
obstruct any change that may take away his or her private benefits of control. 
Moreover, “rule-driven dependence” will defend the concentrated market due 
to “efficiency” and “group politics”. In other words, for a concentrated market, 
it is efficient to design legal rules that will continuously support the 
concentration structure, and the political group that represents controlling 
shareholders’ interests will push the enactment of concentration-friendly legal 
rules, and vice versa. If a country initially has a dispersed market, “path 
dependence” will sustain this dispersed ownership both structurally and legally. 
Bebchuk and Roe further remark that such path dependence does not exclude 
efficiency, because despite the risk of inefficient legal rules or corporate 
structures, a path-dependent ownership structure and path-dependent 
corporate rules, if properly designed, can be efficient.110 Another research 
study, led by Roe further underlines the significance of a country’s political 
environment in shaping ownership structure through what is known as the 
“political determinant theory”.111 More specifically, Roe observes that when a 
country’s political orientation and policies are more socially concerned, then a 
concentrated ownership type is the best alternative for shareholders to secure 
their dominance on the board and to reduce managerial costs.112 The 
association between a country’s political orientation and its corporations’ 
ownership structure has a consequence that legal reforms which are in line 
 
107 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance’, 52 (1999) Stanford Law Review, pp. 127-170. 
108 The “structure-driven path dependence” indicates that the initial ownership structure directly affects a 
country’s subsequent ownership structure. See: ibid. 
109 “Rule-driven path dependence” indicates that the initial ownership structure has an impact on corporate 
rules, and these rules influence a country’s subsequent ownership structure. See: supra. 107. 
110 Supra. 107. 
111 Mark J. Roe, ‘Political Determinants of Corporate Governance’, The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper 
Serie, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/451.pdf. Last visited 
February 2019. 
112 Ibid. 
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with the political context may face less resistance and have a greater chance of 
success.113 
While Bebchuk and Roe emphasise the importance between a country’s initial 
ownership/political orientation and its corporations’ ownership structure in 
accessing minority shareholder protection, Goshen and Hamdani further 
demonstrated that a concentrated ownership structure is not necessarily 
linked with poor minority shareholder protection.114 They put forward the 
notion of “optimal-reward theory”, which recognises the value of the 
concentrated ownership structure, whereby the controlling shareholder has 
the power and incentive to impose stricter monitoring on the company. This 
point is shared also by Gilson and Schwartz, who argue that controlling 
shareholders can be a powerful alternative to market-based supervision of 
management. In return, it is acceptable to compensate the company controller 
with a reasonable amount of private benefits of control.115 Gilson further 
clarified that controlling shareholders can be efficient or inefficient, while a 
legal system which supports both concentrated and dispersed structures ought 
to be considered as “good law”. On the contrary, a legal system which 
exclusively favours the company controller ought to be regarded as “bad 
law”.116 
Goshen and Hamdani further advance the idea through what they describe as 
an “idiosyncratic vision theory”, which is based on the notion that the value of 
control goes beyond the private benefits of control and extends to commercial 
freedom and long-term fulfillment.117 The idea is that a controlling 
shareholder seeks to control a company, not to exploit minority shareholders 
but to enjoy the freedom to lead the company and to fulfill his or her 
long-term vision in the interest of the company. As a result, the concentration 
 
113 Mark J. Roe, ‘Political Determinants of Corporate Governance’, The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper 
Serie, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/451.pdf. Last visited 
February 2019. 
114 Zohar Goshen and Assaf Hamdani, ‘Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision’, 125 (2016) Yale Law 
Journal, pp. 560-617.  
115 If the controlling shareholder provides a larger return to minority shareholders than the private benefits of 
control that he or she extracts, then this amount of private benefit of control is considered reasonable. See: 
Ronald J. Gilson and Alan Schwartz, ‘Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex Ante Control Mechanisms 
Versus Ex Post Transaction Review’, 169 (2013) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, pp. 
160-183. 
116 Ronald Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy’, 119 (2006) Harvard Law Review, pp. 1641-1679. 
117 Supra. 114. 
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structure should in fact align the interests of controlling and minority 
shareholders, alsongside corporate law’s task to strike a balance between the 
controller’s freedom to pursue his/her idiosyncratic vision and minority 
shareholders’ call for protection.118  
Yet, the so-called “problem of the collective action”, namely conflicting 
interests among different parties that may discourage a joint action which 
would have been beneficial to all parties, remains. Becht, Bolton and Roell 
identified five forms of mitigation in relation to this problem,119 which 
illustrates the dilemma of concentrated ownership.120 The authors conclude 
that the core concern of corporate governance is to strike a balance between 
managerial discretion and minority shareholder protection, and to place 
certain restrictions on the power of active or large shareholders.121 
In a similar vein, Peng and Sauerwald illustrate that the concentrated 
ownership structure is not in itself a disadvantage. Nevertheless, concentrated 
ownership in a poor institutional environment may generate a 
“principal-principal” conflict between the controlling and minority 
shareholders.122 Peng and Sauerwald propose two solutions to the matter of 
minority shareholder protection, each of which relates to the external and 
internal aspects of corporate governance. The former mainly refers to the legal 
design, such as shareholder protection rules and regulations, while the internal 
governance aspect has to do with the existence of a coalition of multiple 
blockholders. For Peng and Sauerwald, the alignment of multiple and relatively 
 
118 Supra. 114. 
119 The collective action problem may be mitigated through (i) large shareholders, which can be banks, 
institutional investors or a holding company, etc.; (ii) the board of directors which should serve in the interests 
of its principals, and the CEO, should be held accountable; (iii) the takeover market, through which acquirers 
can remove inefficient management or large shareholders by employing tools such as a proxy battle; (iv) the 
alignment of shareholder interests and management through executive compensation contracts and (v) clearly 
defined fiduciary duty as well as class actions. 
120 The “ownership concentration” approach may give rise to controlling shareholders. And the controller may 
conspire with the management to exploit jointly minority interests, and it may also lower the liquidity of the 
capital market. If the law chooses to protect minority shareholders by restraining the power of large 
shareholders, it may nurture another expropriator, i.e. management may abuse the broadened discretion and 
infringe upon the company and its minority shareholders’ interests.  
121 Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton and Alisa Roell, ‘Corporate Governance and Control’ (October 2002). ECGI - 
Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=343461. Last visited 
February 2019. 
122 Mike W. Peng and Steve Sauerwald, ‘Corporate Governance and Principal-Principal Conflicts’, in Mike 
Wright, Donald S. Siegel, Klevin Keasey and Igor Filatotchev (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 658-672. 
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“large” minority shareholders can form a considerable force to counter the 
controlling shareholder and, accordingly, strengthen internal supervision.123 
Based on a comparative study of national corporate governance systems in 30 
European countries and the US, covering data from 1990-2005, Martynova and 
Renneboog identified regulatory solutions for the principal-principal cost from 
two angles: the enhancement of minority shareholder rights and the 
restriction of the controlling shareholder’s private benefit of control.124 The 
former can be enforced by directly granting rights to minority shareholders or 
by giving them extra powers in mergers and acquisitions. The latter can instead 
be achieved by imposing an obligation on the controlling shareholder to 
disclose his or her ownership status, as well as by applying the 
one-share-one-vote principle.125  
Martynova and Renneboog further illustrate four legal strategies. First, the 
authors propose a “decision right strategy”, which would call for a 
“supermajority” rule and the right to convene an extraordinary meeting. The 
former would aim at protecting minority interests in decision-making. In order 
to avoid any abuse of such a measure, the authors suggest that such a 
supermajority rule should be limited to major events. At the same time, the 
right to convene an extraordinary meeting would afford shareholders the 
ability to challenge problematic managerial decisions and would encourage 
minority shareholder participation and supervision over management.126  
Second, for Martynova and Renneboog, minority shareholder protection could 
be strengthened through an appointment strategy organised along three axes. 
The first would award minority shareholders the power to nominate their own 
representatives on both one-tier and two-tier boards. Such mandatory 
minority representation on the board may allow minority shareholders to voice 
their opinion and deter the board from following the one-sided view of the 
controlling shareholder. The second would restrict the controlling 
shareholder’s power through voting caps. Different from the mandatory 
minority representation strategy, which directly empowers minority 
shareholders, the introduction of voting caps would aim at limiting the 
 
123 Ibid. 
124 Marina Martynova and Luc Renneboog, A Corporate Governance Index: Convergence and Diversity of 
National Corporate Governance Regulations, CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-17; TILEC Discussion 
Pare No. 2010-012, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557627. Last visited February 2019. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
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controller’s influence on the board so that it may facilitate minority 
participation. And the third would avoid deviations from the 
one-share-one-vote principle, such as the dual-class shares which create a 
discrepancy between the cash flow rights and the control rights.127  
Next, for the authors, minority shareholder protection could be advanced 
through what they refer to as a “trusteeship strategy”, which describes 
directors as trustees of minority shareholders and independent from the 
controlling shareholder. The idea behind this strategy would be to nominate 
non-executive officers through minority shareholders, and managing directors 
should be separated from independent directors on one-tier boards while 
directors should be separated from supervisors on two-tier boards.128  
Last, Martynova and Renneboog highlight an “affiliation right strategy”, which 
promotes the fair entry and exit of minority shareholders. For the entry 
element, the disclosure of a large shareholding may curtail the agency cost ex 
ante and may also facilitate the supervision of blockholders. Legal tools for a 
fair minority exit in takeovers could include the mandatory bid rule, the 
sell-out right, the break-through rule and the equal treatment of shareholders 
and other legal devices. Moreover, a minority claim may empower minority 
shareholders to confront managerial resolutions, especially when they suspect 
a fair exit of the company is impossible, due to the manipulation of insiders.129 
To summarise the literature discussed above, the “legal origin theory” and the 
“path dependence theory” depict two different relationships between a 
country’s ownership structure and its minority shareholder protection. 
According to the legal origin theory, the common law system has better 
investor protection law, which leads to a dispersed ownership structure. 
Meanwhile, the civil law system has weaker minority shareholder protection 
law, which leads to a concentrated ownership structure. Related to the legal 
origin theory, the “minority expropriation theory” describes minority 
shareholder expropriations by the controlling shareholder in a concentrated 
ownership structure. Advocates of this notion further pinpoint three solutions 
to the minority expropriation problem through disclosure, liability standards 
and anti-director rights. 
 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
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In contrast, the path dependence and the political determinant theories argue 
that the initial ownership structure and the political environment determine a 
country’s ownership structure. The concentrated ownership structure is not 
necessarily linked to poor minority shareholder protection; instead, both the 
“optimal-reward theory” and the “idiosyncratic vision theory” illustrate the 
benefits of concentrated ownership. In order to restrain the principal-principal 
cost in a concentrated ownership setting, academics propose tackling the issue 
by enhancing the legal protection of minority shareholders and encouraging a 
coalition of relatively “large” minority shareholders. Additionally, a minority 
shareholder protection index has been raised based on the decision right 
strategy, the appointment right strategy, the trusteeship strategy and the 
affiliation strategy. 
 
2.4 Theoretical analysis of minority shareholder protection 
in China 
If we do not wish the law to be nothing but an empty promise on the books, a 
country’s legal rules should be compatible with its legal environment.130 
Research has applied the agency theory framework to conflicts of interest 
within Chinese listed companies and has discussed the complexities of having 
the state often acting as the controlling shareholder in the country.131 With its 
own characteristics, particularly the participation of the party organization in 
corporate governance,132 China does not seem to fall exclusively into one 
specific category, and thus a more complicated Chinese reality should be taken 
into account when applying Western theories. 
According to the traditional understanding of the agency cost, a 
principal-principal cost normally exists between the controlling shareholder 
and minority shareholders in a concentrated company, while the 
principal-agent cost normally exists between shareholders and management in 
a dispersed company.  
 
130 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins’, 46 (2008) Journal of Economic Literature, pp. 285-332. 
131 Donald C. Clarke, ‘The Role of Non-legal Institutions in Chinese Corporate Governance’, in H Kanda, K S Kim 
and C J Mihaupt (eds.), Transforming Corporate Governance in East Asia (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 168. 
132 More discussion on the party organization can be found in chapter 3 section 3.2.2. 
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Despite the concentrated ownership structure, two main elements may cause 
the principal-agent cost in Chinese state-owned listed companies. As scholars 
have argued, the “over proportion of State-owned shares” and the resulting 
“absence of owner”133 problem are the leading reasons behind insider 
control,134 i.e. the control of the company is de facto or de jure captured by 
management whose interests orient the company’s decision-making 
processes.135 When compared with private shareholders, the state controller 
may not have sufficient incentive, information or professional knowledge to 
monitor management in a timely manner.136 Li, Feng and Cao demonstrated 
how this “absence of owner” phenomenon worsens the “insider control” 
issue.137 The “special identity” of the state controlling shareholder may 
prevent minority shareholders benefiting from the reward of a concentrated 
ownership structure, namely an enhanced monitoring of management. 
Research conducted by Chen et al. also found that the more shares held by the 
state, the more severe insider control is in Chinese state-owned listed 
companies.138  
Scholars have further illustrated that another issue which worsens the “insider 
control” problem is “political connections”,139 due to the fact that in 
 
133 所有者缺位 (absent owner “i.e. monitoring individuals being locally employed and salaried and therefore 
dependent to local government, which might have other corporate policies such as high employment, while 
the formal ownership of shares is lodged in a higher level of government; a monitoring individual who works in 
a government agency is less able to distinguish good from bad corporate policy than a monitoring individual 
who works for a business-oriented institutional shareholder; individual monitoring on behalf of the state less 
likely to have someone at some point above him in the chain of command making a strong demand for good 
corporate performance in companies held by the state, which deprived the large shareholder in his role he 
plays in corporate governance regarding vertical agency problems”). See: Knut Benjamin Pissler, and Liu Junhai, 
‘Corporate Governance of Business Organizations in the People's Republic of China: The Legal Framework After 
the Revision of the Company Law in 2005’, China: Corporate governance of business organizations, in: Klaus J. 
Hopt, Andreas M. Fleckner (Hg.), Comparative Corporate Governance: A Functional and International Analysis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 156-207. 
134 Xie Qingxi and Wang Ruiying, ‘中国上市公司内部人控制与非公平关联交易的实证分析 (Empirical 
Analysis on Insider Control and Unfair Affiliated Transactions in Chinese Listed Companies)’, 4 (2004) 经济评
论 (Economic Review), pp. 113-117. 
135 Masahiko Aoki Hyung-Ki Kim (ed.), Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the 
Role of Banks (Washington D C: World Bank Institute Development Study EDI Development Studies, 1995), p. 
xii. 
136 Supra. 133. 
137 Li, Shuangyan, Feng, Genfu. and Cao, Guangjun, ‘Private Benefits of Managerial Control, Government 
Ownership, and Acquirer Returns: Evidence from the Chinese State-Controlled Listed Companies’, 29 (2012) 
CAN J ADM SCI, pp. 165-176.  
138 Chen Xiangyong, Zhang Jianwen, and Zhang Weiwen, ‘我国上市公司 ‘内部人控制’研究 (Research on 
Insider Control of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 4 (2000) 管理世界 (Management World), pp. 103-109.  
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state-owned listed companies, the chairman of the board is commonly a 
former party secretary or retired government official.140 That is to say, 
managers of state-owned listed companies often hold semi-political authority 
over and above that of private businessmen. Usually, the chairman is also the 
general manager. This overlap of managers and directors disempowers the 
internal supervision designed by the Chinese Company Law, which grants the 
board of directors the power to appoint and remove managers.141 Moreover, 
due to the over-proportion of state-owned shares, the state is unable to 
monitor persistently all state-owned listed companies. In fact, the idea behind 
appointing political authorities as management is that, based on political trust, 
the state is able to delegate more decision-making power to managers and 
undertake less strict monitoring.142 Consequently, the state controller 
constantly fails to monitor the board and managers, while minority 
shareholders are normally too weak to monitor management.143 In this 
context, directors and managers, as “de facto” controllers of the company, 
have sufficient motivation to seek private benefits at the expense of the 
company and of its minority shareholders.144 Thus, the issue of powerful 
management with semi-political powers exacerbates the insider control 
problem. 
Xie and Wang noted that in most state-owned listed companies, the state 
controller is also not well-informed, and as a result, insiders can arbitrarily 
exploit the company and encroach on the interests of minority shareholders.145 
More specifically, scholars have identified eight typical insider control 
 
Tonghai, former chairman of the board of directors of the Sinopec, was sentenced to death with a two-year 
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pp. 54-78.  
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144 Ibid.  
145 Xie Qingxi and Wang Ruiying, ‘中国上市公司内部人控制与非公平关联交易的实证分析(Empirical 
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behaviours in China: (1) excessive company-paid consumption, such as 
sumptuous banquets financed by the company, business trips abroad or 
private tours funded by the company; (2) defective information disclosure, 
abusing management power to “modify” accounting procedures at will or 
provide no explanation for major company events; (3) short-term action 
without considering the long-term value and development of the company; (4) 
excessive investment and a waste of company assets; (5) unreasonable 
increases in the remuneration, bonuses and welfare of managers; (6) the 
transfer of state-owned capital;146 (7) no dividend, or an insufficient dividend, 
and (8) overdue debts.147  
The above discussed “absence of owner”, and its resulting “insider control” 
phenomenon, force a redefinition of the “principal-agent” cost in China. In 
Chinese state-owned listed companies, if the state controlling shareholder fails 
to monitor management effectively, the abuse of managerial power 
constitutes the principal-agent cost between shareholders and management. 
Different from shareholders in a dispersed company, the state controlling 
shareholder is very powerful, and thus the principal-agent conflict in fact 
intensifies between management and minority shareholders. In this research, 
the “principal-agent” cost between minority shareholders and management 
should be distinguished from the traditional “principal-agent” cost between 
shareholders as a whole and management.  
Different from the “principal-agent”, the “principal-principal” conflict describes 
a situation whereby the controlling shareholder manipulates management to 
intrude upon the interests of minority shareholders. In the Chinese context, 
the principal-principal cost may be found in both state-owned and 
non-state-owned listed companies, since they are both characterised by a 
concentrated ownership structure. And yet, some differences exist. 
In state-owned listed companies, if the state controlling shareholder 
dominates management and coerces managers into misappropriating 
company assets to pursue political goals, the company may be led astray by 
ineffective investments, and minority shareholders may suffer financial losses. 
This state “principal-principal” cost differentiates itself from the traditional 
 
146 Deng Yungui, ‘论公司 ‘内部人’控制之法律治理 (Analysis on Legal Regulation on the Insider Control of 
the Company)’, 2 (2002) 当代法学 (Contemporary Law Review), pp. 128-130. 
147 Fei Fangyu, ‘控制内部人控制-国企改革中的治理机制研究 (Control Insider Control-Research on 
Governance of the Reform of the SOEs)’, 6 (1996) 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), pp. 31-39. 
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“principal-principal” cost. As a matter of fact, the state may be less effective in 
monitoring management than a private controlling shareholder. Moreover, the 
conflict between the state and minority shareholders normally takes place 
around political issues rather than economic issues. In other words, the conflict 
is often about the fact that the state is likely to pursue non-commercial 
interests, due to its political nature.148 Different from private shareholders 
who prioritise profits, economic returns are usually not the only priority of 
government-related investors.149 Such “inconsistency in goals” is particularly 
severe between the controlling and minority shareholders.150  
A typical example in this regard is state-owned listed companies’ high 
consideration of social costs, also known as political costs, such as maintaining 
a certain employment rate and social welfare, which are the reasons behind 
the inefficiency of many state-owned companies.151 If truth be told, managers 
normally have to consult with the dominant shareholder, i.e. the state, before 
making crucial decisions.152 When there is a conflict of interest between the 
state and minority shareholders, it is unrealistic to expect the board to 
safeguard the latters’ interests by counteracting the former. The main reason 
for the lack of board independence is their semi-political identity; for example, 
an adverse decision might have repercussions on the future political career of 
managers or directors. As could be expected, those managers and directors 
who intend to pursue a political position will be more prone to applauding the 
state controller.153 In a nutshell, the “state-owned” element turns the 
relationship between different parties in a firm into a bureaucratic straitjacket, 
and in such a context, minority shareholders find themselves at the very 
bottom of this hierarchy.  
In non-state-owned listed companies, the private controller-minority conflict 
can instead be described according to the traditional “principal-principal” cost 
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153 Ibid.  
24B_BW_Fu_stand.job
38 
 
examined in the opening sections of this chapter.154 By abusing the dominant 
position, a private controller can easily acquire the private benefit of control at 
the expense of minority shareholders.155 On the one hand, when compared 
with the state, a private controlling shareholder may keep a closer eye on 
management. On the other hand, a private controlling shareholder may have 
more incentive to exploit minority shareholders for personal economic 
interests.156  
According to a number of empirical studies, private controlling shareholders 
are in fact more likely to pursue illegitimate activities, such as tunnelling157 
and earnings management than the state.158 Such illegitimate activities can be 
credited to the insufficient protection of property rights,159 weak enforcement 
of the law160 and, crucially, discrimination against non-state-owned 
companies.161 It has also been emphasised that since non-state-owned 
companies have less access to equity markets and bank loans than 
state-owned companies,162 private controllers often intentionally turn to 
political connections for “alternative safeguards” they may not find in the 
law.163 Unavoidably, such political shelter-seeking entails extra costs, and such 
expenses are normally split among minority investors. As a result, private 
controllers have the financial incentive to conduct minority expropriations.  
Another factor that may worsen the conflict between minority shareholders 
and controlling shareholders is that most of the existing Chinese corporate 
legislation is based on the US model, which targets conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and management. One strand of academic opinion 
argues that by adopting “principal-agent” solutions tailored to the US reality, 
 
154 Weng, Charlie Xiaochuan. ‘Chinese Shareholder Protection and the Influence of the US Law: The 
Idiosyncratic Economic Realities and Mismatched Agency Problem Solutions’, 40 (2012) Securities Regulation 
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the existing Chinese corporate governance system cannot adequately address 
the roots of the problem of minority expropriations by controlling shareholders, 
particularly private controllers, in the Chinese context.164 
As good deal of the literature remarks, the principal-principal conflict in the 
Chinese context has caused a pressing issue in practice, namely “tunnelling”,165 
an expression that describes a situation whereby the company controller 
pursues his or her own private benefit of control by transferring company 
assets and resources.166 The phenomenon has many damaging effects on 
minority shareholders: it worsens information asymmetry, it decreases market 
transparency,167 it reduces the efficiency of the capital market168 and, finally, 
it lowers the company’s performance and its equity value.169 Methods 
involved in tunnelling include: (1) acquiring listing qualifications by fraud; (2) 
embezzlement of listed companies’ funds; (3) financing guarantees which 
expose listed companies to abnormal risks; (4) looting company assets or 
profits through related-party transactions; (5) low dividend rates or malicious 
dividend policies; (6) false capital contribution and fraud listings to deceive 
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minority shareholders and (7) the manipulation of share prices through false 
financial reporting intended to mislead minority shareholders.170 
Liu et al. impute tunnelling activities to insufficient legal protection for 
minority shareholders and the absence of a market mechanism to control the 
controlling shareholder.171 Within a highly concentrated structure, the 
company controller can exercise controlling power, without any restrictions. 
According to Tang and Jiang, due to China’s specific context, minority 
expropriations by the controlling shareholder are more serious than in other 
developed markets.172 Based on observations of the Hong Kong stock 
exchange, Cheung et al. showed that whenever an actual controller can be 
traced back to companies in mainland China, the company is more likely to 
have conducted the related-party transaction, which is a common method of 
tunnelling.173  
The tunnelling phenomenon exists in both state-owned and non-state-owned 
listed companies. Furthermore, both state-owned and non-state-owned listed 
companies in China, more or less, suffer from different degrees of intervention 
by local governments, and state-owned listed companies, in particular, are 
considered as a “fund-raising platform” for the government.174 As various 
scholars have demonstrated, over-investment by state-owned listed 
companies is more severe than non-state-owned listed companies.175 Another 
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study further reveals that non-commercial government interference could be 
the main reason behind the tunnelling.176 Two cases further exemplify such 
government interference, with subsequent infringement upon minority 
shareholders’ interests. In the Huang He Ke Ji (hereinafter HHKJ 黄河科技) 
case, the chairman of the board had been the party committee secretary since 
the establishment of HHKJ as a company. Senior management cared more 
about pursuing their political careers than protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders. For the fear of losing HHKJ as a local brand, the Shanxi provincial 
government directly intervened by terminating the restructuring plan between 
HHKJ and Ke Long and instead organising another transaction with a SOE.177 A 
series of related-party transactions with other SOEs took a toll on HHKJ and 
caused serious losses for its minority shareholders. 
Another example is the Wu Liang Ye (hereinafter WLY 五粮液) case. Initially, 
WLY was listed to serve the fundraising requirements of the Sichuan provincial 
government. The government dominated the board of directors and appointed 
the deputy mayor as the chairman. After its listing, the government directed 
WLY, a breweries company, to invest in scientific and car manufacturing 
projects, in order to support the development of those industries.178 These 
over-investments damaged the economic returns of the company as well as 
the interests of minority shareholders. 
Applying agency cost theories to the Chinese context, the last few sections 
have illustrated how Chinese listed companies may face two types of agency 
cost, namely the “principal-agent” cost between minority shareholders and 
management, and the “principal-principal” cost between minority 
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shareholders and the controlling shareholder. Hereinafter, the expression 
“controlling-minority conflicts” will be referred to in this research, to cover 
both principal-principal and principal-agent costs.  
Another possible lens through which to interpret the Chinese situation is the 
legal origin theory, according to which, China belongs to a civil law origin with a 
highly concentrated ownership structure. Insofar as minority shareholder 
protection remains a challenging issue in the country,179 the Chinese reality 
fits the legal origin theory’s correlation between a concentrated ownership 
structure and weak minority shareholder protection. Nevertheless, as previous 
sections have shown, China’s concentrated ownership is more the product of a 
conscious political choice than a mere market response to a weak legal regime 
in terms of investor protection. After the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, China’s economy was guided by communist ideology 
and social public ownership, while firms existed primarily as state-owned 
enterprises.180 As a matter of fact, the first Chinese Company Law was 
promulgated only in 1993, while the first Chinese Securities Law was 
promulgated in 1998. In other words, the interpretation offered by the legal 
origin theory would not make much sense here, as concentrated state 
ownership existed long before the law was introduced.  
In addition to what could be described as a political choice, Lin emphasised the 
importance of the cultural element in shaping the power dynamic within 
Chinese listed companies.181 More specifically, in assessing the Chinese 
context, one should take into consideration issues such as China’s peculiar 
“family” ideology, which breeds two important values of “leadership” and 
“insiders vs. outsiders” and is deeply rooted in the nation’s culture. Mirroring 
these values, a Chinese listed company may be regarded by its shareholders as 
a “family”, and the controlling shareholder would therefore be seen as the 
“leader” thereof. As the most authentic figure within a family, he or she would 
hold the highest authority and power. Moreover, the aforementioned division 
between “insiders and outsiders” encourages the formation of closed interest 
groups that tend to be guided by the same goal. More specifically, in a Chinese 
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listed company, the controlling shareholder and management may be viewed 
as “insiders”, while minority shareholders may be treated as “outsiders”. This 
insider-outsider conflict may in turn generate collusion between management 
and the controlling shareholder, and it may also worsen the information 
asymmetry of minority shareholders. As claimed by a Chinese proverb, “family 
shames should stay within the family”, so the “litigation-aversion” sentiment 
means that minority shareholders who bring any action against the “family” 
not to mention against their “leader” as the controlling shareholder, are 
despised.182 All of the above elements not only appear to consolidate further 
state concentrated ownership structure in China, but they also further prove 
that the legal origin theory is inadequate in terms of interpreting the Chinese 
context. 
It could be argued that the path dependence theory and the political 
determinant theory are a better fit in this regard, as they claim that the 
efficiency of a country’s ownership structure depends on its initial ownership 
and political context.  
As seen above, the idiosyncratic vision theory argues that the controlling 
shareholder may achieve beyond-market interests for the company by fulfilling 
his or her long-term vision. This interpretation could also be an apt fit for 
China’s case. Following this theory’s logic, a concentrated ownership structure, 
and even state ownership per se, may not be a disadvantage. This 
interpretation is shared by scholars such as Stiglitz who has recently argued 
that a market-oriented state controller may be the best choice for countries 
with a weak institutional environment.183 In other words, as some have 
contended, government interference may turn out to be an alternative to the 
market control system, which is currently lacking in China.184 However, as 
things currently stand, widespread phenomena such as “insider control” and 
“tunnelling” in the Chinese context do indeed confirm a serious minority 
expropriation problem and the poor corporate governance of Chinese listed 
companies. On the one hand, the idiosyncratic vision theory shows the 
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potential of a concentrated state ownership structure. On the other hand, the 
minority expropriation theory reflects the current Chinese reality. Therefore, 
the future of minority shareholder protection in China largely depends on how 
to address the “imbalance” of powers and to establish “balanced” corporate 
governance in Chinese listed companies.  
It should also be noted that Western theories may not be able to grasp fully 
the Chinese picture in its entirety, due to the particularity of state 
participation.185 As a result, while this work will employ and deem useful some 
of the legal strategies individuated in Western literature,186 it will also 
underline, from time to time, potential deviations from existing theories, in 
order to analyse Chinese minority shareholder protection. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The existing literature has examined and shed light on issues of corporate 
governance and minority shareholder protection. Originally, the agency theory 
focused on the “separation of ownership and control”, which in turn leads to a 
principal-agent cost between shareholders and management. Further, the 
theory has been applied to interpret conflicts of interest in a concentrated 
ownership structure where a principal-principal cost between the controlling 
and minority shareholders has been identified. On the basis of the agency 
theory, academic research has moved forward to explore how a country’s 
ownership structure may affect its shareholder protection.  
Additionally, the existing literature provides various legal strategies for 
minority shareholder protection. Academic debates seem to be divided into 
two main positions. One argues that minority shareholders can be protected 
through large shareholders. Specifically, coalitions of relatively big minority 
shareholders may form a counter-force against the controlling shareholder and 
simultaneously shield minority interests. The other one posits instead that 
minority shareholders can be protected by the board of directors. This view 
depicts directors appointed by the minority shareholders as trustees, and it 
asserts that these trustees will represent minority interests in running the 
company. 
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Applying the above theories to the Chinese context, this research proposes to 
define the Chinese principal-agent relationship as the cost between minority 
shareholders and management, and to distinguish the principal-principal cost 
in state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies. Within the Chinese 
corporate structure, minority shareholders may be exposed to both 
principal-principal and principal-agent costs. The resulting insider control and 
tunnelling phenomenon seems to confirm the minority expropriation theory, 
which asserts that the controlling shareholder tends to exploit minority 
shareholders in exchange for private benefits of control. This research also 
found that the path dependence and the political determinant theories may 
explain the concentrated ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. The 
former claims that a country’s initial ownership structure determines its 
subsequent ownership structure, while the latter posits that concentrated 
ownership is the best alternative facing social-oriented policies. Besides, 
idiosyncratic vision theories may stand if the controlling shareholder can 
provide better monitoring and consistently pursue a long-term vision that 
benefits the company and minority shareholders. 
The consideration of these theories in the light of the Chinese case further 
revealed how shareholder protection is not an issue exclusively determined by 
existing legal rules. In fact, cooperation between legal rules and the legal 
environment is a key determinant of the levels of protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights. In other words, the consideration of the Chinese case 
progressively revealed how elements such as a country’s legal tradition, legal 
institutions, ownership structure and agency conflicts are key to determining 
what kind of approach will be adopted by legislation, and whether these rules 
can be effectively implemented in practice.  
Having uncovered the problem in theory, the next chapters will attempt to 
establish a few solutions by way of a comparative perspective between the 
Chinese context and two other countries, namely the US and the Netherlands. 
Such a comparative perspective will be crucial in enabling the research to 
reflect upon the Chinese context and propose innovative suggestions for 
minority shareholder protection in Chinese listed companies. 
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Chapter 3 Minority Shareholder Protection in China 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The historical heritage of the transformation from a planned economy to a 
socialist market economy has left Chinese listed companies with a special 
ownership structure. Highly concentrated ownership and state ownership have 
caused a series of governance problems, such as insider control, tunnelling and 
an inactive securities market. These complications in turn impose both 
principal-principal and principal-agent costs on minority shareholders, and as a 
result, minority shareholder protection has become a pressing issue in China.  
A series of newly promulgated or amended legislations, such as the Provisions 
of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of 
the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (IV), Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (V), the latest revision of the 
Chinese Corporate Governance Code, and the newly revised 2020 Chinese 
Securities Law has responded to the corporate governance challenge by 
especially focusing on the protection of minority interests. In order to form a 
better understanding of the issue, this chapter intends to analyse minority 
shareholder protection in Chinese listed companies from the corporate 
governance perspective. Specifically, the discussion includes three main parts. 
First, it reviews shareholder rights in Chinese legislation. Second, it examines 
the monitoring mechanisms of disclosure and internal supervision, and third, it 
underlines minority shareholder protection in mergers and acquisitions. Lastly, 
the chapter ends with a conclusion. 
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3.2 Minority shareholder protection through shareholder 
rights in China 
According to the Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter Legislation Law), Chinese legislation consists of laws enacted by 
the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, administrative 
regulations enacted by the State Council, local regulations, autonomous 
regulations and separate regulations enacted by a provincial-level 
government’s People’s Congress or its Standing Committee and administrative 
rules enacted by the State Council’s departments, committees, other 
regulatory institutions or local rules enacted by local governments. The 
hierarchy of the legislation is as follows: the constitution has the highest legal 
effect; laws have higher legal effect than administrative regulations, local 
regulations and rules; administrative regulations have higher legal effect than 
local regulations and rules, and local regulations have higher legal effect than 
the same-level and lower-level local rules.187  
Table 3.1 Legislation Hierarchy 
 
Shareholder rights are mainly prescribed by the Chinese Company Law, the 
Chinese Corporate Governance Code and the Provision on Strengthening the 
Protection of the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders. Explicitly, the 
Chinese Company Law is on the level of law, and the other two legislations fall 
into the category of departmental regulatory documents, whose legal effects 
 
187 Articles 87, 88 and 89, Legislation Law. 
Constitution
Law
Administrative 
regulations
Local regulations
Local rules
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are not specified in the Legislation Law. Academics hold the opinion that 
departmental regulatory documents have a lower legal effect than 
administrative rules.188 
3.2.1 Shareholder rights in legislation 
Within a highly concentrated ownership structure, the general meeting of a 
Chinese listed company is often dominated by the controlling shareholder. 
Considering the potential conflicts of interest between the company controller 
and minority shareholders, the rights of the general meeting do not equate to 
minority shareholder protection. According to how a shareholder right is 
exercised, i.e. by the general meeting, by passing a threshold or by any 
shareholder, the elaboration below will describe shareholder rights from a 
minority shareholder perspective. The first step will outline the general 
meeting’s powers, while the second step will discuss what rights minority 
shareholders can exercise if they pass a certain threshold. The last step will 
enquire into the rights and rules that have been designed especially for 
minority shareholders.  
Powers of the general meeting 
The Chinese Company Law (hereinafter CCL)189 explicitly declares in its Article 
98 that the general meeting is the governing body of a company limited by 
shares.190 In other words, the general meeting is entitled to all of the essential 
 
188 Some academics believe that regulatory documents are legally binding but the legal effect is lower than 
administrative regulations. In other words, if there is any conflict between administrative regulations and 
regulatory documents, the former prevails. See: Ye Bifeng, ‘论规范性文件的效力(Legal Effect of Regulatory 
Documents)’, 4 (1994) 行政法学研究 (Administrative Law Review), pp. 50-55. 
Huang Jinrong, ‘“规范性文件”的法律界定及其效力 (Defining the Legal Effect of “Regulatory Documents”)’, 
7 (2014) 法学 (Law Science), pp. 10-20. 
Some academics claim that regulatory documents are one type of soft law in China. See: Luo Haocai and Song 
Gongde, ‘认真对待软法-公域软法的一般理论及其中国实践 (Take Soft Law Seriously – General Theories of 
Soft Law in Public Law and its Practice in China)’, 2 (2006) 中国法学 (China Legal Science), pp.3-24. 
189中华人民共和国公司法 (The Chinese Company Law)was originally promulgated by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress on 29th December 1993, amended on 25th December 1999, 
amended on 28th February 2004, amended on 27th October 2005, amended on 28th December 2013 and 
amended on 26th October 2018. The latest version came into effect on 26th October 2018. 
190 In order to become a Chinese listed company, the establishment of a company limited by shares is the 
preliminary step. In other words, Chinese listed companies can be considered a sub-group of companies 
limited by shares. Accordingly, provisions on the rights of shareholders in companies limited by shares also 
apply to shareholders in Chinese listed companies, if there is no special provision prescribed otherwise. For 
this reason, provisions on limited liability companies will not be discussed here. 
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decision-making powers within a company. Specifically, Article 99 clarifies the 
powers of the general meeting as follows:  
- to decide on operating guidelines and investment plans;  
- to appoint and remove directors and supervisors who are not employee 
representatives, and also to determine their remuneration;  
- to approve reports provided by the board of directors and the supervisory 
board, annual financial budget plans, final accounts, profit distribution plans 
and loss recovery plans;  
- to make resolutions on increasing or decreasing registered capital, the 
issuance of corporate bonds, mergers, divisions, dissolution, liquidation or 
conversion of the corporate form;  
- to modify the articles of association;  
- and other powers, if prescribed in the articles of association. 
Rights with a threshold 
Rights with a threshold refer to a right that can be exercised once a certain 
threshold is reached by a shareholder(s). According to the CCL, if minority 
shareholders pass the minimum requirements, they may exercise rights with a 
threshold, which affects the company in four ways. To start with participation 
in the general meeting, minority shareholders who pass the 10% shareholding 
and 90 consecutive-day requirements have the right to convene and preside 
over the general meeting,191 who pass the 10% shareholding have the right to 
request for an extraordinary general meeting,192 and who pass the 3% 
shareholding are entitled to the right to initiate an interim proposal.193 Second, 
minority shareholders who fulfill the 10% shareholding demand may propose 
 
191 Article 101 of the CCL prescribes that if the board of directors and the board of supervisors do not convene 
and preside the general meeting, shareholders who either independently or collectively have held 10% or 
more than 10% of the company shares for at least 90 consecutive days have the discretion to convene and 
preside over the general meeting. 
192 Article 100 of the CCL stipulates that the general meeting of shareholders shall be held once a year. 
However, if requested by shareholders who either independently or collectively owns 10% or more than 10% 
of company shares, an extraordinary meeting shall be held within two months. 
193 Article 102 of the CCL prescribes that shareholders shall be informed in advance concerning the time, 
location and issues to be discussed of the general meeting. And shareholders who independently or 
collectively hold 3% or more than 3% of the company shares, are entitled to the right to submit an interim 
proposal to the board of directors ten days before the meeting, and the content of the interim proposal shall 
be within the power of the general meeting. Besides, issues that have not been delivered to the shareholders 
in advance shall not be decided at the general meeting. 
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to convene an interim meeting of the board of directors.194 Third, in the most 
extreme situation,195 minority shareholders who pass the 10% shareholding 
threshold can request a court to dissolve the company. Lastly, minority 
shareholders who have held 1% or more of company shares for at least 180 
consecutive days are entitled to bring a derivative action.196 This derivative 
action can be used to redress any breach of fiduciary duty by the directors or 
the controlling shareholders.197 
Rights of minority shareholders 
To safeguard the interests of minority shareholders better, Chinese legislation 
prescribes rights that a shareholder may exercise on his or her own. 
Specifically, the protection is granted mainly through the equal treatment 
principle, the economic right, the participation right and the exit right.  
First, equal treatment is confirmed in Article 126 of the CCL, which maintains 
that “each share of the same class shall be entitled to the same rights”. And 
Article 103 of the CCL declares the “one share, one vote” by specifying that 
each share held by a shareholder should entitle the holder to one voting right 
at the general meeting, except for the shares held by the company itself. 
Furthermore, Article 8 of the Chinese Corporate Governance Code (hereinafter 
CCGC)198 stresses that a listed company’s corporate governance should 
protect shareholders’ rights, especially those of small and medium 
shareholders. In addition to common shares, Article 131 of the CCL grants the 
State Council the power to regulate other categories of shares, such as 
preferred shares, in separate provisions.  
Second, the CCL prescribes that a shareholder is entitled to the right to a 
dividend,199 and the general meeting has the power to declare and distribute 
 
194 Based on Article 101 of the CCL, shareholders who represent 10% or more than 10% of the voting rights 
may propose to convene the interim meeting of the board of directors. 
195 Article 182 of the CCL prescribes the most extreme situation whereby the company is facing great difficulty 
in its operation and management, and the continued existence of the company will expose shareholders to 
great losses and there is no other way to solve the problem. 
196 For Article 151 of the CCL, more discussion on the derivative action can be found in section 3.4.2 of this 
chapter.  
197 The fiduciary duties of directors and controlling shareholders will be elaborated in 3.4.2 of this chapter.  
198 上市公司治理准则 (Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies), China Securities Regulatory 
Commission and the State Economic and Trade Commission, date of issue January 7th 2002. The latest 
amendment came into effect on 30th September, 2018. The citations in this research refer to the 2018 version. 
The legal effect of the CCGC is at the level of “normative documents”, which has a binding effect.  
199 Article 4, CCL.  
31B_BW_Fu_stand.job
52 
 
dividends.200 The general rule is that the distribution of the remaining 
after-tax profits201 should be in proportion to the shares held by the 
shareholder, albeit the articles of association can deviate from such a rule.202 
Besides the CCL, the Provision on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights 
and Interests of Public Shareholders (hereinafter Public Shareholder 
Provision)203 holds the distribution of cash dividends as one of the 
preconditions for a listed company seeking to issue new shares.204 In 2006, 
this precondition was specified in the Administrative Measures for the Issuance 
of Securities by Listed Companies as a dividend distribution of no less than 20% 
of the average annual distributable profits in the previous three years.205 This 
dividend requirement was raised from 20% to 30% in 2008 by the Decisions on 
Amending Some Provisions on Cash Dividends by Listed Companies.206 In 2012, 
the Notice on Further Implement Related Issues of Cash Dividend of Listed 
Companies emphasised that the decision to distribute cash dividends should 
be made in consultation with minority shareholders and independent 
directors.207 The latest 2018 revision of the CCGC added a provision to deal 
specifically with the cash dividend problem. Article 10 states that a listed 
company’s articles of association should explicitly stipulate the measures 
available for dividend distribution, especially cash dividend policies.208 For a 
listed company that has the ability but chooses not to distribute cash dividends, 
 
200 Article 99, CCL. 
201 Article 166 of the CCL regulates that 10% of after-tax profit shall be allocated to the company’s statutory 
common reserve fund. Thereafter, the general meeting may also accrue a discretionary common reserve fund 
from the after-tax profit. And only after covering losses and making allocation to the common reserve fund can 
the remaining after-tax profit be distributed to shareholders. 
202 According to Article 166 of the CCL, the distribution of the remaining after-tax profit can deviate from the 
proportion of shares held by each shareholder, if the articles of association provide so. 
203 关于加强社会公众股股东权益保护的若干规定 (Provision on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights 
and Interests of Public Shareholders), issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue 
December 7th 2004. 
204 “No listed company may issue additional shares or convertible bonds to the general public or allot shares 
to its existing shareholders, if it did not make any profit distribution in cash in the last three years”. Section 3, 
Article 4, Public Shareholder Provision. 
205 “The profits which it has accumulatively distributed in cash or in stocks are not less than 20% of the 
average annual distributable profits realized in the recent 3 years”. Section 5, Article 8,《上市公司证券发行管
理办法》(Administrative Measures for the Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies), China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, date of issue May 6, 2006, amended. 
206 《关于修改上市公司现金分红若干规定的决定》(Decisions on Amending Some Provisions on Cash 
Dividends by Listed Companies), China Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue October 9th 2008. 
207 《关于进一步落实上市公司现金分红有关事项的通知》(Notice on Further Implement Related Issues of 
Cash Dividend of Listed Companies), China Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue May 4th 2012.  
208 The revised 2020 Chinese Securities Law added Article 91, which similarly prescribes that the articles of 
association should specify the procedure and measures for distributing cash dividends, and a company should 
follow these provisions to distribute cash dividends if after-tax profits are available. 
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it should fully disclose its reasons for not doing so. The Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (IV) (hereinafter CCL Provisions 
IV)209 states that shareholders may file an action in a court based on the 
specific dividend distribution resolution of the general meeting.210 Without 
this resolution, the court will reject the shareholder’s request, unless the 
no-dividend resolution was the result of an abuse of shareholder rights, 
normally by the controlling shareholder and causing losses for other 
shareholders.211 
Third, to encourage the participation of minority shareholders in corporate 
governance, Chinese legislation has made four key improvements, by 
strengthening the right to know, by stipulating friendly voting rules, by 
granting the right to request a court to cancel a flawed resolution and by the 
right to bring a direct action. 
Right to know 
Minority shareholders’ right to know is represented by the right to inspect and 
the right to inquire. Article 97 of the CCL prescribes that a shareholder has the 
right to inspect corporate documents, which include “articles of association, 
shareholder registers, counterfoils of corporate bonds, minutes of the general 
meetings or of meetings of the board of directors or of meetings of the 
supervisory board and financial and accounting reports”.212 The CCL Provisions 
IV further clarifies that the right to inspect should not be substantially 
restricted by the articles of association or shareholder agreements.213 
Shareholders are entitled to bring an action if the right to inspect has been 
violated.214 And if directors or senior managers fail in their duties, so that the 
company does not prepare or reserve documents prescribed in Article 97 CCL, 
shareholders are eligible to request compensation from responsible directors 
 
209 最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国公司法》若干问题的规定（四） (Provisions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (IV)), issued by the Supreme People’s Court, date of issue 25th August 2017, date of effect 1st September 
2017. 
210 Article 14, CCL Provisions IV. 
211 Article 15, CCL Provisions IV. 
212 Concerning the financial and accounting report, Article 165 of the CCL requires a company limited by 
shares to make them available 20 days in advance of the annual general meeting for its shareholders to 
inspect.  
213 Article 9, CCL Provisions IV. 
214 Article 7, CCL Provisions IV. 
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or senior managers.215 For the right to inquire, Article 150 of the CCL clarifies 
that it is the general meeting that has the power to demand directors, 
supervisors and senior management personnel, as non-voting participants, be 
present at the general meeting, so that shareholders may question the above 
personnel. 
Moreover, Chinese legislation provides various minority-friendly voting rules 
which cover the cumulative voting, proxy voting, online voting, supermajority 
and separate vote counting rules. 
Cumulative voting  
As an instrument designed to enhance the appointment rights of minority 
shareholders, and to increase their representation on boards, cumulative 
voting is prescribed in Article 105 of the CCL.216 Precisely, when it comes to the 
election of directors and supervisors, the general meeting may adopt 
cumulative voting. However, it has to be clarified that cumulative voting is not 
a default rule pursuant to Article 105; instead, its application depends on the 
articles of association or the resolution of the general meeting.  
In comparison with the CCL, the CCGC takes a stronger stance on minority 
representation on boards. For example, Article 17 of the CCGC starts with an 
explicit statement that the selection of directors or supervisors should fully 
represent the opinions of small- and medium-sized shareholders. If a single 
shareholder, or persons acting in concert, holds more than 30% of shares, the 
listed company should adopt cumulative voting. Furthermore, the listed 
company that employs cumulative voting should formulate detailed 
implementing rules in the articles of association.217 
 
215 Article 12, CCL Provisions IV. 
216 According to section 2 of Article 105, cumulative voting applies when the general meeting appoints 
directors or supervisors, the number of voting rights under each share is equivalent to the number of directors 
or supervisors to be elected, and shareholders may cast all of their votes for a single candidate. 
217 Academics hold the opinion that there is a legislative conflict between Article 31 of the CCGC (Article 17 of 
the revised 2018 CCGC) and Article 105 of the CCL. Since the legal effect of the CCL is greater than the CCGC, it 
remains a question as to whether minority shareholders may rely on the judicial remedy to enforce cumulative 
voting, if the controlling shareholder (a single shareholder and persons acting in concert in the revised 2018 
CCGC) owns more than 30% shares, while the articles of association do not recognise cumulative voting. See: 
Xiao Wei, Lu Xiongying and Xu Yang et.al 上市公司治理准则与国内经济法律制度匹配性研究 (Research on 
the Compatibility between Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies and the Chinese Economic 
Legal System), available at http://max.book118.com/html/2014/0525/8459675.shtm. Last visited February 
2019. 
In addition to cumulative voting, Article 79 of the CCGC highlights that institutional investors shall play a role in 
the appointment of directors. 
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Proxy voting 
Article 106 of the CCL endows a shareholder with the right to authorise a proxy 
to attend the general meeting and also to exercise voting rights within the 
scope of authorisation. The corresponding procedure requirement is that the 
proxy should submit the power of attorney issued by the shareholder to the 
company. Besides the CCL, the CCGC affirms that proxy voting has the same 
legal effect as voting in person,218 and the solicitation of votes should be 
conducted in a gratuitous way; moreover, there should be no minimum 
shareholding threshold to exercise the right to solicitation.219 Recently, the 
revised 2020 Chinese Securities Law (hereinafter 2020 CSL )220 added two 
articles to regulate proxy solicitation. Article 90 stipulates that a listed 
company’s board of directors, independent directors, shareholders who hold 1% 
or more shares and the Investor Service Center are entitled to independently 
or to designate securities companies or securities service institutions to solicit 
shareholder votes.221 Illegal solicitation which damages a listed company or its 
shareholders’ interests comes with compensation liabilities. Article 199 
specifies that any breach of Article 90 will face correction, warning or a fine 
under 500 thounsand RMB. 
Online voting  
Online voting is a modern voting method which allows minority shareholders 
to express their own will without being physically present at the general 
meeting. This new method may largely reduce the voting cost, and thus it is 
highly recommended by Chinese legislation. The Public Shareholder Provision 
places a strong emphasis on online voting as a method to encourage the 
participation of minority shareholders in listed companies. On December 28th 
2004, both the SSE and the SZSE issued their own Implementing Rules for 
Online Voting at General Meetings of Listed Companies.222 In addition, the 
 
218 Article 15, revised 2018 CCGC. 
219 Article 16, revised 2018 CCGC. 
220 The Chinese Securities Law was originally promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on 29th December 1998, amended on 28th August 2004, on 27th October 2005, on 29th June 2013 and 
31st August 2014. The latest amendment was on 28th December 2019 and will come into effect on 1st March 
2020. 
221 The solicitation should not be conducted in a paid way, and solicitation documents should be disclosed. 
Article 90, revised 2020 CSL. 
222 上海证券交易所上市公司股东大会网络投票实施细则 (Implementing Rules of SSE for the Online Voting 
at General Meetings of Listed Companies), Shanghai Stock Exchange, date of issue December 28th 2004. 
Amended on September 8th 2006; February 22nd 2011; and the latest amendment issued on January 15th 2015. 
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Guidance on Listed Companies’ Articles of Association (hereinafter Guidance on 
AoA)223 also calls for listed companies to adopt modern techniques, such as 
online voting. The 2018 revision of the CCGC also stipulates that the general 
meeting should be held in a combination of on-site meetings and online 
voting.224 
Supermajority rule 
Under the simple majority rule, the controlling shareholder often dominates 
the voting process. Consequently, Article 103 of the CCL clarifies that major 
events, such as a “modification of the articles of association, increase or 
reduction of the registered capital, merger, division or dissolution, or the 
conversion of the company”, require a two-thirds supermajority. Additionally, 
Article 121 of the CCL commands a supermajority when “the value of the 
purchase or sale of any substantial assets or the provision of guarantee 
exceeds 30% of the total asset value of the listed company within a given 
year”. 
Separate vote-counting rule  
Also known as the “majority of minority” rule, separate vote counting applies 
in order to guide major issues that may influence minority shareholders’ 
interests.225 According to the Public Shareholder Provision, major decisions of 
a listed company not only require the resolution of the general meeting, but 
also a simple majority agreement of public shareholders.226 Furthermore, 
these major decisions include the issuance of additional shares, convertible 
bonds and the allotment of shares to the company’s existing shareholders; 
“major asset reorganisation, in the case where the total price of the assets 
purchased exceeds the audited net book value of those assets by 20% or 
more”; a shareholder who repays the debts owed to a listed company with the 
shares of this company that he or she holds; oversea listing of any subsidiaries 
 
深圳证券交易所上市公司股东大会网络投票实施细则 (Implementing Rules of SZSE for the Online Voting at 
General Meetings of Listed Companies), Shenzhen Stock Exchange, date of issue December 28th 2004. 
Amended on April 20th 2006; February 1st 2010; February 14th 2014; and the latest amendment on September 
5th 2014.  
223 上市公司章程指引 (Guidance on Listed Companies’ Articles of Association), issued by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission, date of issue 20th October 2014. 
224 Article 15, the revised 2018 CCGC. 
225 关于加强社会公众股股东权益保护的若干规定 (Provision on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights 
and Interests of Public Shareholders), issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue 
December 7th 2004. 
226 Article 1 of the Public Shareholder Provisions implements the “majority of minority” rule on a trial basis.  
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which has a great influence on a listed company and other issues that may 
have a significant impact on public shareholders’ interests.227 
Right to request a court to cancel, confirm the non-existence or invalidate a 
resolution 
In addition to the preferential treatments in voting mentioned above, Article 
22 of the CCL endows a shareholder with the right to request a court to cancel 
a flawed resolution or confirm a resolution that has never been formed or is 
invalid.228 Specifically, a resolution of the general meeting or the board of 
directors is invalid by default if its content breaches laws or administrative 
regulations. In a lenient case, if the convening or voting procedures of the 
general meeting or the meeting of the board of directors violate laws, 
administrative regulations or articles of association, or if the content of the 
resolution violates the articles of association, then a shareholder may request 
a court to cancel the resolution within 60 days. However, Article 22 also 
imposes a restriction on this right, namely when a shareholder brings a 
cancellation lawsuit, in which case the company can request the court to 
demand a guarantee from the plaintiff shareholder. 
Direct action 
Additionally, minority shareholders have the right to bring a direct action. 
Different from the derivative action, the direct action does not have a 
threshold. Article 152 of the CCL prescribes that directors, senior management 
personnel who breach laws, administrative regulations or articles of 
association, infringe on shareholders’ interests, the shareholder(s) is/are 
entitled to bring an action in a court. Simply judging from this Article, the direct 
action seems to have a narrower scope than the derivative action. Namely, it 
does not specify whether supervisors or “any other person” can be charged as 
the respondent.  
However, for securities compensation litigation based on for example false 
statements, if claims fall into the same type and one party involves numerous 
person, then a representative can be selected to proceed the action. The court 
 
227 Article 1, Public Shareholder Provisions. 
228 The right to request the court to confirm a resolution that has never been formed was newly added by the 
CCL Provisions IV. 
Article 2 of the CCL Provisions IV also clarified that the plaintiff should remain as a shareholder of the company 
at the time of bringing an action to cancel the disputed resolution.  
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should make an announcement of the case so that investors may register with 
the court within a certain period. The verdict or ruling of the court will be valid 
for all registered investors. The China Securities Investor Service Center may 
act as the litigation representative if it received authorizations from 50 or more 
shareholders. The China Securities Investor Service Center will register with the 
court on behalf of investors who have been confirmed by the securities 
registrar, except those who have clearly expressed their unwillingness to 
participate in the litigation. This Chinese “representative action” were recently 
added as Article 95 in the revised 2020 CSL. 
Fourth, Chinese legislation offers minority shareholders the freedom to leave 
the company. Article 137 of the CCL affirms a shareholder’s right to transfer his 
or her shares, albeit with certain exceptions.229 In acquisitions, shareholders 
are entitled to mandatory bid rule and sell-out right protection. Similarly, 
minority interests are guarded by the appraisal right in mergers. Protection in 
takeover transactions will be further elaborated in paragraph 3.4.1 of this 
chapter. 
3.2.2 Protection by quasi-state institutions 
Different from many jurisdictions, corporate governance in China consists of a 
general meeting of shareholders, boards and the party organisation. 
Participation of the party organisation in corporate governance has gone 
through four main stages in China.230 In the plan economy stage, the party was 
in charge of SOEs’ operations. At the beginning of the opening and reform 
stage, the party intended to step down and shown more respect to the 
autonomy of the company. After the establishment of the socialist market 
economy, the party organisation primarily focused on its political role rather 
than business-oriented issues. Nevertheless, the classification reform stage 
brought back a strengthened party organisation in corporate governance.231  
This party influence has been reinforced by recent policies. For instance, in the 
2016 document Promote Party Building While Comprehensively Deepening SOE 
 
229 Article 141, CCL. 
230 Liu Dahong and Xu Danlin, ‘党组织参与国企公司治理的路径与法律研究-以国企分类改革为视角 (The 
Approaches and Implementation Mechanism of the Party’s Participation in Administering the State-owned 
Enterprises Under the Circumstances of Classification Reform)’, 23 (2017) 中南大学学报 (Journal of Central 
South University), pp. 31-38. 
231 Ibid. 
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Reform,232 the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (hereinafter SASAC) confirmed an “ex-ante procedure”, in that 
major decisions should be discussed and approved by the party organisation 
before being submitted to the board of directors.233 Similarly, two Circulars234 
were issued by the State Council in 2017 to strengthen the party organisation’s 
leadership in SOEs, especially the supervision of cadres. Specifically, the party 
organisation is in charge of three main tasks: making “three important, one 
large decisions”, i.e. decide on important decisions, important cadres, 
important projects and the usage of large funds; “double entry, cross offices”, 
i.e. members of the party organisation can also serve as directors, supervisors 
and managers and vice versa; “party supervising both cadres and talents”, 
whereby the party cooperates with the board of directors to appoint senior 
executives and human resource management, and the party seeks to build up 
professional talents.235 Furthermore, the revised 2018 CCGC added Article 5 to 
require explicitly all listed companies to establish party organisations and 
state-controlled listed companies to incorporate party organisation policies 
into their articles of association. The party organisation plays both a leadership 
role and a political core role,236 and the party organisation even comes before 
the board of directors in the decision-making process.237  
 
232 《在全面深化国企改革中加强党的建设工作》, available at 
http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-05/31/c_1118938354.htm. Last visited February 2019. 
233 Jamie Allen, Li Rui, Guo Peiyuan, Li Zhaowen, Zhang Zhengjun and Zhou Chun, Awakening governance: The 
Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, Asian Corporate Governance Association China Corporate 
Governance Report 2018, available at https://www.acga-asia.org/specialist-research.php. Last visited February 
2019. 
234 Guiding Opinions on Further Improving the Legal Person Governance Structure of State-owned Enterprises
《关于进一步完善国有企业法人治理结构的指导意见》and Notice on Forwarding the Plan of SASAC on 
Focusing on Capital Management and Advancing the Functional Transformation《国务院办公厅关于转发国务
院国资委以管资本为主推进职能转变方案的通知》, issued by the General Office of the State Council, 
available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-05/03/content_5190599.htm and 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-05/10/content_5192390.htm. Last visited February 2019. 
235 Supra. 233. 
236 The party organisation decides SOEs’ directions, macro development and the implementation of party 
policies, law and legislations and major decisions of the central party. See: Ma Lianfu and Wang Jianing, ‘党组
织嵌入国有企业治理结构的三重考量 (Considerations of Party Organizations Embedded in the Governance 
Structure of State-owned Enterprises)’, 3 (2017) 改革 (Reform), pp. 5-13. 
237 The party organisation has the right to participate in decision-making when it comes to major company 
issues. With the implementation of the “double entry, cross-offices” policy, the party organisation has a 
greater influence on the board of directors. Normally, the party organisation and members of the board of 
directors have a meeting before any decision-making. Later, these board members will report the opinion of 
the party organisation to the board of directors. See: Ma Lianfu, Wang Yuanfang and Shen Xiaoxiu, ‘中国国有
企业党组织治理效应研究 (Research on Governance Effects of China’s State-owned Companies’ Party 
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In order to improve further the corporate governance of SOEs, the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party established four pillars of SOE 
reform.238 Especially, the main task of the SASAC should be limited to capital 
management, and it should improve SOEs and prevent the losses of state 
assets. In other words, government intervention is not boundless, and more 
decision-making should be delegated to the company. Moreover, SOEs should 
establish a modern corporate governance system in which checks and balances 
are guarded by the independent operation of both boards.239 Besides, the SOE 
reform encourages the development of mixed ownership, namely state-owned 
capital and non-state-owned capital jointly support and supervise the 
development of a SOE.240 
Under this peculiar “political company law”241 structure, recent developments 
seem to show that China intends to solve its minority shareholder 
expropriation problem also through the visible hand of the government. 
Investor protection in China has been summarised as the “one body, two wings 
(一体两翼)” system.242 The “one body” refers to the Investor Protection 
Bureau of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereinafter CSRC), and 
the “two wings” element refers to the Securities Investor Protection Fund and 
the China Securities Investor Services Centre.  
The Investor Protection Bureau steers Chinese investor protection on the 
macro level and provides guidance on all relevant investor protection issues, 
such as improving legislation and policies to protect investors, supervising and 
educating related institutions, stock exchanges, associations and other market 
 
Organization-A Perspective Based on ‘Insider Control’)’, 8 (2012) 中国工业经济 (China Industrial Economics), 
pp. 82-95. 
238 These four pillars are capital management, the categorisation of SOEs, corporate governance and mixed 
ownership. See: supra. 233. 
239 It was also stipulated that the party would supervise and guide the company through the “cross-office” 
process, i.e. where party members simultaneously hold board positions or vice versa. However, it is still 
unclear how this requirement could be fulfilled without damaging the independence of directors or 
supervisors. See: ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
241 The “political company law” emphasises the party organisation’s participation in corporate governance. It 
intends to establish such a system whereby the party organisation supervises the company internally and the 
market supervises the company externally. See: Jiang Dazing, ‘走向“政治性公司法”-党组织如何参与公司治
理 (Political Company Law: How Party Organisation Participates in Corporate Governance)’, 23 (2017) 中南大
学学报 (Journal of Central South University), pp. 27-33.  
242 See: New Channel of Investor Protection, interpretation of policies, available at 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2018-05/25/content_5293507.htm. Last visited February 2019. 
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participators, encouraging investors to seek legal remedies and organising 
domestic and international cooperation.243 
Article 126 of the Chinese Securities Law establishes the Securities Investor 
Protection Fund (hereinafter SIPF), which is maintained by the state and 
composed of funds contributed by securities companies and other funds raised 
according to law. The State Council has the discretion to stipulate detailed 
rules to regulate the size,244 raising, control and use of funds. The task of the 
SIPF is to compensate creditors and investors when securities companies are 
annulled, closed, bankrupted or under mandatory regulatory measures, such 
as in the case of an administrative takeover or a trusteeship.245 
In December 2014, the China Securities Investor Services Centre (hereinafter 
ISC), i.e. a non-profit securities and financial institution under the direct control 
of the CSRC, was established to provide educational, legal, informational, 
technical and other services to minority shareholders.246 In February 2016, the 
CSRC started a pilot project which approved the ISC holding shares of listed 
companies in Shanghai, Guangdong (excluded Shenzhen) and Hunan provinces. 
During the pilot project, the ISC issued letters to 181 listed companies and 
provided 388 suggestions on the articles of association. All 181 listed 
companies made their official responses, and more than 100 listed companies 
amended their articles of association. In April 2017, the CSRC announced that 
the pilot project had achieved significant success and the project would extend 
across the entire Chinese mainland. Up to May 2017, the ISC had become a 
shareholder in 3003 listed companies (with 100 A shares in each company) on 
the SSE and the SZSE. Shares held by the ISC are not for sale.247 This minority 
guardian role of the ISC was confirmed in the 2018 revision of the CCGC, which 
added Article 82 to call for the active participation of the ISC in the interests of 
minority shareholders, as well as in the newly revised 2020 CSL that the ISC 
should assist minority shareholders with vote solicitation,248 advanced 
compensation, mediation, and litigation.249 
 
243 See: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/tzzbhj/. Last visited February 2091. 
244 This element was recently added into the 2020 Chinese Securities Law. 
245 See: http://www.sipf.com.cn/index.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
246 See: http://www.isc.com.cn/about_us/. Last visited February 2019. 
247 See: http://www.isc.com.cn/exercise/201705/t20170517_171506.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
248 See: 3.2.1 proxy voting. 
249 Articles 90, 93, 94 and 95, revised 2020 CSL. 
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If an issuer’s fraudulent issuance, false statement or other illegal behavious 
damage shareholders’ interests, the issuer’s controlling shareholder, actual 
controller or related securities companies can designate the ISC to reach an 
advanced compensation agreement with the shareholders.250 Regarding 
disputes between shareholders and issuers or securities companies, either 
party can request the ISC for a mediation.251 Based on its shareholder identity, 
the ISC represents minority shareholders in exercising all kinds of rights, such 
as the inspection right and the voting right. For rights with a threshold, such as 
the right to initiate an interim proposal and the right to bring a derivative 
action, the ISC represents minority shareholders exercising these rights 
through the public solicitation of votes.252 After the latest amendment of the 
2020 CSL, derivative actions filed by the ISC based on its shareholder identity 
are exempted from the 180 consecutive days and the 1% shareholding 
requirements.253 With authorizations of 50 or more shareholders, the ISC can 
act as the litigation representative in securities compensation suits.254 To 
support further minority shareholders’ right to suit, the ISC collaborates with 
the All-China Lawyers Association, and it is in charge of the preparation of 
litigation materials as well as the appointment of litigation attorneys. In other 
words, minority shareholders do not need to pay lawyers’ fees but only the 
litigation fee, which is refunded if minority shareholders eventually win the 
case.255 The ISC, through its website and other media platforms, discloses 
relevant information in a timely manner regarding the exercise of shareholder 
rights. The ISC also supervises listed companies and reports any illegal actions 
to the CSRC.256  
In addition to the SIPF and the ISC, an investor hotline 12386 and an investor 
website257 were established to provide small and medium investors with 
information, consultation services, mediation and other assistance. Securities 
companies are held liable to shareholders for compensations unless a company 
fully informs itself of relevant shareholder information, discloses its securities’ 
or services’ important information and risks, and sells securities or provides 
 
250 Article 93, revised 2020 CS L. 
251 Article 94, revised 2020 CSL. 
252 See: http://www.isc.com.cn/exercise/201705/t20170517_171505.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
253 Article 94, revised 2020 CSL. 
254 Article 95, revised 2020 CSL. 
255 See: http://www.isc.com.cn/rights/201705/t20170517_171527.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
256 See: http://www.isc.com.cn/exercise/201705/t20170517_171505.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
257 See: https://www.investor.gov.cn/. Last visited February 2019. 
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services that are suitable to its investors.258 In terms of disputes between 
individual investors and securities companies, the burden of proof falls on the 
securities companies.259 
3.2.3 Analysis 
Corporate governance in China has its own characteristics, one of which is the 
participation of party organisations. Under this “political company law”, the 
goals of minority shareholder protection are pursued by both the legal 
approach and the political approach. The legal approach refers to shareholder 
rights prescribed in Chinese legislation, while the political approach refers to 
protection provided by quasi-state institutions, particularly the ISC. 
Chinese legislation presents a strong general meeting which is in charge of the 
significant decision-making in a listed company.260 Considering the highly 
concentrated ownership structure, a controlling shareholder can easily 
dominate the general meeting and usurp its strong power granted by law. 
Consequently, and as discussed in Chapter 2, a strong controlling shareholder 
may turn out to be a double-edged sword for minority shareholders.  
Also, Chinese legislation provides shareholders with rights with a threshold, 
which normally consists of a shareholding or timing requirement, or a 
combination thereof. According to SZSE statistics, individual minority 
shareholders hold their shares for 39.1 consecutive days on average, and 
institutional investors hold their shares for 190.3 consecutive days on 
average.261 Up to February 2016, 27.83% individual minority shareholders held 
less than 10,000 RMB share capital, and 48.9% individual minority 
shareholders held a share capital between 10,000 and 100,000 RMB. In 
contrast, 52.72% institutional investors held more than 1 million RMB share 
 
258 Article 88, revised 2020 CSL. 
259 Article 89, revised 2020 CSL. 
260 Nicholas C. Howson, ‘Protecting the State from Itself? Regulatory Interventions in Corporate Governance 
and the Financing of China’s State Capitalism’, in Benjamin L. Liebman and Curtis J. Milhaupt (eds.), Regulating 
the Visible Hand?: The Institutional Implications of Chinese State Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2016), pp. 49-68. 
261 The most recent available statistics this research could find were collected from 2009-2012. See: 从近年数
据看深市投资者结构和行为变化特征 (Characteristics of trading and structure of investors of the SZSE Based 
on Recent Statistics), available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/zhejiang/gzdt/201305/t20130530_228814.htm. Last 
visited February 2019. 
37B_BW_Fu_stand.job
64 
 
capital.262 Compared with individual minority shareholders, institutional 
investors hold more shares and for a longer period. Besides institutional 
investors, the newly developed ISC is a long-term shareholder with 100 shares 
in a listed company. Though the ISC does not own a large amount of shares, its 
semi-governmental status may help it to solicit votes easily from individual 
minority shareholders and overcome the shareholding threshold. After 1st 
March 2020, the ISC is no longer restricted by the threshold when bringing 
derivative actions thanks to recent legislative developments. Consequently, 
qualified minority shareholders, such as institutional investors and the ISC, 
have a greater chance than individual minority shareholders of overcoming the 
threshold and exercising these shareholder rights, either on their own or 
through a coalition.263 Under a highly concentrated ownership structure, the 
participation of qualified minority shareholders may strengthen the 
supervision of both management and the company controller, and thus 
individual minority shareholders are also protected. Nevertheless, if the 
interests of qualified minority shareholders are in conflict with those of 
individual minorities, then the former could turn out as expropriators instead 
of guardians of the latter.264  
However, minority shareholder rights prescribed in Chinese legislation are still 
subject to various limitations. First, the implementation of many minority 
rights depends on the general meeting. For example, minority shareholders are 
entitled to the right to a dividend, but the power to declare and distribute 
dividends remains with the general meeting. Minority shareholders also have 
the right to question directors, supervisors or senior managers, but they have 
to count on the general meeting to demand that the above personnel are 
present at the meeting. This reliance on the general meeting may cause an 
obstacle if there is a controller-minority conflict.  
 
262 中国股市投资者全景图：个人账户高达 99.71% (An Overview of the Investors on the Chinese Stock 
Exchange: the Number of Individual Shareholders Accounts for 99.71%), available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/smjj/smdt/2016-04-01/doc-ifxqxcnr5189753.shtml. Last visited February 
2019. 
263 Jin Qiong, ‘对机构投资者、独立董事制度与公司治理的思考(A Thought on the Relations of Institutional 
Investor, Independent Director System and Corporation Governance)’, 4 (2013) 铜陵学院学报 (Journal of 
Tongling University), pp. 45-48. 
264 Zhai Feng, ‘公司治理视角中的中小股东权益保护 (Minority Shareholder Protection Under the 
Perspective of Corporate Governance)’, 1 (2013) 上海企业 (Shanghai Enterprise), pp. 67-69. 
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Second, scholars express some concerns about the right to request a court to 
cancel a flawed resolution.265 Especially, the 60-day limit to bring an action is 
calculated from the day that the resolution was made. A strict application of 
this time limit may ignore the interests of uninformed minority shareholders 
who may have been unaware of the meeting in the first place.266 Besides, 
scholars emphasise that the guarantee requirement may cause a huge obstacle 
for minority shareholders seeking to bring litigation in practice, and the law 
should clarify preconditions pertinent to requesting a guarantee, such as the 
respondent’s obligation to prove the “bad will” of the applicant.267 Vanke (万
科) is a controversial case in terms of this “guarantee” requirement. 
Responding to a litigation, which requested the court to cancel flawed 
resolutions made by the board of directors, the company demanded minority 
shareholder applicants a guarantee of 1.2 billion RMB.268  
Third, some minority preferential rules, such as the online voting and the 
separate vote counting rules, are mainly stipulated by regulatory documents, 
which may have less authority, since the main legal sources for a judicial ruling 
are laws and administrative regulations.269 
 
 
265 Ye Haiyan and Mo Min, ‘论股东会决议瑕疵救济制度-以中小股东利益保护为视角 (Discussion on the 
Legal Remedies of Flawed Resolutions of the General Meeting-From the Perspective of Small-and-Medium 
Shareholder Protection)’, 19 (2013) 会计之友 (Friends of Accounting), pp. 107-110. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ding Yong, ‘公司决议瑕疵诉讼担保制度检讨及立法完善 (Examination and Improvement of the 
Guarantee System for Flawed Resolution Litigations)’, 5 (2014) 法学 (Law Science), pp. 90-101.  
Li Jianwei, ‘公司决议效力瑕疵类型及其救济体系再构建-以股东大会决议可撤消为中心 (Categories of 
Flawed Resolution and the Reestablishment of Its Legal Remedy-Focus on Revocable Resolutions of the 
General Meeting)’, 15 (2008) 商事法论集 (Commercial Law Review), pp. 53-94.  
268 In the midst of the takeover battle between Vanke and Baoneng, Vanke turned to Shenzhen Metro as a 
white knight by passing 12 resolutions to issue new shares and to purchase Shenzhen Metro assets. An 
independent director, Zhang Liping, who was supposed to safeguard minority shareholders’ interests, 
circumvented voting on the above resolutions, based on a conflict of interest. Two individual shareholders, Ms. 
Yuan and Mr. Zhang, brought an action in court for the cancellation of the above 12 resolutions. They claimed 
that Vanke did not review the claim of the independent director Zhang, did not disclose relevant information 
and did not postpone the voting but let independent director Zhang circumvent it, which led to the passing of 
the 12 resolutions. See: 小股东诉万科要求撤销董事会决议 被索 12 亿担保金 (Minority Shareholders Who 
Suit Vanke For Cancellation of Resolutions of the Board of Directors Were Requested For A Guarantee of 1.2 
Billion), available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-09-27/doc-ifxwermp3973567.shtml. Last visited 
February 2019.  
More details of the Vanke case can be found in 3.4.3 of this chapter. 
269 Deng Rui and Guan Yanfang, ‘控股股东的诚信义务与中小股东利益的保护 (Controlling Shareholders’ 
Fiduciary Duty and Minority Shareholder Protection’, 2 (2011) 特区经济 (Special Zone Economy), pp. 
145-146. 
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3.3 Minority shareholder protection through monitoring 
mechanisms in China 
Listed companies’ disclosures are directly linked to minority shareholders’ right 
to know, information asymmetry and the external supervision of the securities 
market and the CSRC. Likewise, the internal supervision system of a listed 
company is closely related to minority interests, since it oversees both 
management and the controlling shareholder. Accordingly, this part intends to 
explore how minority shareholders are protected by disclosure and the 
internal supervision system of a Chinese listed company.  
3.3.1 Disclosure 
Elaboration on disclosure follows three steps: a brief introduction to Chinese 
legislation, mainstream academic views on the disclosure of Chinese listed 
companies based on existing research and a discussion on the obstacles and 
elements that are detrimental to the transparency, as well as suggestions for 
potential improvements. 
3.3.1.1 Disclosure in legislation 
The main disclosure legislation in China covers the Chinese Company Law, the 
Chinese Securities Law, the Chinese Corporate Governance Code and the 
Regulation on Listed Companies’ Information Disclosure. 
Generally speaking, Chinese legislation regulates the disclosure of a listed 
company in relation to four elements, namely disclosure obligations, obligators, 
supervision and liabilities. First, disclosure obligations cover both positive and 
negative disclosures. A positive disclosure demands a listed company 
continuously and in a timely manner270 discloses truthful, accurate, 
complete,271 understandable272 and substantial information, and it should 
also ensure all shareholders have equal access to this information. Besides 
 
270 Article 88, CCGC. 
271 Article 78, disclosure standards of “simplify, clear and easy to understand” were newly added into the 
revised 2020 CSL. 
272 Article 92, CCGC. 
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mandatory disclosure, listed companies are encouraged to disclose voluntarily 
other useful information, but this disclosure should not serve any illegal 
purpose.273 A negative disclosure states the clear prohibition of “false entries, 
misleading statements or major omissions”.274 Second, the obligators of 
information disclosure concern issuers and their directors, supervisors, senior 
management personnel,275 the sponsor, the underwriter, the controlling 
shareholder or the actual controller.276 Third, Article 87 of the revised 2020 
CSL delegates “the securities regulatory authority under the State Council” and 
the “stock exchanges” to oversee disclosure. Furthermore, Article 9 of the 
Regulation on Listed Companies’ Information Disclosure (hereinafter 
Information Disclosure Regulation)277 specifies that the CSRC and the stock 
exchange are two supervision bodies for information disclosure.278 Fourth, 
Article 197279 of the revised 2020 CSL states that a breach of the disclosure 
duty will lead to a correction, a warning and a fine of no less than 500,000 RMB 
but no more than 5 million RMB. For the directly-in-charge person and other 
directly responsible persons, a warning and a fine of no less than 200,000RMB 
but no more than 2 million RMB will be imposed. If the controlling shareholder 
or the actual controller organizes or instigates the illegal conduct, the 
sanctions mentioned above also apply. For “false entries, misleading 
statements or major ommissions”, the fine was raised to no less than 1 million 
RMB but no more than 10 million RMB; and its direct responsible persons’ fine 
was raised to no less than 500,000 and no more than 5 million RMB.  
Chinese legislation enumerates the scope of disclosure of listed companies in 
eight ways:  
 
273 Article 91, CCGC. 
274 Article 78, revised 2020 CSL. 
275 Article 82, revised 2020 CSL. 
276 Article 85, revised 2020 CSL.  
277 上市公司信息披露管理办法 (Regulation on Listed Companies’ Information Disclosure), issued by China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue January 30th 2007. 
278 Specifically, Article 9 stipulates that the CSRC is in charge of supervising disclosed documents and related 
announcements, and managing information disclosure, and also the behaviours of the controlling shareholder, 
actual controller and other responsible persons for information disclosure. The stock exchange shall monitor 
disclosures of listed companies and other responsible persons, to urge them to disclose accurately and in a 
timely manner the required information, and to monitor the trading of securities and other derivative products. 
However, listing rules and other rules of information disclosure employed by the stock exchange shall be 
approved by the CSRC. 
279 In comparison with Article 193 of the 2014 CSL, the amendment imposed a harsher punishment by raising 
the fine range from 300,000 to 500,000 RMB, from 600,000 to 5 million RMB, from 30,000 to 200,000 RMB, 
from 300,000 to 2 milllion RMB, from 300,000 to 1 million RMB, from 600,000 to 10 million RMB, from 30,000 
to 500,000 RMB, and from 300,000 to 5 million RMB. 
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- Listing documents: Article 64 of the 2014 CSL specifies that the public 
issuance of shares or corporate bonds, the prospectus or methods used for 
fundraising should be made public. For the issuance of new shares or bonds, 
financial and accounting reports should also be released. However, the 
revised 2020 CSL deleted this Article. 
- Basic company reports: these refer to the mandatory disclosure of a listed 
company’s interim report,280 annual report281 and provisional report.282  
- 5% shareholding disclosure: the obligation to disclose when an acquirer 
owns more than 5% of a company’s shares through the stock exchange, 
which will be further discussed in paragraph 3.4.1 of this chapter. 
- Remunerations: article 116 of the CCL imposes a general obligation on the 
company to disclose regularly the remunerations of directors, supervisors 
and senior management personnel. 
 
280 According to Article 65 of the 2014 CSL, the interim report shall cover financial and accounting reports, the 
state of the business; major litigations; changes to issued shares or corporate bonds; important issues 
considered by the general meeting and other issues prescribed by the securities regulatory authority under the 
State Council. However, Article 79 of the revised 2020 CSL deleted the above specific requirements and only 
generally required the release of the interim report. 
281 Pursuant to Article 66, the annual report shall disclose the general situation; financial and accounting 
reports, the state of the business; a brief introduction to directors, supervisors and senior management 
personnel as well as their respective shareholdings; the situation regarding issued shares and corporate bonds, 
a list of the top 10 shareholders and their respective shareholdings; the actual controller and other issues 
prescribed by the securities regulatory authority under the State Council. However, Article 79 of the revised 
2020 CSL deleted the above specific requirements and only generally required the release of the annual report. 
282 When a major event which may considerably affect the market price of shares has happened, and such an 
event has not been made known to the shareholders, Article 67 of the 2014 CSL requires the immediate 
submission of a provisional report to the securities regulatory authority under the State Council and the stock 
exchange. In addition, the report must be publicised. Based on Article 67, a “major event” refers to a 
fundamental change in business policy or the scope of business; major decisions on investments or the 
purchase of assets (Article 80 of the revised 2020 CSL added a standard of 30% of the company assets); the 
conclusion of an important contract which may have a considerable impact on assets, liabilities, rights and 
interests or business results (added important garantees or related-party transactions); the incurring of 
significant debts or default on significant debts at maturity; a major deficit or loss; a major change to external 
business conditions; the replacement of directors, or one-third or more of supervisors or managers ( added 
that “ and the chairman or manager cannot perfom his or her duties”); a big change to the actual controller or 
shareholder with a 5% or more than 5% shareholding ( added that “a big change to the actual controller and 
his or her other enterprises that run similar or the same business”); a decision on capital reduction, mergers, 
division, dissolution or bankruptcy ( added that “important changes to dividend distribution, shareholding 
structure as well as legally enter bankrupt procedure or closed down”); a major litigation (added “abitration”) 
or the nullification or rescission of a resolution of the general meeting or the board of directors; a criminal 
investigation into the company or (added the controlling shareholder , actual controller) a director, supervisor, 
or senior management personnel who has been held as a criminal suspect and under compulsory measure of 
the judiciary and other issues prescribed by the securities regulatory authority under the State Council. Article 
80 of the revised 2020 CSL also added the controlling shareholder or actual controller’s inform and disclose 
obligations regarding major events. 
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- Financial and accounting reports: apart from the basic company reports, 
Article 165 of the CCL stipulates a general rule that listed companies should 
publicise their financial and accounting reports. 
- Information on the environment, social and governance (ESG): to improve 
the ESG scores of Chinese listed companies, the 2018 revision of the CCGC 
incorporated ESG reporting by adding Articles 95 and 96. Namely, a listed 
company should disclose relevant environmental information and provide 
information on its social responsibilities.283 Besides, a listed company 
should disclose relevant corporate governance information and regularly 
analyse the status quo, devise plans to improve corporate governance and 
then implement these plans.284 
- Shareholder information: persons such as shareholders who reach a 
disclosure threshold, actual controller, acquirer and its transaction party 
etc., should disclose information required by relevant regulations, 
cooperate with the disclosure of the listed company and inform the listed 
company about major events in a timely manner, such as changes of control, 
changes of ownership and affiliated relationships.285  
- Related-party transactions: directors, supervisors, senior management 
personnel, shareholders who hold 5% or more shares and those who act in 
concert, and the actual controller of a listed company, should report in a 
timely manner the names and relationships of the related parties to the 
board of directors.286 
3.3.1.2 Disclosure in practice 
Based on available academic research, three observations on disclosure can be 
noted. First, the transparency of the Chinese securities market needs to be 
further improved. For example, it has been demonstrated that the average 
 
283 Article 95, CCGC. 
284 Article 96, CCGC. 
285 Article 90, CCGC. 
286 Article 48, Information Disclosure Regulation. Moreover, the listed company shall follow the deliberation 
procedure of related-party transactions and strictly exclude interested parties from voting on the related 
issues.  
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information cost287 in mainland China is twice as great as the information cost 
of the Hong Kong market.288  
Second, Chinese listed companies still face big challenges in terms of 
information asymmetries and unsatisfactory information disclosures.289 
Research has shown that during the period 2002-2010, the quality of 
information disclosed by A share listed companies on the SZSE was rather 
unstable, and most of the disclosures could hardly be regarded as 
satisfactory.290 Furthermore, statistics from 2008 to 2012 show that there 
were 757 breaches of disclosure duty cases among Chinese listed companies. 
Specifically, there were 275 delays (36.3%), 252 major omissions (33.3%), 189 
false statements (25%) and 41 fraudulent profits and assets (5.4%).291 
Moreover, research highlights that information disclosed by Chinese listed 
companies is “abundant but empty”, and there is very little valuable material 
that can be used by shareholders.292 Taking the disclosure of major events as 
an example, empirical research observes an abundance of low-quality 
information.293  
Third, it has been claimed that the disclosure of fraudulent accounting 
information is the “Chinese chronic disease”.294 Publicly known influential 
cases illustrate the seriousness of this problem. In 2010, for instance, Huang 
Guanyu, the founder of GOME Electrical Appliances (国美电器), was 
 
287 According to Farlex Financial Dictionary, information costs include everything an individual or company 
spends when investigating whether a particular investment or activity is prudent and/or likely to be profitable, 
available at http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Information+costs. Last visited February 2019.  
288 Wang Yihui, Liao Li and Deng Xiao Tie, ‘不对称信息，交易成本与投资者保护：内地（中国大陆）和香港
的比较研究 (Asymmetry of Information, Transaction Costs and Investor Protection: Comparative Research 
between Mainland China and Hong Kong)’, 10 (2003) 金融研究 (Journal of Financial Research), pp. 27-36. 
289证券市场中小投资者利益保护问题系统研究(Systematic Research on Protection of Small-and-Medium 
Investors in the Securities Market), available at http://www.sipf.com.cn/tzzjy/tbyj/2010/01/2750_2.shtml. Last 
visited February 2019. 
290 Luo Jinhui, ‘上市公司的信息披露质量为何摇摆不定? (Why Quality of the Information Disclosed by Listed 
Companies Are Unstable?)’, 1 (2014) 投资研究 (Review of Investment Studies), pp. 134-152. 
291 Mi Zhiqiang and Xie Ruifeng, ‘上市公司信息披露违规研究 (Research on Illegal Information Disclosure of 
Listed Companies)’, 1 (2015) 价值工程 (Value Engineering), pp. 160-162.  
292 Chen Junlan and Xie Chi, ‘上市公司信息披露质量测度与评价 (Measurement and Evaluation of the 
Quality of the Disclosed Information of Listed Companies)’, 23 (2013) 证券市场导报 (Securities Market 
Herald), pp. 25-33. 
293 Zhang Zongxin and Zhu Weiye, ‘我国上市公司信息披露质量的实证研究 (Empirical Research on the 
Quality of the Disclosed Information of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 1 (2007) 南开经济研究 (Nankai 
Economic Studies), pp. 45-59. 
294 Liu Liguo and Du Ying, ‘公司治理与会计信息质量关系的实证研究 (An Empirical Research on the 
Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Quality of Accounting Information)’, 2 (2003) 会计研究 
(Accounting Research), pp. 28-36. 
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sentenced to 14 years’ imprisonment for bribery, insider trading and illegal 
transactions. Furthermore, the disclosure of fraudulent financial information 
was the instrument through which Huang conducted financial fraud. In 2011, it 
was reported that “Xin Da Di (新大地)” had forged profits of 20.4236 million 
RMB. Additionally, it was condemned for major omissions in its 2012 
pre-disclosed prospectus. In 2013, based on the announcement of 
administrative penalty decisions, 10 listed companies were punished by the 
CSRC or local securities regulatory bureaus for financial fraud. Furthermore, 
another nine listed companies were still under financial fraud investigation by 
the CSRC.295 The insufficient punishment lowers disclosure rules’ deterrent 
effect and accounts for continuing illegal disclosure in the Chinese securities 
market.296 
3.3.1.3 Analysis 
Disclosure has been demonstrated through empirical evidence to be closely 
related to minority shareholder protection in China.297 For instance, research 
has shown that low-quality disclosure leads to severer tunnelling,298 insider 
trading299 and unstable business in Chinese listed companies.300 On the 
contrary, a higher quality of disclosure can encourage Chinese listed 
companies to distribute dividends to their shareholders, and those with better 
transparency also tend to distribute more cash dividends.301  
 
295 More information regarding the above cases, see: Zhang Yong, ‘我国上市公司财务造假现状, 成因及对策
分析(Analysis on the Status quo, Causation and Solution of Financial Fraud of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 11 
(2014) 市场研究 (Marketing Research), pp. 61-62. 
296 Li Jianwei and Li Jia qi, ‘中美股票市场比较分析与启示( The Comparative Analysis and its Enlightenment of 
China-US Stock Market)’, 33 (2019) 湖南大学学报 (Journal of Hunan University), pp.37-51. 
297 Lan Wenyong and Wei Mingsheng, ‘我国上市公司信息披露机制实证检验-基于投资者保护的视角
(Empirical Examination on the Information Disclosure System of Chinese Listed Companies—From the 
Perspective of Investor Protection)’, 8 (2009) 广西社会科学 (Guangxi Social Science), pp. 46-51. 
298 Wang Kemin, Ji Meiguang and Li Wei, ‘公司信息透明度与大股东资金占用研究 (Corporate Transparency 
and Tuneling)’, 4 (2009) 南开管理评论 (Nankai Business Review), pp. 83-91. 
299 Qu Wenzhou and Cai Zhiyue, ‘我国上市公司信息披露违规的动因实证研究 (An Empirical Study on the 
Motive of Illegal Disclosure of Listed Companies in China)’, 4 (2007) 中国工业经济 (China Industrial 
Economy), pp. 96-103. 
300 Quan Xiaofeng and Wu Shinong, ‘CEO 权力强度、信息披露质量与公司业绩的波动性——基于深交所上
市公司的实证研究 (CEO Power, Quality of Information Disclosure and Volatility of Business—An Empirical 
Research Based on Listed Companies of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange)’, 4 (2010) 南开管理评论 (Nankai 
Business Review), pp. 142-153. 
301 The research was based on the empirical evidence of A share listed companies on the SZSE during 
2003-2010. See: Xu Shoufu, ‘信息披露、公司治理与现金股利政策：来自深市 A 股上市公司的经验证据 
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As presented in 3.3.1.1, existing Chinese legislation has imposed 
comprehensive disclosure obligations on listed companies. To increase the 
transparency of the Chinese market, it is important to address incentives, the 
institutional environment and other related elements. First, the highly 
concentrated ownership structure has an impact on both the incentive to 
disclose and the incentive to monitor. In a listed company, there is significant 
information asymmetry between minority shareholders and management. 
Different from minority shareholders, the controlling shareholder who has 
control over the company, and probably also dominates the board, has many 
informal channels through which to obtain information from within a 
company.302 In other words, this information gap also exists between minority 
shareholders and the controlling shareholder. Both management and the 
controlling shareholder may have incentives to withhold information, in order 
to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders.  
When it comes to the incentive to monitor, the concentrated ownership 
structure exhibits both sides of the same coin. The bright side is that the 
controlling shareholder may have a strong incentive to monitor management 
disclosure, which also serves the interests of minority shareholders. However, 
if the company controller is the one abusing the information asymmetry, then 
minority shareholders may be exploited. In this event, the safety of minority 
interests can only depend on the supervision of the CSRC, the securities market 
or minority shareholders themselves. Nevertheless, none of these “solutions” 
would be easy in China; for instance, the CSRC may face an accusation of 
self-supervision when the controlling shareholder is the state, and the quality 
of the supervision of the securities market has been challenged by empirical 
research.303 For the last option, the “rational apathy”304 and “free-rider”305 
 
(Information Disclosure, Corporate Governance and Cash Dividend Policy: Empirical Evidence from A share 
Listed Companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange)’, 1 (2013) 证券市场导报 (Securities Market Herald), pp. 
1-11. 
302 Chun Yip Yuen, Ming Liu, Xu Zhang and Chan Lu, ‘A Case Study of Voluntary Disclosure by Chinese 
Enterprises’, 1 (2009) Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting, pp. 118-145. 
303 The empirical research, based on a sample of A share Chinese listed companies on the SZSE during 
2002-2010, found that the “ups and downs” of the qualities of the disclosed information do not necessarily 
affect the share price or market values of the company. See: Luo Jinhui, ‘上市公司的信息披露质量为何摇摆
不定? (Why is the Quality of the Information Disclosed by Listed Companies Unstable?)’, 1 (2014) 投资研究 
(Review of Investment Studies), pp. 134-152. 
304 “Rational apathy” claims that it is a shareholder’s rational choice not to be involved in a company 
operation after the cost-benefit analysis regarding enforcement of his or her rights.  
See: Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown, 1986), pp. 390-392. 
See also: Bernard S. Black, ‘Shareholder Passivity Reexamined’, 89 (1990) Michigan Law Review, pp. 520-608. 
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concerns have been known as obstacles to shareholder governance. Facing a 
powerful controller, these obstacles may become even more difficult for 
minority shareholders to overcome, and thus they may have fewer incentives 
to monitor the disclosure of the company.  
Second, the institutional environment plays an important role in achieving a 
more transparent securities market. To begin with, accounting rules and the 
independence of auditors are crucial for disclosure. Some researchers claim 
that immature accounting rules and the unwillingness to follow full disclosure 
are two of the reasons why the accounting and reporting practices of Chinese 
listed companies still lag behind international accounting standards.306 In 
addition, some auditors assert that there is a “race to the bottom” competition 
among auditing firms in China. Qin Xiaodong (George Qin), the partner and 
China affairs responsible person for the US auditing firm Malone Bailey, 
revealed that his Chinese clients once took him to task: “Why are you being so 
serious? You have to adapt to the unspoken Chinese rules if you want to do 
business here. Even some local governments are helping corporations with 
fraudulent financial disclosures”. Furthermore, these complaints came from 
not only clients, but also other auditors.307 Another research claims that the 
listed company is actually a relatively new concept in China. Many Chinese 
listed companies were transformed from the state-owned enterprises and 
unavoidably inherited the “old” governance problems. The pressure to survive 
on the securities market may tempt some companies to breach financial 
disclosure obligations and to forge good financial record.308 Besides the above 
 
305 The “free-rider” concern can be illustrated from two perspectives: on the one hand, due to the 
“opportunistic” consideration, it is easy for shareholders to sit still and do nothing but wish they could share 
information interests relying on other shareholders’ monitoring behaviours; on the other hand, even if we 
assume shareholders are all highly moral people and there is no free-rider, Easterbrook argued that it will still 
cause waste if everybody repeats the same work, and it will also interrupt the division of labour. See: Frank H. 
Easterbrook, ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’, 70 (1984) Virginia Law Review, pp. 
669-715. 
306 Lin Z. Jun and Wang Liyan, ‘Financial Disclosure and Accounting Harmonization: Cases of Three Listed 
Companies in China’, 16 (2001) Managerial Auditing Journal, pp. 263-273. 
307 Qin told the journalist that one peer approached him and warned him during a conference in Beijing that 
“if you continue to be so strict with the Chinese listed companies, then no one will dare to invest in the 
Chinese stock market, and we will all have no business in the future”. Qin also expressed his concern that his 
auditing firm had lost a good deal of business with Chinese clients, due to its reputation for strict auditing. See: 
Wang Zhen, 近 3 月中国 19 家在美上市公司遭停牌或摘牌 (New York Exchange sanctioned 19 Chinese 
Companies for Stock Suspension or Delisting in the Past 3 Months), available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/c/20110608/12369958941.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
308 Yang Shizhong, Liu Saiding, ‘我国上市公司会计信息披露暨审计质量分析 (An Analysis of Audit Quality 
and Accounting Information Disclosure of China Listed Companies)’, 2 (2013) 审计与经济研究 (Journal of 
Audit & Economics), pp. 42-48. 
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academic evidence, on December 3rd 2012, for the purpose of protecting US 
investors from accounting fraud perpetrated by Chinese companies listed on 
the US securities market, the SEC brought a charge against Chinese affiliates of 
four big accounting firms. This news cast serious doubt on the credibility of 
accounting firms in China.309 
Furthermore, research points out that unsatisfactory law enforcement 
negatively affects the disclosure of Chinese listed companies,310 so the 
supervision of the CSRC should be further improved. For example, it has been 
found that the CSRC, in many cases, has failed to discover forgery company 
prospectuses.311 Regarding the breach of disclosure obligations, the CSRC 
mainly relies on soft measures, such as corrections and warnings, instead of 
harsher administrative sanctions. Based on 563 published disclosure-related 
cases dating from 2000 to 2012, there were 204 cases on which the CSRC 
imposed administrative sanctions, and there were 352 (62.52%) cases were 
merely subjected to self-discipline.312 Empirical studies for the period of 2006 
to 2014 revealed that the CSRC imposed very low sanctions on directors, 
independent directors, supervisors and senior managers.313 Scholarly opinion 
asserts that the punishment for fraudulent financial disclosure is too low to 
deter offenders in China.314 For example, Nanfang Gufen (南纺股份) 
continuously forged 344 million RMB profits over a five-year period; however, 
the company only faced a fine of 500,000 RMB, without any other penalty such 
as delisting or criminal prosecution. Another company, Lv Dadi (绿大地), even 
though it acquired its listing qualification by fraudulent pratices, was not 
subjected to delisting, and it even received a government subsidy of 13.072 
million RMB. Similarly, ST Yaxin (ST 亚星), despite being sanctioned by the 
 
309 SEC Charges China Affiliates of Big Four Accounting Firms with Violating US Securities Laws in Refusing to 
Produce Documents, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2012-2012-249htm. Last visited 
February 2019. 
310 Lin Z. Jun and Wang Liyan, ‘Financial Disclosure and Accounting Harmonization: Cases of Three Listed 
Companies in China’, 16 (2001) Managerial Auditing Journal, pp. 263-273. 
311 Li Boqiao and Wang Pei, ‘中国证监会信息监管的法律反思 (Introspection of the CSRC’s Supervision on 
Information Disclosure)’, 22 (2004) 河北法学 (Hebei Law Science), pp. 103-105. 
312 Li Wenhua, ‘我国上市公司信息披露违法违规监管执法问题研究 (Research on the Law Enforcement of 
Breaches of Disclosure Obligations of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 1 (2015) 西南金融 (Southwest Finance), pp. 
56-60. 
313 Zhang Fang and Li Xiang, ‘对证监会执法强度的实证分析(Quantitative Analysis of CSRC Enforcement 
Intensity)’, 38 (2016) 现代法学 (Modern Law Science), pp. 173-183. 
314 Zhang Yong, ‘我国上市公司财务造假现状, 成因及对策分析 (Analysis on the Status quo, Causation and 
Solution of Financial Fraud of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 11 (2014) 市场研究 (Marketing Research), pp. 
61-62. 
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CSRC twice in 2013, also received a government subsidy of 150 million RMB in 
the same year.315 And even when a huge fine of 449 million RMB was imposed 
on Yi’an Keji (亿安科技), it was never implemented in practice.316  
In search of the reasons behind this phenomenon, research indicates that in 
the early days of the Chinese securities market, the security regulatory 
authority faced a difficult dilemma.317 On the one hand, it should safeguard 
the interests of investors, but on the other hand, it was burdened with the task 
of assisting in the financing of state-owned enterprises. It was this dilemma 
that led to the unique Chinese phenomenon “selective supervision”. However, 
with the modernisation of Chinese listed companies, the goal of “investor 
protection” has gradually aligned with the goal of “facilitating the growth of 
state-owned listed companies”. Thus, the CSRC is expected to oversee in equal 
measure the disclosure of all listed companies and to build up a more 
transparent securities market in the future.318  
In addition to the CSRC, courts’ enforcement of disclosure rules is rather weak. 
In 2001, the Supreme People’s Court issued the Notice on Temporarily Stop 
Accepting Civil Securities Compensation Cases.319 In 2002, the Supreme 
People’s Court promulgated the Notice on Related Issues of Civil Tort Cases 
caused by Securities False Statement (hereinafter 2002 Notice).320 Thus, 
instead of an absolute rejection, courts can accept private securities cases 
caused by false statements. Besides, Article 2 of the 2002 Notice imposes 
another filter, namely that only false statement cases which previously have 
been sanctioned by the CSRC or its agencies can be brought to courts. 
Subsequently in 2003, the Supreme People’s Court enacted Provisions on 
Adjudicating Civil Compensation Cases caused by Securities False Statement 
 
315 Ibid.  
316 Cases on the breach of disclosure obligations are rarely brought to court for civil and criminal liabilities in 
China. See: Li Boqiao and Wang Pei, ‘中国证监会信息监管的法律反思 (Introspection of the CSRC’s 
Supervision on Information Disclosure)’, 22 (2004) 河北法学 (Hebei Law Science), pp. 103-105. 
317 Zhao Juan, ‘国有上市公司信息披露监管分析 (Analysis on Information Release Regulation of 
State-owned Listed Enterprises)’, 3 (2011) 技术经济与管理研究 (Technoeconomics & Management 
Research), pp. 96-101. 
318 Ibid. 
319 最高人民法院关于涉及证券民事赔偿案件暂不予受理的通知 (Notice on Temporarily Stop Accepting 
Civil Securities Compensation Cases ), Supreme People’s Court, date of issue 21st September 2001, invalid.  
320 最高人民法院关于受理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事侵权纠纷案件有关问题的通知 (Notice on 
Related Issues of Civil Tort Cases caused by Securities False Statement), Supreme People’s Court, date of issue 
15th January 2002. 
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(hereinafter 2003 Provisions).321 The 2003 Provisions further clarify conditions 
to file a private securities’ false statement litigation. For example, Articles 5 
and 6 expand the scope of the filter prescribed in Article 2 of the 2002 Notice. 
Besides cases sanctioned by the CSRC and its agencies, the 2003 Provisions 
allows securities’ false statement cases which were under administrative 
penalties imposed by the Ministry of Finance or other administrative 
authorities, or had been found criminally guilty, to enter into judicial 
proceedings. This situation lasted until the promulgation of the Opinion on 
Promoting the Reform of the Registration System for Case Docket in 2015.322 
This reform replaced the previous substantial review with the registration 
system. In other words, administrative sanctions are no longer a precondition 
for bringing securities’ false statement litigation in courts.323 Very recently, the 
revised 2020 CSL established a Chinese style of “class action” for securities civil 
compensation suits, and affirmed that the ISC may act as the litigation 
“representative” with 50 or more shareholders’ authorizations. With the 
removal of the legislative obstacle, courts should gradually accept more breach 
of disclosure cases, in order to facilitate the enforcement of disclosure rules. 
Furthermore, with the recent development of the ISC project, the ISC should 
actively represent minority shareholders to bring direct action and seek 
compensation for any breach of disclosure duties based on tort.  
Third, other elements influence the effect of disclosure. Research has found 
that elements such as the size and ownership structure of the firm, its 
composition, structure and the functioning of the board and director 
remuneration are related to the voluntary disclosure of a firm.324 Another 
study, based on a sample of 472 listed companies on the SZSE in 2006, found 
that listed companies with an audit committee have higher information 
 
321 最高人民法院关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定 (Provisions on 
Adjudicating of Civil Compensation Cases based on Securities False Statement), Supreme People’s Court, date 
of issue 9th January 2003. 
322 最高人民法院关于印发《关于人民法院推行立案登记制改革的意见》的通知 (Notice of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Issuing the Opinions on Promoting the Reform of the Registration System for Case Docket by 
the People’s Courts), Supreme People’s Courts, date of issue 14 April 2015. 
323 Xiao Danfeng, ‘虚假陈述案件部分法律适用问题 (Legal Application Problems of False Statement Cases)’, 
1 (2020) 合作经济与科技 ( Co-operative Economy & Science), pp.179-183. 
324 Chun Yip Yuen, Ming Liu, Xu Zhang and Chan Lyu, ‘A Case Study of Voluntary Disclosure by Chinese 
Enterprises’, 1 (2009) Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting, pp. 118-145. 
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disclosure quality in comparison to those without an audit committee.325 
Apart from the audit committee, Chinese legislation accords “the secretary of 
board of directors” to be in charge of the information disclosure of listed 
companies.326 It has been argued that qualified minority shareholders, such as 
institutional investors, are more capable and more motivated to monitor 
disclosure, in comparison with individual minority shareholders.327 Based on 
statistics for Chinese listed companies from 2007-2010, research has found 
that the existence of long-term institutional investors is positively related to 
the voluntary disclosure of a company. Furthermore, this positive relationship 
becomes stronger when the institutional investors hold a larger shareholding 
in a concentrated company.328 
In sum, the reason behind a listed company’s breach of disclosure duty is that 
the benefit outweighs the cost of violation. To enhance the transparency of 
listed companies, it requires stronger supervision to impose a higher violation 
cost. This supervision is both internal and external. “Outward” supervision 
consists of the securities market and the CSRC. Specifically, the establishment 
of efficient market supervision demands an improvement in the credibility of 
intermediate agencies, such as accounting firms and law firms, as well as a 
more sensitive market which can quickly discipline any breach of disclosure 
duty with a lower share price. The CSRC should strengthen its supervision of 
 
325 Cai Weixing and Gao Minghua, ‘审计委员会与信息披露质量: 来自中国上市公司的经验证据 (The Audit 
Committee and Information Disclosure: Empirical Evidence of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 4 (2009) 南开管理
评论 (Nankai Business Review), pp. 120-127. 
It is to clarify here that with the revision of CCGC in 2018, the audit committee has become mandatory for 
Chinese listed companies. 
326 First of all, Article 123 of the CCL prescribes that a secretary of the board of directors is in charge of 
preparing the general meeting and the meeting of the board of directors, preserving company files and 
shareholder data and disclosing information. On the basis of which, Articles 28 and 93 of the CCGC emphasise 
the information disclosure obligation of the secretary of the board of directors. It stipulates that the secretary 
organises and coordinates information disclosure issues, and he/she is in charge of publishing any disclosure. 
The secretary prepares and reserves documents of the general meeting, manages shareholders’ materials, 
conducts disclosures and coordinates investor relationships. To fulfill their obligations, the secretary is entitled 
to participate in relevant meetings, inspect relevant documents and inform him or herself of the financial and 
operating situations of the company. In addition, Article 28 underlines that the board of directors and 
managers shall positively support the secretary to fulfill his or her obligations. To guarantee the independence 
of the secretary, it claims that no interference can be imposed on his or her work. Moreover, Article 45 of the 
Information Disclosure Regulation provides a more detailed provision. 
327 Wu Xia, ‘国有控股上市公司会计信息披露监管的探讨(Discussion on the Supervision of Disclosure of 
Accounting Information of State-owned Listed Companies)’, 2 (2011) 审计与理财 (Auditing and Finance), pp. 
40-41. 
328 Niu Jianbo, Wu Chao and Li Shengnan, ‘机构投资者类型、股权特征和自愿性信息披露 (Institutional 
Investor Types, Equity Characteristics and Voluntary Disclosure)’, 25 (2013) 管理评论 (Management Review), 
pp. 48-59.  
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the securities market and impose stricter sanctions on severe misconduct. 
Equally, the CSRC should regulate the disclosure of both state-owned and 
non-state-owned listed companies. Correspondingly, “inward” supervision 
refers to more effective corporate governance within a listed company. Under 
the concentrated ownership structure, both the controlling shareholder and 
management may have incentives to abuse information asymmetry. Hence, 
the controlling shareholder should increase his or her supervision of 
management disclosure. However, if the controlling shareholder fails to 
supervise, or even actively abuses information asymmetry, then the solution 
may orient towards the involvement of the audit committee and the secretary 
of the board of directors and look at whether the participation of qualified 
minority shareholders can have certain restrictions on the controller. In 
addition, courts should gradually play a greater role in regulating breaches of 
disclosure obligations. Consequently, shareholders’ incentive to monitor could 
also be encouraged. 
3.3.2 Supervision 
In this part, the internal supervision of Chinese listed companies is first 
discussed in law, following which the functioning of internal supervision is 
assessed from an academic viewpoint. Current challenges and future 
developments are summarised in the end of the subsection. 
3.3.2.1 Supervision in legislation 
Chinese legislation regulating the internal supervision system of a listed 
company mainly consists of the Chinese Company Law, the Chinese Corporate 
Governance Code, the Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of Independent 
Director System in Listed Companies and the Provision on Strengthening the 
Protection of the Rights and Interests of Public Shareholders. 
In China, a listed company consists of two boards, namely the board of 
directors and the supervisory board. For the board of directors, independent 
directors are also required. Supervisors and independent directors are in 
charge of internal supervision. 
The supervisory board 
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The supervisory board is regulated in the CCL mainly through three Articles. 
Article 117 provides that it should have at least three members, and the 
supervisors should include both shareholder representatives and a minimum 
one-third of employee representatives.329 A director or senior manager is 
forbidden from concurrently holding the position of supervisor.330 Supervisors’ 
power to oversee directors and senior management personnel is grounded in 
Article 118, which entitles them, as non-voting participants, to attend board 
meetings at which they may raise questions or give suggestions on discussed 
issues.331 The supervisory board also has the competence to conduct an 
investigation when it notices any abnormality in the operation of the company, 
and an accounting firm can be hired, with the cost paid for by the company.332 
When a director or senior manager’s behaviour damages the company’s 
interests, the supervisory board has the power to require a correction. 
Ultimately, the supervisory board has the power to make proposals to remove 
directors or managers, but it has no determination power on the issue. Article 
119 centres on the supervisory board meeting, which is held at least every six 
months and where supervisors can also propose to convene interim meetings 
of the supervisory board.333  
Independent directors 
 
329 Under Article 117, the articles of association can stipulate the specific proportion of employee 
representatives on the supervisory board. However, employee representatives shall make up no fewer than 
one-third of the members of the supervisory board.  
330 Moreover, based on Article 52 of the CCL, the term of office of a supervisor is three years and re-election is 
possible. In addition to the CCL, Article 45 of the CCGC sets down the qualifications of supervisors, namely a 
supervisor shall be equipped with professional knowledge or working experience. 
331 Besides the right to attend meetings of the board of directors, Article 48 of the CCGC prescribes that the 
supervisory board may request that directors, managers, other senior management personnel and internal or 
external auditing personnel be present at the meeting of the board of supervisors and to answer related 
questions. 
332 In addition to the supervision of directors and managers, Article 118 CCL also affirms the supervisory 
board’s power to inspect any company financial issues, to propose to convene interim shareholders’ meetings, 
to convene and preside over the general meeting when the board of directors fails in this duty, to submit 
proposals to the general meeting, to bring a lawsuit against a director or senior management person when 
conditions prescribed in Article 151 have been satisfied (However, according to Article 151, the board of 
supervisors does not enjoy independent power to bring an action against directors or senior management 
personnel. The precondition for exercising this power is a written request submitted by the shareholders), and 
other powers granted by the articles of association. 
333 Regarding voting rules and deliberation procedures, the law grants discretion to the articles of association, 
but it confirms that resolutions passed by the supervisory board shall be passed by simple majority, and 
supervisors presented at the meeting shall sign their names on the meeting minutes.  
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According to Article 122 of the CCL, the independent director system is a 
prerequisite for a listed company. Nevertheless, the CCL does not specify any 
details but leaves them to other regulations or rules.  
The CCGC defines the independent director system in terms of two general 
aspects, namely directors should be independent from major shareholders and 
act as the guardians of minority shareholders. Article 35 of the CCGC states 
that a listed company should have independent directors who have no 
connections with the firm or major shareholders. Article 36 mandates that 
independent directors should not be influenced by major shareholders, actual 
controllers or other entities or individuals who may have interests in the listed 
company.334 Moreover, Article 37335 emphasises that independent directors 
should “particularly focus on lawful rights and interests of small-and-medium 
shareholders”.336 Since the latest 2018 CCGC revision, the audit committee is 
mandatory for Chinese listed companies. However, other special committees, 
such as the strategic committee, the nomination committee, the remuneration 
committee and the evaluation committee, are still left to the discretion of 
listed companies. Special committees, i.e. audit committees, nomination 
committees, remuneration and evaluation committees, should consist of a 
majority of independent directors.337 
Additionally, the Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of Independent Director 
System in Listed Companies (hereinafter “Independent Director Opinion”)338 
provides more detailed provisions on independent directors relating to 
proportion, qualifications, independence, minority representation and power. 
Article 1 (3) of the Independent Director Opinion states that independent 
directors should occupy at least one-third of a board of directors. With regard 
to qualifications, independent directors should include at least one 
professional accountant,339 and they should have five or more years’ working 
 
334 Article 36 also states that independent directors are entitled to special powers on certain issues based on 
the articles of association and the legislation. 
335 Article 37 also states that if there is any conflict between shareholders or directors, independent directors 
should fulfill their responsibilities, to safeguard the listed company. 
336 It has been claimed by academics that the independent director system was introduced especially for the 
interest of minority shareholders. See: Zhou Ling, ‘Independent Director System and Its Legal Transplant into 
China’, 6 (2011-2012) Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 262-291. 
337 Article 38, CCGC. 
338 关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见 (Guiding Opinion on the Establishment of Independent 
Director System in Listed Companies), China Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue August 21st 2001. 
339 Article 1, Independent Director Opinion. 
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experience in law, economics or other relevant fields.340 Besides the 
qualification requirement, a candidate still needs to pass the “independence” 
test to become an independent director. Furthermore, the Independent 
Director Opinion defines the concept of independence by excluding conditions 
of dependence. Article 3 deprives certain personnel and their lineal relatives of 
the chance to become an independent director, for example an individual 
shareholder who directly or indirectly holds more than 1% of the issued shares 
or who is one of the top ten shareholders of the listed company; a person who 
works for an entity which holds directly or indirectly more than 5% of the 
issued shares, or this entity is one of the top five shareholders of the listed 
company.341 To ensure the independence of independent directors, the CSRC 
is given the power to examine their qualifications.342 Furthermore, the CSRC 
further authorises this examination power to the two stock exchanges.343  
The Independent Director Opinion also encourages minority representation. It 
endows a shareholder who either independently or jointly holds more than 1% 
of the issued shares of a listed company with the right to nominate candidates 
for independent directors. However, the general meeting still has the final say 
on any appointments.344  
Concerning the authorities, the Independent Director Opinion stipulates that 
independent directors have special powers for certain issues, such as major 
related-party transactions, the employment of an accounting firm, interim 
general meetings, meetings of the board of directors, the engagement of 
external auditing and consulting institutions and the solicitation of proxy 
voting.345 Independent directors have the right to express their independent 
 
340 Article 2, Independent Director Opinion. 
341 Besides the above two types of people, Article 3 also stipulates that the following persons shall be 
excluded from the position of independent director: employees of the listed company or its subsidiaries, and 
their lineal relatives as well as principal social relations (lineal relatives refers to parents, spouses, children, etc. 
and principal social relations include siblings, parents-in-law, spouses of siblings, siblings of spouses, etc.); any 
person who fits any of the three types mentioned above in the past one year; any person who provides the 
listed company or its subsidiaries with financial, legal or consulting services and other services; other 
personnel determined by the articles of association and the CSRC. 
342 For those whose qualifications have been questioned by the CSRC, they can still become candidates for 
director positions but not be independent directors. Article 4, Independent Director Opinion. 
343 Jamie Allen, Li Rui, Guo Peiyuan, Li Zhaowen, Zhang Zhengjun, and Zhou Chun, Awakening Governance: The 
Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, Asian Corporate Governance Association China Corporate 
Governance Report 2018, available at https://www.acga-asia.org/specialist-research.php. Last visited February 
2019. 
344 Article 4, Independent Director Opinion. 
345 Pursuant to Article 5 of the Independent Director Opinion, a “major related-party transaction” shall be a 
total amount of more than 3 million RMB or higher than 5% of the net asset value according to the latest 
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opinions to the board of directors or the general meeting on issues that are 
likely to be contra to minority shareholders’ interests.346 
In addition to the Independent Director Opinion, an important order was issued 
in 2013 by the Organisation Department of the Communist Party of China. The 
order states that, within the first three years of retirement, party incumbents 
and former major cadres are forbidden from serving as independent directors 
of listed companies.347 
Last but not least, the Provision on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights 
and Interests of Public Shareholders (hereinafter Public Shareholder 
Provision)348 asserts that sufficient information is necessary for the effective 
functioning of the independent director system, and it particularly stresses 
cooperation between the secretary of the board of directors and independent 
directors.  
3.3.2.2 Supervision in practice 
Research provides mixed evidence on the effectiveness of the internal 
supervision of Chinese listed companies. Some academics hold the opinion 
 
auditing. A major related-party transaction first shall be acknowledged by independent directors, and 
subsequently it shall be submitted to the board of directors for discussion. And before independent directors 
make their judgment, they can hire an intermediary agency to provide an independent financial report. 
Besides, independent directors have the power to propose to the board of directors those they wish to hire or 
dismiss in terms of accounting firms, convening interim general meetings and convening meetings of the board 
of directors. Also, they can independently decide to engage external auditing and consulting institutions, as 
well as solicit proxy votes before the general meeting. If it fails any of the powers mentioned above, the listed 
company is obliged to disclose the related information. Last, Article 5 also confirms the simple majority rule for 
independent directors’ resolutions. And, if a listed company is equipped with special committees, such as a 
remuneration, auditing and nomination committee, then more than half of the committee members shall be 
independent directors.  
346 Article 6 specifies that independent directors shall issue independent opinions on the following issues: 
nomination and appointment of directors; employing or dismissing senior management personnel; the 
remuneration of directors and senior management personnel; related-party loans or other capital transactions 
which are more than 3 million RMB or higher than 5% of the net asset value according to the latest auditing, 
and also whether the listed company has taken sufficient measures to recover the loans; issues may infringe 
on minority shareholders’ interests according to independent directors’ judgment and other issues specified 
by the articles of association. 
347 关于进一步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职（任职）的意见 (Opinions on Furthering Regulating Part-time 
(Full-time) Employment in Enterprises of the Leading Cadres in the Party and Government), issued by the 
Organisation Department of the Communist Party of China, date of issue October 19th 2013. 
348 关于加强社会公众股股东权益保护的若干规定 (Provision on Strengthening the Protection of the Rights 
and Interests of Public Shareholders), issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue 
December 7th 2004. 
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that the functioning of the supervisory board is not yet sufficient.349 For 
instance, based on a sample of 55 Chinese listed companies on the SZSE which 
were sanctioned by the CSRC during 2009 and up to the first half of 2013, it has 
been shown that none of these listed companies’ supervisory boards 
discovered illegal activity.350 Moreover, the research noted that no supervisor 
had voted “no” or “abstention” for malpractices accused by the CSRC.351 More 
often than not, supervisory boards of Chinese listed companies remain 
followers of boards of directors.352 
Furthermore, scholars claim that the ineffectiveness of the supervisory board 
is the reason behind the transplantation of the independent director system in 
China.353 According to the Survey of Independent Directors in China,354 there 
were 6497 independent directors in Chinese listed companies in 2013. During 
2010 to 2013, boards of directors of A share Chinese listed companies voted 
more than 60,000 times, but only 47 “no” votes and 94 abstentions by 
 
349 Xi opines that the supervisory board is nothing more than a decorative representation of the internal 
monitoring system of a Chinese listed company. See: Xi Chao, ‘In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board 
Model: Board Reforms and the Political Economy of Corporate Law in China’, 22 (2006) Connecticut Journal of 
International Law, pp. 1-46. 
No better than a “decoration”, Yang and Yang also found that some Chinese listed companies’ supervisors can 
indeed perform their duties satisfactorily, but the majority of them still come across as “rubber stamps”. See: 
Yang Jingyuan and Yang Zhouxiao, ‘上市公司监事会的履职现状及问题探究 (Research on the Status quo of 
the Performance of the Supervisory Board of Chinese Listed Companies and its Problems)’, 10 (2013) 北方经
贸 (Northern Economy and Trade), pp. 109-110. 
350 Zhang Zhibo and Wang Guo, ‘我国上市公司监事会治理的实践 (Monitoring Practice of Supervisory 
Boards of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 1 (2014) 金陵法律评论 (Jin Ling Law Review), pp. 112-125. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ye Yang, ‘上市公司监事会形同 “鸡肋”, 三方面摆脱尴尬处境 (Supervisory Boards of Listed Companies 
only Exist on the Surface, and This Awkward Situation Shall be Removed from Three Aspects)’, 3 (2013) 证券
日报 (Securities Daily), pp. 1-2. 
353 Jin Pu, ‘公司的平衡—论独立董事和监事会的并存 (Balance of a Company-the Co-existence of the 
Independent Directors and the Supervisory Board)’, 7 (2011) 法制与社会 (Legal System and Society), pp. 
100-102. 
Also Zhou Mei, ‘德国监事会制度的最新发展及对中国监事会发展的启示 (Newest Development of the 
German Supervisory Board System and its Inspirations for the Improvement of the Chinese Supervisory Board)’, 
7 (2009) 中德法学论坛 (Johrbuch des Deutsch-Chinesischen Instituts fur Rechtswissenschatt der 
Universitaten Gottlingen undd Nanjing), pp. 92-108.  
354 中国独董生态调查 (The Survey of Independent Directors in China), available at 
http://stock.hexun.com/2014-07-29/167063245.html. Last visited February 2019. 
Compared with the 2004 Survey of Independent Directors in China, which found that 33.3% of independent 
directors never voted ‘no’ or abstained in a meeting of the board of directors. Whilst 35% of independent 
directors never issued an independent opinion on the controlling shareholder or senior managers, the 
functioning of the independent director system did not witness a big change between 2004 and 2014. See: 
Yang Yudong, Libin, Guwen and Li Minglang, ‘中国独董生存现状 (Status quo of Independent Directors in 
China)’, 6 (2004) 上海证券报 (Shanghai Securities News), available at 
http://www.ce.cn/new_hgjj/ziliao2/200410/27/t20041027_2108400.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
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independent directors were recorded. Based on annual reports, more than 
1700 listed companies stated that their independent directors were absent 
from board meetings. Moreover, research identifies four big problems with the 
independent director system in China, namely corruption, poor or non-existent 
diligence, non-independence and incompetence.355 These existing problems 
unavoidably lower independent directors’ supervision of a company, 
particularly in relation to the controlling shareholder. In the “ST Xindu (ST 新
都)” case, due to the manipulation of directors and the controlling shareholder, 
the company was trapped in numerous illegal guarantees and loans, which led 
to a 130 million RMB compensation package ruled by the court. After the 
incident, ST Xindu’s independent directors raised various proposals, such as 
replacing the audit firm and removing directors who had been appointed by 
the company controller. However, the independent directors failed to make 
any changes due to the rejection of the general meeting.356 Consequently, 
scholarly opinion asserts that the Chinese independent director system does 
not essentially solve the supervision problem but merely functions as 
“decoration”, also known as “vase directors”, or “puppets” of the controlling 
shareholder.357  
In contrast to these critiques, some research and empirical studies 
acknowledge the value of the supervisory board and the independent director 
system, observing a progressive trend. The case study of Congquin (重庆百货
大楼股份有限公司) highlighted a negative market response when a Chinese 
listed company failed to issue its supervisory board report.358 Especially after 
the 2006 amendment of the CCL, which largely increased the role of the 
supervisory board, an improvement was recorded.359 Concerning the 
 
355 Liu Xinglong, ‘独董换血更需换机制 (Reshape the Independent Director System) in 中国独董生态调查 
(The Survey of Independent Directors in China)’, available 
athttp://stock.hexun.com/2014-07-29/167061798.html. Last visited February 2019. 
356 Yang Jiao, ‘*ST 新都：独董与大股东的战斗(ST Xindu: the Fight Between Independent Directors and the 
Controlling Shareholder) in 中国独董生态调查 (The Survey of Independent Directors in China)’, available at 
http://stock.hexun.com/2014-07-29/167062580.html. Last visited February 2019. 
357 Zhou Ling, ‘The Independent Director System and Its Legal Transplant into China’, 6 (2011) Journal of 
Comparative Law, pp. 262-291. 
358 Jay Dahya, Yusuf Karbhari, Jason Zezong Xiao and Mei Yang, ‘The Usefulness of the Supervisory Board 
Report in China’, 11 (2003) Corporate Governance: An International Review, pp. 308-321. 
359 The 2006 amendment strengthened the power of the supervisory board in several aspects, such as the 
ability to propose to replace a disqualified director or manager or to bring a fraud litigation, to express 
opinions in a meeting of the board of directors, to make proposals to the general meeting, to supervise the 
CFO, secretary or the VP, to use external consultation services, etc. See: Ding Shujun, Wu Zhenyu, Li Yuanshun 
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supervisory board’s monitoring of executive compensation, research has 
uncovered significant differences before and after 2006.360 A similar opinion is 
that improvements in the supervisory board are the outcome of the powers 
strengthened in the 2006 amendment, compared to the 1994 CCL.361  
Moreover, the 2014 Report on Performance of Duty of the Supervisory Board of 
Chinese Listed Companies (hereinafter Supervisory Board Report),362 which 
was based on 576 valid questionnaires received in July 2014 from three groups, 
i.e. supervisors, management personnel, shareholders and other related 
parties of Chinese listed companies, illustrated that 41.3% of the recipients 
considered the supervisory board’s role in minority shareholder protection as 
“mediocre”, while 39.9% chose “satisfactory”, 11.3% answered “good”, 6.6% 
replied “bad” and 0.9% selected “very bad”. Likewise, the 2013 Report on 
Performance of Duty of Independent Directors of Chinese Listed Companies 
(hereinafter 2013 Independent Director Report)363 depicted a general picture 
of the independent director system in China. Based on 275 valid 
questionnaires received in August 2013 from four groups, i.e. independent 
directors, management personnel, shareholders and other related listed 
company parties, the statistics showed that 50.8% of recipients considered 
independent directors’ roles in minority shareholder protection as 
“satisfactory”, 41% responded “mediocre”, 6% responded “bad”, 1.6% 
responded “good” and one recipient (0.5%) responded as “very bad”. However, 
both reports explicitly clarified that their empirical results may be more 
optimistic than the reality, due to the fact that the above questionnaires were 
not conducted anonymously, and thus the recipients may have given higher 
ratings. Despite some positive evidence, scholars generally agree that the 
 
and Jia Chunxin, ‘Can the Chinese Two-Tier-Board System Control the Board Chair Pay?’ 1 (2009) Asian Journal 
of Finance & Accounting, pp. 1-22. 
360 Ding Shujun, Wu Zhenyu, Li Yuanshun and Jia Chunxin, ‘Executive Compensation, Supervisory Board, and 
China’s Governance Reform: A Legal Approach Perspective’, 35 (2010) Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, pp. 445-471. 
361 Ding Shujun, Wu Zhenyu, Li Yuanshun and Jia Chunxin, ‘Can the Chinese Two-Tier-Board System Control 
the Board Chair Pay?’ 1 (2009) Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting, pp. 1-22. 
362 上市公司监事会履职状况报告 (2014 Report on Performance of Duty of the Supervisory Board of Chinese 
Listed Companies), available at http://www.capco.org.cn/content_file/66/4/_1420043918_jshlzbg.pdf. Last 
visited February 2019. 
363上市公司独立董事履职情况报告 (2013 Report on Performance of Duty of Independent Directors of 
Chinese Listed Companies), available at http://www.capco.org.cn/content/26295.shtml. Last visited February 
2019. 
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internal supervision of Chinese listed companies still needs some 
improvement.364 
3.3.2.3 Analysis 
Concerning the internal supervision of Chinese listed companies, existing 
research has identified two main challenges, namely the lack of real power and 
the lack of independence.365 
First, both the supervisory board and independent directors have “soft” 
powers in China. Pursuant to Chinese legislation, the supervisory board has the 
power to demand a correction or propose a general meeting to remove a 
director or manager.366 This is very different from the typical two-tier board 
system, such as the German example, in which the supervisory board has 
substantial power to appoint and remove directors directly.367 Concerning this 
difference, critical scholarly opinion claims that “the Company Law of China 
expects that the board of supervisors will perform a supervisory role 
essentially by simply saying that it will”.368 Without any genuine power to 
select or remove directors and managers, supervisors cannot effectively 
perform their monitoring duties, even if they wish to do so.369 Furthermore, 
this lack of substantial supervisory power also worsens existing information 
asymmetry between the two boards and further lowers the efficiency of the 
supervisory board.370 
Similarly, existing research has pointed out, from a legislative point of view, 
two deficiencies in the power of independent directors. According to Chinese 
legislation, independent directors have the power to issue independent 
opinions on major events, and they also have special powers under certain 
 
364 Ding Shujun, Wu Zhenyu, Li Yuanshun and Jia Chunxin, ‘Can the Chinese Two-Tier-Board System Control 
the Board Chair Pay?’, 1 (2009) Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting, pp. 1-22.  
365 Zhou Ling, ‘The Independent Director System and its Legal Transplant into China’, 6 (2011-2012) Journal of 
Comparative Law, pp. 262-291. 
366 See paragraph 3.3.2.1  
367 Supra. 365. 
368 Donald C. Clarke, ‘The Role of Non-Legal Institutions in Chinese Corporate Governance’, in H Kanda, K S Kim 
and C J Mihaupt (eds.), Transforming Corporate Governance in East Asia (Routledge 2008), pp. 168-192. 
369 Zhao Jun, ‘Comparative Study of US and German Corporate Governance: Suggestions on the Relationship 
Between Independent Directors and the Supervisory Board of Listed Companies in China’, 18 (2009) Michigan 
State International Law Review, pp. 495-510 
370 Yang Jingyuan and Yang Zhouxiao, ‘上市公司监事会的履职现状及问题探究 (Research on the Status quo 
of the Performance of the Supervisory Board of Chinese Listed Companies and its Problems)’, 10 (2013) 北方
经贸 (Northern Economy and Trade), pp. 109-110. 
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circumstances.371 Nevertheless, this legislation is considered too vague and 
general,372 for instance, it does not specify how to exercise the special powers 
or outline procedural requirements and other related issues.373 As a result, 
these special powers are rarely exercised by independent directors in 
practice.374 Furthermore, the CCL only has one Article that regulates 
independent directors. Rules relating to the independent director system, in 
terms of selection, powers and obligations, are all stipulated by regulatory 
documents. This low legal authority may therefore make independent 
directors’ supervision more difficult in practice.375 
Second, independence from the controlling shareholder remains questionable 
for both supervisors and independent directors in Chinese listed companies. 
Based on Chinese legislation, the general meeting has the power to appoint 
both supervisors and independent directors and also to determine their 
remuneration and allowances.376 Under the concentrated ownership structure, 
it is likely that the controlling shareholder exclusively dominates the 
appointment of both supervisors and independent directors. In fact, various 
studies have provided evidence to support this statement. An interview-based 
research, for instance, observed a common phenomenon, in that the company 
controller dominated the general meeting and manipulated the board of 
directors and the supervisory board.377 Another investigation asserted that 
supervisors were basically selected by the controlling shareholder and they 
normally had close personal relationships with the controller or the 
directors.378 Likewise, most independent directors were found to be directly or 
indirectly chosen by the controlling shareholder in practice, and thus they were 
 
371 See paragraph 3.3.2.1 
372 Supra. 365. 
373 Ibid.  
374 Jamie Allen, Li Rui, Guo Peiyuan, Li Zhaowen, Zhang Zhengjun, and Zhou Chun, Awakening governance: The 
Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, Asian Corporate Governance Association China Corporate 
Governance Report 2018, available at https://www.acga-asia.org/specialist-research.php, last visited February 
2019. 
375 Supra. 365. 
376 See paragraph 3.3.2.1. 
377 Jay Dahya, Yusuf Karbhari and Jayson Zezong Xiao, ‘The Supervisory Board In Chinese Listed Companies: 
Problems, Causes, Consequences and Remedies’, 9 (2002) Asia Pacific Business Review, pp. 118-137. 
378 Yang Jingyuan and Yang Zhouxiao, ‘上市公司监事会的履职现状及问题探究 (Research on the Status quo 
of the Performance of the Supervisory Board of Chinese Listed Companies and its Problems)’, 10 (2013) 北方
经贸 (Northern Economy and Trade), pp. 109-110. 
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prone to either promoting the interests of the controller or loosely supervising 
management.379  
In Chinese state-owned listed companies, the chairman of the board of 
directors, or of the supervisory board and the CEO, are typically granted 
political titles.380 The SASAC nominates supervisors and sometimes its own 
officers as full-time supervisors and as supervisory board chairmen.381 It is also 
common practice to hire former government officials as supervisors or 
independent directors, in order to take advantage of their political connections 
as well as social networks for the development of the company.382 Different 
from state-owned companies, which build a natural relationship with the 
government, private listed companies are more likely to seek this political 
affiliation.383 However, this political affiliation also has its negative side-effects, 
in that the former government officials may pursue their personal interests 
through rent-seeking or corruption at the expense of the company.384 
Furthermore, political affiliation may lead to inferior supervision, known as 
“open one eye, close the other”.385 Consequently, the lack of independence 
from the controlling shareholder may damage the performance of any internal 
supervision system set up in Chinese listed companies. 
Additionally, research shows that a highly concentrated ownership structure 
(without good corporate governane) is the root of the unsatisfactory internal 
supervision of Chinese listed companies. Unbalanced corporate governance 
creates a super controller that largely constrains the functioning of monitoring 
 
379 Zhou Ling, ‘The Independent Director System and its Legal Transplant into China’, 6 (2011-2012) Journal of 
Comparative Law, pp. 262-291. 
380 Jay Dahya, Yusuf Karbhari and Jayson Zezong Xiao, ‘The Supervisory Board In Chinese Listed Companies: 
Problems, Causes, Consequences and Remedies’, 9 (2002) Asia Pacific Business Review, pp. 118-137. 
381 Cu Weihua, ‘独立董事的价值：来自独立董事集中辞职的证据 (The Values of the Independent Directors: 
from the Evidence of the Concentrated Designation of the Independent Directors)’, 37 (2015) 经济管理 
(Business Management Journal), pp. 56-66. 
382 Ran Guangkui, Fang Qiaoling and Luo Shuai, ‘中国公司的监事会真的无效吗? (Is the Chinese Supervisory 
Board really Useless?)’, 1 (2015) 经济学家 (Economist), pp. 73-82. 
383 Jamie Allen, Li Rui, Guo Peiyuan, Li Zhaowen, Zhang Zhengjun, and Zhou Chun, Awakening governance: The 
Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, Asian Corporate Governance Association China Corporate 
Governance Report 2018, available at https://www.acga-asia.org/specialist-research.php. Last visited February 
2019. 
384 Supra. 382. 
385 Yao Sheng, ‘政治关联、环境信息披露与环境业绩：基于中国上市公司的经验证据 (Political Affiliation, 
Environmental Information Disclosure and Business: Empirical Evidence of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 4 (2011) 
财贸研究 (Finance and Trade Research), pp. 78-85.  
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mechanisms,386 and so scholars argue that the solution is to re-balance the 
ownership structure and to establish internal “checks and balances”.387 
Essential to minority shareholder protection, qualified minority shareholders, 
such as institutional investors and foreign strategic investors, should be 
allowed to own a greater proportion of shares and be encouraged to 
participate actively in the governance of the company.388 In particular, 
research has found that in companies with institutional investors, the 
proportion of independent directors is positively related to the performance of 
the company.389 Scholars also claim that “long-term” institutional investors 
are conducive to the functioning of independent directors and the protection 
of individual minority shareholders. However, “short-term” institutional 
investors may conspire with the controlling shareholder, which in turn 
exaggerates the lack of independence and exposes individual minority 
shareholders to greater dangers.390 Meanwhile, research admits that neither 
institutional investors nor independent directors are currently active enough in 
supervision. To tackle this “passive” supervision, a “localisation of the legal 
transplantation” is suggested to encourage the participation of institutional 
investors and to liven up the independent director system.391 Besides 
institutional investors, the recent ISC pilot project has portrayed the ISC as 
another qualified minority shareholder whose task is to safeguard minority 
interests. The participation of the ISC may support independent directors in 
supervising management. However, one may doubt whether the ISC, as a 
 
386 Li Wei’an and Hao Chen, ‘中国上市公司监事会治理评价实证研究 (An Empirical Research of Supervisory 
Board Governance in China’s Listed Companies)’, 8 (2006) 上海财经大学学报 (Journal of Shanghai University 
of Finance and Economics), pp. 78-84 
387 Li Wei’an and Wang Shiquan, ‘中国上市公司监事会治理绩效评价与实证研究 (Appraisal and Empirical 
Research about the Governance of Supervisor Board of China’s Public Companies)’, 8 (2005) 南开管理评论
(Nankai Business Review), pp. 4-9. 
388 Xu Huiling and Gao Long, ‘论我国独立董事制度与中小投资者利益保护 (The Chinese Independent 
Director System and Minority Shareholder Protection)’, 10 (2013) 湖北经济学院学报 (Journal of Hubei 
University of Economics), pp. 37-39.  
389 Wu Xiaohui and Jiang Yanfu, ‘机构投资者影响下独立董事治理效率变化研究 (Change of the 
Independent Director’s Governing Efficiency under the Influence of Institutional Investor: Empirical Evidence 
from China’s Listed Firms)’, 5 (2006) 中国工业经济 (China Industrial Economy), pp. 105-111. 
390 Jin Qiong, ‘对机构投资者、独立董事制度与公司治理的思考(A Thought on the Relations of Institutional 
Investors, Independent Director System and Corporation Governance)’, 4 (2013) 铜陵学院学报 (Journal of 
Tongling University), pp. 45-48. 
391 Chen Yihua, ‘监事会、独立董事与机构投资者-上市公司监督视阈下的制度整合与路径选择(The 
Supervisory Board, Independent Directors and Institutional Investors-the Alignment of Mechanisms and 
Choices of Approaches From the Perspective of Supervision of Listed Companies)’, 10 (2015) 理论观察 
(Theoretic Observation), pp. 80-83. 
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semi-governmental institution, can actively supervise the state controlling 
shareholder. 
To encourage the participation of qualified minority shareholders, some 
suggestions have been made. Chinese legislation seems to promote “minority 
independent directors”,392 but its current provisions are still quite problematic. 
Article 3 of the Independent Director Opinion draws a parallel between 1% 
shareholding and the top ten shareholders. Subsequently, Article 4 grants 
shareholders with more than 1% of shares the right to nominate independent 
directors. Depending on a Chinese listed company’s ownership structure, if a 1% 
shareholder is considered a top ten shareholder, the question is whether this 
threshold is too high for minority shareholders, or even qualified minority 
shareholders, to exercise their right set out in Article 4. Moreover, Article 4 
merely prescribes the minority nomination right, and the final decision is still 
left to the general meeting. Under the concentrated ownership structure, 
genuine independence from the controlling shareholder is very difficult, or 
even impossible, in some companies. In line with this notion, research argues 
that a number of independent directors should be appointed by minority 
shareholders, resulting in a stronger regulatory stance to replace the minority 
“nomination” right with the “appointment” right.393 Some scholars also call for 
a minority removal right, thus entitling minority shareholders a private course 
of action to remove unqualified independent directors.394 Furthermore, 
research encourages share rewards for independent directors. According to 
the Equity Incentive Plans,395 independent directors are currently excluded 
from the scope of share rewards. However, research claims that equity 
ownership can genuinely turn independent directors into minority 
shareholders, and so for their own sake, they will work for the minority 
interests.396 
In sum, the main problems with the internal supervision of Chinese listed 
companies are the lack of real powers and the lack of independence. For the 
 
392 The term “minority independent directors” in this research refers to independent directors that are elected 
by minority shareholders (mainly qualified minority shareholders). 
393 Zhang Zhong, ‘The Shareholder Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in China: Why the 
Excitement is Actually for Nothing’, 28 (2011) UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, pp. 174-209. 
394 Shen Sibao and Jia Jing, ‘Will the Independent Director Institution Work in China?’, 27 (2005) Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, pp. 223-248. 
395 上市公司股权激励管理办法 (Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed 
Companiesl), China Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue 15th August 2018. 
396 Supra. 394. 
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former, legislation should specify relevant rules that are necessary for the 
implementation of supervisory powers, such as related procedural rules and 
legal remedies, or even expand supervisory powers. Furthermore, the latter 
becomes a more intense issue in a highly concentrated ownership structure. 
The question is therefore whether independence against the controlling 
shareholder should be heightened. The mainstream academic opinion does not 
denounce the existence of a controlling shareholder, but it does oppose a 
super controller who strips away the safeguards that are supposed to be 
provided by internal supervision mechanisms. Scholars argue that this 
imbalance of power within Chinese listed companies is the reason why the 
independent director system was transplanted to guard minority interests. To 
genuinely improve internal supervision, a super controller should be 
transformed into a normal controller. One option is to encourage the growth 
of qualified minority shareholders so that a counteracting force against the 
controlling shareholder could be formed. To achieve the above goal, scholars 
recommend legislative adjustments that would motivate and facilitate the 
participation of qualified minority shareholders, especially through the 
independent director system, in order to strengthen the internal supervision of 
Chinese listed companies and to protect the interests of its minority 
shareholders. 
 
3.4 Minority shareholder protection in takeover transactions 
In this part, the discussion will examine two aspects, namely legislative and 
judicial protection. Legislative protection reveals what kinds of measures have 
been adopted in Chinese legislation to safeguard minority interests in takeover 
transactions. Judicial protection demonstrates the general legal remedies that 
minority shareholders can use to redress infringements found in takeovers. 
Relevant legislation in this regard mainly includes the Chinese Company Law, 
the Chinese Securities Law and the Measures for the Administration of the 
Takeover of Listed Companies.397 
 
397 上市公司重大资产重组管理办法 (Measures for the Administration of the Material Asset Restructurings 
of Listed Companies), issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue 23rd October 2014, 
amended on 8th September 2016, and 18th October 2019. It is another legislation regarding M&As in China. 
Particularly, certain material asset restructurings, such as issuing new shares to purchase assets, or 
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3.4.1 Special protection of minority shareholders in takeover 
transactions 
Chinese legislation has prescribed various forms of protection for shareholders 
in the context of mergers and acquisitions, namely by regulating the acquirer, 
the 5% disclosure rules, the mandatory bid rule, the sell-out right, 
anti-takeover measures, the two-thirds supermajority rule, the right to request 
a court to cancel a flawed merger resolution, the appraisal right and the 
exclusion of short-form mergers.  
The acquirer 
Article 6 paragraph 2 of the Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of 
Listed Companies (hereinafter “Takeover Measures”)398 forbids an investor to 
take over a listed company if the investor: 
- has a large amount of unpaid due debts, and this indebted situation is in a 
continuous state; 
- has committed or been suspected of any serious illegal act in the past three 
years; 
- has seriously breached obligations in the securities market in the past three 
years,  
- is a natural person and falls under Article 146 of the CCL,399  
- meets other conditions which are prescribed by laws, regulations or 
commanded by the CSRC. 
The 5% Disclosure Rule 
 
transactions prescribed in Article 13 which are regarded as backdoor listings, need to be approved by the CSRC 
or the merger and reorganisation review committee. 
398 上市公司收购管理办法 (Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies), China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, date of issue October 23rd 2014. 
399 Article 146 of the CCL regulates five types of person who are forbidden from being directors, supervisors or 
senior management personnel: he or she has no/limited civil capabilities; fewer than five years have passed 
since he or she was sentenced due to economic crimes, such as corruption, bribery, etc.; fewer than three 
years have passed since he or she was held personally responsible for the bankruptcy of a company; fewer 
than three years have passed since he or she was held personally responsible for the revocation of a business 
licence of a company, due to a breach of law; he or she has rather heavy and overdue debts. 
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Article 63 of the 2020 CSL amended Article 86 of the 2014 CSL that through the 
stock exchange, if the holding of voting shares by an investor, or the 
joint-shareholding of the investor and others in the form of agreements or 
other arrangements, has reached 5% of the issued shares of a listed company, 
the investor, within three days after the aforesaid fact happens, should submit 
a written report to the CSRC as well as the stock exchange, to inform the 
acquired listed company and make an announcement. More importantly, the 
investor should not continue to purchase or sell the shares of the listed 
company in this period except situations prescribed by the CSRC. In addition, 
after the voting shares of the investor, or the joint-shareholding of the investor 
and others, has reached 5%, then every subsequent 5% increase or decrease 
should be reported and announced following the requirements mentioned 
above. Likewise, the investor should stop purchasing or selling the listed 
company’s shares from the day it happens to three days after the 
announcement except situations prescribed by the CSRC. In addition, Article 63 
added two requirements, i.e. 1% disclosure and 36 months’ restriction. After 
an investor holds or jointly hold more than 5% voting shares, every subsequent 
1% increase or decrease should be reported to the company on the next day 
and make an announcement. If an investor breaches Article 63 paragraph one 
or two, for those shares exceed the statutory percentage, he/she/it cannot 
exercising voting rights for 36 months after the purchase. 
The mandatory bid rule 
Instead of a “strict” mandatory bid rule, which demands that the acquirer issue 
a full tender offer to all remaining shareholders of the target company once 
the threshold is reached, the Chinese rule grants discretion to the acquirer to 
issue a full or a part tender offer.  
Based on Article 62 of the 2020 CSL, takeovers can be conducted through 
tender offers, negotiated acquisitions or other legal means. Respectively, 
tender offer takeovers and negotiated takeovers are prescribed in Article 65 
and Article 73 of the 2020 CSL. The former applies to an acquisition that is 
conducted through a stock exchange, and the latter applies to a negotiated 
acquisition outside a stock exchange. Article 65 specifies that when the 
acquirer, either independently or collectively, holds 30% of a target company’s 
listed voting shares through trading on a stock exchange, a tender offer should 
be issued to all shareholders of the target company for acquiring all or part of 
their shares, if the acquisition continues. In the case of a part tender offer, 
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Article 65 further enumerates that if “the number of the shares committed to 
sell by the shareholders of the target company exceeds the number of the 
shares proposed to acquire, the acquirer should proceed on a prorating 
basis”.400 In comparison with Article 65, Article 73 accords the negotiated 
acquisition the exemption privilege. All other conditions being equal, Article 73 
clarifies that the obligation to issue a full or part tender offer of the acquirer of 
a negotiated acquisition can be exempted based on regulations issued by the 
CSRC. 
The Takeover Measures provides more detail provisions regarding the 
mandatory bid rule. However, these provisions are inconsistent with the 2020 
CSL. It regulates tender offer takeovers, negotiated takeovers and indirect 
takeovers401 in three different chapters.402 For tender offers, Article 24 is 
similar to paragraph one of Article 65, except the latter specifies “listed voting 
shares” instead of “listed shares”. For negotiated takeovers, Article 47 seems 
to distinguish “30% of issued shares” and “30% of all shares”, the former 
triggers the obligation to issue a full or part tender offer, while the latter 
triggers the obligation to issue a full tender offer (both can be exempted by the 
CSRC under conditions). Meanwhile, Article 56 stipulates that for indirect 
takeovers, when the acquirer owns more than 30% of issued shares, a full 
tender offer should be made to the target’s shareholders (can be exempted by 
the CSRC under conditions). The Takeover Measures’ provisions of mandatory 
bid not only are inconsistent with those of the 2020 CSL, but also impose 
different treatments on different types of takeovers.   
The sell-out right 
If the company has been converted from a public company to a private 
company, without the protection of a sell-out right, shareholders of the target 
company may find themselves trapped in the converted company and under 
the complete control of the acquirer. Therefore, Article 74 of the 2020 CSL 
stipulates that after the expiration of the takeover period, if the target 
 
400 This refers to the proportion between the amount of shares proposed to acquire by the acquirer and the 
amount of shares committed to sell by shareholders. For example, let us assume that A is the acquiring 
company and B is the target company, which consists of two shareholders C and D. A proposes to acquire 100 
shares of B, and shareholder C commits to sell 400 shares, and D shareholder commits to sell 600 shares. 
Consequently, the “prorating basis” here is 100 divided by 1000. In other words, A shall acquire 
100/1000*400=40 shares from shareholder C, and 100/1000*600=60 shares from shareholder D.  
401 Indirect takeovers refer to transactions in which the acquirer is not a shareholder of the target company, 
but intends to takeover the target through investments, agreements or other arrangements. 
402 Chapters 3, 4 and 5, Takeover Measures. 
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company’s share structure no longer satisfies listing conditions of the stock 
exchanges, the remaining shareholders of the target company have the right to 
sell their shares to the acquirer on the same terms403 as those set out in the 
tender offer, and the acquirer is obliged to acquire such shares. As required by 
Article 50 of the 2014 CSL, a listed company’s publicly-issued shares should be 
more than 25% of the total shares of the company. For a listed company 
whose total share capital is more than 400 million RMB, the publicly-issued 
shares should be more than 10%. In other words, when the acquirer possesses 
more than 75% of shares in a listed company, or more than 90% shares of a 
listed company whose total share capital exceeds 400 million RMB, then the 
remaining shareholders of the target company have the authority to exercise 
their sell-out rights. However, the revised 2020 CSL deleted Article 50. After 1st 
March 2020, investors should refer to regulations of the stock exchange on 
which a company is listed for specific requirements.  
Anti-takeover measures 
Chinese legislation provides some general provisions to regulate anti-takeover 
measures, such as Article 7,404 Article 8405 and Article 33 of the Takeover 
Measures. Particularly, Article 33 states that after the acquirer has made a 
suggestive announcement, and before the tender offer is over, without the 
approval of the general meeting, the board of directors of the target company 
should not dispose of company assets, make external investments, adjust the 
main business or arrange guarantees or loans etc. which have a significant 
 
403 In comparison with the “appraisal right of dissent shareholders” prescribed in Article 142 of the CCL, the 
sell-out right here has made an improvement by specifying that the price shall follow the terms of the tender 
offer.  
404 Article 7 forbids the controlling shareholder or the company controller of the target company to abuse his 
or her shareholder’s right to damage the rights and interests of the target company or other shareholders. If 
the controlling shareholder or the company controller of the target company, or any related party, damages 
the rights and interests of the company or other shareholders, the controlling shareholder or the company 
controller shall eliminate the damage before transferring control of the target company. If the above person 
fails to eliminate this damage, then the income from the transfer of the shares shall be used to compensate for 
the damage, and if the income is insufficient to cover this cost, effective guarantees or arrangements shall be 
provided for the surplus, and the approval of the general meeting of the target company shall be obtained 
according to the articles of association. 
405 Article 8 confirms the duty of loyalty and the duty of care of the directors, supervisors and senior 
management personnel of the target company, and the above person shall treat all the acquirers fairly. The 
decisions and measures that are adopted for the takeover by the board of directors of the target company 
shall be in the interests of the company and shareholders, the board of directors shall not abuse its power to 
set up any inappropriate obstacle for the takeover, shall not appropriate the company’s resource to provide 
any financial support to the acquirer and shall not damage the rights and interests of the company and its 
shareholders.  
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effect on the assets, liabilities, entitlements or performance of the company, 
unless it is under the normal operation or resolutions of the general meeting of 
the target company. Moreover, Chinese legislation prescribes that certain 
issues, such as a non-public issuance of new shares (revised by 2020 CSL)406 
and material asset restructuring,407 require the approval of the CSRC. This 
approval condition may affect some anti-takeover measures such as the 
“poison pill”408 and the “crown jewel”.409 Article 52 of the Takeover Measures 
restricts the acquirer’s power to replace the board and to cause dramatic 
changes in the target company, but this only applies to negotiated acquisitions 
and is only valid throughout the transition period.410 
In addition to the above defence measures prescribed in legislation, other 
anti-takeover instruments411 can be employed in practice, particularly trading 
suspensions. Specifically, a target company can apply to have its shares 
suspended, to prevent the acquirer from buying when there is a threat. This 
measure was widespread during the collapse of the stock market in 2015.412 
Furthermore, existing securities law and regulations clarify neither the basis 
nor the length of such a suspension.413 
 
 
406 Article 13, 2014 CSL. Article 12 of the revised 2020 CSL prescribes that an issuance of new shares by a listed 
company should follow conditions regulated by the CSRC. 
407 Article 13, Material Asset Restructuring Measures.  
408 The poison pill is a defensive measure against hostile takeovers. It attempts to increase the difficulty in the 
takeover by allowing shareholders, excluding the acquirer, to purchase additional shares at a lower price. 
More details see: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/poisonpill.asp. Last visited February 2019.  
409 The crown jewel is an anti-takeover defence which intends to lower the attractiveness of the target 
company for the acquirer by mandating the sale of the most valuable assets of the target company. More 
details see: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/crownjewels.asp. Last visited February 2019.  
410 Article 52 states that within the transition period, which starts from the conclusion of the acquisition 
agreement till the completion of the transfer of shares, the acquirer shall not reappoint the board of directors 
through the controlling shareholder’s proposal. If it is necessary to reappoint the board of directors, the 
directors appointed by the acquirer shall not make up more than one-third of the board. And the target 
company shall not provide any guarantee for the acquirer and its related parties, shall not raise capital by 
publicly issuing shares, shall not conduct any substantial purchase, sell assets or make substantial investments, 
or other related-party transaction with the acquirer and its related parties, unless it is for the purpose of 
saving the target company from a crisis or severe financial problem.  
411 By ignoring the law, some measures, such as prolonging the terms of office of the board of directors or 
disregarding minority shareholders’ voting rights and proposal rights, are adopted in practice. See: Jamie Allen, 
Li Rui, Guo Peiyuan, Li Zhaowen, Zhang Zhengjun, and Zhou Chun, Awakening governance: The Evolution of 
Corporate Governance in China, Asian Corporate Governance Association China Corporate Governance Report 
2018, available at https://www.acga-asia.org/specialist-research.php. Last visited February 2019. 
412 Scholars believe that trading suspensions may cause market interruption, damage share liquidity and cause 
losses to the company and its minority shareholders. See: ibid.  
413 Though the SSE and the SZSE issued the “Memo on Trading Suspension and Resumption for Listed 
companies”, these self-discipline rules are insufficient to provide clear guidance in reality. See: ibid. 
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The supermajority rule 
Based on Article 103 of the CCL, in order to pass a merger resolution, it 
requires a two-thirds supermajority of shareholders who are present at the 
general meeting. Moreover, academic opinion holds that a merger resolution is 
regarded as a major event and should also follow the “majority of minority” 
rule.414  
Cancellation of a flawed merger resolution 
As mentioned previously in paragraph 3.2.1, Article 22 of the CCL grants 
shareholders the right to request a court to cancel a flawed resolution. 
Subsequently, if a merger resolution falls into Article 22, i.e. an invalid merger 
resolution whose content breaches laws or administrative regulations, or a 
revocable merger resolution whose procedure violates laws, administrative 
regulations or the articles of association, or its content violates the articles of 
association, a shareholder is entitled to the right to request a court to cancel 
the merger resolution. However, to exercise this right, a minority shareholder 
may be required to provide a lawsuit guarantee, which may turn out to be a 
huge obstacle in practice.415 
The appraisal right 
The dissenting shareholders’ appraisal right, which is prescribed in Article 74 
and 142 of the CCL, provides minority shareholders the chance to exit the 
company. Specifically, a shareholder who disagrees with the resolution on the 
merger or division can request the company to acquire his or her shares. 
Nevertheless, the CCL does not stipulate relevant procedural provisions to 
clarify the exercising of the appraisal right, and it is also silent on how to decide 
the repurchase price of the shares.  
Last but not least, short-form mergers416 are not allowed in China. 
 
414 Liu Junhai, ‘论公司并购中的小股东权利保护 (Minority Shareholder Protection in Mergers and 
Acquisitions)’, 5 (2012) 法律适用 (Journal of Law Application), pp. 36-45. 
415 See paragraph 3.2.3. 
416 A short-form merger often happens between a parent company and its subsidiary. When the shareholding 
reaches the threshold, for example 90%, then the merger can be conducted without the approval of 
shareholders. More details see: http://us.practicallaw.com/0-382-3820. Last visited February 2019. More 
discussion on short-form mergers can be found in chapter 4 section 4.4. 
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3.4.2 Minority shareholder protection by courts  
As mentioned in 3.2.1, Chinese legislation affirms shareholders’ right to sue. In 
takeover transactions, minority shareholders may rely on these judicial 
remedies, particularly a derivative action based on a breach of fiduciary duties, 
to defend their interests. 
Derivative actions 
The derivative action, as one of the most significant legal instruments for 
shareholder protection, is provided in Article 151 of the CCL. To exercise this 
right, the shareholder(s) is/are required to either independently or collectively 
hold 1% or more of the company shares for at least 180 consecutive days. 
Additionally, it demands a procedural precondition, i.e. shareholder(s) 
has/have to submit a written request to the supervisory board to issue an 
action in a court. If supervisors are the respondent of the lawsuit, the written 
request should be submitted to the board of directors. Only in a situation 
whereby the supervisory board or the board of directors decides not to bring a 
lawsuit, or fails to bring a lawsuit within 30 days upon receipt of the 
shareholder’s written request, or in emergency cases, the shareholder(s) is/are 
entitled to file directly an action in a court in his/her/their own name(s) for the 
company’s interest. Passing the above conditions, minority shareholders may 
bring a derivative action against directors, supervisors or senior management 
personnel, if Article 149 applies.417 Article 151 additionally expands the scope 
of the respondent of the derivative action to cover any other person who 
damages the company’s legitimate interests and causes losses. Academic 
opinion claims that “any other person” should cover at least company insiders, 
such as the controlling shareholder.418 The revised 2020 CSL recently added 
Article 94 to clarify further that the ISC, if owns shares of a company, can bring 
a derivative action against directors, supervisors, senior managers, the 
controlling shareholder and the actual controller, regardless of thresholds 
prescribed in Article 151 CCL. In other words, minority shareholders are 
 
417 Article 149 of the CCL confirms the compensation liabilities of directors, supervisors and senior 
management personnel when they breach the law, administrative regulations or articles of association during 
performance of duties and damage has been caused to the company. 
418 Hui Huang, ‘中国股东派生诉讼制度: 实证研究及完善建议 (Shareholder Derivative Action in China: 
Empirical Study and Reform Proposals)’, 1 (2014) 人大法律评论 (Renmin University Law Review), pp. 
232-264. 
55A_BW_Fu_stand.job
99 
 
entitled to bring a derivative action against the controlling shareholder. 
Moreover, the CCL Provisions IV clarifies that before the end of the first trial, if 
other shareholders who pass the threshold file derivative actions with the 
same claims, these shareholders should be treated as co-plaintiffs.419 If the 
plaintiff’s claims are partly or fully recognised by the court, then the company 
should shoulder the burden of any reasonable litigation fees that have been 
paid by the shareholders.420 
In addition to derivative actions, a minority shareholder can bring a direct 
action in a court when directors or senior management breach laws, 
administrative regulations or articles of association and infringe his or her 
interest.421 
Fiduciary duties 
Chinese legislation affirms the fiduciary duties of both directors and the 
controlling shareholder. In respect of directors’ fiduciary duties, Article 147 of 
the CCL specifies that directors, supervisors and senior management personnel 
should abide by laws, administrative regulations and articles of association, 
and they should be loyal and diligent. In addition, bribery or any illegal gain 
derived from management power should be prohibited, and encroachment to 
company property should be banned.  
Article 148 of the CCL explicitly lists eight types of prohibited action. 
Specifically, a director or senior manager should not: 
- misappropriate company funds; 
- deposit company funds in an account in his or her name, or the name of any 
individual; 
- violate the articles of association by loaning company funds to others, or 
misuse company property to provide guarantees for others without a 
resolution of the general meeting or the board of directors; 
- breach the articles of association or without a resolution of the general 
meeting to contract or trade with the company; 
 
419 Article 24, CCL Provisions IV. 
420 Article 26, CCL Provisions IV. 
421 Article 152, CCL. 
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- abuse management power to exploit the company’s commercial opportunity 
for his/her own or other people’s interests, or independently run or run for 
others any business that is in the same field as the company that he/she serves, 
without a resolution of the general meeting; 
- encroach on the commissions of company transactions; 
- disclose business secrets without authorisation; 
- conduct other actions which breach the duty of loyalty.  
Moreover, income made through any of the above actions should be owned by 
the company.  
The Guidance on Listed Companies’ Articles of Association (hereinafter 
“Guidance on AoA”)422 divides the fiduciary duties of directors further into the 
duty of loyalty423 and the duty of diligence.424 It also states that in the case of 
resignation or the expiration of a term of office, a director’s duty of loyalty 
does not automatically end on its own but depends on the reasonable 
extension period, if there is any, required by the articles of association.425 
Concerning the controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty, the CCL does not 
precisely adopt the exact expression in any of its Article. Instead, it chooses a 
general prohibition for all shareholders in Article 20, which forbids a 
shareholder from abusing his or her shareholder rights to damage the interest 
 
422 上市公司章程指引 (Guidance on Listed Companies’ Articles of Association), China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, date of issue October 20th 2014.  
423 Article 97 of the Guidance on AoA mainly follows the prescription of Article 148 of the CCL, based on which 
additionally prohibits directors from accepting bribes or other illegal income, encroaching on company assets; 
abusing the related-party relationship for infringing company interests. And in particular, Article 97 endows 
the articles of association with the discretion to prescribe other director liabilities. 
424 Article 98 of the Guidance on AoA cites that directors’ duty of diligence involves cautiously, carefully and 
diligently performing the powers granted by the company, to ensure the business operation is in accordance 
with law, administrative regulations as well as economic policies, and the commercial practice shall follow the 
scope of business prescribed in the business licence. They should also treat all shareholders fairly; present 
information on the operation of the company in a timely manner; sign written confirmations for the periodical 
reports of the company, and guarantee the disclosed information is correct, accurate and complete; truthfully 
provide relevant information and materials to the supervisory board and cause no obstacle to the supervisory 
board in performing its duties and other duties of diligencerequired by law, administrative regulation, 
departmental regulatory rules and articles of association. Besides, it accords the articles of association the 
discretion to prescribe other duties of diligence. 
425 Article 101, Guidance on AoA. 
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of the company or of other shareholders. Furthermore, those who breach the 
above conditions should be liable for compensation.426 
In contrast, the CCGC explicitly states in its Article 63 that the controlling 
shareholder or the actual controller should bear fiduciary duty to the listed 
company and other shareholders. The exercise of power by the controlling 
shareholder should strictly follow the law, in that he/she/it should not infringe 
on the listed company and other shareholders’ interests or pursue illegal 
interests by abusing his/her/its controlling position.427 
Last but not least, the CCL provides general provisions to regulate the liabilities 
of both directors and controlling shareholders.428 
3.4.3 Characteristics of takeovers in China 
Mergers and acquisitions on the Chinese securities market have three main 
characteristics. First, unexpected takeovers are rare, and tender offers are 
uncommon.429 Between 2014 and 2016, only four out of 1578 material asset 
restructures of Chinese listed companies employed tender offers,430 and 
despite some hostile takeover attempts, the first success on the Chinese 
market only appeared very recently in 2018.431 Zhengxing Biopharmaceutical 
and Chemical (振兴生化, hereinafter ST SH) was a listed company on the SZSE. 
 
426 According to academic opinion, Article 20 of the 2013 Chinese Company Law is equal to the “controlling 
shareholder’s fiduciary duty” in Common Law. See Nicholas Callcina Howson and Donald C. Clarke, ‘Pathway to 
Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China’, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968732. Last visited on February 2019. 
James V. Feinerman, ‘New Hope for Corporate Governance in China’, 191 (2007) China Quarterly, pp. 590-612. 
427 The controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty can also be found in Article 39 of the Guidance on AoA and 
Article 5 of the Public Shareholder Provision.  
428 Article 112 of the CCL prescribes that a director is liable for compensation if a resolution of the board of 
directors violates laws, administrative regulations or articles of association and causes tremendous losses to 
the company, unless he or she has expressed his or her dissenting opinion through a vote, and this objection is 
recorded in the minutes. Likewise, Article 149 stipulates that a director is liable for compensation if his or her 
performance of duty breaches laws, administrative regulations or articles of association and causes losses to 
the company. Regarding the controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty in mergers and acquisitions, Article 214 of 
the CSL specifies that if the controlling shareholder of the acquirer abuses the takeover, to damage the target 
company and its shareholders’ interests, he or she shall rectify the malpractice, accept warnings and shoulder 
the burden of any forthcoming administrative fines. 
429 Jamie Allen, Li Rui, Guo Peiyuan, Li Zhaowen, Zhang Zhengjun, and Zhou Chun, Awakening governance: The 
Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, Asian Corporate Governance Association China Corporate 
Governance Report 2018, available at https://www.acga-asia.org/specialist-research.php. Last visited February 
2019. 
430 Ibid. 
431 Ibid. 
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ST SH’s biopharmaceutical product business had been profitable for eight 
consecutive years since 2008. However, due to the huge debts injected by its 
controlling shareholder and unfulfilled promises to spin-off an indebted 
subsidiary, ST SH was labelled an “ST” (special treatment) company by the SZSE. 
The conflicts of interest between ST SH’s minority shareholders and the 
controlling shareholder were severe after years of malpractice. On 21st June 
2017, Zhemin Tou Tianhong Partnership (浙民投天弘投资合伙企业 
hereinafter ZMT) issued a tender offer to acquire 74.92 million shares of ST SH. 
After the tender offer, ZMT would become the biggest shareholder of ST SH 
with 29.99% shares. Subsequently, ST SH opted for a trading suspension based 
on material asset restructuring on 27th June. On 7th July, ST SH’s controlling 
shareholder reported an irregular loan between ZMT and the Minsheng Bank 
to the CSRC. On 14th September 2017, ST SH’s controlling shareholder brought 
a lawsuit against both ZMT and ST SH for breach of disclosure, tunnelling and 
insider trading. However, these actions failed to stop ZMT’s acquisition. On 21st 
September, ST SH resumed its share trading. On 28th November, ST SH took 
another defensive measure. ST SH’s controller transferred its shares (18.57%) 
to Hangyun Jiankang (航运健康 hereinafter HYJK) at a price of 43.2 RMB per 
share, which was higher than ZMT’s offer of 36 RMB per share. After the 
transaction, HYJK would become the biggest shareholder of ST SH with 22.61% 
shares.432 This transaction hit ZMT’s acquisition so heavily that 12.63 million 
pre-accepted shares were revoked. Furthermore, ZMT could not modify its 
offer within 15 days of expiration of the offer according to the Chinese law.433 
The exception to this rule is the appearance of a competitive offer. However, a 
transfer of the controlling shareholder’s shares is not regarded as a 
competitive offer. Nevertheless, ZMT still managed to win the hearts of ST SH’s 
minority shareholders by acquiring 147 million shares, thereby marking the 
first successful hostile tender offer on the Chinese market.434 
 
432 ST SH’s controller also conducted a share-debt swap to transfer 4.04% shares to Shenzhen Cinda (深圳信
达), on the condition that the latter would delegate its voting rights to HYJK for a year. 
433 Article 40, Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies. 
434 Zhou Jiahui, ‘我国上市公司敌意收购与并购防御研究-基于浙民投收购 ST生化的案例分析 (Research on 
Hostile Takeover and Defensive Measures of Chinese Listed Companies-based on the case study of Zhemintou 
and ST Shenghua)’, 28 (2018) 现代商贸工业 (Modern Business Trade Industry), pp. 142-143. 
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There are two main reasons why tender offers are rather rare in China. One is 
the high costs involved,435 and the other is the concentrated ownership 
structure. Under such a structure, takeovers are more predictable and easier 
through negotiations with controlling shareholders.436 In this context, the 
success of the ZMT takeover was the success of the collective action of 
minority shareholders. ST SH’s controlling shareholder had abused its 
controlling position and exploited minority shareholders for years. The tense 
conflicts of interest between minority shareholders and the controller was the 
key that helped ZMT turn its game around despite the appearance of HYJK. The 
success of ZMT’s tender offer demonstrates the powers of minority 
shareholders and the possibility of minority engagement.437 In the meantime, 
this case also raised several regulatory questions, such as how to regulate 
trading suspensions and competitive offers.438  
The second characteristic is that state-owned listed companies, though 
intensively guided by policies, are the primary players on the Chinese takeover 
market.439 In 2017, 126 state-owned listed companies participated in mergers 
and acquisitions. Deals between state-owned listed companies account for a 
majority of the total value of all mergers and acquisitions on the Chinese 
market,440 and normally, deals involving state-owned listed companies are 
driven by political interests. There are two policy burdens in SOEs: the strategic 
policy burden441 and the social policy burden.442 Under these burdens, it is 
difficult for the government to make evaluations simply based on 
 
435 Before the 2014 amendment of the Takeover Measure and the Measures for the Administration of the 
Material Asset Restructurings of Listed Companies, an ex-ante non-objection letter from the CSRC is necessary 
before a tender offer can be issued. 
436 Jamie Allen, Li Rui, Guo Peiyuan, Li Zhaowen, Zhang Zhengjun, and Zhou Chun, Awakening governance: The 
Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, Asian Corporate Governance Association China Corporate 
Governance Report 2018, available at https://www.acga-asia.org/specialist-research.php. Last visited February 
2019. 
437 Zhou Jiahui, ‘我国上市公司敌意收购与并购防御研究-基于浙民投收购 ST生化的案例分析 (Research on 
Hostile Takeover and Defensive Measures of Chinese Listed Companies-based on the case study of Zhemintou 
and ST Shenghua)’, 28 (2018) 现代商贸工业 (Modern Business Trade Industry), pp. 142-143. 
438 Ibid. 
439 Supra. 436. 
440 Ibid.  
441 Under the traditional development strategy of the country, SOEs sometimes need to take ownership of the 
task of investing or assisting in underdeveloped industries. See: Chen Shihua, Lu Changcong, Jiang Guangsheng 
and Wang Yaru, ‘国企高管政治晋升对企业并购行为的影响-基于企业成长压力理论的实证研究 (Impacts 
of Political Promotion of SOEs’ Senior Management on Enterprises’ M&A Decisions: Empirical Research based 
on the Theory of the Growth of the Firm)’, 9 (2015) 管理世界 (Management World), pp. 125-136. 
442 SOEs’ social responsibilities sometimes cause side-effects, such as redundancies and adverse employee 
welfare. See: ibid. 
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profitability.443 Instead, the government must evaluate senior SOE managers’ 
performance based on the “size-oriented” expansion of the company. An M&A 
is a good way to expand the size of a company in a short-term. Senior 
managers and directors of SOEs are “semi-government officials” who are keen 
to climb the political ladder.444 Based on M&A statistics during 2004-2013, 
research has found that an SOE is more likely to conduct an M&A if its senior 
management is up against higher political promotion pressure.445 In addition, 
government policies are another reason for SOEs to conduct M&As. In 2017, in 
order to reduce the amount of central SOEs, the SASAC announced that China 
Hentian Group (中国恒天集团) had merged into Sinomach (中国机械工业集
团). Due to the fact that the merger was more like a political decision rather 
than a business investment, a post-merger synergy problem was uncovered.446 
The third characteristic is government interference in M&As. The highly 
debated Vanke (万科) case is a good example to elaborate this government 
influence. In 1984, Vanke was founded by Wang Shi (王石 hereinafter WS), 
with Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Development Enterprise (深圳特区发展
公司 hereinafter SZDE) as its controlling shareholder. In the next two decades 
or so, Vanke transformed from a concentrated SOE into one of the very few 
large Chinese listed companies with a dispersed ownership structure. In 2014, 
Vanke was voted as the number one listed company most respected by 
investors in China. In 2017, its management team ranked top among Asian 
executive teams in the real estate industry.447 However, a vicious hostile 
takeover battle with Baoneng (宝能 hereinafter BN) forced Vanke to make a 
radical change. 
Before BN, in 1994, several dissent shareholders attempted to seize control of 
Vanke through shareholder proposals demanding the restructuring of the 
 
443 A well-run SOE may have a negative profitability report, due to policy burdens. Thus, it is unfair to judge 
the performance of its senior management based only on profitability. 
444 SOE senior managers are regulated based on standards of government officers/civil servants of the same 
level and with the same remuneration. All responsible persons in SOEs fall under the control of the 
Organisation Department of the Chinese Communist Party at all levels. See: Chen Shihua, Lu Changcong, Jiang 
Guangsheng and Wang Yaru, ‘国企高管政治晋升对企业并购行为的影响-基于企业成长压力理论的实证研
究 (Impacts of Political Promotion of SOEs’ Senior Management on Enterprises’ M&A Decisions: Empirical 
Research based on the Theory of the Growth of the Firm)’, 9 (2015) 管理世界 (Management World), pp. 
125-136. 
445 This type of M&A transaction normally has worse long-term performance in comparison with M&A 
transactions that are not induced by management’s political interests. See: ibid.  
446 Supra. 436. 
447 Ibid. 
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board of directors. The founder, WS, won this battle through numerous 
mediation sessions and the support of CSRC. Subsequently, WS further 
strengthened Vanke’s relationship with central government by instructing the 
transfer of control from SZDE to Huarun (华润 hereinafter HR), a central-level 
SOE. After the transaction, HR became Vanke’s largest shareholder with a 15% 
shareholding, albeit it rarely participated in any decision-making. Meanwhile, 
the management team at Vanke governed the company with a mere 1% 
shareholding. 
In July 2015, BN acquired 5% of Vanke shares through the securities market. In 
December of the same year, BN quickly increased its ownership to 22.45%, 
which surpassed the biggest shareholder, HR. In the face of this hostile 
takeover, Vanke’s management team first turned to HR for help but failed to 
persuade the latter to expand its ownership. A few days later, Vanke applied 
for a trading suspension based on material asset restructuring. This suspension 
lasted for more than six months. Before the suspension, another shareholder, 
Anbang (安邦), was reported to have held 6.18% of Vanke shares.448 
In June 2016, Vanke’s management sought out Shenzhen Metro (深圳地铁
hereinafter SZM), a wholly state-owned company, as a white knight by passing 
a resolution to issue new shares to purchase 100% shares of a subsidiary of 
SZM. However, this resolution was rejected by HR and BN in the shareholder 
meeting. After the failure of this defensive measure, WS publicly outed the 
alliance between HR and BN, the latter of which fought back by proposing an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting to remove the entire board. According to 
speculation, the central government intervened and BN withdrew its 
proposal.449 In the meantime, Henda Group (恒大集团 hereinafter HD) 
purchased Vanke shares through the securities market, ending up with a total 
holding of 14.07% shares. 
At this point, the battle drew great attention from both investors and the 
media, and eventually the government decided to intervene, to solve the 
problem. In January 2017, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(hereinafter CIRC) promulgated a Notice on Relevant Matters of Further 
 
448 Different from BN, Anbang was willing to cooperate with Vanke. 
449 Supra. 436. 
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Strengthening Regulatory of Stock Investment of Insurance Capital,450 which 
forbids insurance companies and non-insurance party to act in concert to 
takeover listed companies and specifies that if an insurance company uses 
insurance capital to purchase shares of listed companies, it has to receive the 
prior approval of the CIRC. Based on legislation, the CIRC imposed a series of 
administrative sanctions on Qianhai Renshou (前海人寿 hereinafter QR), an 
insurance subsidiary of BN that held shares of Vanke. One of the sanctions was 
to revoke the qualification of the actual controller of BN, Yao Zhenhua, and bar 
him from working in the insurance industry for 10 years. The CIRC also 
imposed sanctions on Hengda Renshou (恒大人寿), a subsidiary of HD. 
To settle the takeover battle, SASAC, CSRC and the Shenzhen municipal 
government intervened to structure a deal whereby HR would transfer 15.31% 
of Vanke shares to SZM. BN officially announced its identity as a “financial 
investor” in Vanke, i.e. BN would no longer seek any board position or make 
any attempt to influence management. Later, in March of the same year, HD 
also irrevocably designated all 14.07% of Vanke share voting rights and 
proposal rights to SZM. In June, HD agreed to transfer all Vanke shares under 
its name to SZM despite this transaction causing 7 billion RMB losses for HD. 
SZM became the biggest shareholder of Vanke with 29.38% shares. On 30th 
June, all 11 candidates nominated by SZM were selected as directors, and 
Vanke’s founder, WS, stepped down from the board after 37 years. In the end, 
Vanke defeated BN and won the takeover battle, at the price that Vanke 
returned to being a state-owned listed company. 
The Vanke case exposes two vital issues relating to the Chinese market. One is 
the high risk of dispersed ownership in China.451 Different from a majority of 
Chinese listed companies, Vanke is one of the very few companies that has 
dispersed ownership. Before the takeover battle, although HR was the biggest 
shareholder, Vanke was governed by its management team, and it was 
well-known for a culture of strong management and corporate governance. 
However, it is also this dispersed ownership that subjected Vanke to hostile 
takeover threats. The second issue revealed was that even for a modern listed 
company like Vanke, in times of difficulties, it would still turn to the 
 
450 《关于进一步加强保险资金股票投资监管有关事项的通知》(Notice on Relevant Matters of Further 
Strengthening Regulatory of Stock Investment of Insurance Capital), issued by China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission, 24th January 2017. 
451 Supra. 436. 
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government instead of the market for a solution. One of the reasons was that 
the market was not adequate enough to safeguard Vanke in the face of a 
hostile takeover.452 Many shareholders, including institutional investors, left 
Vanke at the start of the takeover battle, so it was difficult for management to 
fight against BN by soliciting other shareholders’ support. Instead, timely 
government intervention led to a deal between the involved parties and 
prevented Vanke from falling into the hands of an immature acquirer.453 
Vanke, from a state-owned enterprise, developed into a dispersed listed 
company that was largely privately-owned and returned to being a 
state-owned listed company after the takeover battle. The firm’s trajectory 
somewhat exposes the uncertainty of dispersed ownership in China and again 
seems to confirm the authority of the government’s visible hand. 
3.4.4 Analysis 
According to whether a takeover is conducted through an acquisition or a 
merger, Chinese legislation prescribes various forms of protection for minority 
shareholders.454 For the mandatory bid rule, research has shown that it is 
common practice to exempt listed companies from the mandatory bid 
obligation. One empirical study found that 874 companies triggered the 
mandatory bid rule between 21st July 2004 and 16th December 2012, and 843 
of them (96.45%) were exempted by the CSRC.455 Another research study 
recorded 477 cases between 2009 and July 2014, and 454 of these (95.18%) 
were exempted by the CSRC.456  
Concerning the appraisal right, scholars claim that existing provisions are too 
general to make a difference. Without specifying implementation, the 
 
452 Ibid. 
453 BN was a new insurance company that had no experience in the field of real estate. On the contrary, Vanke 
had gone through decades of development and established its own corporate management system and 
culture. Thus, the general view claimed that the defeat of BN was good news for the future of Vanke. See: ibid. 
454 The form of tender offer is rarely used in practice, due to its high costs and the concentrated ownership 
structure. See: ibid. 
455 Cai Wei, ‘强制要约收购制度的再审视: 效率视角下的实证分析 (Review of the Mandatory Bid Rule: 
Empirical Analysis from the Efficiency Perspective)’, 25 (2013) 中外法学 (Peking University Law Journal), pp. 
847-859.  
456 Sun Yizheng, 强制要约收购条款应适度修改 (The Mandatory Bid Rule Provision Shall be Moderately 
Amended), available at http://www.cs.com.cn/sylm/zjyl_1/201409/t20140915_4511398.html. Last visited 
February 2019.  
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appraisal right is rarely used.457 Instead, the “voluntary cash offer”, as an 
invention of Chinese listed companies, has usurped the appraisal right to a 
large extent in practice.458 From 2004 to 2013, research recorded 54 voluntary 
cash offer cases, 50 of which were related to listed company mergers.459 
Under a voluntary cash offer, relevant shareholders can request the listed 
company or a third party to purchase their shares at a price that has been 
previously agreed on.460 However, scholars have expressed their concerns that 
the voluntary cash offer may be abused by the controlling shareholder, to 
exploit minority interests in mergers, since no legal standard is currently 
available to regulate the prior-agreed purchase price, and this price may be 
underrated.461 Additionally, the voluntary cash offer is stipulated merely as 
guidance issued by the stock exchanges,462 without being incorporated into 
the CCL. 
Regarding protection offered by courts, various empirical studies have been 
conducted. In particular, three important works have observed certain 
characteristics.463  
 
457 Zhou Qiao Hong and Zhou Hongli, ‘现金选择权与异议股东回购请求权研究 (Research on the Voluntary 
Cash Offer and the Appraisal Right)’, 14 (2014) 财会月刊 (Finance and Accounting Monthly), pp. 102-105.  
458 Lin Kai, ‘异议表意机制的法律分析———以我国上市公司合并协议中的现金选择权条款为背景 (Legal 
Analysis of the Objection Express Mechanism—Under the Background of the Voluntary Cash Offer in Merger 
Agreements of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 1 (2014) 政治与法律 (Political Science and Law), pp. 88-100. 
459 Supra. 457.  
460 Article 3, 深圳证券交易所上市公司现金选择权业务指引（2011 年修订）(Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s 
Guidance on the Voluntary Cash Offer of Listed Companies (Amended in 2011)), Shenzhen Securities Exchange, 
date of issue September 6th 2011. 
461 Lin Kai, ‘异议表意机制的法律分析———以我国上市公司合并协议中的现金选择权条款为背景 (Legal 
Analysis of the Objection Express Mechanism-Under the Background of the Voluntary Cash Offer in Merger 
Agreements of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 1 (2014), 政治与法律 (Political Science and Law), pp. 88-100. 
Zhou Qiao Hong and Zhou Hongli, ‘现金选择权与异议股东回购请求权研究 (Research on the Voluntary Cash 
Offer and the Appraisal Right)’, 14 (2014) 财会月刊 (Finance and Accounting Monthly), pp. 102-105.  
462 深圳证券交易所上市公司现金选择权业务指引（2011 年修订） (Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s Guidance on 
the Voluntary Cash Offer of Listed Companies (Amended in 2011)), Shenzhen Securities Exchange, date of issue 
September 6th 2011. 
上市公司重大资产重组信息披露工作备忘录 第六号 上市公司现金选择权业务指引（试行）( Memorial of 
Disclosure of Material Asset Reorganizations of Listed Companies No.6 Guidance of Voluntary Cash Offer of 
Listed Companies (Trial)), Shanghai Stock Exchange, date of issue August 3. 2012.  
463 Wang Jun, ‘公司经营者忠实和勤勉义务诉讼研究-以 14 省, 直辖市的 137 件判决书为样本 (On Actions 
against Directors or Officers for Breaching the Duty of Loyalty or the Duty of Care: An Empirical Study Based on 
137 Cases from 14 Provinces in China)’, 4 (2011) 北方法学 (Northern Legal Science), pp. 24-39.  
Xu Guangdong, Zhou Tianshu, Zeng Bin and Shi Jin, ‘Directors’ Duties in China’, 14 (2013) European Business 
Organization Law Review, pp. 57-95. 
Lou Jianbo, Yan Hui and Zhao Yang, ‘公司法中董事, 监事, 高管人员信义义务的法律适用研究-以北京法院
2005-2007 年间的相关案例为样本的实证研究 (Research on the Application of Directors, Supervisors and 
Senior Management Personnel’s Fiduciary Duties Prescribed in the Company Law: Empirical Research on 
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First, the amount of cases is still rather limited in practice. Based on three 
major databases,464 Wang managed to find only 137 fiduciary cases from 2001 
to 2010.465 Lou et al. focused on the three-year period from 2005 to 2007 but 
only collected 13 director fiduciary cases, while Xu et al. employed the Beida 
Fabao database466 and gathered just 33 “duty of loyalty” cases and four “duty 
of diligence” cases467 from 2006 to 2012.468 
Second, hardly any listed company shareholder uses the “fiduciary duty” as a 
weapon to guard the company’s interests. Among 137 cases collected by Wang, 
136 were related to non-listed companies, and only one example was 
connected with a listed company on the SZSE. Similarly, Xu et al.’s sample 
concerned exclusively closely-held companies, with no single case of a listed 
company. Accordingly, Xu et al. concluded that the private enforcement of 
fiduciary duties for shareholder protection still seriously lags behind 
expectation.469 
Third, though the general observation remains that judges mechanically follow 
the wording of legislation in adjudications, some judges have started to 
interpret laws actively and innovatively. Among Wang’s 137 cases, there were 
78 whose respondents had been adjudicated liable for compensation, due to 
breaching their fiduciary duties. Furthermore, in 38 out of the 78 cases (41%),  
courts reached their judgments by interpreting the general provisions of 
Articles 147 or 149 of the CCL, which were beyond the eight specifically 
prohibited acts in Article 148. Xu et al. asserted that courts generally hold a 
conservative and less flexible attitude to fiduciary duty cases. Nevertheless, 
 
Relevant Cases of Courts in Beijing during 2005 to 2007)’, 1 (2012) 商事法论集 (Commercial Law Review), pp. 
530-564. 
464 These three databases are Beida Fabao (http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/), Beijing Fayuan Wang 
(bigy.chinacourt.org) and Shanghai Fayuan Wang (hshfy.sh.cn).  
465 These 137 cases cover 14 provinces or municipalities’ local, medium and higher courts. Among which, 100 
cases were judged during 2007 to 2010. 
466 Beida Fabao (http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/). 
467 In only one out of these four cases did the court rule the plaintiff’s claim on the basis of duty of diligence. 
468 Also based on the Beida Fabao database, under the cause of action of “liability disputes of the 
infringement of shareholders’ interests” and also under the labels of “duty of loyalty” and “duty of care”, this 
research recorded 34 results. After excluding repeated results, this research collected 32 cases from 1st 
January 2010 to 1st March 2017. Moreover, under the cause of action of “liability disputes of the infringement 
of the company’s interest” and also under the labels of “duty of loyalty” and “duty of care”, this research 
recorded 468 results. After excluding repeated results, this research collected 410 cases. In comparison with 
the 137 cases collected by Wang’s research from 2001-2010, an increase in fiduciary duty cases was witnessed 
for the period from 1st January 2010 to 1st March 2017.  
469 Likewise, based on the Beida Fabao database, this research found zero cases under the cause of action of 
“disputes of M&A of listed companies” between 1st January 2010 and 1st March 2017. 
60B_BW_Fu_stand.job
110 
 
they also acknowledged judicial innovation by highlighting three 
representative cases470 in their sample and observing that these innovative 
judges more often exist in economically-advanced cities, such as Beijing and 
Shanghai. Moreover, Xu et al. recorded a similar standard471 of the “business 
judgment rule” in Chinese judicial practice despite the fact that the CCL does 
not provide any provision on this issue. Specific to the controlling shareholder’s 
fiduciary duty, Lin and Cabrelli claimed that related litigations were very rare in 
China.472 Additionally, Clarke and Howson were confident that the Sanlian 
Shangeshe case473 was the only example concerning minority shareholders 
who had brought a derivative action against the controlling shareholder of a 
listed company during the post-2006 and early-2010 period.474 
In response to this reality, academics point out some legislative problems. It is 
suggested to consider whether the threshold of the derivative action in Article 
151 CCL, i.e. 1% shareholding and 180 consecutive days, imposes too heavy a 
burden, considering the characteristics of Chinese shareholders.475 Statistics 
for the first three months of 2007 illustrate that 85.6% of investors on the SSE 
 
470 In case one (北京京华四方贸易有限公司), the court substantially interpreted the law to rule that the duty of 
loyalty should apply to the respondent (a department manager) instead of mechanically following the literal 
meaning of Article 216, which defines senior management personnel as managers, vice managers, financial 
responsible persons, secretaries of the board of directors and other staff prescribed in the articles of 
association. In case two (上海星耘房地产咨询有限公司), the court adjudicated that a resigned director still 
owes a duty of loyalty to the company he or she previously served during certain periods, even though the 
existing 2013 Chinese Company Law does not clarify whether fiduciary duty applies to former directors or not. 
In case three (武汉科地光通信有限责任公司), the court went into the essence of the fiduciary duty and 
concluded that its application should balance the goals of shareholder protection and the efficient functioning 
of the board of directors. In other words, the application of fiduciary duty shall not go to the extreme of 
super-risk-averse directors and thus unnecessarily lose commercial opportunities. 
471 Please refer to case three of the “three representative cases” mentioned above. 
472 Lin Shaowei and David Cabrelli, ‘Legal Protection for Minority Shareholders in China’, 8 (2013), Frontiers of 
Law in China, pp. 266-303. 
473 In 2009, minority shareholders of the Sanlian Shangshe (三联商社) brought a derivative action for 
horizontal competition, illegal usage of a trademark and tunnelling. However, minority shareholders lost the 
lawsuit according to the ruling of the Supreme People’s Court of Shandong Province on 17 October 2012. 
Details see http://info.homea.hc360.com/2009/12/131352469142.shtml. And 
http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/gsgg/20121018/7166629.shtml. Last visited on February 2019. 
474 Nicholas Callcina Howson and Donald C. Clarke, ‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative 
Actions in the People’s Republic of China’, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968732. Last visited February 2019. 
Based on the Beida Fabao database, under the cause of action of “company disputes” and also under the label 
of “controlling shareholder”, this research collected zero case of listed company from 1st January 2010 to 2nd 
March 2017.  
475 Xu Guangdong, Zhou Tianshu, Zeng Bin and Shi Jin, ‘Directors’ Duties in China’, 14 (2013) European 
Business Organization Law Review, pp. 57-95. 
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held their shares for fewer than three months.476 Furthermore, on the SZSE, 
68.7% of investors held their shares fewer than three months in 2006, and 77% 
of investors held their shares fewer than three months during the first eight 
months of 2007.477 Another report in 2009 revealed that 44.22% of the 
surveyed shareholders held their shares for less than one month, 39.18% of 
the surveyed shareholders held their shares more than one month, but fewer 
than 6 months, and only 16.6% of the surveyed investors held their shares for 
more than half a year.478 On the SSE, shareholders in 2013 typically held their 
shares for 66.5 days.479 Consequently, the above data highlight that most 
shareholders on the Chinese securities market cannot pass the 180-day 
requirement of Article 151. 
Besides, individual minority shareholders on the Chinese securities market may 
face significant difficulty in fulfilling the 1% shareholding demand. In the 2009 
Chinese Securities Investors Survey, 64.83% of the surveyed shareholders had a 
shareholding of less than 100,000 RMB, and 85.08% had a shareholding of less 
than 300,000 RMB.480 According to the SSE Statistics Annual, up to the end of 
2015, 50.55% of the shareholders were individuals who had a shareholding of 
less than 100,000 RMB, and 74.21% individuals had less than 300,000 RMB.481 
Another report in February 2016 demonstrated that 97.95% of individual 
shareholders had less than 1 million RMB share capital. Meanwhile, 52.72% of 
institutional investors had more than 1 million RMB in share capital.482 
Consequently, the above statistics reveal that it is barely possible for individual 
 
476中国资本市场发展报告(China Capital Markets Development Report), China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306220/200810/P020090310669067184693.pdf. Last visited 
February 2019. 
477 Ibid.  
478 2009 年中国证券投资者综合调查分析报告 (2009 Chinese Securities Investors Survey), available at 
http://www.doc88.com/p-770875327007.html. Last visited February 2019. 
479上海证券市场投资者结构与行为报告 2013 (2013 Report on the Structure and Behaviours of Securities 
Investors on SSE), available at 
http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=Ih6pGAOaQToBcDRDxj_BE5eoLBXTK5I05RdwHzxZwIGEt1YSCQop-eypwNIL4
WH_CYaJtGwi_q15ot-T4bG6Oshw5slW1z51DCyqRShmQEi. Last visited on February 2019. 
480 Supra. 478. 
481上海证券交易所统计年鉴 2 0 1 6 卷 (SSE Statistics Annual 2016 Vol.), available at 
http://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/publication/yearly/documents/c/tjnj_2016.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
482 中国股市投资者全景图：个人账户高达 99.71% (An Overview of the Investors on the Chinese Stock 
Exchange: the Number of Individual Shareholders Accounts for 99.71%), available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/smjj/smdt/2016-04-01/doc-ifxqxcnr5189753.shtml. Last visited February 
2019. 
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minority shareholders on the Chinese securities market to pass the 1% 
shareholding requirement set out in Article 151.483  
Minority shareholders who manage to pass the Article 151 threshold may still 
lack the incentive to bring derivative actions. The nature of a derivative action 
determines that the compensation goes back to the company rather than 
directly to the shareholder who brought the lawsuit. Considering the 
concentrated ownership structure, there is a potential danger that the 
litigation reward, again under the domination of the controlling shareholder, 
may still fail to give justice to minority shareholders, since controller 
expropriation was probably the cause of the litigation in the first place.484 In a 
situation where the state is the minority expropriator, the protection of a 
derivative action may turn out to be of little account. 
In addition, there are other elements that may disencourage shareholder 
litigation in general considering litigation costs, courts’ negative attitude 
towards securities cases and the absence of class action.485 The CCL does not 
touch upon the burden of litigation costs in shareholder litigation. According to 
Article 118486 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law,487 the plaintiff should pay 
the litigation fee according to related provisions. This means that a minority 
shareholder has to hire a lawyer and pay the litigation fee, in order to bring an 
action.488 Article 29 of the Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs 
(hereinafter Litigation Costs Measures)489 stipulates that the losing party 
should be responsible for any litigation costs, but the plaintiff still needs to pay 
the lawyer’s fee and the cost of court enforcement.490 The CCL Provisions IV 
clarified in 2017 that shareholders’ litigation fees may be refunded by the 
 
483 The 1% shareholding threshold has even been claimed as the “foremost barrier” to derivative action. See 
Zhang Zhong, ‘The Shareholder Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in China: Why the 
Excitement is actually for Nothing’, 28 (2011) UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, pp. 174-209. 
484 Iman Anabtawi and Lynn A. Stout, ‘Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders’, 60 (2008) Stanford Law 
Review, pp. 1255-1308. 
485 After 1st March,2020, Article 95 of the revised 2020 CSL will establish a Chinese style of “class action” to 
deal with securities compensation suits 
486 Paragraph one of Article 118 of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law prescribes that “any party filing a civil 
lawsuit shall pay litigation costs according to relevant provisions. For property cases, besides litigation costs, 
other fees shall be paid according to relevant provisions”.  
487 中华人民共和国民事诉讼法 (Civil Procedure Law of People’s Republic of China), Standing Committee of 
the People’s Congress, amended on 31st August 2012. 
488 Under the ISC pilot project, if minority shareholders bring an action through the ISC, then the ISC will take 
care of the lawyer’s fee. 
489 诉讼费用交纳办法 (Measures on the Payment of Litigation Costs), State Council, date of issue 19th 
December 2006. 
490 Article 10, Litigation Costs Measures. 
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company if the former win the lawsuit. These litigations are normally rather 
lengthy, with an average duration of 2.5 years.491 If the minority shareholder 
wins the lawsuit, some research claims that the reward of the litigation may 
not be as good as expected, and the enforcement of the compensation is 
another headache in practice.492 
The courts’ negative attitude towards private securities litigation is another 
factor that disincentivises minority shareholders and result in them not 
bringing an action. In 2001, the Supreme People’s Court completely shut down 
civil securities litigation, and in 2002, it promulgated a Notice493 to accept 
private securities cases caused by false statements, under certain conditions. 
Subsequently, in 2003, the Court enacted Provisions494 which expanded the 
scope of false statement cases. However, other serious claims, such as insider 
trading and market manipulation, were still rejected by the Court. Since 2002, 
class actions have been ruled out for private securities litigation in China.495 
However, the recent promulgated 2020 CSL added Article 95 to affirm a 
Chinese style of “class action” for securities compensation suits. After 1st 
March 2020, Chinese shareholders are entitled to bring a representative action 
under certain conditions to seek compensations, due to false statements for 
instance. In particular, the revised 2020 CSL further strengthens the ISC’s role 
as minority shareholders’ guardian. It prescribes that the ISC can act as 
minority shareholders’ litigation representative with 50 or more shareholders’ 
authorizations in securities compensation suits, the ISC wil be exempted from 
both the 1% shareholding and 180 consecutive days in bringing a derivative 
action, and the ISC provides general support for shareholder litigation. If the 
ISC represents shareholders in bringing an action, the ISC will take care of the 
lawyers’ fees.  
 
491 Xu Guangdong, Zhou Tianshu, Zeng Bin and Shi Jin, ‘Directors’ Duties in China’, 14 (2013) European 
Business Organization Law Review, pp. 57-95. 
492 Zhang Tiesheng, ‘证券民事诉讼与投资者保护 (Securities Civil Litigations and Investor Protection)’, 11 
(2009) 财政研究 (Public Financial Research), pp. 58-61. 
493 最高人民法院关于受理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事侵权纠纷案件有关问题的通知 (Notice on 
Related Issues of Civil Tort Cases caused by Securities False Statement), Supreme People’s Court, date of issue 
15th January 2002. 
494 最高人民法院关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定 (Provisions on 
Adjudicating of Civil Compensation Cases based on Securities False Statement), Supreme People’s Court, date 
of issue 9th January 2003. 
495 See the 2002 Notice and the 2003 Provisions. 
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In December, 2017, the Shenzhen Financial Tribunal, which is the first special 
commercial tribunal in China, was established. On 25th April 2018, Zhou Qiang, 
the president of the Supreme People’s Court, clarified the Decision (Draft) of 
Establishing Shanghai Financial Court in the second meeting of the 13th 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.496 Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on the Jurisdiction of the Shanghai Financial Court497 
was issued on 7th August 2018,498 and on 20th August 2018, the Shanghai 
Financial Court was officially established499 to focus on relevant financial cases 
in Shanghai. At the beginning of 2019, the Shanghai Financial Court and Beijing 
People’s Courts had innovatively started the standard adjudication mechanism 
to help resolve group actions in securities disputes.500 For group actions, the 
court selects a model case. The ruling of this model case is regarded as the 
standard adjudication guiding other parallel cases501 in different aspects, such 
as factual findings and the application of law. 
To strengthen judicial protection, legislation should further clarify the essence 
of fiduciary duties, the existing provisions of which are regarded as too general, 
considering the absence of case law in China. Legislation simply states that 
directors and controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties to the company 
and other shareholders, without clarifying the essential tenets of fiduciary 
duties and what constitues judicial standards for a court to rule a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Scholars claim that the legal texts on “fiduciary duties” are too 
vague and empty to have an influence in reality.502 Furthermore, the lack of 
detailed rules on directors’ fiduciary duties, especially the duty of diligence, 
 
496 《关于在上海设立金融法院的决定（草案）》的说明, available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-04/27/content_2053989.htm, last visited February 2019. 
497 最高人民法院关于上海金融法院案件管辖的规定 (Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the 
Jurisdiction of the Shanghai Financial Court), issued by the Supreme People’s Court, date of issue 7th August 
2018, date of effect 10th August 2018. 
498 Shanghai Financial Court has the jurisdiction to review first-trial financial and commercial cases that should 
have been under the jurisdiction of the Intermediate People’s Court of Shanghai Municipality, and appeals of 
commercial cases or financial-related administrative cases. 
499 Available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2018-08/21/c_1123299289.htm, last visited February 2019. 
500《关于依法公正高效处理群体性证券纠纷的意见（试行）》 (Opinion on Legally, Justly and Efficiently 
Resolving Group Actions of Securities Disputes (Trial)), Beijing Higher People’s Court, date of issue 29th April 
2019. 
《上海金融法院关于证券纠纷示范判决机制的规定》(Regulation about Standard Adjudication Mechanism 
for Securities Disputes), Shanghai Financial Court, date of issue 6th January 2019. 
501 Parallel cases share common factual disputes and legal disputes with the model case. Article 2, Regulation 
about Standard Adjudication Mechanism for Securities Disputes. 
502 Xu Guangdong, Zhou Tianshu, Zeng Bin and Shi Jin, ‘Directors’ Duties in China’, 14 (2013) European 
Business Organization Law Review, pp. 57-95. 
63A_BW_Fu_stand.job
115 
 
has left it with no substantial effect in practice.503 Likewise, the absence of 
detailed rules of enforcement procedures and legal remedies regarding the 
controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty has tremendously increased the 
difficulty in starting litigation.504 Moreover, the CCL does not directly confirm 
the controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty but leaves it to other legislation, 
such as the CCGC. Some scholars point out that Chinese legislators prefer to 
provide more general prescriptions in law and delegate subordinate legislation 
to stipulate more comprehensive rules, such as departmental regulatory 
provisions or normative documents. However, the main legal sources for a 
judicial ruling are laws and administrative regulations, and lower-level 
legislation only functions as a reference for a court. In other words, the 
controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty, and the relevant rules laid down by 
legislation with lower legal effect, may have less authority in judicial 
application.505 Consequently, academics assert that elements, i.e. the lack of a 
well-defined fiduciary duty, no supplementary detailed rules, no clarified 
judicial standards to determine breaches of fiduciary duties, conservative 
judges and their formative rulings, the general legal environment of weak 
enforcement, etc., have all increased the uncertainty of the outcomes of 
litigation.506  
Since the establishment of the SSE and the SZSE in 1990, the Chinese securities 
market has gone through fewer than three decades of development. As 
relatively new activities, takeover transactions have brought a big challenge to 
both Chinese listed companies and courts, and due to inexperience in this area, 
it is unsurprising that derivative actions based on fiduciary duty have not been 
widely used by minority shareholders. To improve the current situation, 
legislation should be more specific and clear; for example, it should clarify how 
to ascertain the purchase price of the appraisal right, and outline the 
substantial contents of fiduciary duties and judicial review standards. 
Moreover, judicial attitudes to securities cases ought to be more friendly and 
 
503 Ibid. 
504 Lin Shaowei and David Cabrelli, ‘Legal Protection for Minority Shareholders in China’, 8 (2013) Frontiers of 
Law in China, pp. 266-303. 
505 Deng Rui and Guan Yanfang, ‘控股股东的诚信义务与中小股东利益的保护 (Controlling Shareholder’s 
Fiduciary Duty and Minority Shareholder Protection’, 2 (2011) 特区经济 (Special Zone Economy), pp. 
145-146. 
506 See Kang Yong, Shi Lu and Elizabeth D. Brown, ‘Chinese Corporate Governance: History and Institutional 
Framework’, available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR618.pdf. Last visited 
February 2019. 
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open. To increase minority shareholders’ incentives to litigate, 
shareholder-friendly rules should be stipulated (It is encouraging to see that 
the revised 2020 CSL recently adopted the representative litigation and 
granted the ISC an enhanced role in shareholder litigation). Last but not least, 
statistics show that the threshold for exercising the right to a derivative action 
may be too hash for individual minority shareholders. In comparison, qualified 
minority shareholders are more capable of overcoming the threshold and are 
better motivated to exercise this litigation right (The revised 2020 CSL removed 
the 1% shares and 180 days restrictions for the ISC in bringing a derivative 
action). Thus, a potential option is to encourage the growth of qualified 
minority shareholders. The newly established ISC project especially may 
change this situation, since the ISC, as a semi-governmental institution, may 
reduce the litigation costs for minority shareholders and overcome the 
collective action problem. The ISC should gradually take an active role in 
bringing derivative actions, in order to redress minority shareholder 
expropriations in takeover transactions.507 
3.5 Conclusion 
In a Chinese listed company, the general meeting of shareholders, the board of 
directors and the party organisation are three main bodies that influence 
decision-making. Chinese legislation prescribes a strong general meeting, 
which may turn out to be a double-edged sword for minority shareholders. 
Legislation also provides shareholders with certain rights when a threshold is 
reached, but individual minority shareholders may face significant difficulty in 
fulfilling these threshold requirements. Comparatively, qualified minority 
shareholders have a better chance and incentive to exercise rights with a 
threshold. Various minority rights are found in legislation despite limitations 
such as the provisions are rather unclear for implementation, the exercise of 
these rights depends on the general meeting and the rights have low legal 
authority. In addition, the ISC was established as the representative of minority 
 
507 The ISC has shown the impact of supporting minority shareholders seeking to exercise the right to suit. 
Until May 2017, the ISC had represented minority shareholders to bring four direct actions against four 
companies based on torts. These four cases mainly concerned securities false statements that were previously 
sanctioned by the CSRC or other administrative organs. However, the effect of the ISC in supporting minority 
derivative actions, especially in change of control transactions, still waits to be established in the future. See: 
http://www.isc.com.cn/about_us/. Last visited February 2019. 
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shareholders seeking to exercise actively shareholder rights and to safeguard 
minority shareholders’ interests. 
To protect minority shareholders through transparency, Chinese legislation has 
prescribed comprehensive disclosure rules. However, the implementation of 
these rules still faces two major obstacles. One is the side-effect of the highly 
concentrated ownership structure, namely a low incentive to disclose and a 
low incentive to monitor. The other is the immature institutional environment, 
which includes the integrity of intermediate agencies, the quality of accounting 
rules and enforcement by the CSRC and the Chinese courts. 
The internal supervision of a Chinese listed company consists of both the 
supervisory board and a set of independent directors. Different from the 
traditional one-tier and two-tier boards, the supervisory board and 
independent directors in China have relatively soft powers, which are often 
found to be overlapping and without clarification in terms of enforcement. 
Moreover, the controlling shareholder normally dominates the appointment of 
both supervisors and independent directors. Unsurprisingly, independence 
from the controlling shareholder raises doubt in Chinese listed companies.  
Last of all, the Chinese market of corporate control is in the process of 
developing. Three characteristics are summarised herein based on practice. 
First, a majority of M&As in China are conducted through negotiated 
acquisitions instead of tender offers. Second, transactions between 
state-owned listed companies occupy a majority of the total value of Chinese 
M&As. Third, government interference still seems to be more effective than 
the market in resolving takeover challenges. These characteristics are closely 
related to the ownership structure, the securities market, the political system 
and the legal environment. To improve judicial protection in takeover 
transactions, various improvements need to be made; for instance, the law 
should clarify the essence and implementation of fiduciary duties, and courts 
should progressively become more professional and more willing to resolve 
takeover issues.  
 
 
 
  
64B_BW_Fu_stand.job
118 
 
  
65A_BW_Fu_stand.job
119 
 
 
Chapter 4 Minority Shareholder Protection in the US  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the US, listed companies are regulated by both states and federal 
government. Guided by the internal affairs doctrine, state corporate laws 
govern the internal affairs of a company, and the federal government looks 
after the trading of securities.508 In response to serious corporate scandals, 
the federal government has intervened further in regulating public companies 
on the securities market.509 
The federalisation of securities regulations can be traced back to the 1933 
Securities Act, which emphasises disclosure through securities registration, to 
achieve the goals of well-informed investors and no deceit, misrepresentation 
and other fraudulent activities in securities trading.510 Compared with the 
1933 Securities Act, which regulates the primary market, the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act focuses on the secondary market, and thus it is more relevant to 
this research. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act took a major step by 
establishing the Securities and Exchange Commission with comprehensive 
powers to regulate all aspects of the securities industry, especially tender 
offers, proxy solicitations, periodical reporting and insider trading.511  
 
508 Mark J. Roe, ‘Delaware’s Competition’, 117 (2003) Harvard Law Review, pp. 588-646. 
509 It has been claimed that the federal government has become the biggest competitor of Delaware in 
corporate law. See: Mark J. Roe, ‘Delaware’s Competition’, 117 (2003) Harvard Law Review, pp. 588-646. 
However, the opposite opinion asserts that corporate law competition is strongest between Delaware and 
other states, rather than with the federal government. See: Roberta Romano, ‘The Market for Corporate Law 
Redux’, in Francesco Parisi (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics Volume2: Private and Commercial 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 358-398. 
510 See: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml. Last visited February 2019.  
511 See: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
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Subsequently, a series of legislations further amended the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act. In 1968, the Williams Act was passed to govern tender offers. In 
2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as a profound reform to improve corporate 
responsibility and financial disclosure, as well as to tackle fraud on the 
securities market, was put into effect.512 In 2010, the promulgation of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act revealed the 
federal government’s determination to reform several areas, such as consumer 
protection, corporate governance, disclosure and transparency.513 In addition, 
the rules of self-regulatory organisations such as the New York Stock Exchange 
and the NASDAQ Stock Exchange play an important role in regulating listed 
companies. 
On the state level, the primary legal source is Delaware General Corporate Law 
and Delaware case law for the reason that the majority of listed companies are 
from Delaware, i.e. more than 50% of all US listed companies, and more than 
66% of the Fortune 500 companies, are incorporated in Delaware.514 In a 
nutshell, corporate governance in the US is attributed to a combination of 
state corporate laws, federal securities regulations and listing rules for stock 
exchanges.515 
Based on the above legal sources, this chapter will examine minority 
shareholder protection in US listed companies, with a focus on Delaware. 
Under a highly dispersed ownership structure, which creates the predominant 
agency cost between shareholders and management, US law generally 
describes shareholders as a class and grants special attention to minority 
shareholders in takeover transactions. For the above reasons, this chapter will 
delve into three main areas, namely shareholder rights, monitoring 
mechanisms and takeovers. 
 
 
512 The SOX mainly covers the following aspects, strengthens the audit committee, demands top managers 
personally certify financial reports, emphasises disclosure, imposes harsher punishments, requires internal 
control tests and reports and sets up the public company accounting oversight board. See: 
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
513 See: https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml. Last visited February 2019. 
514 See: 
https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-why-corporations-are-flocking-to-delaware-to-conduct-business-201
6-8. Last visited February 2019. 
515 Robert B. Thompson, ‘Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal 
Regulation’, 38 (2003) Wake Forest Law Review, pp. 961-982.  
Marc. I. Steinberg (ed.), The Federalization of Corporate Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 
p.6. 
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4.2 Minority shareholder protection through shareholder 
rights in the US 
In this part, the elaboration reveals the power disparity between shareholders 
and boards of directors. At the same time, it will underline rights that are 
important to minority shareholders. As mentioned in the introduction, state 
corporate laws regulate the internal affairs of a company, and the federal 
government stipulates rules pertinent to the securities market. Accordingly, 
shareholder rights mainly belong to the domain of state corporate laws, and 
the legal source in this part mostly refers to the Delaware General Corporation 
Law (hereinafter “DGCL”).516 Relevant federal securities rules will also be 
mentioned on occasion. Additionally, in order to provide a comprehensive 
discussion on shareholder rights, the Model Business Corporation Act 
(hereinafter “MBCA”),517 as “the most important alternative to Delaware 
law”,518 will also be mentioned in the footnotes for reference, when its 
provisions are different from the DGCL. 
Appointment and removal right  
Modern listed companies consist of hundreds and thousands of shareholders. 
As a result, shareholder voting in listed companies is very often conducted 
through proxy voting. Shareholders’ appointments and removal rights are 
influenced by both state corporate laws and federal proxy rules. 
State corporate laws generally prescribe that shareholders are entitled to the 
most essential right to appoint and remove directors. According to 
DGCL§211(b), the appointment of directors can be conducted by either an 
annual meeting of shareholders or the unanimous written consent of 
shareholders.519 However, the power to nominate candidates remains with 
 
516 Delaware Code, Title 8 Corporation, version of February 3, 2016, available at 
http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/title8.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
517 Model Business Corporation Act (2016). Due to the inconsistency of state corporate laws, the MBCA was 
drafted by the American Bar Association to bring some guidance and clarity, and it has been adopted by 24 
states, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_Business_Corporation_Act. Last visited February 
2019. 
518 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2015), p. 10. 
519 In the latter case, if shareholders cannot reach unanimous written consent, then the appointment can only 
be effected when such an election fulfills all director vacancies, which are supposed to be appointed through 
an effective annual shareholder meeting. 
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the current board, which normally just re-nominates incumbent directors. 
Under the default rule of plurality voting,520 candidates who receive the most 
votes win, regardless of the amount of “withhold” votes.521 In other words, a 
candidate may secure his or her seat with just one vote (even if the vote is 
from the candidate him- or herself).522 In an uncontested election, each 
candidate nominated by the board is guaranteed to be elected, since the proxy 
card lists only the board-nominated slate that equals to the number of seats 
and shareholders can only check the “vote” or “withhold” box, i.e. each board 
candidate is in fact the only vote receivers and one single vote is sufficient to 
guarantee his or her election.523 
To change this situation, shareholder activists have argued that majority voting 
serves shareholders’ appointment rights better than plurality voting.524 The 
DGCL §216 provides shareholders with the ability to replace plurality voting 
with majority voting by amending company bylaws.525 Many companies have 
accepted the idea526 and adopted majority voting in one of two forms. The 
first example is “plurality plus” (also known as the “Pfizer Model”),527 which 
combines plurality voting with a resignation requirement. Normally, this policy 
is stipulated in the corporate governance principle instead of the company 
charter. If a candidate receives more “withhold” votes than “for” votes in an 
uncontested election, the candidate is still elected – as long as he or she has at 
least one “for” vote. However, in this case, the candidate should promptly 
 
In comparison, the MBCA §8.03 (c) also prescribes that shareholders have the right to appoint directors, and it 
specifies this director selection should be carried out at the annual meeting of shareholders, except where 
articles of incorporation demand a staggered board. 
520 DGCL §216 (3). 
521 Shareholders cannot directly vote against the board nominees. See: Joshua R. Mourning, ‘The 
Majority-Voting Movement: Curtailing Shareholder Disenfranchisement in Corporate Director Elections’, 85 
(2007) Washington University Law Review, pp. 1143-1194. 
522 Randall S. Thomas and Patrick C. Tricker, ‘Shareholder Voting in Proxy Contests for Corporate Control, 
Uncontested Director Elections and Management Proposals: A Review of the Empirical Literature’, 70 (2017) 
Oklahoma Law Review, pp. 9-126. 
523 William K. Sjostrom, JR. & Young Sang Kim, ‘Majority Voting for the Election of Directors’, 40 (2007) 
Connecticut Law Review, pp. 459- 510. 
524 See: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=245f961e-7bff-401a-8799-50ff1004164c. Last visited 
February 2019. 
525 DGCL §216 also forbids the board of directors from amending or repealing the bylaw amendment in which 
shareholders demand a majority vote. 
526 Supra. 523. 
Statistics show that almost 90% of S&P500 companies adopted majority voting in one of its forms. But only 29% 
of Russell 2000 companies applied majority voting to uncontested elections. See: 
https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/board_accountability/majority_voting_directors/CII%20Majori
ty%20Voting%20FAQ%201-4-17.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
527 Supra. 523. 
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submit his or her resignation. Furthermore, the board governance committee 
will suggest the board to accept or reject the resignation.528 In contrast, the 
other form is “majority plus” (also known as the “Intel Model”),529 which 
consists of majority voting and a resignation requirement. This form is typically 
established in the bylaw and states that if a candidate receives more “withhold” 
votes than “for” votes in an uncontested election, the candidate will not be 
elected, in which case, if the candidate is an incumbent director, then he or she 
should resign. The board governance committee will then recommend 
whether the board accepts the resignation or not. Despite not being re-elected, 
the “holdover rule”530 will continuously keep the incumbent director on the 
board until his or her successor is elected or qualifies.531 In fact, many 
companies have replaced plurality voting with majority voting.532 
In parallel with the appointment right, shareholders also have the removal 
right. DGCL §141(K) states that a majority agreement of shareholders with 
voting rights can remove a director or even the entire board, with or without 
cause.533 Meanwhile, DGCL §141(K) also provides two exceptions, namely 
directors can only be removed for cause in companies with a staggered board 
structure or cumulative voting. For companies with a staggered board 
structure,534 shareholders can only remove directors with a cause, unless the 
certificate of incorporation prescribes otherwise. For companies with 
cumulative voting,535 if shareholders intend to remove only part of the board, 
 
528 See: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=245f961e-7bff-401a-8799-50ff1004164c. Last visited 
February 2019. 
529 Supra. 523. 
530 DCGC §141 (b). 
531 See: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=245f961e-7bff-401a-8799-50ff1004164c. Last visited 
February 2019. 
532 Joshua R. Mourning, ‘The Majority-Voting Movement: Curtailing Shareholder Disenfranchisement in 
Corporate Director Elections’, 85 (2007) Washington University Law Review, pp. 1143-1194. 
533 The exception to this rule is that if the certificate of incorporation provides for classes or series of directors, 
or in a corporation which adopts cumulative voting, if the vote against the removal of a director is cumulatively 
sufficient to elect this director based on the selection of the entire board, then removal with a cause is 
mandatory. Comparatively, MBCA §8.08 stipulates that shareholders have the right to remove one or more 
directors, with or without cause. However, it clarifies that the articles of incorporation may forbid the removal 
of directors with no cause. 
534 The “staggered board”, which consists of three classes of directors with different terms of office, i.e. after 
the expiration of the terms of office of the first class of directors, shareholders need to wait for another year to 
remove the second class, and after removing the second class, shareholders still need to wait for another year 
to remove the third class, was prescribed in DGCL§141 (d). 
535 DGCL §214 states that if provided by the certificate of incorporation, a shareholder deserves a number of 
votes equal to the shares he or she holds, multiplied by the amount of directors that need to be chosen. The 
shareholder can freely decide to allocate all of his or her votes on one candidate or distribute them among 
more than one, or even all, candidates. 
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and shareholders who disagree with the removal are capable of cumulatively 
electing such a director, then this removal can only be conducted with a cause. 
For a shareholder resolution to be valid, a quorum is required to be present at 
the general meeting. Considering the characteristics of a modern listed 
company, it is infeasible for a majority of shareholders to be present in person 
due to time, physical distance or other reasons. Instead, voting by proxy has 
become a common practice for listed companies.536 Acknowledging the 
overwhelming impact of proxy voting, federal proxy rules intend to create 
similar opportunities as voting in person for shareholders through disclosure 
and due procedures.537 Federal proxy rules,538 i.e. Securities Exchange 
Commission (hereinafter “SEC”) Regulation 14A, which implements 1934 
Securities Exchange Act (hereinafter” SEA”) section 14 (a), stress two main 
arrays of rules associating with proxy statement and shareholder proposals.539 
For the former, it particularly states that pursuant to SEA Rule 14a-3, a proxy 
solicitation demands the solicitor provide a proxy statement based on 
Schedule 14A of Regulation 14A.540 For director elections, an annual report 
should also be provided to shareholders.541 Besides, the solicitor should 
provide a proxy card,542 which lists the names of director nominees with boxes 
for both a “for” vote and a “withhold” vote.543  
If shareholders intend to nominate their own candidates, there are two ways 
to achieve this end.544 One is to suggest the candidate to the board committee, 
which has full discretion to include the candidate or not in the proxy statement. 
 
536 Supra. 523. 
537 See: Briefing Paper: Roundtable on the Federal Proxy Rules and State Corporation Law, available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy-briefing050707.htm. Last visited February 2019. 
538 Federal proxy rules mainly refer to SEC regulation 14 A, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-01 to 14a-10, which mainly 
cover rules relating to proxy solicitations, information provided to shareholders, proxy requirements, proxy 
statement, filing requiremernts, delivery of soliciting materials, shareholder proposals, prohibition of false or 
misleading information, and forbidden solicitations. 
539 James J. Park, ‘Reassessing the Distiction Between Coporate and Securities Law’, 64 (2017) UCLA Law 
Review, pp. 116-182.  
540 SEA Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-3(a), 17 C.F.R. §240.14A-101. 
541 17 CFR §240.14a-3 (b). 
542 17 CFR §240.14a-4(b). 
543 Proxy materials normally include the proxy statement, the proxy card and the annual report. See: supra. 
529. 
544 Danielle Vukovich, ‘Proxy Access Voting: Evaluating Proxy Access and the Recent Phenomenon of 
Corporations Adopting Shareholder Protective Policies’, 19 (2018) San Diego International Law Journal, pp. 
437-472. 
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The other is to introduce a much higher cost to conduct a proxy contest.545 In 
the latter case, solicitors have to distribute the proxy statements at their own 
cost and fund other relevant activities. The expense of a proxy contest is 
usually significantly heavy, ranging from $267,000 to $2.17million.546  
To relieve these costs, the SEC attempted to facilitate shareholders’ solicitation 
by using company proxy materials. In 2003, the SEC issued a proxy access 
proposal, consisting of a trigger event, a 5% threshold and a holding period of 
at least 2 years. Fulfilling these conditions, shareholders would be qualified to 
nominate their candidates; however, this proposal faced many controversies 
and ended up being rejected. After several attempts to regulate the proxy 
access in 2007 and 2009, on 25th August, 2010, under the authorization of 
Dodd-Frank Act,547 the SEC adopted proxy access Rule 14a-11 with a threshold 
of 3% and a holding period of a minimum 3 years. Candidates nominated by 
shareholders could account for a maximum 25% of the entire board. Shortly 
after its adoption, a suit was filed by the Business Roundtable and the 
Chamber of Commerce. The Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit 
vacated the proxy access rule on 22nd July, 2011.548 Despite the failure of Rule 
14a-11, the SEC did successfully amend Rule 14a-8549 regarding shareholder 
proposals in 2010 by restricting its election exclusions. Before the amendment, 
Rule 14a-8 excluded proposals in which shareholders could demand proxy 
access.550 Now, based on Rule14a-8, eligible shareholders may pursue proxy 
access by submitting shareholder proposals to request an amendment of a 
company’s governing documents regarding nomination procedures.551  
Correspondingly, the DGCL amended its §112 to permit companies to adopt 
proxy access through bylaws. Subject to conditions provided in these bylaws, 
 
545 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, ‘The Insignificance of Proxy Access’, 97 (2011) Virginia Law Review, pp. 
1347-1434.  
546 Research has recorded that the average cost is $267,000 for companies with capital less than $300 million, 
$643,000 for companies with capital between $300 million and $1billion and $2.17 million for companies with 
capital of more than $1 billion. See: ibid. 
547 Section 971 of the Dodd-Frank Act officially authorized the SEC to prescribe proxy access rules which may 
allow eligible shareholders to nominate board candidates by using the company’s proxy materials. 
548 Ibid. 
549 Rule 14a-8 prescribes the shareholder proposal right, more discussion of which can be found below in this 
section.  
550 Reilly S Steel, ‘Proxy Access and Optimal Standardization in Corporate Governance: An Empirical Analysis’, 
23 (2017) Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, pp. 173-255. 
551 See: 
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/memos/firmmemo_07_30_15_proxy-access-proposals.pdf. Last 
visited February 2019 
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one or more shareholder nominees, together with nominees of the board, will 
be included in proxy materials. Statistics have shown that proxy access is 
becoming progressively more available. In 2016, more than 50% of the S&P 
500 companies adopted proxy access through bylaws,552 and in 2017, 60% of 
S&P 500 companies553 and even 80% of S&P100 companies had embraced 
it.554 In 2018, more than 71% of S&P 500 companies and 48% of Russell 1000 
companies had adopted proxy access.555 
Approval right 
Besides the fundamental right to appoint and remove directors, US law 
safeguards shareholder interests by requiring shareholder approval for major 
decisions, namely amending certificates of incorporation, adoption, 
amendments or annulments of bylaws, mergers or consolidations, the sale of 
all assets or the dissolution of a corporation. For these major decisions, DGCL 
§102(b)(4), which declares that a higher threshold of shareholder voting can be 
required by the certificate of incorporation, makes the “supermajority rule” 
possible.556  
Regarding the certificate of incorporation, DGCL §242(b) clarifies that it is the 
board of directors that can propose such amendments, and the board should 
list and declare the advisability of proposed amendments. Subsequently, 
shareholders have the power to approve or disapprove these proposed 
amendments at a special shareholder meeting or the next annual shareholder 
meeting, but they have no power to change the content of the amendment.557  
 
552 Danielle Vukovich, ‘Proxy Access Voting: Evaluating Proxy Access and the Recent Phenomenon of 
Corporations Adopting Shareholder Protective Policies’, 19 (2018) San Diego International Law Journal, pp. 
437-472. 
553 See: 
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/frequently-asked-questions-about-shareholder-proposals-and-proxy-ac
cess.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
554 See: https://www.cii.org/proxy_access. Last visited February 2019. 
555 See: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/01/the-latest-on-proxy-access/ Last visited February 2019. 
556 And MBCA §7.27 further provides that any modification to the greater quorum or shareholding voting 
threshold shall be passed by the same quorum or voting requirement.  
DGCL also affirms shareholders’ right to vote via proxies. Its §212 (c)(2) further specifies that the authorisation 
of proxies can be conducted through electronic methods, such as telegram and cablegram. Furthermore, 
DGCL§211 (a)(2) prescribes that voting rights of shareholders or their proxies can be exercised by means of 
remote communication in lieu of physical presence, if authorised by the board of directors. Similar rules can 
also be found in MBCA §7.09 and §7.22. 
557 §242 (b)(1) specifies that changes prescribed in §242 (a)(1) or (7) do not require shareholder voting unless 
the certificate of corporation requires so. §242(a)(1) covers changes to the name of the corporation; (7) 
includes deleting names of the incorporator(s), the first group of board of directors and the initial shareholders; 
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Similarly, shareholders merely have approval power for a merger or 
consolidation. According to DGCL §251(b) and (c), it is the board of directors 
that decides the terms and conditions and drafts the merger or consolidation 
agreement. After the board of directors passes the resolution, this agreement 
is transmitted to each constituent corporation’s annual or special meeting for 
shareholder approval.558 Even if it has been approved by shareholders, §251(d) 
prescribes that the merger or consolidation agreement can endow the board 
of directors with the power to terminate the agreement before it becomes 
effective according to §103. The merger or consolidation agreement can also 
award amendment power to the board of directors before effecting the 
agreement, as long as the amendment does not cover changes to shares, 
securities or their related rights, changes to the certificate of incorporation and 
changes which have adverse impacts on shareholders’ interests. Another 
occasion that requires shareholder approval is the sale of all, or substantially 
all, assets of a corporation, pursuant to DGCL §271(a).559  
Comparatively speaking, shareholders enjoy broader power regarding 
dissolution and the bylaws. DGCL §275 specifies two ways to dissolve a 
corporation, namely a co-determination by the board of directors and 
shareholders, or the unanimous agreement of shareholders. In the former case, 
the board of directors, based on its majority opinion, takes the initiative in 
proposing a dissolution. Subsequently, this board resolution is submitted to 
the shareholder meeting for approval. In the latter case, all shareholders with 
voting rights can independently decide to dissolve the corporation with written 
 
and provisions, which serves the effectuation of amendments of stocks while these amendments are put into 
effect. 
In comparison, MBCA §10.03 directly prescribes that it is a must for proposed amendments to be passed by 
the board of directors. Except for situations described in §10.05, §10.07 and §10.08, the director-accepted 
proposed amendment will be transmitted to shareholders for a decision. (§10.05 prescribes amendments of 
articles of incorporation, which can be solely decided by the board of directors. In other words, it confirms that 
in eight specific situations, the amendment does not involve shareholder approval; § 10.07 regulates the 
restatement of the articles of incorporation and §10.08 refers to amendments that are caused by 
reorganisation). In addition, §10.03 also affirms that it is within the authority of the board of directors, on any 
basis, to condition its submission of the proposed amendments. 
558 Under circumstances set out in §251 (f)(g)(h), in the case of the absence of a clear demand in the 
certificate of incorporation, the authorisation of a merger can be accomplished without shareholder voting for 
a constitute corporation which still exists after the merger. 
559 §271(b) specifies that the board of directors has the power to terminate the sale proposed in situation 
§271(a). Further, §12.02 (a) of MBCA establishes the standard of “significant continuing business activity”, and 
it states that a sale of assets which leaves the corporation with less than 25% of its total assets requires 
shareholder approval. As for the sale of assets without shareholder approval, please refer to MBCA §12.01. 
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consent. In other words, a board resolution is not needed in this case.560 
Regarding the bylaw, DGCL §109(a) prescribes that shareholders with voting 
rights have the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws. However, the 
certificate of incorporation can also endow the board of directors with this 
power, which will not affect shareholders’ bylaw power as mentioned 
above.561 
For shareholder approval, DGCL §212(a) affirms that a shareholder is entitled 
to one vote for each share he or she holds.562 Meanwhile, DGCL §151(a) 
regulates the “dual-class” share structure, which explicitly permits various 
classes of shares, or series of shares, and voting power among different classes, 
or series of shares can vary from full voting power, limited voting power to 
even no voting power. Furthermore, shareholders of different classes or series 
may have different preferences, designations, qualifications, limitations, 
restrictions or other special rights.563 To balance out the dual-class shares, 
“group voting” has been established by statutes under different conditions. 
DGCL §242(b)(2) clarifies that if an amendment which attempts to change the 
amount, the par value, the power, preferences or special rights of a certain 
class of shares adversely impacts the interests of shareholders of this class, 
then group voting should apply, even if these shareholders were originally 
entitled to no voting rights.564  
 
560 DGCL §275 (e) clarifies that the dissolution resolution can grant the board of directors the power to 
abandon the proposed dissolution, regardless of whether or not it is based on the authorisation or consent of 
the shareholders.  
561 In contrast, MBCA § 10.20 describes the amendment or revocation power of the bylaws more as a shared 
competence between shareholders and the board of directors. For the latter, it can only be restricted if the 
articles of incorporation or the bylaw itself expressly accords the powers to shareholders alone, except in 
circumstances set out in §2.06 (d), if, in amending, repealing or adopting a bylaw, shareholders have directly 
deprived directors of the authority to make an amendment, repeal or reinstate the bylaw (Based on §2.06 (d), 
the board of directors’ power shall be exempted from limitation if it is for the purpose of “a reasonable, 
practicable, and orderly process”). 
562 The precondition for the right to vote is that the certificate of incorporation does not prescribe otherwise 
and §213 has been followed. And §213 regulates the board of directors’ power of fixing a record date for the 
determination of shareholders. 
563 Similarly, MBCA §6.01 (c) also stipulates that authorised shares can entitled to “special, conditional, limited 
or no voting right”. 
564 Group voting also applies in circumstance where the interests of shareholders of a series are negatively 
influenced by the amendment according to DGCL §242 (b)(2). 
Distinguished from the “adversely affected” condition under the DGCL, MBCA §10.04 (a) adopts another 
approach by explicitly listing eight situations under which group voting can be referred to. §10.04 (a) 
prescribes that group voting shall apply if the modification touches upon the exchange or reclassification of a 
class of shares into another class, or shares of another class into this class, or amends the rights, preferences 
or limitations of shares, or creates a new superior class of shares, or through strengthening the rights, 
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Fiduciary duties 
The fiduciary duties play an important role in holding directors bound to 
shareholders. Fiduciary duties are composed of the duty of care and the duty 
of loyalty, the former requires directors to act with the extent of care that 
reasonablely prudent third partys would use in similar situations,565 the latter 
demands directors to avoid acting with conflicts of interest, such as 
self-dealing or looting a company opportunity,566 and both duties are mainly 
developed by case law. For the duty of care, the Delaware court applies “a 
reasonable person” standard in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.567 In this 
case, the court ruled in favor of the directors, since they had fulfilled the duty 
of care by paying attention to the extent that an “ordinarily careful and 
prudent” man would pay.568 In Aronson v. Lewis,569 the court asserted that 
the business judgment rule, which assumes a board’s decision is made in “good 
faith”, on a “well-informed” basis and in the “best interests of a company”, is 
the default rule for duty of care disputes. Also, the rule reflects the ideology of 
director primacy and managerial authority.570 
Though the business judgment rule has been affirmatively confirmed in the 
case law, its application is not always undisputable. In Smith v. Van Gorkom,571 
for instance, the board approved the merger without being timely informed, 
without sufficient material information or reliable reports. Consequently, the 
court asserted that protection of the business judgment rule should not be 
overly extended to cover an unadvised decision, and the “procedural or 
process due care” should be held as a precondition of the business judgment 
rule.572 However, the court thoroughly changed its attitude from merely a 
procedural review to a substantial review in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.573 
 
preferences or amounts of authorised shares to make it superior to the rest of the class, or limit or deny 
preemptive rights of shares or cancel rights to distribute certain shares of the class.  
565 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2015), p. 107. 
566 See: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/duty-loyalty.asp Last visited February 2019. 
567 188 A.2d.125 (Del 1963).  
568 Correspondingly, the duty of care can also be found in statutes such as MBCA §8.30 (b), which defines the 
care a director shall pay is equal to what a reasonable peer who shares a similar position would do under 
comparable conditions.  
569 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
570 In another case Joy v. North 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), the court 
acknowledged that directors are rarely held accountable for their inferior decisions, and the business 
judgment rule had formally scripted this reluctance to inculpate bad business choices.  
571 488 A.2d 858 (Del.1985). 
572 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2015), p. 111. 
573 634 A.2d 345 (Del.1993). 
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In Technicolor, the court described the objective of the business judgment rule 
as being to prevent unreasonable judicial interference in commercial choices. 
In comparison with Van Gorkom, which described the purpose of the business 
judgment rule as the protection of and deference to managerial authority, the 
statement in Technicolor implied that the court had the judicial power to 
substantially review the reasonableness of the board’s decision.574 Different 
from the abstention interpretation of the business judgment rule, which 
isolates the court from touching upon the “care” issue, Technicolor diverted 
attention to the burden of proof. It claimed that the rule is rebutted as long as 
the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty, i.e. the 
lack of good faith, loyalty and due care, in which case the burden of proof 
shifts to the defendant, to prove the “entire fairness” of the transaction.575 
Despite the switch from abstention to intrusive review, the courts’ attitude to 
the business judgment rule remains arguable.576 In Brehm v. Eisner,577 instead 
of citing Technicolor, the court went back to follow the abstention strategy by 
opining that deference should be granted to the board decision, if directors are 
disinterested or independent, in good faith, pursing a reasonable commercial 
purpose and with no gross negligence in the decision-making process. The 
court also imposes a procedural requirement for the board to examine all 
material information that is reasonably accessible.578 However, in McMullin v. 
Beran,579 the court cited the Technicolor case to emphasise the distribution of 
the burden of proof between parties, namely, if the plaintiff can prove the 
infringement based on loyalty, good faith or due care, then the defendant is 
obliged to justify the “entire fairness” of its decision. Accordingly, the business 
judgment rule still progressively evolves through the development of case law, 
particularly in Delaware.580 
In addition to the duty of care, case law affirms directors’ duty of loyalty. In the 
case Solash v. Telex Corp.,581 the Delaware court described the breach of 
loyalty duty as a fiduciary, such as when a director or the controlling 
shareholder abuses their managerial position or the power of control to 
 
574 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Law (New York: Foundation Press, 2015), p. 112. 
575 Ibid., p. 112. 
576 Ibid., p. 114. 
577 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
578 Supra. 574, p. 114. 
579 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000). 
580 Supra. 574, pp. 114-115. 
581 No. 9518, 9528, 9525, 1988WL 3587 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
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directly or indirectly conduct an unfair transaction with the company. 
Moreover, DGCL§144 (a) stipulates that a conflict of interest transaction is not 
void by default, or because of the presence or participation of the interested 
directors or because the interested votes have been counted in the approval, if 
any of the following three preconditions have been fulfilled. The first 
precondition requires the disclosure of material facts and a good faith 
authorisation by a majority of disinterested directors. The second precondition 
demands also the disclosure of material facts plus good faith approval of 
shareholders. The last scenario dictates the transaction to be fair at its 
authorisation, approval and ratification.  
Meanwhile, in order to avoid risk-averse directors, DGCL §102(b)(7) grants the 
company the discretion to decide freely on its certificate of incorporation a 
liability elimination or limitation provision for directors. Nevertheless, this 
provision only applies to situations that concern directors’ duty of care. In 
other words, directors’ liabilities cannot be reduced or exempted for any 
breach of duty of loyalty, bad faith, intentional misconduct, intentional 
violation of law, situations prescribed in DGCL§174 or transactions which 
improperly benefit their personal interests. Moreover, the liability limitation 
provision can only limit directors’ monetary damages.582  
The controlling shareholder also owns a fiduciary duty towards the company 
and its minority shareholders. The Delaware court confirms this duty in Allied 
Chemical & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co.,583 by ruling that the controlling 
shareholder was acting in bad faith to exploit minority shareholders’ interests, 
and this misuse of power was treated as a fraud. In another case, Sinclair Oil v. 
Levien,584 Sinclair Oil was the controlling shareholder and owned 97% of its 
subsidiary’s shares. A minority shareholder of the subsidiary brought a 
derivative action against three parent-subsidiary transactions. The court held 
that the business judgment rule was rebutted, due to the self-dealing of the 
controlling shareholder. In other words, the parent company simultaneously 
acted on both sides of the transaction and abused its control to extract 
 
582 However, it has been claimed that the overlapping of the causes of actions between duty of loyalty and 
duty of care may have degraded the liability limitation provision in practice, since plaintiffs can circumvent this 
provision by phrasing their claim under a breach of the duty of loyalty. See: Supra. 574, pp. 148-149. In 
addition, MBCA§2.02 (b) (4) prescribes a comparable provision as DGCL§102 (b) (7). 
583 14 Del. Ch.1, 64, 120 Atl. 486, 122 Atl. 142 (1923). 
584 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). 
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unjustifiable benefits exclusively, and all at the expense of minority 
shareholders of the subsidiary.  
Indeed, the conflicts of interest between controlling and minority shareholders 
become more evident in takeover transactions, so more analysis on the issue 
will be conducted in 4.4 of this chapter.  
Right to sue 
To enforce fiduciary duties and other legal protection for shareholders, the 
right to sue is one of the most significant shareholder rights. In the US, there 
are two basic ways that a shareholder can bring a lawsuit, namely a direct suit 
and a derivative suit. In the former, the shareholder plaintiff brings a claim 
based on his or her own rights, to seek remedies for his or her own interests. In 
the latter case, the shareholder plaintiff brings a claim on behalf of the 
company, to redress any breach of duty by the defendant, in the interests of 
the company.  
To distinguish between these two suits, in the case Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin 
& Jenrette, Inc.,585 the Delaware court relied on a “two-pronged” standard, i.e. 
who is the victim of the caused harm, the company or the individual 
shareholder(s)? Furthermore, who is entitled to the return of the judicial 
remedy, the company or the individual shareholder(s)? If the company is the 
victim and the receiver of the judicial remedy, then it is a derivative action. If 
the shareholder who filed the lawsuit is the victim and the receiver of the 
judicial remedy, then it is a direct action. Further, this standard was analysed in 
the case Feldman v. Cutaia.586 The court stated that if the company was the 
only entity to suffer from the damage caused, and the entitlement to remedy 
is also exclusively enjoyed by the company, then it is a derivative lawsuit. In 
contrast, if the shareholder is the one who independently shoulders the loss, 
and the shareholder also has the right to bring an individual claim, then it is a 
direct lawsuit. In another case, NAF Holdings, LLC v. Li & Fung Trading Ltd.,587 
the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed the primary difference between a 
direct action and a derivative action, namely whether the claim is a personal 
claim made by a shareholder or a claim of the company. The former is a direct 
action, and the latter is a derivative action.  
 
585 845 A. 2d 1031 (Del. Sup. 2004). 
586 951 A.2d 727 (Del. 2008). 
587 C.A. No. 641, 2014, 2015WL3896792 (Del. 2015). 
72A_BW_Fu_stand.job
133 
 
In Delaware, to bring a derivative action, a shareholder has to satisfy the 
“continuous ownership” requirement, namely the plaintiff should be a 
shareholder both at the time of the dispute and at the time of filing the 
action.588 Moreover, a shareholder has to cross one of these two hurdles 
before a derivative case can be established in court, i.e. submit a pre-suit 
demand to the board of directors by presenting the claim, requesting the 
board to bring an action and also demonstrating that a refusal of a lawsuit is a 
mistake, or by exhibiting facts to show that it is futile to make demands of the 
board.589 For the “demand futility”, the Delaware Supreme Court enunciated 
in the case Aronson v. Lewis590 that the plaintiff should bring specific 
fact-based claims, which raised reasonable doubt to the disinterested or 
independence of the directors or to the fact that the alleged transaction was a 
genuine business judgment.  
Even in a demand-exempted situation, the board of directors may designate a 
special litigation committee, consisting of only independent directors, to 
investigate and make recommendations to the court on the continuation or 
dismissal of the case at hand. Regarding the recommendation of the special 
litigation committee, different states have different judicial review 
standards.591 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected a default application of 
the business judgment rule in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.592 Besides 
procedural requirements, the Delaware court set up a two-step examination 
regarding the dismissal of an action. The first examination empowers the court 
to review issues such as the independence and good faith of the committee, as 
well as the reasons behind the recommendation. The burden of proof at this 
stage lies with the company. The second step grants the court a final say on 
the dismissal of the action, relying on its own judgment. The rationale behind 
the second step is to guarantee that the court functions as the last defence, 
even though the committee’s dismissal recommendation has passed the 
first-step examination. In other words, a special committee’s dismissal 
 
588 Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 731 F.Supp.643 (D. Del. 1990). 
589 In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
590 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
591 The New York court opined that the business judgment rule determines judicial deference to 
recommendations made by the special litigation committee. Auerbach v. Bennett, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). 
However, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected the Auerbach but insisted on a less deferential attitude. 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
592 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
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recommendation, which fulfils the technical requirements but fails the essence 
of law, will not impede a legitimate action from being presented in court.  
To facilitate shareholder litigations, both federal and state rules affirm the 
“company pay” rule. Generally speaking, the court will order the company to 
pay the shareholder plaintiff’s derivative litigation costs, as long as the 
litigation results in monetary recovery or substantial non-monetary recovery to 
the company.593 This shareholder-friendly rule aims at removing obstacles to 
shareholder derivative actions. Due to the nature of a derivative lawsuit, the 
recovery of the legal remedy goes directly to the company instead of the 
shareholder who went through all of the legal proceedings as the plaintiff. If 
there is no preferential treatment in relation to litigation fees, it will 
affirmatively stop a shareholder’s incentive to bring a derivative action in the 
interests of the company but at the expense of him or herself. In addition to 
the litigation fee, the activism of the plaintiff’s attorney is another element 
that promotes derivative litigations.594  
In addition, a “class action” is a crucial weapon employed to lower the 
litigation cost and to encourage shareholder litigation.595 In a class action, the 
shareholder plaintiff may bring a direct or derivative claim, and the result of 
such a claim will be binding for the entire class. To prevent extorted results, 
class action settlements require the approval of the court.596 Shareholders 
who disagree with the settlement may have a new opportunity to opt-out of 
the class at the discretion of the court.597 Regarding litigation costs, the 
“common fund doctrine”, which allows the winning attorney to receive a 
 
593 Supra. 574, p. 210. 
594 However, it has been claimed that the plaintiff’s attorney turns out to be the biggest winner in a derivative 
litigation, thanks to the huge amounts they charge in fees. See: Supra. 574, p. 210. 
Using Delaware as an example, it has been claimed that the chance of awarding a higher attorney fee in a 
winning action attracts more litigations. See: Donald E. Pease, ‘Delaware’s Disclosure Rule: the “Complete 
Candor” Standard, its Application, and Why Sue in Delaware’, 14 (1989) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, pp. 
445-498. 
595 Celine Gainet, ‘Controlling Shareholders’ Fiduciary Duties Owed to Minority Shareholders-A Comparative 
Approach: The United States and France’, in Chris A. Malin (eds.), Entrepreneurship, Finance, Governance and 
Ethics (Netherlands: Springer, 2013), pp. 137-174. 
596 Rule 23 (e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
597 Rule 23 (e)(4), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the case In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 212, 2012 (Del. Dec. 27, 2012), the Delaware Supreme Court 
reversed the Court of Chancery’s ruling and affirmed the class member’s discretionary opt-out right.  
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reasonable proportion of the class compensation awarded by the court, is 
commonly used in practice.598 
Satisfying respective requirements, class actions can be brought in either the 
federal court or state courts. For federal securities fraud class actions, which 
mainly target false or misleading company disclosures,599 the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (hereinafter SLUSA) amended the 
Securities Act 1933600 and removed state courts’ jurisdiction over such cases to 
the federal court.601 To bring a federal securities fraud class action, the Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 sets out four conditions: first, the number of parties, 
i.e. the plaintiff, the defendant or both, is so numerous that it is unfeasible to 
bring all of the members together; second, the class has common questions 
relating to law or fact; third, the class’s typical claims or defences are 
represented by those of the representative parties and last, the representative 
parties should fairly and adequately safeguard the class.602 Despite moving 
securities fraud class actions to the federal court, the SLUSA still preserves 
state courts’ jurisdiction over class actions related to acquisitions and a few 
other circumstances through the “Delaware carve-out”.603 In particular, state 
 
598 Rule 23 (h), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Also see: Chen Wenjing, ‘An Overview of Shareholder Litigation’, in A Comparative Study of Funding 
Shareholder Litigation (Singapore: Springer, 2017), pp. 15-66. 
599 This type of suit is normally brought in the name of shareholders who bought or sold securities at an unfair 
price, due to the false or misleading disclosure of the company, and to seek compensation for each 
shareholder involved. See: Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, ‘The New Look of Shareholder 
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions’, 57 (2004) Vanderbilt Law Review, pp. 133-209. 
600 Securities Act 1933 Section 16 was amended. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C.77p(b), “covered class actions” related 
to false or withheld disclosures, or fraud regarding dealings of securities listed on a national stock exchange. 15 
U.S.C.77p(c) further prescribes that the covered class actions in (b), should be removed to the federal court.  
601 Originally, securities issues were regulated by state “blue sky” laws. Due to the “nation-wide” nature of 
securities, applying one state’s law to regulate nationally traded securities would lead to such a result that one 
state’s law would prevail over the laws of other states. Consequently, federal securities regulations were 
enacted to provide a uniform standard to regulate securities. By taking advantage of the “class actions” in 
federal civil procedures, some meritless suits were brought to seek settlements. In order to curtail these strike 
suits, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (hereinafter PSLRA) was promulgated to impose 
stricter standards for bringing a securities fraud class action. However, the PSLRA failed to reduce the amounts 
of securities class actions and indirectly created incentives for investors to divert these cases to state courts, to 
circumvent the harsh requirements of the PSLRA. Consequently, the SLUSA was adopted to correct the 
situation by excluding state courts’ jurisdiction over securities fraud class actions. See: Kenneth Hsu, ‘The 
Delaware Carve-Out’s Carve: Examining and Repairing SLUSA’s State Law Exception’, 11 (2015) Hastings 
Business Law Journal, pp. 385-420.  
602 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (a). 
603 15 U.S. Code§77p (1)(B) prescribes state preserved actions, which include: (1) any transaction that the 
issuer or its affiliate buys or sells securities exclusively from or to the issuer’s equity securities holders; or (2) 
any recommendation, position, or other communication in terms of the issuer’s sale of securities which is 
conducted between the issuer or its affiliate and the issuer’s equity securities holders; and influences the 
equity holders’ voting , response to a tender/exchange offer or dissenters’/appraisal rights.  
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acquisition-oriented class actions, which are based on state corporate law to 
redress misconduct, primarily breaches of fiduciary duties in M&As, can be 
brought in state courts.604 To bring a class action in Delaware, four conditions 
prescribed in Rule 23 of the Rules of the Court of Chancery of the state of 
Delaware have to be met.605 
Other shareholder rights 
Aside from the above protection, shareholders are entitled to other rights, 
such as the dividend right, the inspection right, the right to call a special 
meeting and the proposal right.606 First, the DGCL confirms shareholders’ right 
to dividend. However, it is the board of directors that has the power to 
determine these dividends. Specifically, DGCL §170(a) grants declaration and 
distribution power to the board of directors unless there is any restriction in 
the certificate of incorporation. It also specifies that dividends should be 
withdrawn from the surplus of the corporation in the first place, and in the 
absence of such a surplus, alternatively, dividends can be extracted from net 
profits for the current fiscal year and/or the preceding fiscal year.607 
Additionally, the DGCL §172 grants full immunity to directors or members of 
any board committee as long as the decision to declare or distribute dividends 
is made in good faith and based on trustworthy materials.608 For directors who 
breach their duties, DGCL §174(a) prescribes the joint and several liability, 
which covers the full amount of illegally distributed dividends and interests for 
 
604 Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas, ‘The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented 
Class Actions’, 57 (2004) Vanderbilt Law Review, pp. 133- 209. 
605 The four conditions required in Delaware are similar to the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedures 23. See: https://courts.delaware.gov/rules/pdf/ChanceryCourtRules_FINAL_5-20-16.pdf. Last 
visited February 2019.  
606 The proposal right and the right to call a special meeting may be related to the appointment right. For 
instance, shareholders who fulfill relevant conditions may exercise the proposal right to propose proxy access 
to the company. And shareholders who satisfy relevant requirements may exercise the right to call a special 
meeting to restructure the board. 
607 DGCL §170 (a) clarifies that the specific definition of “surplus” shall refer to §154 and §244. According to 
which, a surplus consists of the discrepancy between the net assets and the capital of the corporation, net 
assets refer to the excess of the total assets over the total liabilities, and capital can be ascertained in two 
cases – for shares with a par value, the capital equals to the aggregate par value of all issued shares, and for 
shares without a par value, it is the discretion of the board of directors to designate a part of the received 
consideration of the issued shares as the capital.  
608 Trustworthy materials refer to corporate records and reports, information, opinions or statements 
provided by officers, employees, committees of the board of directors or other designated persons who have 
been appointed with care, based on his or her professional capabilities.  
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six years after the unlawful distribution.609 Nevertheless, this liability can be 
exempted if a director expressly records his or her dissent in the corporate 
books.610 
Second, the DGCL §220(b) maintains that a shareholder is entitled to the right 
of inspection, either exercised in person or through an agent such as an 
attorney. The preconditions for exercising this right are the “written demand 
under oath” and the “proper purpose”. Furthermore, a shareholder who fulfils 
the conditions mentioned above may inspect, make copies and take extracts 
during business hours from the corporation’s stock ledger, shareholder list and 
other corporation books and records, as well as related documents of a 
subsidiary of the corporation.611 To safeguard this inspection right, DGCL 
§220(c) grants a shareholder the right to request the Court of Chancery to 
issue an order to compel the inspection if there is a rejection or no response 
after five business days.612 Additionally, it imposes various conditions on 
inspecting different documents.613 
Third, the right to call a special meeting is not a default right for shareholders 
in Delaware. Pursuant to DGCL§211(d), the board of directors may call a 
 
609 The “illegal distribution of dividend” mentioned here refers to any willful or negligent breach of §160 or 
§173. 
610 In addition to the above prescriptions, DGCL §173 clearly stipulated that no dividend shall be distributed 
unless it is prescribed in this chapter. These dividend statutes reveal the legislative intention of preventing the 
transferring of interests from the corporation to its shareholders in the form of dividends (See: Supra. 574, p. 
461). These provisions are very different from the dividend policy in China. See Chapter 3. 
611 Based on DGCL §220(b), the inspection of a subsidiary’s books and records shall be subjected to certain 
conditions: first, the corporation is in control of the subsidiary’s records in this regard, and second, the 
shareholder’s exercising of the inspection right does not violate existing third-party related agreements, and in 
the absence of a legitimate denial right against the inspection.  
612 In comparison, the CCL only clarifies that the shareholder of a limited liability company is entitled to 
request the court to demand that the corporation implements the inspection in Article 33. However, in terms 
of a company limited by shares, Article 97 only states that shareholders have the right to inspection, raise a 
proposal or make an inquiry, without mentioning the legal remedy of the court.  
613 For the inspection of “books and records”, §220 (c) lists three preconditions, namely shareholder status, 
compliance of procedures and the shareholder shall demonstrate a proper purpose for such an inspection. For 
“the shareholder list or stock ledger”, other conditions being equal, §220 (c) transfers the burden of proof to 
the corporation, to verify that the shareholder inspection has no proper purpose. 
Concerning the right to inspection, the MBCA mainly prescribes this right in § 16.01, §16.02 and §16.04. 
§16.01(e) imposes an obligation on the corporation to reserve at its head office a copy of related corporate 
records. With these documents, §16.02(a) provides a general inspection right to shareholders. Compared with 
the provisions in the DGCL, §16.02(a) does not mandate the “proper purpose” standard but requires the 
written inspection request to be submitted at the latest five days in advance. In addition, §16.04 moves the 
“court-ordered inspection” a step further by stipulating that the court order for inspection also demands the 
corporation covers the requesting shareholder’s expenses, such as attorney fees. The only exemption to this 
obligation is that the corporation can demonstrate that its rejection of an inspection was conducted in good 
faith and was based on reasonable doubt.  
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special meeting, or another person or persons authorised by the certificate of 
incorporation or the bylaws may call a special meeting. In other words, 
shareholders can only exercise this right if the certificate of incorporation or 
the bylaws has authorised so.614 In practice, the company’s certificate of 
incorporation or bylaws may impose certain requirements, such as a threshold, 
notification obligations and clarification of the purposes and disclosure, before 
this right can be exercised.615  
As briefly mentioned before in the appointment right, federal regulation 17CFR 
§240.14a-8 endows shareholders with the right to make a proposal. To 
exercise this right, a shareholder should continuously be in possession of at 
least 1% of voting shares, or $2000 market value, for at least one year, and 
they must continue to hold those securities through the meeting. If the 
shareholder fails the quantity requirement, then the corporation has the 
authority to exclude his or her proposal from any meeting for the next two 
calendar years. Concerning the exclusion of proposals, 17CFR §240.14a-8 
specifies conditions under which a proposal can be excluded by the 
corporation616 and emphasises that the burden of proof lies with the 
corporation. 
Shareholder activism 
Based on the above statutory rights, shareholder activism is one of the 
significant elements that help to transform protections in book into 
protections in action in the US. This phenomenon reflects self-governance, in 
that shareholders actively participate in corporate governance so that the 
agency cost can be reduced through enhanced monitoring. With the growth of 
institutional investors and hedge funds, shareholder activism has started to 
 
614 Different from DGCL, MBCA §7.02 grants shareholders who pass the 10% threshold the right to call a 
special meeting. Meanwhile, it also allows the articles of incorporation to set a lower threshold or a higher 
threshold at a maximum of 25%. 
615 See: http://www.theactivistinvestor.com/The_Activist_Investor/Special_Meetings.html. Last visited 
February 2019. 
616 Excluding a shareholder proposal is normally allowed if the shareholder who submits the proposal is 
ineligible according to law, the proposal violates law, proxy rules, the proposal only redresses an individual 
grievance instead of shareholder interests as a whole, the proposal is insufficient in terms of relevance, the 
proposal intrudes on management authority to cover the corporation’s daily operation, the proposal relates to 
certain issues of director selection or specific amounts of dividends, the proposal is beyond the ability of the 
corporation, the proposal is simply the duplication of another proposal, a unqualified resubmission or is in 
conflict with the corporation’s proposals or the proposal has been substantially implemented by the 
corporation.  
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take a stand in terms of corporate governance.617 Research has shown that 
the voting process is one of the main channels for shareholder activism.618 The 
combination of shareholder activism and class action has enormously 
increased shareholder protection despite the limited amount of shareholder 
rights in US legislation.619 Between 2014 and 2018, the average annual 
amount of activist campaigns was 272; specifically, 2015 saw the highest 
amount with 300 campaigns, and 2017 marked the lowest with 254 
campaigns.620 These activist campaigns pursued various governance goals, 
such as board representation, business strategies, dividend distributions and 
M&A-related issues.621 To reach these goals, shareholder activists may 
exercise different shareholder rights to nominate their own board candidates, 
to request disclosures, to call a special meeting, to bring shareholder litigation, 
etc.622 On average, activist shareholders managed to appoint one or more 
directors in 45% of proxy contests during 2014-2018. In 2018, activists won 67% 
of short slate contests and 43% of control slate contests, made public 
disclosures in 40% of campaigns, brought shareholder litigation in 2%-4% 
campaigns and called a special meeting in fewer than 5% of campaigns.623  
Analysis  
Based on the above examination of shareholder rights, this part intends to 
reveal its preeminent characteristics. In the US, shareholders are entitled to 
the most essential right to appoint and remove directors. However, it is the 
board of directors that has the nomination right. With the default rule of 
plurality voting, the board of directors controls the ballot and ensures their 
candidates are appointed. Changes have been made that more and more listed 
companies adopt the majority voting. Concerning the influence of majority 
 
617 Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes’, 41 (2018) Seattle 
University Law Review, pp. 497- 524. 
618 Peter Iliev, Karl V. Lins, Darius P. Miller and Lukas Roth, ‘Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance 
Around the World’, 28 (2015) Review of Financial Studies, pp. 2167-2202. 
619 Willem J.L. Calkoen, The One-Tier Board in the Changing and Converging World of Corporate Governance 
(The Netherlands: Kluwer Deventer, 2012), p. 289. 
620 2018 witnessed a 5.5% increase from 2017 with 268 campaigns. See: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Review and 
Analysis of 2018 US Shareholder Activism, available at 
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-SandC-MnA-2018-US-Shareholder-Activism-Analysis.p
df. Last visited March 2019. 
621 Ibid.  
622 Ibid.  
623 In 2018, issuers also won 47% of control slate contests with a 14% vote split. The data for board 
nominations and disclosures are specific data from 2018, while data for shareholder litigation and calling a 
special meeting are the average annual proportions in the five-year period from 2014-2018. See: Supra. 620. 
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voting, academics hold mixed views. The proponent argues that majority 
voting may properly balance the power disparity between shareholders and 
the board of directors in director elections.624 The opponent claims that the 
theory of majority voting fails to match the practice. Particularly, the “holdover 
rule” manages to keep a director on board despite he or she failing to be 
re-elected by shareholders.625 
If shareholders intend to nominate their own candidates, they may need to 
prepare and mail their proxy materials to hundreds and thousands of 
shareholders. The high cost of a proxy contest has tremendously increased the 
difficulty of shareholder nomination. To strengthen shareholders’ influence on 
board composition, several attempts have been made at the federal level. 
Despite the failure of a federal proxy access rule, Rule 14a-8 was amended to 
permit shareholders to propose proxy access to the company. In Delaware, 
shareholders may pursue proxy access by amending the bylaws. Shareholders 
also have the power to approve major decisions, but for majority of these 
decisions, they can only accept or veto the board’s resolution as a whole, and 
they have no power to propose their own resolution or to revise the board’s 
resolution. Besides, shareholders are endowed with other rights, such as the 
right to dividend. However, the power to determine the dividend stays with 
the board of directors. 
The board of directors is in charge of most of a company’s decision-making. 
DGCL§141 instructs that a company’s business and affairs should be managed 
or oriented by the board of directors. To balance the power between 
shareholders and the board, directors are subjected to fiduciary duties. To 
enforce fiduciary duties and other legal protections, shareholders can bring 
direct or derivative claims. Satisfying relevant conditions, direct or derivative 
claims can be brought as a class action, which is a powerful weapon to 
overcome the collective action problem and to grant equal protection to 
shareholders of the same class. The company pay rule, the contingent fee and 
attorney activism encourage shareholders to seek actively judicial remedies.  
 
624 Joshua R. Mourning, ‘The Majority-Voting Movement: Curtailing Shareholder Disenfranchisement in 
Corporate Director Elections’,85 (2007) Washington University Law Review, pp. 1143-1194. 
William K. Sjostrom, JR. & Young Sang Kim, ‘Majority Voting for the Election of Directors’, 40 (2007) 
Connecticut Law Review, pp. 459- 510. 
625 Supra. 523. 
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For shareholders to exercise their rights fully and to seek judicial remedies, 
shareholder activism is another critical characteristic of US listed companies. 
Mixed opinions on shareholder activism are found in the academic world. In 
respect of different sorts of shareholders, some scholars believe that the 
engagement of institutional investors can overcome the collective action 
problem, while others argue that it may cause another agency cost between 
money managers and small shareholders.626 It has also been claimed that 
hedge fund activism faces a smaller rational apathy issue, thanks to its 
undiversified and large shareholdings. Nevertheless, critics criticise hedge 
funds for their short-term orientation.627 Responding to this accusation, it has 
been argued that a legal regime with unfriendly shareholder participation rules 
partly contributes to the notorious rational apathy issue.628 To encourage the 
growth of long-term shareholders, a greater voice should be given to 
institutional investors.629 Through a delicate design, a balanced institutional 
voice instead of institutional control can form vertical supervision between 
money managers and corporate managers, as well as horizontal supervision 
among shareholders in joint actions. As a result, improved corporate 
governance also benefits small shareholders.630 Moreover, empirical research 
records that shareholder activism also exists in controlled listed companies, 
thus providing evidence to support shareholder engagement in corporate 
governance in general.631 
In brief, US legislation endows shareholders with certain essential rights. In 
comparison with the board of directors, shareholders’ governing powers are 
rather limited. However, the latter may rely on judicial protection to safeguard 
their interests, and shareholder activism may serve as an instrument to 
overcome collective action, the rational apathy problem and to bring 
shareholders together. 
 
626 Edward B. Rock, ‘The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism’, 79 (1990) 
Georgetown Law Journal, pp. 445-506. 
627 John C. Coffee, Jr and Darius Palia, ‘The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate 
Governance’, 41 (2015) Journal of Corporation Law, pp. 545-607.  
628 Julian Velasco, ‘Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously’, 41 (2007), U.C. Davis Law Review, pp. 605-682. 
629 John H. Matheson and Brent A. Olson, ‘Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate 
Governance’, 76 (1991) Minnesota Law Review, pp. 1313-1393. 
630 Bernard S. Black, ‘Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice’, 39 (1992) UCLA 
Law Review, pp. 811-893. 
631 The empirical study is based on more than 200 activist activities in controlled listed companies during 
2005-2014. See: Kobi Kastiel, ‘Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism In Controlled Companies’, 60 (2016) 
Columbia Business Law Review, pp. 60-132.  
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4.3 Minority shareholder protection through monitoring 
mechanisms in the US 
With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, corporate law reforms 
highlighted investor protection through various aspects. Here underlines 
particularly two of them, namely pursuing more accurate and reliable 
corporate disclosure, and strengthening internal supervision through the 
independent director system. After the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (hereinafter “SEC”) further incorporated the above 
reforms in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
Correspondingly, stock exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange, 
adjusted their listing rules to meet the relevant requirements. The task of this 
part is to examine two monitoring mechanisms, i.e. disclosure and 
independence, in the US system. The legal sources elaborated below mainly 
cover the Securities Act 1933 (hereinafter “SA”), the Securities Exchange Act 
1934 (hereinafter “SEA”), the New York Stock Exchange Listed Company 
Manual (hereinafter “NYSE Manual”), the NASDAQ Stock Market Rules 
(hereinafter “NASDAQ Rules”) and Delaware case laws.  
4.3.1 Disclosure 
Delaware statute imposes almost no active obligation on directors for 
information circulation, but it does assume that the deterrent effect of the 
“annual election of directors” is sufficient to motivate qualified disclosures.632 
Due to this lax disclosure on the state level, the New York Stock Exchange first 
attempted to regulate mandatory disclosure in 1907.633 Subsequently, 
disclosure was federalised by the Securities Exchange Act and became the 
primary regulatory tool of the SEC.634 Since then, disclosure has been a 
standard instrument of the federal government.635 Correspondingly, there is 
 
632 Mark J. Roe, ‘Delaware’s Competition’, 117 (2003) Harvard Law Review, pp. 588-646. 
633 Ibid. 
634 David Friedman, ‘The Regulator in Robes: Examining the SEC and the Delaware Court of Chancery’s Parallel 
Disclosure Regimes’, 113 (2013) Columbia Law Review, pp. 1543-1584. 
635 Robert B. Thompson, ‘Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal 
Regulation’, 38 (2003) Wake Forest Law Review, pp. 961-982.  
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one disclosure regulatory regime at the state level and another at the federal 
level, represented by the Delaware Court of Chancery and the SEC. They have 
adopted two regulatory approaches, i.e. the Delaware court formulates 
“fiduciary-duty-based” disclosure, which stands on a case-by-case analysis, and 
the SEC grounds its authority on disclosure rules with the support of 
interpretations made by its staff.636  
Federal statutory laws 
On the federal level, disclosure obligations cover six main aspects, namely 
registration statements and periodical reports, 5% shareholding, tender offers, 
going-private transactions, proxy solicitations and the Rule 10b-5. 
Disclosure of registration statement and periodical reports 
At the initial registration stage, Section 7(a) of the SA demands a corporation 
to disclose information required by Schedule A637 in its registration statement. 
After the registration, Section 13(a) of the SEA prescribes a corporation’s 
quarterly report and annual report. In addition, Section 13(I) requires a “rapid 
and current” disclosure of any material changes, if the Commission holds the 
opinion that this disclosure is necessary or helpful to shareholder protection or 
is in the public interest. 
5% shareholding disclosure 
Pursuant to 17 CFR638 240.13d-1(a), any person who directly or indirectly holds 
more than 5% shares of any class should file a statement to the Commission on 
the basis of Schedule 13D, which includes basic information on the corporation 
and its shares, the identity of the shareholder, the source and amount of funds, 
the purpose of the transaction and contracts, understandings and relationships, 
 
636 David Friedman, ‘The Regulator in Robes: Examining the SEC and the Delaware Court of Chancery’s Parallel 
Disclosure Regimes’, 113 (2013) Columbia Law Review, pp. 1543-1584. 
637 It lists 32 aspects, such as basic information of the corporation, its directors, the chief executive and 
financial and accounting officials and their remuneration, shareholders with more than 10% of any class of 
share, underwriters, capitalisation statements, securities statements, the price of the shares and the net 
proceeds, commissions and other expenses paid by the corporation, information on the vendors and legal 
counsels, material contracts, the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement. 
638 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/help/index.html#about_code_of_federal_regulations.htm. Last visited February 2019. 
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etc. However, if the transaction involves no change of control, he or she can 
submit a simplified statement on Schedule 13G639 instead of Schedule 13D.640 
Tender offer 
Sections 13(d)-(e) and sections 14(d)-(f) were added to the SEA by the Williams 
Act. In particular, section 14(d) stipulates a third-party bidder’s disclosure 
obligations.641 Additionally, Regulation 14D, which was adopted under section 
14(d), further augments the disclosure of tender offers. 17 CFR240.14d-3 
specifies that a bidder who will own more than 5% of the target company’s 
shares after the tender offer has obligations to file and transmit a tender offer 
statement.642 17CFR240.14d-6 stipulates that tender offer disclosures should 
include tender offer materials,643 summary publication644 and no transmittal 
letter. 
Going-private transaction disclosure 
In order to protect minority shareholders, 17 CFR 240.13e-3645 imposes a 
broader disclosure obligation on a going-private transaction based on Schedule 
13E-3,646 which requires the disclosure of many issues, such as the purpose of 
the transaction, whether there are alternatives to fulfill the above purpose and, 
if so, why the alternative has been ruled out, the reasons for adopting such a 
going-private transaction at such a moment, the impacts of this transaction 
 
639 More details of Schedule 13G, please refer to https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.13d-102. Last 
visit February 2019.  
640 17CFR 240.13d-1 (b). 
641 The disclosures should cover the bidder’s identity and background, the source and amount of 
consideration, the bidder’s shareholding in the target company and the purpose of the tender offer. See: 
William C. Tyson, ‘The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the Regulation of Tender Offers’, 
66 (1990) Notre Dame Law Review, pp. 241-358. 
642 The bidder should file a tender offer statement on Schedule TO to the SEC, deliver a copy of Schedule TO to 
the target company and any other bidder and provide listed securities exchanges and National Association of 
Securities Dealers with telephonic notice according to Rule 14d-6 (d)(2)(i) and (ii) and a copy of Schedule TO by 
mail. 
643 Tender offer materials include Item 1 of Schedule TO and the remaining items (except Item 12) of Schedule 
TO for third-party tender offer, or a sufficient and fair summary. 
644 Summary publications should include the bidder and the target’s identities, Item 1004 (a)(1) of Regulation 
M-A, whether the tender offer has an acquisition purpose, instruction for shareholders to obtain tender offer 
materials, and if a tender offer is delivered by shareholder lists or security position listings, a request 
statement should be provided, the summary publication should state that tender offer materials will be 
delivered to parties on the lists. 
645 Details refers to https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.13e-3. Last visit February 2019. 
646 Details refers to https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.13e-100. Last visit February 2019.  
78A_BW_Fu_stand.job
145 
 
regarding the target corporation, its subsidiaries and minority shareholders 
and also the fairness of the transaction for unaffiliated shareholders.647 
Proxy solicitation disclosure 
According to 17 CFR240.14a-3, a solicitation can only be conducted if sufficient 
information has been provided to shareholders.648 For the selection of 
directors in an annual meeting, in a special meeting or through written consent, 
the solicitation should provide not only the proxy statement, but also an 
annual report to shareholders. This annual report covers diverse information 
such as the financial statement, the balance sheet, changes or disagreements 
in terms of accounting or financial disclosure, the business of the corporation 
and its subsidiaries, identities of directors and executive officials and the 
market price and dividends payable to shareholders.649 Moreover, Section 14(i) 
of the SEA reads that the proxy or consent solicitation of an annual meeting 
should specifically disclose compensation as required by the Code of Federal 
Regulations,650 and clarify the relationship between executive compensation 
and performance.  
Rule 10b-5 
To prevent fraud, and to regulate manipulative and deceptive behaviours, 17 
CFR240.10b-5 (b) forbids false material facts or the withholding thereof. 
Furthermore, the case law gradually substantiates its contents. For example, in 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,651 the Supreme Court affirmed the 
standing of a private party under Rule 10b-5 but limited it to only the seller and 
the purchaser. Based on Rule 10b-5, the SEC further established the 
 
647 Besides federal securities rules, disclosing going-private transactions is also regulated by state corporate 
laws, especially case law. More discussion can be found in 4.4 of this chapter.  
648 17 CFR240.14a-3 (a) lists the disclosure of proxy statements based on Schedule 14A and its exceptions, the 
disclosure of a written proxy statement incorporated in the registration statement relies on Form S-4 or F-4 OR 
Form N-14. More details please refer to https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.14a-3. Last visited 
February 2019. 
And content of the Schedule 14 A can be found at https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.14a-101. Last 
visited February 2019.  
17 CFR 240.14a-9 forbids false or misleading statements of material facts or the omission of such information. 
649 For more information on the disclosure of the annual report, refer to 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.14a-3. Last visit February 2019.  
650 See: section 229.402, title 17, Code of Federal Regulations. 
651 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). One of the offerees who did not accept the 
stock selling offer of the stamp company brought an action in front of the court based on Rule 10b-5 by 
claiming that the information disclosed by the prospectus was purposely made in an excessively negative way 
to discourage the offerees from purchasing the stocks. However, the Supreme Court rejected the claim on the 
basis that only the purchaser or the seller of the transaction has a standing under Rule 10b-5.  
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“disclosure or abstain rule” in its administrative ruling in In re Cady, Roberts & 
Co.,652 according to which an insider with non-public material information 
should not trade on such information before its disclosure, and even if the 
disclosure is improper or impossible, the insider should still abstain from 
trading. This disclosure or abstain rule was later adopted by the court in SEC v. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.653 In the same case, the court further defined the 
meaning of “materiality”, namely information that is significant enough to 
have an impact on the decision of a reasonable investor.654 
State corporate law 
In comparison with federal regulations, disclosure is very often addressed 
through fiduciary duty litigations in Delaware.655 In Singer v. Magnavox Co.656 
the court affirmed that both directors and the controlling shareholder owe a 
“fiduciary obligation of honesty” to the company and its minority shareholders. 
Moreover, a director’s disclosure obligation only exits when a shareholder 
action is needed.657 The reason for drawing this line is to avoid any overlap 
between state and federal laws on disclosure. State corporate law regulates a 
company’s internal affairs, which normally are related to shareholder actions. 
Meanwhile, federal securities law controls disclosure on a broader scope of 
national securities markets.658 
In the case Stroud v. Grace,659 the Delaware court affirmed this borderline by 
stating that the “duty of candor” demands directors fully and fairly disclose all 
available material information before seeking a shareholder action. However, 
 
652 40 S.E.C.907 (1961). 
653 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
654 In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway Inc. 426 U.S. 438(1976), the court defined “materiality” as information 
which is important enough to influence a reasonable investor on how to vote. And an amended version of this 
definition, which changed “how to vote” to “whether and how to buy or sell a security”, was applied by court 
to Rule 10b-5 cases. See: Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1986), p. 328. 
655 Robert B. Thompson, ‘Delaware’s Disclosure: Moving the Line of Federal-State Corporate Regulation’, 167 
(2009) University of Illinois Law Review, pp. 167-190. 
656 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).  
657 For example, DGCL §222(a) a written notice of a meeting which requires shareholder action; DGCL §242 (b) 
a notice of amendment of a certificate of incorporation; DGCL §251 (c) notice of a merger or a consolidation; 
DGCL §262 (b)(1) notice of the appraisal right. Furthermore, case law developed by the court also confirms 
that there is no fiduciary-duty-based disclosure obligation without shareholder action.  
See: Nicole M. Kim, ‘Malone v. Brincat: The Fiduciary Disclosure Duty of Corporate Directors under Delaware 
Law’, 74 (1999) Washington Law Review, pp. 1151-1180. 
658 Ibid. 
659 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992). 
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the Delaware court departed from this rule in Marhart Inc. v. Calmat Co.660 by 
expanding the directors’ fiduciary disclosure duty to also cover situations that 
require no shareholder action. Subsequently, Unimarts, Inc. v. Stein661 cleared 
up the Marhart confusion by limiting the fiduciary disclosure duty to only 
situations in which shareholder actions are involved.  
Concerning the disclosure standard, the court in Lynch v. Vickers Energy 
Corp.662 protected minority shareholders by stressing the majority 
shareholder’s fiduciary duty of “complete candor” to disclose fully related 
information of the tender offer to minority shareholders. Additionally, the 
court emphasised that the majority shareholder should disclose all “germane” 
facts. By “germane”, it was referring to information that is important enough 
to affect a reasonable shareholder’s decision on the sale or possession of the 
shares. In Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.,663 the Delaware Supreme Court replaced 
the word “germane” with the “materiality” standard in TSC Industries, Inc. v. 
Northway.664 The court also extended this disclosure duty to careless mistakes. 
In Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. Smith,665 the court held the controlling shareholder 
liable for a computer error which caused an omission of reserves in the 
financial document disclosed to minority shareholders. 
Moreover, the procedural effect of disclosure serves a great value in judicial 
reviews, since a fully informed shareholder approval may shield managerial 
wrongdoing in the absence of fraud, according to Delaware law.666 Besides, a 
faultless disclosure is one of the preconditions for shifting the burden of proof 
in many circumstances. For example, in the case Moran v. Household 
International, Inc.,667 based on DGCL §144, when the right conditions for the 
disclosure and approval of independent directors have been achieved, then it 
shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff. As shown in 4.4 of this chapter, a 
proper disclosure before the approval of both the independent committee and 
minority shareholders induces a shift in the judicial review standard in 
freeze-out transactions. 
 
660 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 330 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1992). 
661 Nos. 14713, 14893, 1996 WL 466961 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 1996). 
662 383 A.2d 278 (Del.1977). 
663 493 A.2d 929 (Del.1985). 
664 426 U.S 438 (1976). 
665 606 A.2d 112 (1992). 
666 Nicole M. Kim, ‘Malone v. Brincat: The Fiduciary Disclosure Duty of Corporate Directors under Delaware 
Law’, 74 (1999) Washington Law Review, pp. 1151-1180. 
667 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.Nov.19, 1985), aff’g 490 A.2d 1059 (Del.Ch.1985). 
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Analysis of disclosure 
Research has investigated the practical effect of disclosure rules by assessing 
the disclosure of US listed companies. Particularly, the “information overload” 
problem, which obstructs shareholders’ ability to distinguish effectively useful 
materials from the rest, has been identified.668 This finding is supported by 
both the Chamber of Commerce’s 2014 report on disclosure and the KPMG 
2011 report. The former claimed that, first, disclosed information is 
“incomprehensible” itself, and second, it is too “time-consuming” for 
shareholders to go through everything.669 The latter pointed out that minority 
shareholders are the biggest victims, since their ability to make a 
well-informed decision has been greatly damaged by the excessive information. 
It also revealed that the “complexity of accounting standards” and the “volume 
of mandated disclosure” are two top causes of information overload.670 From 
the same report, it is also interesting to observe that the deterrent effect of 
public enforcement, i.e. worries about future rejection by the SEC or other 
regulators, may encourage the disclosure of immaterial information, whilst the 
fear of potential litigation is another consideration for disclosure.671  
Correspondingly, potential improvements are suggested in four main areas. 
First, to safeguard shareholders’ right to information, a “non-discriminatory” 
entry and a “reliable source” should be the foundation.672 Second, disclosures 
of listed companies should follow the “materiality” standard,673 i.e. they 
should be “non-duplicative”, should avoid repetition, should remove irrelevant 
 
668 Simon C. Y. Wong, ‘A Call to Reform US Disclosure-Based Regulation’, 2 (2010) Butterworths Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law, pp. 77-79. 
Teresa E. Iannaconi, William M. Sinnett, ‘Disclosure Overload and Complexity: Hidden in Plain Sight’, available 
at https://www.scribd.com/document/335028195/Disclosure-Overload-Complexity. Last visited February 
2019. 
669 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ‘Corporate Disclosure Effectiveness: Ensuring a Balanced System that Informs 
and Protects Investors and Facilitates Capital Formation’, available at 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/021053_ccmc_disclosure.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
670 Teresa E. Iannaconi, William M. Sinnett, ‘Disclosure Overload and Complexity: Hidden in Plain Sight’, 
available at https://www.scribd.com/document/335028195/Disclosure-Overload-Complexity. Last visited 
February 2019. 
671 Ibid.  
672 SEC, ‘Report on Review of Disclosure Requirements in Regulation S-K’, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf. Last visited February 
2019. 
673 Besides the “materiality” standard developed by case law, the SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin and the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board provide some criteria to determine whether the information is material 
or not. See: Ernst & Young, ‘Disclosure Effectiveness: What Companies can do Now’, available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-disclosure-effectiveness-what-companies-can-do-now/$FILE/
EY-disclosure-effectiveness-what-companies-can-do-now.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
80A_BW_Fu_stand.job
149 
 
information and focus on the material documents.674 Third, the delivery and 
presentation of the information should increase its “readability” and 
“navigability”,675 and the disclosure should be reoriented from 
“document-based” to “interactive data-based”.676 Precisely, various methods, 
such as cross-referencing, tabular presentation formatting and the layering of 
information, are actively encouraged.677 Fourth, research clearly underlines 
the significant role of SEC enforcement and the “redress-seeking” channel in 
keeping shareholders well-informed. The 2015-2016 record demonstrates 
“active and aggressive” public enforcement by the SEC, with more than 200 
financial reporting and disclosure actions being brought and over 245 
individuals charged.678 In respect of the redress channel, the critical opinion 
states that the existing highly disclosure-reliance approach creates 
incoherence between the limited shareholder rights and the “hand-off 
regulatory approach”. Shareholders have few channels for redress except for 
an expensive and lengthy proxy fight and litigation. To address this gap, and to 
hold directors accountable to shareholders, practitioners are proposing to 
strengthen shareholder rights.679 Moreover, research has observed that 
institutional ownership is beneficial to company disclosure, and even passive 
shareholders are better-off, thanks to enhanced transparency.680 These 
arguments indicate that a proper degree of shareholder participation may be 
valuable to transparency.  
 
674 SEC, ‘Report on Review of Disclosure Requirements in Regulation S-K’, available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf. Last visited February 
2019. 
675 Ibid. 
676 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ‘Corporate Disclosure Effectiveness: Ensuring a Balanced System that Informs 
and Protects Investors and Facilitates Capital Formation’, available at 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/021053_ccmc_disclosure.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
677 Teresa E. Iannaconi, William M. Sinnett, ‘Disclosure Overload and Complexity: Hidden in Plain Sight’, 
available at https://www.scribd.com/document/335028195/Disclosure-Overload-Complexity. Last visited 
February 2019. 
Ernst & Young, ‘Disclosure Effectiveness: What Companies can do now’, available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-disclosure-effectiveness-what-companies-can-do-now/$FILE/
EY-disclosure-effectiveness-what-companies-can-do-now.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
678 Jones Day Whit Paper: SEC Enforcement in Financial Reporting and Disclosure-2016 Year in Review, 
available at 
http://www.jonesday.com/sec-enforcement-in-financial-reporting-and-disclosure2016-year-in-review-01-31-2
017/. Last visited February 2019. 
679 Simon C. Y. Wong, ‘A Call to Reform US Disclosure-Based Regulation’, 2 (2010) Butterworths Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law, pp. 77-79. 
680 Andrew Bird and Stephen A. Karolyi, ‘Do Institutional Investors Demand Public Disclosure?’, 29 (2016) 
Review of Financial Studies, pp. 3245-3277.  
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On the basis of the illustration above, two aspects of disclosure can be 
highlighted. First, it consists of both positive and negative obligations.681 The 
former attempts to ensure that shareholders’ well-informed decision-making is 
based on the direct dissemination of information, while the latter safeguards 
shareholder interests by prohibiting false information or the omission of 
information. Especially, the disclosure of financial information in annual and 
quarterly reports regularly updates shareholders of changes to and the 
operation of the corporation. The disclosure of intention may give existing 
shareholders an early warning of a potential takeover, once the 5% 
shareholding threshold is reached. If a change-of-control transaction develops 
into a going-private transaction, a broader disclosure obligation is imposed, in 
order to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders. Likewise, a proxy 
solicitation should be conducted with transparency, to ensure voting reflects 
the true will of minority shareholders.682  
Second, disclosure in the US is regulated by both statutory regulations and 
case law, and it is a collective effort by both the federal government and the 
states. Disclosure is one of the primary regulatory tools used in federal 
securities regulations, and it follows a “rules-based” approach. These statutory 
disclosure rules can be found in different legislation, such as the Securities Act, 
the Securities Exchange Act, and accounting rules, and normally, they are very 
specific and technical. While these characteristics preserve the consistency and 
formalisation of disclosure, in practice they may cause an information overload 
problem. In contrast, on the state level, disclosure is incorporated into the 
fiduciary duty. This “principle-based” approach, developed by case law, 
ensures flexibility and adaptability, but it may increase uncertainty and 
indeterminacy.683 Last, enforcement, which consists of the SEC, securities 
fraud litigations and breach of fiduciary duty litigations, substantially 
contributes to the implementation of disclosure rules in the US.684 
 
681 Robert B. Thompson, ‘Delaware’s Disclosure: Moving the Line of Federal-State Corporate Regulation’, 167 
(2009) University of Illinois Law Review, pp. 167-190. 
682 The information right of shareholders of a public company is much better than their counterpart in a 
private company, thanks to the disclosure legislation provided by the federal securities laws. In comparison, 
shareholders’ information right is quite narrow under state laws, even in Delaware. In addition, directors are 
held liable for breaching the “complete candor” duty, albeit only when it concerns “material” information. See: 
Julian Velasco, ‘The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder’, 40 (2006) UC Davis Law Review, pp. 407-467. 
683 William J. Carney and George B. Shepherd, ‘The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success’, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999477. Last visited February 2019.  
684 Further discussion on litigations can be found in section 4.4 of this chapter. 
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4.3.2 Independence 
In addition to disclosure, an internal independent supervision body is another 
powerful instrument to guard shareholders’ interests. In this regard, the US 
follows the one-tier board structure, which combines both managerial and 
supervisory tasks. The board of directors usually consists of inside directors 
and outside directors, the latter of which can be further divided into 
independent directors and non-independent directors. Different from the 
two-tier board structure, internal supervision of the one-tier entity relies on 
independent directors instead of a separate supervisory board. Since the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, independent directors’ role in 
corporate governance, particularly in shareholder protection, has drawn great 
attention. One of the far-reaching reforms of the Act is the requirement that a 
listed company should have a fully independent audit committee.685 Following 
this lead, listing rules for stock exchanges affirm a “majority independent 
director board” and “mandatory special committee” requirements. 
Listing rules for stock exchanges 
Statutory laws in this part will mainly refer to listing rules for the two most 
influential US stock exchanges, namely the New York Stock Exchange Listed 
Company Manual and the NASDAQ Stock Market Rules.686 
Independence 
According to the NASDAQ Stock Market Rules (hereinafter “NASDAQ Rules”)687 
5605(a)(2), an “executive officer” or an “employee” should not become an 
independent director. As for an individual who is related to the company, the 
board of directors has the discretion to determine the independence of such a 
person. Moreover, its paragraphs (A) to (G) list conditions that forbid a person 
becoming an independent director, such as past employment relationship, 
direct or indirect continuous receipt of compensation in the past, the family 
 
685 Steven T. Petra, ‘Do Outside Independent Directors Strengthen Corporate Boards?’, 5 (2005) The 
International Journal of Business in Society, pp. 55-64.  
686 Academic opinion also highlighted that the 2002 Reform did not touch upon the incumbent-dominated 
electoral system, which caused great difficulty in achieving the goal of competitive elections in practice. See: 
William B. Chandler III and Leo E. Strine, JR., ‘The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance 
System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State’, 152 (2003) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review, pp. 953-1005.  
687 NASDAQ Stock Market Rule (2009), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/. Last visited February 
2019. 
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member of a previous executive officer and other affiliated or interest-related 
relationships.688 Similarly, the New York Stock Exchange Listed Company 
Manual (hereinafter “NYSE Manual”)689 §303A.02 prescribes “independent 
tests”, which also grant the discretion to the board of directors to decide 
whether there exists a “material relationship” that may degrade the 
independence of the director. Additionally, it lists five circumstances under 
which a director would lose his or her independence.690 Last but not least, 
both the NASDAQ Rule and the NYSE Manual claim that ownership of shares 
alone does not deprive a director of his or her independence.691 As a result, it 
is evident that the US statutory definition of independence focuses on 
independence against management.  
Majority independent board 
Both the NYSE Manual §303A.01 and the NASDAQ Rule 5605(b)(1) demand a 
listed company’s board of directors be composed of a majority of independent 
directors. However, both NYSE Manual §303A.00 and NASDAQ Rule 5015(c) 
exempt a “controlled company”692 from this majority independent board 
requirement. It is believed that the controlling shareholder has the power to 
 
688 More details see: 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_1_4_
3_8_5&CiRestriction=independent+director&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F. Last 
visited February 2019.  
689 New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual (2015), available at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/. Last visited February 2019. 
690 Similar to the NASDAQ rule, unqualified conditions cover past employment relationships, the past receipt 
of direct compensation by the director or his/ her family members and other affiliated relationships. For more 
details see: 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fs
ections%2Flcm-sections%2F. Last visited February 2019. 
691 NASDAQ Rules IM-5605, see: 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_1_4_
3_8_5&CiRestriction=independent+director&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F; 
NASDAQ Rule IM-5605-6 even specifically asserts that appointing significant shareholder representatives to 
the compensation committee may help monitor better executive compensation. 
NYSE §303A.02 Commentary, see: 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fs
ections%2Flcm-sections%2F. Last visit February 2019. 
692 A controlled company refers to a company whose shareholders, alone or as a group, can dominate more 
than 50% of the voting power when it comes to director elections. See: NYSE Rule § 303A.00 and NASDAQ Rule 
5615 (c)(1), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fs
ections%2Flcm-sections%2F, 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_1_4_
3_8_21&CiRestriction=exemption&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F. Last visited 
February 2019. 
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dominate the board with his or her representatives, in which case the majority 
independent board is no longer necessary.  
Special board committees  
The NYSE Manual demands three special committees, namely the 
“nominating/corporate governance committee”, the “compensation 
committee” and the “audit committee”. Meanwhile, the NASDAQ Rule does 
not strictly require a nomination committee. 
Nominating/corporate governance committee 
Pursuant to NYSE Manual §303A.04, it is mandatory for a listed company to 
have a nominating/corporate governance committee consisting of only 
independent directors. Furthermore, the company should draft a written 
charter that clarifies the responsibility, purpose and annual evaluation of the 
committee, as well as the qualifications, appointment and removal of 
committee members. In contrast, the NASDAQ Rule does not specifically call 
for a nominating committee but prescribes in 5605(e)(1) an independent 
directors’ oversight function on nomination. Based on this point, a listed 
company has two options, namely to select or recommend director nominees 
either with a majority of independent directors or a fully independent director 
nomination committee. However, both the NYSE Manual and the NASDAQ 
Rule grant an exemption to controlled companies regarding the above 
requirement.693 
Compensation committee 
NYSE Manual §303A.05 (a) stipulates that a listed company must have a 
compensation committee comprised of exclusively independent directors. 
Furthermore, §303A.02 (a)(ii) particularly emphasises that members of the 
compensation committee should be independent from management. Likewise, 
§303A.05 (c)(iv) highlights that a consultant, legal counsel or other advisor 
should be independent from management. In parallel, NASDAQ Rule 5605(d)(1) 
states that it is compulsory for every listed company to have a written charter 
 
693 See: NYSE Rule § 303A.00 and NASDAQ Rule 5615 (c)(1), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fs
ections%2Flcm-sections%2F, 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_1_4_
3_8_21&CiRestriction=exemption&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F. Last visited 
February 2019. 
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for its compensation committee, and 5605(d)(2)(A) demands that the 
compensation committee should have no fewer than two independent 
directors. Nevertheless, 5605(d)(2)(B) clarifies that if it is in “the best interests 
of the company and its shareholders”, and in “exceptional and limited 
circumstances”, the board can approve the appointment of a non-independent 
director to the compensation committee. Both NYSE Manual and NASDAQ Rule 
prescribe the exemption of controlled companies.694 
Audit committee  
In comparison with other two special committees, the audit committee has a 
stricter independence requirement, since there is no exemption for controlled 
companies.695 
NYSE Manual §303A.06 affirmatively confirms the necessity of an audit 
committee for a listed company based on Rule 10A-3 of the SEA 1934. 
Furthermore, §303A.07 specifies additional requirements, such as an audit 
committee should consist of at least three independent directors, should have 
a written charter and should have an internal audit function. Similarly, 
NASDAQ Rule 5605(c) demands a written charter for the audit committee for 
each listed company, and the committee should be composed of at least three 
independent directors, except in “exceptional and limited circumstances” as 
stated in 5605(c)(2)(B). 5605(c)(3) enumerates the responsibilities and 
authority of the audit committee based on Rules 10A-3(b)(2),(3),(4) and (5) of 
the SEA 1934. 
For exemptions relating to the majority independent board and two special 
committees, as previously mentioned, disclosure obligations have been 
imposed. In general, §303A.04,05,06 of NYSE Manual requires the disclosure of 
written charters for three special committees. Particularly, a broader 
disclosure requirement is imposed on a situation which deviates from the 
independent requirement. For example, both NYSE Manual §303A.00 and 
NASDAQ Rule IM-5615-5 stipulate that if a controlled company intends to seek 
 
694 See: NYSE Rule § 303A.00 and NASDAQ Rule 5615 (c)(1), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fs
ections%2Flcm-sections%2F, 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_1_4_
3_8_21&CiRestriction=exemption&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F. Last visited 
February 2019. 
695 Ibid. 
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an independence exemption, it must follow relevant disclosure requirements. 
Besides, NASDAQ Rules 5605(c)(2)(B),(d)(2)(B) and (e)(3) assert that the 
appointment of non-independent directors in special committees, in 
“exceptional and limited circumstances”, should be accompanied by 
disclosures through websites, proxy statements or other reports, as required.  
State corporate law 
On the state level, the Delaware court adopts a “highly fact-intensive” 
approach, based on a case-by-case analysis rather than a strict “bright-line” 
approach, to find whether a director is independent or not.696 By examining 
the concrete facts of the case at hand, the court will find the independent 
director either a “faithful monitor” or a “rubber-stamp”. If the answer points 
to the former, the court will respect the independent decision.697 Moreover, 
the independent standards established by the Delaware case law may vary in 
terms of listing rules on elements such as “employment and personal 
relationships, financial ties and nomination to the board”.698 Instead of 
formulating an abstract concept, the court prefers to look into the case details, 
to ascertain whether independent directors have approved the transaction in 
dispute and whether the relationship between independent directors and a 
company can be regarded as independent.699  
Different from listing rules, Delaware courts do not impose a mandatory 
requirement but determine that independent directors should play an 
important role by granting deference to their decisions. As mentioned in 4.2 of 
this chapter, in the demand-exempted situation, shareholders’ derivative 
action can be dismissed if a special litigation committee, which consists 
exclusively of independent directors, proves that a dismissal decision is for the 
 
696 Jay P. Lefkowitz, Andrew B. Clubok, Yosef J. Riemer, and Matthew Solum, “Director Independence: 
Interplay Between Delaware Law and Exchange Rules”, available at 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/07/director-independence-interplay-between-delaware-law-and-ex
change-rules/. Last visited February 2019.  
697 Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project’, 61 (1993) 
George Washington Law Review, pp. 1034-1083.  
698 For instance, the current employment relationship does not necessarily exclude a director from being 
found as independent but depends on the extent of this relationship. However, listing rules clearly preclude a 
current employee from taking up the position of independent director; for past employment relationships, 
listing rules establish a “three-year” threshold. Nevertheless, the Delaware court generally does not find a past 
employment relationship undermines independence; for financial ties, the Delaware court may not strictly 
follow the thresholds set in the listing rules; for the element of nomination of a director to the board, it does 
not preclude independence on its own according to the Delaware case law. Yet this element has not been 
addressed by the listing rules. More details see: supra. 696. 
699 Ibid.  
83B_BW_Fu_stand.job
156 
 
best of a company. Moreover, independent directors have substantial value in 
related-party transactions and takeovers. DGCL§144 (a)(1) affirms the 
cleansing effect of independent director approval, in that a related-party 
transaction is not necessarily void if conditions of proper disclosure and 
good-faith independent director approval are fulfilled. In several important 
cases, such as Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,700 Moran v. Household 
International, Inc.701 and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,702 
Delaware courts affirmed that the anti-takeover measure is permissible if the 
decision is independently made by a board with a majority of independent 
directors.703 As shall be demonstrated in 4.4 of this chapter, the approval of a 
special negotiating committee of independent directors, plus that of a majority 
of minority shareholders, shifts the judicial review standard from the entire 
fairness to the business judgment rule in freeze-out transactions. Accordingly, 
the independent director system, as a legal instrument utilised to balance the 
separation between ownership and control, naturally serves the goal of 
shareholder value. Meanwhile, it may also shield the managerial authority 
from an aggressive corporate control market.704 
Analysis of the independent director system 
Academic research demonstrates that the independent director system has 
become common practice among US listed companies. Gordon, for instance, 
examined an extensive period ranging from 1950 to 2005 and pointed out a 
dramatic proportion change of independent directors, from 20% to 75%, in 
large US listed companies.705 The 2011 U.S. Director Compensation and Board 
Practices Report presented an even higher percentage of more than 80% of 
independent directors in listed companies.706 Besides, the Report also 
confirmed that a simple majority independent director requirement had been 
widely accepted by listed companies. Furthermore, the 2015 Spencer Stuart 
 
700 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
701 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
702 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
703 Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-20005: Of Shareholder 
Value and Stock Market Prices’, 59 (2007) Stanford Law Review, pp. 1465-1568. 
704 Ibid. 
705 Ibid. 
706 The Conference Board, NASDAQ OMX and NYSE Euronext, The 2011 U.S. Director Compensation and Board 
Practices Report, available at 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/11/11/the-2011-u-s-director-compensation-and-board-practices-report
/. Last visited February 2019.  
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Board Index (hereinafter the 2015 Index)707 continued to display this growing 
trend by recording 84% of independent directors on the boards of S&P500 
companies,708 as well as an increase of 376 new independent directors, which 
was the highest rate of growth since 2008. 
Existing literature presents mixed results concerning the functioning of the 
independent director system. One strain of research positively supports its 
value.709 Daily and Dalton, based on the data of 100 fast-growing small public 
companies in the US, observed a positive connection between the participation 
of independent directors and better firm performance.710 Similarly, Barnhart 
et al. found a notable relationship between board composition, especially 
independent directors and firm performance.711 Petra divided the function of 
the board into two categories, namely decision management and decision 
control. The prior relates to the performance of the firm, and the latter refers 
to control over management.712 Based on previous studies, Petra concluded 
that the independent director system fails to play a substantial role in decision 
management, but it does function efficiently in decision control in certain 
aspects, such as shareholder advocacy713 and financial reporting.714 
Additionally, by examining independent directors’ trading records, Ravina and 
Sapienza claimed that, averagely speaking, independent directors are informed 
correctly in both good times and bad times, and the better the corporate 
 
707 Spencer Stuart, Spencer Stuart U.S. Board Index 2015, available at 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/research-and-insight/spencer-stuart-us-board-index-2015. Last visited 
February 2019.  
708 S&P500 index is founded on the market capitalisation of the top 500 common stock listed companies on 
the NYSE or NASDAQ. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S%26P_500_Index. Last visited February 2019. 
A list of S&P 500 companies, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_S%26P_500_companies. Last visited 
February 2019. 
709 Steven T. Petra, ‘Do Outside Independent Directors Strengthen Corporate Boards?’, 5 (2005) Corporate 
Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, pp. 55-64. 
710 Catherine M. Daily and Dan R. Dalton, ‘The Relationship between Governance Structure and Corporate 
Performance in Entrepreneurial Firms’, 7 (1992) Journal of Business Venturing, pp. 375-386. 
711 Scott W. Barnhart, M. Wayne Marr and Stuart Rosenstein, ‘Firm Performance and Board Composition: 
Some New Evidence’, 15 (1994) Managerial and Decision Economics, pp. 329-340. 
712 Supra. 709. 
713 In particular, it claimed that shareholders are likely to receive more benefits in front of tender offers or 
takeover threats, if the board of directors is under the control of independent directors. See:  
John W. Byrd and Kent A. Hickman, ‘Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer 
Bids’, 32 (1992) Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 195-221. 
Philip A. Gibbs, ‘Determinants of Corporate Restructuring: the Relative Importance of Corporate Governance, 
Takeover Threat, and Free Cash Flow’, 14 (1993) Strategic Management Journal, pp. 51-68. 
714 It has been stated that independent directors can restrain frauds in financial reports. See: Mark S. Beasley, 
‘An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement 
Fraud’, 71 (1996) The Accounting Review, pp. 443-465. 
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governance, the better informed the independent directors.715 Another 
innovative research connected changes in the stock price with the sudden 
deaths of independent directors in US companies, and affirmed independent 
directors’ contributions to shareholders.716 In a recent comparative study, 
empirical evidences shown that a higher percentage of independent directors 
discourages the board to take excessive risks.717  
In contrast, other research negates the effectiveness of the independent 
director system.718 Hermalin and Weisbach, for example, based on a sample of 
142 companies on the NYSE, revealed the absence of a linkage between board 
composition and company performance.719 Bhagat and Black, whose research 
covered 934 of the largest US companies, found that bad performance induced 
a company to increase the amount of independent directors, and yet this 
change brought no practical improvement to the company. A bigger 
proportion of independent directors did not create a corresponding advantage 
in financial returns, and in many cases they caused further degeneration in 
performance.720 Relevantly, Agrawal and Knoeber, by examining various 
agency cost-reducing mechanisms, claimed that independent directors are 
negatively correlated to company performance.721 In addition, by delving into 
specific board committees, Klein’s research confirmed the substantial value of 
insider directors, particularly on financial and investment committees, which 
was against the rationale behind the regulatory requirement of independent 
special committees.722 A recent research also found that independent 
directors fail to curtail frauds and malfeasances.723 
 
715 Enrichetta Ravina and Paola Sapienza, ‘What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their 
Trading’, 23 (2010) Review of Financial Studies, pp. 962-1003. 
716 Bang Dang Nguyen and Kasper Meisner Nielsen, ‘The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from 
Sudden Deaths’, 98 (2010) Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 550-567. 
717 Zahid Irshad Younas, Christian Klein, Thorsten Trabert and Bernhard Zwergel, ‘Board Composition and 
Corporate Risk-Taking: A Review of Listed Firms From Germany and the USA’, 20 (2019) Journal of Applied 
Accounting Research, pp. 526-542. 
718 Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard S. Black, ‘The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term 
Firm Performance’, 27 (2001) Journal of Corporation Law, pp. 231-273. 
719 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, ‘The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on 
Firm Performance’, 20 (1991) Financial Management, pp. 101-112. 
720 Supra. 718. 
721 Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber, ‘Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems 
between Managers and Shareholders’, 31 (1996) Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 377-397. 
722 April Klein, ‘Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure’, 41 (1998) Journal of Law & Economics, pp. 
275-304.  
723 S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani and H. Nejat Seyhun, ‘Do Independent Directors Curb Financial Fraud? The 
Evidence and Proposals for Further reform’, 93 (2018) Indiana Law Journal, pp. 757- 805. 
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Furthermore, various studies have ascribed the ineffective monitoring of 
independent directors to the lack of true independence and the lack of 
incentives. First, it is hard to ensure genuine independence at the nomination 
stage, due to office politics. Hermalin and Weisbach stated that substantial 
differences between inside and outside directors no longer exist, since both 
selections are under the control of the top management.724 Clark also 
observed insider manipulation of the board.725 Namely, the nomination 
committee, more than often, is dominated by insiders, or outside directors 
who conspire with the insiders. Consequently, this nomination committee 
determines independent director candidates. Through various layers of 
manipulation, the nominated independent directors are often friends of the 
CEO or other insiders, or peers from an equal social class with shared values.726 
Second, insufficient incentives and resources are reasons behind the 
unsatisfactory performance of independent directors at the post-nomination 
stage. Being independent, by nature, suggests the absence of any personal 
incentive to be actively involved.727 Besides, factors such as part-time 
employment, information asymmetry and budgetary limitations considerably 
constrain the functioning of independent directors in practice.728 
To address the above issues, it has been claimed that incentives can be 
provided from monetary, career and legal liability aspects.729 Regarding legal 
liability, existing data display a low punishment rate for independent directors. 
During 1980 to 2005, Black, Cheffins and Klausner only recorded 13 cases in 
which outside directors of public companies made an individual financial 
payment according to a judgment or settlement. The research also highlighted 
that the personal financial liability risk of an independent director was way 
lower than expected, on account of the popularity of the director and officer 
 
724 Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, ‘The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on 
Firm Performance’, 20 (1991) Financial Management, pp. 101-112. 
725 Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), p. 183. 
726 Ibid., p. 183. 
727 Ibid., p. 184. 
728 Ibid., p. 184. 
In a very recent research, Bainbridge reaffirmed “part-time employment”, “information asymmetry” and 
“insufficient incentives” as elements that cause the inefficiency of independent directors, and further 
proposed to replace individual independent directors with institutional ones. See: Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
‘Rethinking the Board of Directors: Getting Outside the Box’, 74 (2019) The Business Lawyer, pp. 285-295. 
729 María Gutiérrez and Maribel Sáez, ‘Deconstructing Independent Directors’, 13 (2013) Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies, pp. 63-94. 
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insurance in public companies.730 For securities cases, during 1996 to 2010, 
Brochet and Srinivasan found a small percentage of 11% named independent 
directors.731 However, one should be aware that this low personal financial 
risk of independent directors may be an intentional legal design, since a larger 
cohort of academics still opines that director liabilities may induce risk-averse 
directors.732 In contrast, an alternative solution to the incentive problem is to 
build up an independent director reward regime, which imposes lower costs 
than the existing liability regime.733 In other words, stronger independence 
can be achieved through both rewards and sanctions, primarily from economic 
and reputation perspectives.734 Research also identifies that independence 
may become more problematic in controlled companies, since independent 
directors are appointed by a controlling shareholder. To achieve true 
independence, some scholars additionally call for “enhanced-independence” 
directors who are accountable to minority shareholders and play a role in 
screening conflict of interest transactions with the company controller.735 
Last, academic discussion goes back to two preliminary questions. The first 
debate is whether there is an optimal board structure. The pro-optimal board 
opinion claims that there exists a best board structure, which is superior to the 
rest.736 Meanwhile, the con-optimal board opinion declines a universal 
 
730 Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Michael Klausner, ‘Outside Director Liability’, 58 (2006) Stanford 
Law Review, pp. 1055-1159.  
731 Francois Brochet and Suraj Srinivasan, ‘Accountability of Independent Directors: Evidence from Firms 
Subject to Securities Litigation’, 111 (2014) Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 430-449. 
732 See: Roberta Romano, ‘What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance’, 14 (1989) 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, pp. 1-33.  
Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins and Michael Klausner, ‘Outside Director Liability: A Policy Analysis’, 162 
(2006) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, pp. 5-20.  
733 Assaf Hamdani and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Rewarding Outside Directors’, 105 (2007) Michigan Law Review, pp. 
1677-1711.  
734 Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder 
Value and Stock Market Prices’, 59 (2007) Stanford Law Review, pp. 1465-1568. 
735 Lucian A Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, ‘Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders’, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741738. Last visited February 2019.  
736 The pro-optimal-board opinion, which finds support from scholars such as Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 
demonstrated a non-monotonic relationship between Tobin’s Q and director ownership. McConnell and 
Servaes’ research revealed a curvilinear relationship between Tobin’s Q and insider ownership. These 
researches, to a certain extent, proved the existence of a peak before the Tobin’s Q goes down. See: Benjamin 
E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, ‘The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm 
Performance’, 20 (1991) Financial Management, pp. 101-112. 
Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An 
Empirical Analysis’, 20 (1988) Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 293-315. 
John J. McConnell and Henri Servaes, ‘Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value’, 27 
(1990) Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 595-612. 
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optimal board structure but insists on a company-based optimal board.737 
Subsequently, the second question focuses on legal intervention vs. company 
freedom. Following the pro-optimal board logic, an optimal structure can 
generate the highest return for a firm. Reasonably, then, the optimal structure 
should be confirmed by a binding regulation which applies to all firms. In 
contrast, a con-optimal board means that the optimal structure of a specific 
firm should be left to the discretion of the company and be regulated by 
company bylaws.738 As a matter of fact, this dispute was tested during the 
formulation of the American Law Institute’s (hereinafter “ALI”) Principles of 
Corporate Governance. Regarding the “one-size-fits-all” mindset in its 
Tentative Drafts, it was warned that if this mindset were indeed confirmed by 
mandatory rules instead of recommendations, it might be unjust for 
companies that invest in choosing the most proper structures for 
themselves.739  
The above elaborations have demonstrated three characteristics of the US 
independent director system. First, under the dispersed ownership structure, 
the main agency cost for US securities market rests with shareholders and 
management. The main function of independent directors is to monitor 
management on behalf of shareholders. Accordingly, the US statutory 
definition of “independence” emphasises independence from management. If 
there is a controlling shareholder, some statutory independent director 
requirements are exempted. In other words, the task of protecting minority 
shareholders in these circumstances is left to other legal instruments, such as 
disclosures and fiduciary duty litigations. Second, to regulate the independent 
director system, strict “bright-line” requirements are found in the listing rules 
on the federal level. Furthermore, “fact-intensive” case law is developed by 
Delaware courts on the state level. This combined regulatory approach intends 
to underline both the predictability and the flexibility of law. Third, the 
independent director system is a design used mainly to safeguard shareholder 
 
737 The con-optimal-board opinion argues that the optimal board structure relies on the particular 
characteristics of a certain company and the specific industry of the company. See: Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard 
S. Black, ‘Independent Directors’, 2 (1998) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, pp. 
283-287. 
Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, ‘The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on 
Firm Performance’, 20 (1991) Financial Management, pp. 101-112. 
738 Ibid. 
739 Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project’, 61 (1993) 
George Washington Law Review, pp. 1034-1083.  
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interests. However, Delaware courts may navigate around this instrument in 
favour of management on certain issues, such as the right to bring a derivative 
action, self-dealing transactions and takeovers, when relevant conditions are 
met.740  
4.3.3 Analysis of both monitoring mechanisms 
This part has examined two monitoring mechanisms in the US system – 
disclosure and independent directors – and found the interplay between 
federal securities regulations and state corporate laws.  
Federal regulations and listing rules prescribe very detailed and technical 
disclosure obligations and mandatory requirements of independent directors, 
with a common goal of shareholder protection. For the former, disclosure of 
the transaction intention, when the 5% shareholding threshold is met, and the 
intensive disclosure obligations of going-private transactions both demonstrate 
the consideration of (minority) shareholder protection. For the latter, listing 
rules for stock exchanges demand independent directors be independent from 
management, but exempt some statutory independent director requirements  
for controlled companies. This statutory design highlights that independent 
directors’ primary task is to monitor management.741  
On the state level, the DGCL does not have many specific disclosure and 
independent director requirements. Instead, Delaware courts mostly regulate 
disclosures under fiduciary duties and determine the importance of 
independent directors by granting judicial deference to their decisions. 
Examinations of disclosure and independent directors have shown that the 
case-by-case analysis approach adopted by the court not only complements 
and substantiates law, but it also increases the adaptability and flexibility of 
law. Additionally, thanks to a strong private litigation culture, the court 
continuously engages in the implementation of disclosure and independent 
director rules. Simply put, the courts make a great contribution to the 
development of US corporate law.  
 
740 More discussion can be found in section 4.4 of this chapter. 
741 The conflicts of interest between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders becomes evident 
in takeover transactions. Accordingly, the Delaware courts recognise the cleansing effect of independent 
director approval based on a case-by-case analysis of independence. More discussion can be found in section 
4.4 of this chapter.  
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Last but not least, despite mixed opinions on shareholder activism, existing 
academic research claim that a proper degree of shareholder participation may 
be beneficial to both disclosure and independence.  
 
4.4 Minority shareholder protection in takeovers, especially 
by courts  
Minority shareholder oppression becomes more evident in takeovers,742 due 
to the conflicts of interest between the controller and minority shareholders. 
To explore the issue, this part will analyse the US system by elaborating two 
main forms of takeovers, the protection of judicial review standards, and the 
protection of the appraisal right.  
4.4.1 Two main forms of takeover transaction 
The discussion below will focus on the two most relevant forms of takeover 
transaction: one-step transactions and two-step transactions. Specifically, 
one-step transactions, also known as statutory mergers or long-form mergers, 
refer to mergers that require both the approval of the board and the approval 
of shareholders, as prescribed in DGCL §251(c).743 Two-step transactions 
normally start with a tender offer as the first step, which is then followed by 
the second step of a back-end merger. Back-end mergers include three further 
types: (1) a long-form merger, which requires both the approval of the board 
and the approval of shareholders,744 (2) a short-form merger, namely if the 
acquirer owns at least 90% of shares of the target after the first step, in which 
 
742 The wording of “takeovers” in 4.4 follows the board definition, which covers both sale of control 
transactions and freeze-out transactions.  
743 One-step mergers also require the target company to file a proxy statement to the SEC, while both 
short-form and medium-form mergers do not have this filing obligation. see: Audra Boone, Brian Broughman 
and Antonio J. Macias, ‘Shareholder Decision Rights in Acquisitions: Evidence from Tender Offers’, 331 (2017) 
Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper, pp.1-50, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629424. Last visited February 2019. 
744 The term “long-form merger” mentioned here specifically refers to the second step of a two-step 
transaction, i.e. after the acquirer has become the controlling shareholder of the target through the first step, 
the controlling shareholder of the target now employs a long-form merger to freeze-out all remaining minority 
shareholders. This term should be distinguished from “one-step transactions”, which describes a long-form 
merger between the target and a non-controller acquirer, i.e. the sale of control and the freeze-out of minority 
shareholders of the target all happen together in one transaction.  
87B_BW_Fu_stand.job
164 
 
case a short-form merger could be completed without shareholder approval,745 
and (3) a medium-form merger,746 which allows the acquirer to complete the 
second-step merger without shareholder approval, as long as the acquirer 
owns more than 50% or a higher threshold, if required by the articles of 
association, after the first-step tender offer. However, preconditions must be 
met before this type of transaction can be consummated: (i) the merger 
agreement expressly opts in to DGCL §251(h) and provides that the 
second-step merger will be effected as soon as practicable after the first-step 
tender offer and (ii) the first-step tender offer is open for all outstanding stocks 
of the target, and the consideration of the second-step merger should be the 
same amount and the same kind as the consideration of the first-step tender 
offer. 
A complete takeover process can be divided into two phases: in the first phase, 
an acquirer intends to seize control of the target company and becomes its 
controlling shareholder, normally through tender offers; after becoming the 
controlling shareholder, such controller may decide to enter the second phase 
by freezing-out all minority shareholders, normally either through a long-form 
merger (the “merger route freeze-out”) or through a tender offer plus a 
short-form merger (the “tender offer route freeze-out”). However, not every 
takeover has such a clear division of two phases. In a one-step transaction 
between a company and a third party,747 the seize of control and the 
freeze-out is conducted simultaneously through the same merger. For a 
two-step transaction structured as a tender offer, followed by a medium-form 
merger, between a company and a third party, Delaware courts assert that 
despite its two steps, this type of transaction has similar effect as a one-step 
transaction since DGCL §251(h) requires both steps to be written in the merger 
agreement that is agreed by the board, both steps to have exactly the same 
consideration, the second-step to be conducted immediately after the 
first-step (if possible), and a majority of shareholders’ acceptance of the tender 
offer is comparable to shareholder approval. Similar to one-step transactions, 
this type of transactions also has no clear division of two phases given that 
both steps are negotiated and agreed upon between the target and a third 
 
745 If the parent company is the one that disappears after the merger, then approval of shareholders of the 
parent company is required. See: DGCL §253. 
746 DGCL §251 (h). 
747 The term of “a third party” here refers to anyone who is not the controlling shareholder of the target 
company. 
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party. Thus, the discussion below will put the first phase of takeovers, one-step 
transactions with a third party and the DGCL §251(h) two-step transactions 
with a third party into one group since they all happen/ are negotiated before 
the existence of a controlling shareholder; and the second phase of takeovers 
as another group due to the “self-dealing” of a controlling shareholder. 
Furthermore, in this research, a freeze-out, also known as cash-out, refers to a 
transaction between the target and its controlling shareholder in the second 
phase of a takeover, in which remaining minority shareholders of the target 
receive only cash consideration.  
4.4.2 Minority shareholder protection in takeover transactions by 
judicial review 
Three judicial review standards 
To begin with, minority shareholder oppression is not an independent cause of 
action in Delaware; instead, minority shareholders are protected under the 
fiduciary duties.748 In Harbor Finance Partners v. Huizenga,749 the plaintiff 
brought a derivative action against the company’s acquisition decision by 
claiming that the unfair transaction was purposely designed to benefit the 
controlling shareholders – at the expense of minority shareholders. In the 
analysis, Vice Chancellor Strine asserted that a shareholder oppression 
allegation does not necessarily protect minority shareholders from controlling 
shareholders. In contrast, the well-developed “fiduciary duty” case law in 
Delaware confers sufficient safeguards to minority shareholders by subjecting 
a conflicted-interest transaction to stringent judicial review standards. 
Under the fiduciary duty, Delaware courts have established a delicate system 
of three-layer standards, namely the business judgment rule, the enhanced 
scrutiny standard and the entire fairness standard. Specifically, the business 
judgment rule is the default rule and the most lenient rule for the defendant. It 
applies to an independent and informed board decision that is made in good 
faith and in the interests of the company and its shareholders. Enhanced 
 
748 Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and Officers of Delaware and 
Texas Corporations, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2408036. Last visited 
February 2019.  
749 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
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scrutiny is a less lenient standard, and it regulates a board decision to take 
defensive actions or an approval resolution that concerns a sale of control. The 
entire fairness standard is the strictest option and inspects an approved 
decision on a self-dealing transaction involving management or the controlling 
shareholder, or in the case that the plaintiff has successfully rebutted the 
business judgment rule.750  
Judicial review of takeover transactions with a third party 
The discussion in this section focuses on the first phase of takeovers, one-step 
transactions with a third party, as well as two-step transactions with a third 
party, structured as a tender offer plus a medium-form merger according to 
DGCL §251 (h). 
The first phase of takeovers 
When an acquirer intends to take over a target company, it creates an inherent 
conflict of interest between the board of directors and the shareholders of the 
target. On the one hand, directors face the danger of losing their jobs after the 
takeover. On the other hand, directors have fiduciary duties to safeguard 
shareholder interests. Driven by personal interests, directors may take 
unnecessary or excessive takeover defence measures to preclude a takeover 
transaction that benefits shareholders, or they may accept a sub-optimal bid at 
the expense of shareholders.751 To protect shareholder interests in these 
circumstances, Delaware courts normally apply the medium-level judicial 
review standard, namely enhanced scrutiny. 
For defensive measures, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.752 is an 
important case, as it establishes a two-pronged test of reasonability and 
proportionality. Specifically, Mesa (who already owned about 13% of Unocal 
shares before the transaction) attempted to acquire Unocal through a 
two-step transaction, which consisted of a cash tender offer for around 37% of 
Unocal’s shares as the first step. The second step would compel shareholders 
 
750 Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and Officers of Delaware and 
Texas Corporations, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2408036. Last visited 
February 2019.  
751 These conflicts of interest can be seen in the first phase of a two-step transaction or in a one-step 
transaction; for example, the target board prefers a certain bidder because such a bidder promises the board 
future employment or other personal interests, and the board takes defensive measures to ward off another 
bidder who has a better deal or reject a higher offer from another bidder.  
752 493, A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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who failed in the first step to exchange their shares with junk bonds. After 
consulting expert opinions, Unocal’s board found that Mesa’s two-tier offer 
was inadequate and coercive. To prevent minority shareholders from receiving 
Mesa’s unfair junk bonds, Unocal directors adopted a self-tender offer to 
repurchase its own shares but excluded Mesa from this offer. When reviewing 
the case, the court opined that the enhanced scrutiny standard should apply, 
after considering a conflict of interest existed in the sale of control transaction. 
Hence, the board owed the burden of proof to demonstrate the following. First, 
its belief in an existing threat to the company was built on a reasonable basis. 
Second, the adopted defence action was a reasonable and proportionate one. 
In this case, Unocal’s self-tender offer was a reasonable and proportional 
decision, which was made by an independent board in good faith after 
sufficient investigation, and to serve the valid purpose of minority shareholder 
protection. Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court 
of Chancery and concluded that the Unocal board passed the enhanced 
scrutiny test and should be reviewed under the business judgment standard.  
To protect shareholders from a sub-optimal bid, the Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc.753 case was a judicial turning point for 
shareholder protection and a decline in the dominant business judgment 
rule.754 In this case, Pantry Pride was a third-party acquirer who issued cash 
tender offers in a takeover bid for Revlon. In response, Revlon’s board of 
directors took defensive measures and later attempted to reject Pantry Pride’s 
ongoing takeover by selling Revlon (with a compromised lock-up option) to 
another company, Forstmann. The Delaware court considered that if a 
break-up of the company becomes inevitable, then the directors’ fiduciary duty 
shifts from guarding the independence of the company to negotiating the 
highest price available for its shareholders.755 On the contrary, however, 
Revlon’s board had taken defensive measures to end a competitive bidding 
contest rather than pursuing a shareholder-optimal bid. By seeking a 
sub-optimal deal with Forstmann, Revlon’s directors shielded themselves from 
 
753 506 A.2d 173 (Del.1986). 
754 George Parker Young, Vincent P. Circelli and Kelli L. Walter, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Minority Shareholder 
Oppression from the Defense Perspective: Differing Approaches in Texas, Delaware, and Nevada’, 45 (2013) 
Texas Journal of Business Law, pp.257-322. 
755 Moreover, Vice Chancellor Strine stressed the significant function of the court to protect minority 
shareholders from making decisions without full disclosure. See: Robert B. Thompson, ‘Delaware’s Disclosure: 
Moving the Line of Federal-State Corporate Regulation’, 167 (2009) University of Illinois Law Review, pp. 
167-190. 
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personal liabilities, accused by the note holders,756 while damaging 
shareholders’ interests. Consequently, Revlon’s board was not entitled to 
business judgment protection, and the Delaware courts ruled that they had 
failed the Unocal reasonableness and proportional test and enjoined its 
takeover defences.  
In another case, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,757 
Paramount was a company with a dispersed ownership structure, while 
Viacom was a concentrated company with a controlling shareholder. 
Paramount and Viacom agreed on a two-step transaction with various defence 
measures. QVC then also proposed a two-step transaction to acquire 
Paramount. However, Paramount’s board rejected the QVC offer, which was 
$1 billion higher than the one offered by Viacom. In reviewing this case, 
Delaware courts emphasised shareholders’ risks in a sale of control transaction. 
Namely, a sale of control transaction gives rise to minority shareholders and 
decreases the voting power of this cohort. As compensation for their 
vulnerable minority status, minority shareholders should receive a control 
premium. Considering the minority interests at risk, Delaware courts applied 
the enhanced scrutiny standard to review a sale of control transaction, and 
they insisted on the Revlon demand of a maximum price for shareholders. 
Delaware courts further distinguished the case at hand with Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., because the disputed Paramount and 
Viacom transaction in this case would result in a controlling shareholder, i.e. 
Viacom, while the surviving entity following the Time and Warner transaction 
would remain a dispersed company. Thus, Delaware courts found that the 
Paramount board did not pass the enhanced scrutiny standard in this case, due 
to unreasonable defensive measures and preferential treatment granted to the 
sub-optimal Viacom deal.  
One-step transactions with a third party 
On occasions, a company’s board may decide that a merger with a third party 
is for the best of the company and its shareholders. In Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,758 after a thorough research and 
 
756 At the initial defence stage, the Revlon board adopted two defensive measures, respectively a Rights Plan 
and a Notes Plan. The subsequent negotiation with Frostmann caused the Notes’ market value to drop, and 
note holders claimed, in order to seek litigation.  
757 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).  
758 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).  
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independent deliberation, Time’s board concluded that a one-step transaction, 
to combine with Warner, would best serve the corporation’s long-term 
interests. Delaware courts found that the initial stock-for-stock agreement 
between Time and Warner was an informed decision made by an independent 
board in the interests of the company, and it caused no sale of control (both 
Time and Warner were widely-held companies and the surviving company 
after the merger still remained widely-held) and should be measured under 
the business judgment standard. Subsequently, Paramount issued an all-cash 
offer to take over Time and later claimed that the board of Time had failed the 
Revlon duty by not seeking the maximum price for its shareholders. 
Responding to this claim, Delaware courts identified two general situations 
that invoked the Revlon duty. The first situation describes an active bid that 
concerns the sale of a company or a clear breaking-up thereof. The second 
situation involves abandoning a long-term strategy and breaking-up a company. 
The Delaware court did not find that there may have been an inevitable sale of 
Time, or abandonment of its long-term strategy, and thus it rejected the 
motion to invoke Revlon. Responding to Paramount’s hostile offer, Time 
replaced the initial stock exchange merger agreement with a stock purchase 
agreement with Warner. Considering its defensive nature, Delaware courts 
applied the enhanced scrutiny standard to review the adjusted merger 
agreement, and they found the agreement had successfully passed the 
two-pronged test of Unocal. 
In 2015, Delaware case law further evolved by granting judicial deference to 
shareholder approval in a one-step transaction with a third party that would 
otherwise be subjected to the enhanced scrutiny standard.759 For a 
post-closing damage action, the Delaware court highlighted the cleansing 
effect of shareholder approval in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings.760 
Concerning a one-step stock-for-stock merger between KKR and KKR Financial 
Holding, the Delaware Supreme Court supported the Court of Chancery’s 
finding that KKR was not the controlling shareholder of KKR Financial Holdings 
and rejected the application of the entire fairness standard. For a case which is 
 
759 The Corwin Effect: Stockholder Approval of M&A Transactions, available at 
https://information.hunton.com/34/1537/uploads/the-corwin-effect-stockholder-approval-of-m-and-a-transa
ctions.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
Iman Anabtawi, ‘The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A Jurisprudence’, 43 (2019) Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law, pp. 161-211. 
760 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
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not subjected to the entire fairness standard, namely where the transaction 
excludes the self-dealing element between a company and its controlling 
shareholder, if the transaction was approved by a majority of disinterested 
shareholders under two conditions, respectively uncoerced and fully informed, 
then the business judgment rule applies.761 Furthermore, the court underlined 
that Unocal and Revlon rulings are designed to deal mainly with “before closing” 
situations rather than post-closing damage claims. The cleansing effect of such 
shareholder approval is “outcome-determinative, even if the Revlon 
applies”.762 Delaware courts reaffirmed the reluctance to second-guess 
business decisions, i.e. when a business decision could be examined by the 
ballot, applying a stricter review standard would impose excessive litigation 
rents, and thus the business judgment rule applies.763  
Furthermore, judicial deference to shareholder approval in Corwin is deeply 
rooted in two substantial “fully informed” and “uncoerced” elements.764 In In 
re Saba Software, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,765 the plaintiff, who was a former 
shareholder of Saba, brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the board 
of directors regarding an all-cash merger. The Delaware court found that the 
board purposely withheld material information from shareholders, and the 
merger was imposed on these shareholders at a time when Saba’s common 
shares were delisted by the SEC, due to financial fraud. In this context, 
shareholders had no choice but to accept the merger at an undervalued price. 
Thus, the court rejected the idea of applying Corwin, because shareholder 
approval in Saba was conducted without full disclosure and under coercion. 
Instead, the court applied the Revlon enhanced scrutiny to review the case. 
DGCL §251(h) two-step transactions with a third party 
The Corwin effect does not stop at one-step transactions but extends also to 
two-step transactions with a third party, structured as a tender offer plus a 
medium-form merger. In In re Volcano Corporation Stockholder Litigation,766 
 
761 The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery’s narrow interpretation of Gantler v. 
Stephens’ 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) ruling and confirmed the cleansing effect of both voluntary and statutory 
shareholder approval. 
762 Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) [308]. 
763 Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) [313]. 
764 Francis Pileggi, Chancery Applies Revlon Standard-Not Corwin-In Sale of Company, available at 
https://www.delawarelitigation.com/2017/05/articles/chancery-court-updates/chancery-applies-revlon-stand
ard-not-corwin-in-sale-of-company/. Last visited February 2019. 
765 C.A. No. 10697-VCS, 2017 WL 1201108 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017). 
766 143 A.3d 727, 738 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
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Philips executed a two-step all-cash transaction with Volcano through a tender 
offer plus a medium-form merger under DGCL §251(h). Through the first-step 
tender offer, Philips acquired 89.1% of Volcano’s shares. Immediately after the 
first-step, the second-step medium-form merger was consummated without 
shareholder approval. In terms of the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, 
Delaware courts, first, followed the Corwin ruling and affirmed that fully 
informed and uncoerced disinterested shareholder approval leads to an 
irrebuttable application of the business judgment rule, unless “waste” has 
been proven, and second, the acceptance of the first-step tender offer by a 
majority of disinterested, fully informed and uncoerced shareholders has the 
same cleansing effect as the shareholder approval in Corwin. Delaware courts 
asserted that despite the two-steps, DGCL §251(h) transaction is substantially 
similar to a one-step merger in essence since the board of directors also needs 
to negotiate, declare advisability, approve and disclose material information 
regarding both the first-step tender offer and the second-step medium-form 
merger. Besides, DGCL§251(h) is structured to remove potential coercion in 
tender offers, by requiring the first-step tender offer to be issued to all 
shareholders of the target, the second-step merger to be conducted as soon as 
possible with the exact same consideration after the consummation of the 
first-step and the appraisal right provided to dissenting minority shareholders. 
Hence, the Corwin cleansing effect expands to cover also two-step DGCL 
§251(h) transactions with a third party,767 in which case the business judgment 
rule applies.  
The above examination of case law in takeover transactions with a third party 
has shown Delaware courts’ efforts to establish equilibrium between (minority) 
shareholder protection and directorial authority. Generally speaking, Delaware 
courts respect directorial authority, as long as a business decision is made in 
good faith by a fully informed independent board in the interest of the 
company. However, considering the inherent conflicts of interests between the 
board and the shareholders in a sale of control or defensive measures, 
Delaware courts apply a medium review standard. To prevent directors trading 
shareholder interests for their personal interests, by accepting a sub-optimal 
deal, the Revlon doctrine commands the board to pursue the highest 
 
767 To invoke the Corwin effect, the transaction must not be subjected to the entire fairness standard. In other 
words, the Corwin effect only applies to a two-step DGCL §251(h) transaction with a third party. For a two-step 
DGCL §251(h) transaction between the target and its controlling shareholder, the entire fairness standard 
applies, unless certain procedural protection have been provided to shift the judicial review standard. 
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reasonable price for shareholders, if there is an inevitable or imminent sale of 
control or break-up of the company. To prevent the board arbitrarily warding 
off a profitable transaction, driven by personal interests, the Unocal test 
requires such defensive measures to be both reasonable and proportional. 
Reasonably, Delaware courts’ protection for shareholders is not unlimited, in 
that the court should avoid second-guessing a business decision if shareholders 
have been granted the opportunity to decide for themselves. In Corwin and 
Volcano, Delaware courts confirmed the cleansing effect of fully informed, 
uncoerced and disinterested shareholder approval in both third party one-step 
transactions and two-step transactions structured as tender offers, plus 
medium-form mergers under DGCL §251(h), by replacing the enhanced 
scrutiny standard with the business judgment rule.  
Judicial review of freeze-out transactions with a controller 
Different from a one-step transaction with a third party, a DGCL §251(h) 
two-step transaction with a third party, and the first phase of takeovers 
(normally with a tender offer), this section focuses on the second phase of 
takeovers, whereby the controlling shareholder votes to freeze out all 
remaining minority shareholders. In this second phase, the controlling 
shareholder can structure a freeze-out transaction normally in one of two ways, 
namely through a long-form merger (hereinafter the “merger route 
freeze-out”) or through a tender offer plus a short-form merger (the “tender 
offer route freeze-out”). Historically, Delaware courts applied different judicial 
review standards to these two routes. This discrepancy lasted until the turning 
point case In re COX Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation (hereinafter 
“COX”)768 in 2005, which established a unified approach to freeze-out 
transactions. In other words, Delaware courts’ attitude to freeze-out 
transactions reveals a change from discrepancy to unification.769  
For merger route freeze-outs, i.e. through a long-form merger, Weinberger v. 
UOP770 was the landmark case, and it set out the most stringent judicial review 
standard for entire fairness in self-dealing transactions. In the first phase of the 
two-step transaction, Signal, in 1975, became the controlling shareholder of 
UOP with a 50.5% shareholding. Three years later, in 1978, Signal decided to 
 
768 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
769 Fernán Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian, ‘The Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structure & 
Outcomes: Evidence on the Unified Approach’, 5 (2015) Harvard Business Law Review, pp. 205-236. 
770 457 A.2d 701,703 (Del. 1983). 
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enter the second phase by acquiring the remaining shares of UOP. 
Subsequently, two UOP directors, who were also employees of Signal, issued a 
“feasibility report”, which suggested a price of up to $ 24 for Signal. However, 
this report was never disclosed to minority shareholders of UOP. The UOP 
board approved the merger and advised minority shareholders to accept the 
price of $21, since it was a fair amount based on Lehman Brothers’ opinion 
(with no disclosure of the fact that this opinion was made in a hurry). In 
reviewing this freeze-out transaction, the court asserted that the conflicts of 
interest caused by self-dealing, i.e. directors acting on both sides of the 
transaction and the controlling shareholder was the acquirer, determined that 
the entire fairness standard would be imposed. Moreover, the court clarified 
that entire fairness included both fair dealing and a fair price. In this case, the 
two UOP directors who were also employees of Signal used the UOP data to 
prepare a report exclusively for the use, and in the interests, of Signal. 
Obviously, these conflicting directors’ behaviours contaminated the fairness of 
the merger agreement and failed the fair dealing test. 
Another major concern of merger route freeze-out transactions was whether 
procedural protection, such as approving of a majority of minority 
shareholders or an independent committee, is sufficient to cause a shift in the 
judicial review standard or merely a shift in the burden of proof. Concerning 
the shield of “majority of minority” approval, Delaware courts affirmed in the 
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.771 case that the informed approval of a majority of 
minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff. Meanwhile, 
the controlling shareholder shoulders the burden to prove sufficient disclosure 
of material information.  
For “approval of a special negotiating committee”, in the In re Trans World 
Airline Inc. Shareholder Litigation (hereinafter “TWA”)772 case, Delaware 
courts believed that the protection provided by a special independent 
committee may shift the review standard from entire fairness to business 
judgment rule, if relevant conditions are fulfilled.773 However, this ruling was 
rebutted by Citron v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. (hereinafter “Citron”),774 in 
which Delaware courts emphasised the danger of minority shareholder 
 
771 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985). 
772 Civ. A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988). 
773 Fernán Restrepo, ‘Do Different Standards of Judicial Review Affect the Gains of Minority Shareholders in 
Freeze-Out Transactions? A Re-Examination of Siliconix’, 3 (2013) Harvard Business Law Review, pp. 321-359. 
774 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
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expropriation in a parent-subsidiary merger and insisted on the entire fairness 
standard. Thus, the approval of a special committee of independent directors 
only shifts the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff, in order to demonstrate 
that the transaction was unfair.  
To solve the tension between TWA and Citron, Delaware courts explicitly 
stated in Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems Inc.775 that contrasting views 
exist concerning the effect of disinterested committee approval on the 
controlling shareholder’s burden to prove the entire fairness of the transaction. 
One view asserts that such approval shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff. 
However, another view claims such approval shifts the judicial review standard 
from the entire fairness to the business judgment.776 By referring to 
Weinberger and Rosenblatt, Delaware courts recognised that the entire 
fairness should remain as the only judicial review standard in self-dealing 
mergers, since such transactions require cautious scrutiny.777 Furthermore, 
the court also invoked Rabkin v. Olin Corp.778 to clarify two preconditions for 
shifting the burden of proof, namely the controlling shareholder should not 
dominate the terms of the merger, and the independent committee should 
have actual bargaining power to guarantee an at-arm’s-length transaction.779 
In sum, procedural protection, i.e. the approval of a special negotiating 
committee or a majority of minority shareholders, only shifts the burden of 
proof from the defendant to the plaintiff and causes no changes to the 
application of the entire fairness standard in a merger route freeze-out 
transaction.  
Different from the merger route described above, Delaware case law created a 
chance for practitioners to circumvent the most stringent entire fairness 
standard by structuring their freeze-out transactions through the tender offer 
route, namely tender an offer to acquire 90% of the target’s shares, followed 
by a short-form merger.  
In the In re Siliconix Inc. Shareholders Litigation (hereinafter “Siliconix”)780 case, 
Delaware courts rejected the application of the entire fairness standard to 
tender offer transactions in the absence of coercion or disclosure violations. 
 
775 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994). 
776 Id. at 1116. 
777 Id, at 1117. 
778 Civ. A. No. 7547, 1990 WL 47648 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990). 
779 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), at 1118. 
780 Civ. A. No.18700, 2001 WL 716787(Del. Ch. June 19, 2001).  
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Admittedly, the court recognised that a less stringent approach had been 
adopted for tender offers than for mergers. However, the court justified these 
different treatments based on two distinctions: first, the tender offer, as a 
transaction form itself, does provide sufficient protection to minority 
shareholders, since they are free to decide to accept or reject the offer. In 
contrast, minority shareholders are powerless in a merger, due to the 
overwhelming voting power of the controlling shareholder. Second, the role of 
the board substantially varies in mergers and public tender offers. The former 
requires an essential contribution of the board to initiate and recommend the 
merger, while the latter demands no statutory influence of the board, since it 
is a matter of selling the property of minority shareholders.  
Shortly after Siliconix, Delaware courts refused to apply the entire fairness 
standard to a short-form merger in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. 
(hereinafter “Glassman”).781 In this case, the court based its decision on the 
very purpose of the short-form merger statute itself, by claiming that such a 
statute aims at speeding up the elimination of minority shareholders in a 
summary procedure, which is inconsistent with the “fair dealing” requirement 
of the entire fairness standard. In other words, the nature of a short-form 
merger, i.e. no notice, no board approval, no vote, etc., determines that it is 
impossible to apply the entire fairness standard.782 
Combining Siliconix and Glassman, Delaware courts created a chance for 
controlling shareholders to avoid the entire fairness review by structuring a 
freeze-out transaction in the form of a tender offer followed by a short-form 
merger. The court further clarified this exemption of the entire fairness review 
under three conditions in In re Pure Resources Litigation.783 Namely, a 
transaction is deemed as non-coercive as long as it fulfills the requirement of 
the majority approval of minority shareholders, followed by a short-form 
merger with the same price and no retributive threat. Hence, a non-coercive 
tender offer route freeze-out transaction is entitled to the business judgment 
rule, according to the court.  
 
781 777 A.2d. 242 (Del. Supr. 2001). 
782 Glassman also confirmed the appraisal as the exclusive remedy for minority shareholders in a short-form 
merger unless fraud or illegality has been shown. Under these conditions, minority shareholders have no other 
choice but either receive the merger consideration or exercise the appraisal right. Accordingly, the court highly 
underlined the importance of full disclosure duty in a short-form merger in order to make sure minority 
shareholders’ choices represent their true wills. 
783 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
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Up to this point, the discrepancy in judicial review standards has been 
demonstrated. On the one hand, the court insisted on applying the entire 
fairness standard to a merger route freeze-out transaction. On the other hand, 
the court rejected the entire fairness standard under the tender offer route. In 
reality, both the merger route and the tender offer route intend to achieve the 
same result of squeezing out minority shareholders, but obviously, the tender 
offer route is much more beneficial for controlling shareholders, since it can 
escape the most stringent judicial scrutiny of entire fairness. Judging from the 
increasing amount of tender-offer route freeze-out transactions and the lower 
prices paid to minority shareholders, research has shown that after Siliconix 
and Glassman in 2001, more businessmen took advantage of this judicial 
contour, to avoid the entire fairness review.784  
To put an end to the above inconsistency, the Delaware court established a 
unified approach in In re COX Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation 
(hereinafter “COX”)785 for freeze-out transactions, regardless of the specific 
transaction form. In this case, the court advocated a uniform standard for 
freeze-out transactions through either the merger or the tender offer route. 
This standard consists of two elements, namely the approval of a special 
negotiating committee, consisting of independent directors, and the approval 
of a majority of minority shareholders. Moreover, the court emphasised the 
complementary relationship between these two elements. The special 
negotiating committee serves as an independent bargaining agent in the 
interests of minority shareholders in the first step. The second step shields 
minority shareholders from disloyal agents by granting them the right to vote 
against the proposed transaction. Consequently, the court believed that these 
two procedural protections were sufficient to reflect an at-arm’s-length 
transaction, and thus they were capable of providing minority shareholders 
with effective protection and should consistently apply to guide both forms of 
freeze-out transaction.  
Subsequently, the COX standard has been adopted in both merger route and 
tender offer route freeze-out transactions. In In re CNX Gas Corporation 
Shareholders Litigation,786 the court followed the COX unified standard and 
 
784 Fernán Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian, ‘The Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structure & 
Outcomes: Evidence on the Unified Approach’, 5 (2015) Harvard Business Law Review, pp. 205-236.  
785 879 A.2d 604, 624 (2005). 
786 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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ruled that the business judgment rule applies to a tender offer route 
freeze-out transaction, if both the approval of a special negotiating committee 
and the approval of a majority of minority shareholders are achieved. However, 
if these two conditions fail to be accomplished completely, or if the plaintiff 
has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of any or both of the devices, then it will 
trigger the entire fairness standard. Likewise, in the merger route freeze-out 
case In re MFW Shareholders Litigation,787 the court confirmed the application 
of the business judgment rule, if the approval of a special independent 
committee and of a majority of minority shareholders is achieved. In addition, 
Delaware courts also clarified why the unified standard may be the optimal 
structure for minority shareholder protection. First, in exchange for a 
defendant-friendly judicial review, the unified standard motivates the 
controlling shareholder to adopt the double-approval structure in the interests 
of minority shareholders. Second, by requiring also the approval of a majority 
of minorities, the unified standard may provide the special committee with 
more incentives to conduct better independent bargaining so that the result of 
its negotiation will not be voted down by minority shareholders at a later stage. 
Last but not least, if minority shareholders are not satisfied with the work of 
the independent committee, they can always reject it by voting. 
Appraisal remedy 
To safeguard dissenting minority shareholders in takeover transactions, DGCL 
§262 provides a legal remedy to ensure they will receive a fair price 
established by the court. The exercise of this appraisal right should follow 
certain conditions. First, its scope covers mergers and consolidations.788 
Second, only shareholders who continuously hold shares of the corporation 
through the date of the merger or consolidation and up to the date of making 
the demand, and neither voted yes nor expressed written consent for the 
merger or consolidation, can submit written demands to the Court of Chancery 
for the implementation of the appraisal right.789 Besides the above 
 
787 C.A. No. 6566-CS, 2013 WL 2436341 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2013). 
788 It has been argued that by disguising the transaction in a different form rather than as a merger, i.e. 
transfer of assets, amendment of charters or the dissolution of the company, it can deprive minority 
shareholders of the appraisal remedy. See: Kimble C. Cannon and Patrick J. Tangney, ‘Protection of Minority 
Shareholder Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and Maximizing 
Long-Term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion’, (1995) Columbia Business Law Review, pp. 
725-784. 
789 The fact that shareholders are not entitled to a class appraisal action according to Delaware law may 
significantly lessen the protection provided to minority shareholders by the appraisal remedy. See: Ronald J. 
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requirements, the 2016 amendment of the DGCL, which came into effect on 1st 
August 2016, added a shareholding or value threshold to the appraisal right. 
Pursuant to the revised DGCL §262(g), for shareholders of listed companies, 
only shareholders who own more than 1% of the target company’s shares, or 
the considerations that these shares received in the merger or consolidation 
are worth more than $1 million, or shareholders in a short-form merger as 
prescribed in §253 or §267, are capable of bringing a qualified appraisal 
proceeding in the court. Besides, the 2018 amendment of DGCL §262 
confirmed that the appraisal right is available to both long-form mergers and 
medium-form mergers in the same conditions. Namely, after the 2018 
amendment, dissenting minority shareholders in a long-form merger, a 
medium-form merger or a short-form merger are now entitled to the 
protection of appraisal right, if relevant conditions are met.  
Meanwhile, the “market-out exception” under DGCL §262(b)(1) determines 
that minority shareholders are deprived of the appraisal right if the 
corporation is listed on a national exchange or has more than 2000 
shareholders, or if the corporation is the surviving firm after a merger and this 
merger does not require shareholder voting of the surviving corporation. 
However, the DGCL also prescribes the “exception to the exception” in section 
§262(b)(2),790 namely that this deprivation of the appraisal right is restored if 
considerations for the shares are paid in any form except stocks (cash for 
fractional shares).791  
Before the 2016 and 2018 amendments of the appraisal right, Delaware courts 
had established a “quasi-appraisal” remedy. Starting with the Weinberger case, 
Delaware courts provided minority shareholders with the “quasi-appraisal” 
remedy if the controlling shareholder breached the full disclosure duty in a 
 
Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘Controlling Controlling Shareholders’, 2 (2003) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, pp. 785-843.  
790 According to DGCL §262 (b)(3), shareholders in a two-step stock-for-stock merger, as prescribed in §251 (h), 
are still entitled to appraisal rights unless the offerer owns 100% of the target’s shares after the first step. 
Meanwhile, shareholders in a one-step stock-for-stock merger are not entitled to appraisal rights, due to 
“market-out” exception in § 262 (b)(1) and (2). To remove this inconsistency between one-step and two-step 
mergers, the 2018 proposed amendment of the DGCL suggested amending §262 (b)(3) so that two-step 
mergers would be subjected to the same treatment as one-step mergers. 
791 In comparison, the scope of appraisal right is broader in the MBCA. Its §13.02 (a) lists eight situations, 
covering mergers, share exchange, disposition of assets, amendment of articles of incorporation, 
domestication, conversion of the corporation, where the appraisal right is available if related conditions are 
fulfilled.  
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short-form merger.792 Subsequently, the Glassman case affirmatively 
confirmed the appraisal right as the exclusive remedy of minority shareholders 
in a short-form merger, with the notable exceptions of fraud and illegality.793 
In Berger v. Pubco Corp.,794 Delaware courts clarified the procedural aspects of 
such a quasi-appraisal remedy by affirming Nebe795 and rejecting Gilliland,796 
asserting that the quasi-appraisal should follow the opt-out approach and no 
escrow demand.797 
4.4.3 Analysis 
In viewing the fiduciary duties of directors, normally the business judgment 
rule will apply if the decision was made independently with full disclosure, in 
good faith and serves the interests of the company. The predominance of the 
business judgment rule can be roughly explained from two aspects. First, the 
court is not necessarily a better business decision-maker than directors. Judges, 
though equipped with many years of sophisticated legal training, do not 
maintain the same degree of commercial expertise and thus lack firm-specific 
knowledge in most cases.798 Moreover, the hindsight bias is a problematic 
issue in judicial reviews.799 In a probabilistic world, directors inevitably face 
uncertainty at the time of decision-making. On the contrary, judges 
retrospectively examine what went wrong in a business decision after its 
failure. Unsurprisingly, it is easier to conclude that the risk of the transaction in 
dispute outweighs its benefits, since it has been proven as a mistake in 
practice.800 Second, a director-friendly liability default rule may be more 
 
792 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), at 715. However, the Weinberger listed limitations of 
the quasi-appraisal remedies. 
793 Nicholas Carroll, ‘A Win For the Little Guys? Appraising Minority Shareholder Rights Under the Delaware 
Short-Form Merger Statute After Berger v. Pubco Corp.’, 59 (2014) Villanova Law Review, pp. 243-268. 
794 976 A.2d 132 (Del. 2009). 
795 Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp. Inc. Civ. A. No. 13618, 1995 WL 405750 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995). 
796 Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc. 873 A.2d 305 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
797 Research claims that the court of Chancery extends the quasi-appraisal remedy beyond squeeze-out and to 
broadly cover other situations as a post-closing remedy for breach of disclosure duties. See: Robert B. Schumer, 
Stephen P. Lamb, Justin G. Hamil, and Joseph L. Christensen, ‘Quasi-Appraisal: The Unexplored Frontier of 
Stockholder Litigation’, 12 (2012) The M&A Journal, pp. 1-6, available at 
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/103314/7719347_1.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
798 Supra. 574, p. 115-121. 
799 Ibid.  
800 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’, 50 
(1998) Stanford Law Review, pp. 1471-1550. 
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beneficial to shareholders.801 Ex-post, directors are held accountable for an 
erroneous investment under the fiduciary duty. An overly strict director 
liability rule may deprive the company of many profitable investments, due to 
risk-averse directors. To resolve the conflict between risk-tolerant 
shareholders and risk-averse directors, the business judgment rule, based on 
the presumption of goodwill directors, may turn out to be a more favourable 
approach for shareholders.802  
However, due to the conflicts of interest and the risk of minority 
expropriations in takeovers, Delaware courts will apply stringent review 
standards, i.e. enhanced scrutiny or entire fairness, to guide different 
transactions. Elaborations in previous sections have shown that minority 
shareholder protection mainly relies on judicial review standards and the 
appraisal right.  
Considering the inherent conflicts of interest between shareholders and the 
board in takeover transactions, defensive measures are examined under the 
enhanced scrutiny standard, which imposes a two-pronged test of 
reasonability and proportionality. In special situations, such as an inevitable or 
imminent sale of control, or the break-up of a company, an obligation to 
maximise the share price is imposed on the board, to protect shareholders’ 
economic returns. Meanwhile, the court resists unnecessary second-guessing 
of board decisions by granting shareholder approval the cleansing effect, 
namely for a transaction which is not subjected to the entire fairness review, 
fully informed and uncoerced approval of a majority of disinterested 
shareholders generates the application of the business judgment rule, in both 
one-step transactions and two-step transactions structured as a tender offer 
plus a medium-form merger under DGCL §251(h).  
In freeze-out transactions, the controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to 
minority shareholders who face the danger of being forced out of the company. 
The fairness of such a transaction is seriously in question, due to the 
self-dealing of the controlling shareholder. Accordingly, the most stringent 
judicial review standard of the entire fairness standard is imposed to ensure a 
fair deal and a fair price. Meanwhile, Delaware case law also demonstrates 
deference to justifiable controller “self-dealing” transactions. Namely, if 
 
801 Supra. 574, p. 115-121. 
802 Ibid.  
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procedural protection of the approval of a special independent committee and 
the approval of a majority of minority shareholders is provided, the judicial 
review standard shifts from the entire fairness to the business judgment in 
both merger route and tender offer route freeze-out transactions. 
In respect of dissenting minority shareholders, the appraisal right will ensure a 
fair exit price in different forms of mergers, varying from long-form mergers 
and medium-form mergers, to short-form mergers.  
In Delaware, courts pursue the dual goals of shareholder protection and 
directorial authority as well as minority shareholder protection and controller 
authority in takeover transactions. For (minority) shareholder protection, the 
court holds the expropriator, either directors or the controlling shareholder, 
liable for any breach of fiduciary duty. To reach this goal, the court has 
established a well-built system of judicial review standards, i.e. the business 
judgment rule, the enhanced scrutiny standard and the entire fairness 
standard, which progressively become more burdensome for the defendant 
according to the risk of minority exploitation. For directorial authority, the 
court affirms the cleasing effect of shareholder approval. For controller 
authority, the court contents that if proper procedural protection has been 
provided to achieve an at-arm’s-length transaction, such a transation should 
be respected, based on the business judgment rule. Besides, it is interesting to 
see that legal instruments such as “disclosure” and “independent directors” 
may play two roles, i.e. they may monitor the self-dealing transaction in the 
interests of minority shareholders, and they may serve as a shield to discharge 
controlling shareholder’s fiduciary duty, thanks to the business judgment rule.  
In sum, Delaware courts play a significant role in safeguarding minority 
interests in takeover transactions. By applying various judicial review standards, 
the courts intend to reach a balance between director primacy and 
shareholder protection, a balance between the review standard and the 
burden of proof and a balance between minority shareholders and the 
controlling shareholder. Consequently, the US system underlines the role of 
the court, highlights justice based on a case-by-case analysis and prioritises 
flexibility over rigidity to achieve the final goal of an advanced system of 
“enabling and evolving law”.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
Based on the analysis above, this research has found that minority shareholder 
protection in the US is not a separate task involving one or two rules that are 
specially designed for minority shareholders. Instead, it is a collective effort of 
the corporate law system as a whole.  
To understand US corporate law, the dispersed ownership structure is the 
starting point. Within this structure, the primary conflicts of interest arise 
between shareholders and management. State corporate laws regulate 
respective powers of shareholders and boards of directors. The DGCL depicts a 
board of directors as the governing body of a company. Comparatively, 
shareholders as a class are limited to basic rights, such as the appointment 
right, the approval right and the right to sue. Additional minority protection is 
left to the free choice of the company. 
With the growth of shareholder activism, a call to curb unsatisfactory director 
behaviours has been raised at the federal level. Federal securities regulations 
and listing rules used by stock exchanges provide comprehensive provisions to 
regulate disclosure and independent directors. Guided by statutory laws, US 
courts further develop and elaborate the substance of the two monitoring 
mechanisms through case-by-case analysis. Moreover, a mature securities 
market and effective enforcement provide inalienable support for the law to 
function in practice. For instance, the assistance of effective intermediary 
agencies, such as accounting firms, auditing firms and law firms, substantially 
improves the transparency of the market. The SEC consistently supervises the 
stability and legality of the securities market. In addition, a sensitive securities 
market, on which the share price reflects the ups and downs of the company, 
as well as an active “market of corporate control”, essentially contribute to the 
external supervision of listed companies. 
Addressing the general shareholder-management conflict, the US system 
restrains broad directorial powers through fiduciary duties, shareholder model, 
disclosure and independent directors. For the controlling shareholder-minority 
shareholder conflict, the US system attentively underlines minority 
shareholder protection in takeover transactions through its courts that 
implement the fiduciary duty of a controlling shareholder, disclosure, 
independent directors and appraisal rights. First, the judicial remedy system 
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has provided enough support for minority shareholders to actively exercise 
their right to bring an action. For example, to encourage minority shareholders 
to bring fiduciary duty litigation, the law affirms the “company pay” rule. 
Furthermore, the law equips minority shareholders with the tool of “class 
action”, and the “contingent fee” generates attorney activism. Second, the 
strong case law tradition provides a sophisticated judicial review system to 
confront minority shareholder oppression. In general, the court applies the 
medium “enhanced scrutiny” standard to guide a sale of control transaction. If 
the element of “self-dealing” is involved, the most stringent “entire fairness” 
standard is imposed on freeze-out transactions. For transactions supposedly 
under the enhanced scrutiny review, courts respect managerial authority by 
shifting the review standard back to the business judgment rule, if the decision 
was approved by shareholders under certain conditions. Courts also intend to 
safeguard minority interests in freeze-outs by modelling an at-arm’s-length 
transaction via procedural protection, including transparency and approval of 
both an independent committee and minority shareholders. If an 
at-arm’s-length transaction is actioned, a court shows deference to the 
transaction by shifting the judicial review standard to the business judgment 
rule. In other words, courts ultimately strike a balance by employing 
monitoring mechanisms, either to regulate the directors/ controllers or to 
shield them from liability. Last, for dissenting minority shareholders, the 
appraisal right facilitates them exit the company with a fair price. 
Briefly, US corporate law stresses the interplay between federal securities 
regulations and state corporate laws, and between statutory law and case law. 
It presents such a system which consistently pursues a balance between the 
two core values of shareholder protection and board primacy. Particularly, US 
courts serve as the last guardian of a listed company’s “checks and balances”. 
Naturally, a listed company with well-functioning corporate governance also 
benefits its minority shareholders. For potential threats, such as takeovers, the 
system protects minority shareholders through timely disclosure, through a 
fair exit price and through at-arm’s-length transactions supervised by the court. 
Therefore, minority shareholder protection is a joint effort of the entire legal 
system, which shapes balanced corporate governance and grants 
circumstance-specific attention to minority shareholders, when necessary. 
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Chapter 5 Minority Shareholder Protection in the Netherlands 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
With the harmonisation of corporate law in Europe, and under the influence of 
foreign investors, the legal framework of corporate governance in the 
Netherlands has undergone important adjustments over the past decade, 
especially in areas such as transparency, independence, shareholder rights and 
board structures. Besides, the “flexibility” of Dutch corporate law has turned 
the Netherlands into an attractive market for foreign companies.803 
Dutch listed companies are mainly traded on the Euronext Stock Exchange 
Amsterdam, which has three indices for three different trading volumes, 
namely AEX (Amsterdam Exchange Index), AMX (Amsterdam Midcap Index) 
and AScX (Amsterdam Smallcap Index). In the Netherlands, not only shares, 
but also depository receipts can be listed on the stock exchange. According to 
the latter mechanism, shares are deposited in a trust office, and for each 
deposited share, a depositary receipt is listed on the exchange. In addition, a 
“structure regime” applies to Dutch “large companies”, which will be discussed 
at length later in this chapter. Generally, in the Dutch framework, large 
companies should have a supervisory board, to which certain powers of the 
general meeting are transferred. Since 2013, large stock companies governed 
by such a structure regime and other stock companies can also opt for the 
one-tier board structure. 
 
803 Some foreign companies, such as Fiat, Mylan and Altice, have moved to the Netherlands due to the 
flexibility of the Dutch legislation. See: “Flexible Corporate Law As Selling Point”, available at 
https://cismanagement.nl/news/flexible-corporate-law-as-selling-point/. Last visited February 2019. 
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Despite the recent development of a more concentrated ownership,804 Dutch 
listed companies are traditionally identified with the dispersed ownership 
structure, the main agency cost for which lies between management and 
shareholders. This chapter will examine how shareholder protection is pursued 
in the Dutch corporate governance system, with a focus on minority 
shareholder protection in takeover transactions. Based on legal sources such 
as EU Directives, the Dutch Civil Code, the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, 
the Dutch Financial Supervision Act and Dutch case law, this chapter will be 
divided into three main parts. The first will examine the protection of 
shareholder rights at both the EU and the Dutch law levels. The second part 
will first elaborate on relevant EU legislation and then discuss how 
shareholders can benefit from the transparency and the internal supervision of 
Dutch listed companies. The third part will investigate Dutch courts’ role in 
redressing minority shareholder oppression in takeovers.  
 
5.2 Minority shareholder protection through shareholder 
rights in the EU and the Netherlands 
The harmonisation of company law in European member states underlines 
shareholders’ significant role in promoting better corporate governance. 
Especially, Directive 2017/828 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as regards the 
encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement805 highly emphasises 
the need for “effective and sustainable shareholder engagement” as well as 
internal “checks and balances” within a listed company. Another important 
reference is the Takeover Bid Directive, which aims at safeguarding particularly 
minority shareholders’ interests by stipulating a “mandatory bid rule”806 and a 
“sell-out right”.807 These principles, set by EU rules, have been or will be 
incorporated into Dutch corporate law, as we shall see in more detail in this 
 
804 Eumedion, “Position of Minority Shareholders in Companies with A Controlling Shareholder”, available at 
http://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/position-papers/2016-06-position-paper-minority-sha
reholders-final-version.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
805 Directive No. 2017/828, O.J.EUR.COMM.(No. L132) 1 (2017). 
806 The mandatory bid rule demands the acquirer issues a public offer to all shareholders, to acquire all of the 
remaining shares when a certain threshold has been reached. 
807 The sell-out right enables remaining minority shareholders to require the acquirer to purchase their shares 
when the acquirer has reached a certain threshold after the offer. 
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first part, which consists of three sections. The first section will give a brief 
introduction to shareholder rights in EU Directives. The second section will 
elaborate on shareholder rights from the domestic law level, mainly based on 
the Dutch Civil Code. Based on the overview of legislation provided by the first 
two sections, the third section will analyse and discuss shareholder protection 
in the Dutch context. 
5.2.1 Shareholder rights in EU directives 
According to Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(hereinafter “TFEU”), it is within the power of the Union to remove obstacles 
for the free movement of goods, capital, services and persons. TFEU Article 49 
and 50 also confirm the freedom of establishment. To achieve these goals, the 
Union has progressively established thirteen Directives, to harmonise 
corporate law at the EU level. In June 2017, several of these corporate law 
directives (Directive 1, 2, 3, 6, 10 and 11) were merged into Directive 
2017/1132, which mainly regulates the establishment, the functioning and 
mergers and divisions of limited liability companies.808  
More specifically, the First Corporate Directive809 regulated the disclosure of a 
company’s basic documents, representations and the safeguarding of third 
parties’ interests. The Second Corporate Directive810 clarified the formation, 
the maintenance and capital alteration of public limited liability companies for 
the protection of shareholders and creditors. Related to shareholder rights, the 
Second Directive pinpointed shareholders’ right to demand an independent 
evaluation of company assets,811 separate voting for relevant classes of 
shareholders,812 preemptive rights813 and the equal treatment of 
shareholders.814 The Third Corporate Directive815 targeted public limited 
liability company mergers. It prescribed various shareholder rights, such as the 
 
808 Directive No. 2017/1132, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.169) 46 (2017). For clarification, the discussion below still 
refer to the original Directives before they were incorporated into Directive 2017/1132. 
809 Directive No. 2009/101, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L258) 11 (2009), repealed by Directive 2017/1132. 
810 Directive No. 2012/30.O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L315) 4 (2012), repealed by Directive 2017/1132.. 
811 Article 11.2, The Second Corporate Directive. 
812 Article 29.3, The Second Corporate Directive. 
813 Article 33, The Second Corporate Directive. 
814 Article 46, The Second Corporate Directive. 
815 Repealed by Directive No. 2011/35, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L110) 1 (2011). 
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right to be adequately informed,816 the separate voting of affected classes of 
shareholders,817 the right to approve a merger and the right to convene a 
general meeting on special occasions,818 the right to an independent expert 
report,819 an inspection right820 and the sell-out right.821 In addition, the Third 
Corporate Directive straightforwardly confirmed administrative or 
management bodies’ civil liabilities in terms of shareholders,822 as well as 
independent experts’ civil liabilities in the same regard.823 Both the Fourth 
Corporate Directive and the Seventh Corporate Directive were repealedby 
Directive 2013/34,824 which stipulated financial statements and reports and 
provides detailed guidance on the preparation of various financial documents. 
It also granted member states the discretion to hold administrative, 
management and supervision bodies directly liable to shareholders for 
financial disclosure.825  
The Sixth Corporate Directive826 set down rules governing the division of public 
limited liability companies. To protect shareholder interests in a division, the 
Directive specified that shareholders are entitled to the right to be sufficiently 
informed,827 the right to separate voting,828 the inspection right,829 the right 
to approve the division and the right to convene a general meeting on special 
occasions,830 the right to an independent expert report831 and minority 
 
816 Preamble (5), The Third Corporate Directive. 
817 Article 7.2, The Third Corporate Directive. 
818 Generally speaking, the general meeting has the right to approve a merger resolution. If the acquiring 
company is exempted from the approval of the general meeting, various conditions must be fulfilled. 
Particularly, shareholders of the acquiring company who pass the threshold are entitled to the right to call for 
a general meeting for the approval of the merger, and the threshold should not be more than 5%. See: Article 
8, The Third Directive. 
819 Article 10, The Third Corporate Directive. 
820 Article 11, The Third Corporate Directive. 
821 In a parent-subsidiary merger, minority shareholders of the target company have the right to request the 
acquiring company to acquire their shares at a reasonable price, if the acquiring company owns 90% or more 
of the target company’s shares. See: Article 28(a), The Third Directive. 
822 Article 20, The Third Corporate Directive. 
823 Article21, The Third Corporate Directive. 
824 Directive No. 2013/34, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L182) 19 (2013).  
825 Preamble (40), Directive 2013/34. 
826 Sixth Council Directive No.82/891, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L378) 47 (1982), amended by Directive No. 
2014/59, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L173) 190 (2014). 
827 Preamble, The Sixth Council Directive. 
828 Article 5.1, The Sixth Council Directive. 
829 Article 9, The Sixth Council Directive. 
830 Generally speaking, the general meeting has the right to approve the division resolution. If the recipient 
company is exempted from approving the general meeting, various conditions must be fulfilled. Particularly, 
shareholders who pass the threshold are entitled to the right to call up a general meeting for the approval of 
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shareholders’ right to request to purchase their shares.832 The Eighth 
Corporate Directive833 elaborated on statutory audits and affirms that 
shareholders’ right to appoint auditors or audit firms should not be 
restricted.834 For public interest entities, shareholders with 5% or more of 
capital or voting rights are entitled to request the court to dismiss the auditors 
or the audit firm.835 Besides, the Directive allowed member states to decide 
freely on shareholders’ annual election of the chairman of the audit 
committee.836 The Tenth Corporate Directive837 lowered barriers for 
cross-border mergers of limited liability companies. Moreover, member states 
are free to take appropriate measures to protect dissenting minority 
shareholders.838 In order to protect shareholders and third parties’ interests, 
the Eleventh Corporate Directive839 stipulated the disclosure of branches of 
companies. The Twelfth Corporate Directive840 set out to lay down the 
foundations for the legal recognition of single-member private limited liability 
companies. The Thirteenth Corporate Directive (hereinafter “Takeover 
Directive”)841 focused on takeover bids and entails principles such as the equal 
treatment of shareholders and the protection of non-controlling 
shareholders.842 Particularly, the Directive prescribed the mandatory bid 
rule843 and the sell-out right844 to protect minority interests in takeovers. In 
addition, the Proposal for the Fifth Directive attempted to regulate the 
 
the division, and the threshold should not be more than 5%. See: Article 6 (c), Sixth Council Directive 
No.82/891, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L378) 47 (1982). 
831 Article 8, Sixth Council Directive No.82/891, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L378) 47 (1982). 
832 If shares of the recipient company are used as compensation, and these shares are not in proportion to the 
divided company’s shareholders’ capital, then minority shareholders of the divided company may have the 
right to request the recipient company to purchase their shares. See: Article 5.2, Sixth Council Directive 
No.82/891, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L378) 47 (1982). 
833 Directive No. 2006/43, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L157) 87 (2006), amended by Directive No. 2014/56, 
O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L158) 196 (2014). 
834 Article37, The Eighth Corporate Directive. 
835 Article 38.3 (a), The Eighth Corporate Directive. 
836 Article 39, The Eighth Corporate Directive. 
837 Directive No. 2005/56, O.J. EUR.COMM. (No.L310) 1 (2005), repealed by Directive 2017/1132. In 2019, 
Directive 2019/2121 was adopted amending Directive 2017/1132 on cross-border conversions, mergers, and 
divisions.  
838 Article 4.2, The Tenth Directive. 
839 Eleventh Council Directive No.89/666, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L395) 36 (1989), amended by Directive No. 
2012/17, O.J.EUR.COMM. (L156)1 (2012). 
840 Repealed by Directive No. 2009/102, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L258) 20 (2009). 
841 Directive No. 2004/25, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L142)12(2004), amended by Directive No. 2014/59. 
O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L173) 190 (2014). 
842 Article 3, The Thirteenth Corporate Directive. 
843 Article 5, The Thirteenth Corporate Directive. 
844 Article 16, The Thirteenth Corporate Directive. 
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structure and powers of public company organs. The Proposal for the Ninth 
Directive prescribed company groups. However, both documents so far only 
remain draft proposals, due to opposition put forth by member states. Hence, 
the discussion herein will not cover these two proposals.  
An important foundation of the EU framework on shareholders’ rights is the 
Directive on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies 
(hereinafter “Shareholder Rights Directive”).845 In the Preamble to this 
directive, the legislator remarkably recognises that effective shareholder 
control is a precondition of good corporate governance. It further prescribes 
the strengthening of shareholder rights by way of increased transparency, 
proxy voting, electronic participation and cross-border voting. The directive 
also affirms the equal treatment of shareholders846 and aims at improving 
transparency through disclosure of information,847 the publication of voting 
results848 and granting shareholders the right to ask questions.849 The 
directive regulates proxy voting in Article 10 and clarifies the formalities in 
Article 11. Last but not least, it enhances shareholders’ participation and voting 
rights by giving them the right to put items on the agenda and to table draft 
resolutions,850 by elaborating requirements related to the exercising of 
participation and voting rights,851 by allowing shareholders to participate via 
electronic means or correspondence852 and also by removing obstacles of 
shareholder voting.853 
In 2014, the European Commission issued a proposal to amend the 
Shareholder Rights Directive, in order to address two significant problems, 
respectively, “insufficient shareholder engagement” and the “lack of adequate 
transparency”.854 Insufficient shareholder engagement is one of the reasons 
 
845 Directive No. 2007/36, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L184) 17 (2007), amended by Directive 2017/828. 
846 Article 4, Shareholder Rights Directive. 
847 Article 5, Shareholder Rights Directive. 
848 Article 14, Shareholder Rights Directive. 
849 Article 9, Shareholder Rights Directive. 
850 Article 6, Shareholder Rights Directive. 
851 Article 7, Shareholder Rights Directive. 
852 Article 8 and 12, Shareholder Rights Directive. 
853 Article 13, Shareholder Rights Directive. 
854 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as 
regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards 
certain elements of the corporate governance statement /COM/2014/0213 final, available at 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52014PC0213, adopted by Directive 2017/828. 
Last visited February 2019. 
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behind the short-termism of listed companies.855 Specifically, the proposal 
suggests three solutions: increase transparency, establish shareholder 
oversight on related-party transactions and allow shareholders to vote on 
remuneration issues.856 In 2017, Directive 2017/828, amending Shareholder 
Rights Directive, as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder 
engagement857 was adopted. In line with the 2014 proposal, the 2017 
Shareholder Rights Directive highlights the core value of “effective and 
sustainable shareholder engagement” that relies on “checks and balances”, 
and it pursues the two main goals of “long-term shareholder engagement” and 
“enhanced transparency between the company and the investors”. The 
amendment covers various areas, such as the “identification of shareholders”, 
“transmission of information”, “remuneration policy and report” and “material 
related party transactions”. In respect of material related-party transactions, 
the Directive demands a public announcement and an independent 
assessment report, to demonstrate the fairness and reasonableness of the 
transaction from a minority shareholder’s perspective. Such transactions also 
require shareholder approval or administrative/supervisory body approval with 
sufficient procedural protection for minority shareholders. Furthermore, 
member states can freely adopt stricter rules for the purposes of protecting 
minority shareholders, helping exercise shareholder rights and promoting 
shareholder engagement. 
5.2.2 Shareholder rights in the Netherlands  
In compliance with the aforementioned EU directives, the Dutch Civil Code 
(hereinafter “DCC”)858 affirmatively prescribes various shareholder rights. The 
main reference for this is its Book 2 on Legal Persons, which is also a 
fundamental source of Dutch corporate law. Article 2:107 DCC states that 
shareholders of public companies are entitled to residual powers. Namely, any 
 
855 Ibid.  
856 The proposal also prescribes exemptions to the above obligations. See: Directive No.2014/59, 
O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L173) 190 (2014). 
857 Directive No. 2017/828, O.J.EUR.COMM.(No. L132) 1 (2017). 
858 Provisions of the Dutch Civil Code mentioned hereinafter will be based on an unofficial translation 
provided by the Dutch Civil Law website. See: http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodegeneral.htm. Last visited 
December 2017. 
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power that has not been designated to the board of directors or other 
corporate organs should be reserved for the general meeting.859  
Powers of the general meeting 
According to the DCC, the general meeting has the right to appoint and dismiss 
the board of directors860 and the supervisory board.861 Besides appointing 
directors and supervisors, the general meeting has a say in major decisions 
which may change the identity or character of the company. Article 2:107a 
DCC specifically demands shareholder approval for any resolution in the 
following instances: a transfer of the enterprise, or in fact the entire enterprise, 
the start or termination of a fundamental alliance or partnership and the 
acquisition or disposal of one-third or more of the company’s assets. Article 
2:317 and Article 2:334m prescribe that a merger or a division of a company 
requires the approval of the general meeting.862 In addition, the general 
meeting has the power to amend the articles of association,863 to issue new 
shares,864 to pass a conversion865 as well as to adopt the annual account,866 
which is related to the distribution of dividends.867  
 
859 The second paragraph of Article 2:107, DCC also prescribes that the board of directors and the supervisory 
board are obliged to provide all requested information to the general meeting of shareholders. 
However, Dutch case law, such as the ASMI case, affirms the autonomy of the board by emphasising that it has 
the power to decide on corporate strategies and the involvement of shareholders. The court also intends to 
curtail the impact of shareholder activists.  
860 Article 2:132, DCC prescribes that except for the first generation of the board of directors affirmed in the 
notarial deed of incorporation, the general meeting is eligible to appoint the board of directors in normal 
circumstances.  
861 Article 2:142, DCC states that except for those designated by the notarial deed of incorporation, the 
general meeting has the power to appoint company supervisors. The provision also grants the articles of 
incorporation the discretion to set down supervisors’ qualifications. However, the general meeting can rebut 
these limitations through a two-thirds resolution.  
862 In the ABN case, the court confirms that shareholders’ approval power should be limited within Article 
2:107 (a). Based on the stakeholder model, the court supports the board of directors’ decision. For more 
details, see section 5.4.2. 
863 Article 2:121, DCC.  
864 Article 2:96, DCC. 
865 Article 2:18, DCC 
866 Article 2:101 (3), DCC. 
867 Article 2:105, DCC. According to Article 2:105 of the DCC, shareholders are entitled to the right to a 
dividend. Article 2:216 of the DCC prescribes that in a closed company, the general meeting has the power to 
allocate and distribute dividends. In the KLM case, after Air France became the controlling shareholder with a 
96.3% shareholding, KLM was delisted. Concerning the dividend resolution, minority shareholders of KLM 
argued that the resolution to reserve instead of to distribute the dividends went against the reasonableness 
and fairness principle. However, the court respected the discretionary authority of the general meeting and 
held a “no interference” attitude in the KLM ruling, which sets a high standard for minority shareholders to 
challenge the dividend policy. See: Floor Veltman, Can KLM’s Decision to Reserve Profits Be Upheld in View of 
the Interests of the Minority Shareholders? available at 
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Nevertheless, powers of the general meeting may be subjected to limitations 
when it comes to the “structure regime” under Dutch corporate law. Article 
2:153(2) DCC sets the criteria of a “large” company, namely a public company: 
a) with at least € 16,000,000 of issued capital, b) is obliged to set up a work 
council according to law and c) jointly employs at least 100 employees in the 
Netherlands. If the company has continuously fulfilled the above criteria for 
three years, the structure regime applies.868 Under the structure regime, the 
works council can recommend one-third of the supervisory board.869 Pursuant 
to Article 2:154 DCC, the “structure regime” requires a mandatory supervisory 
board. Moreover, certain shareholder powers in this circumstance are 
transferred to the supervisory board; for example, the supervisory board 
replaces the general meeting to appoint the board of directors or executive 
directors,870 to adopt the annual account and to approve certain 
resolutions.871 Historically speaking, Dutch corporate law follows a two-tier 
board structure. Since 1st January 2013, a one-tier board structure has become 
possible, according to Article 2:129a DCC. The structure regime also applies to 
one-tier board companies.872 Be that as it may, due to the exemptions 
provided by Article 2:153 (3), as well as the partial exemptions in Article 2:155 
 
https://kvdl.com/news/can-klms-decision-to-reserve-profits-be-upheld-in-view-of-the-interests-of-the-minorit
y-shareholders/. Last visited February 2019. 
Onno Boerstra, When Can Minority Shareholders Demand  Dividend? Available at 
https://www.vandoorne.com/en/knowledge-sharing/blog/when-can-minority-shareholders-demand-dividend
/. Last visited February 2019. 
868 Article 2:154, DCC. 
869 Article 2:158 (6), DCC. The creation of the structure regime was a byproduct of the stakeholder model, 
which stresses the interests of other stakeholders alongside shareholders. Its design, which grants the works 
council the right to nominate one-third of the supervisory board or non-executive directors, reveals the 
intention behind increasing employee influence in large listed companies while decreasing the power of 
shareholders. See: Jaron van Bekkum, Steven Hijink, Michael C. Schouten and Jaap W. Winter, ‘Corporate 
Governance in the Netherlands’, 14 (2010), Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 1-35. 
And Maarten Muller (ed.), Corporate Law in the Netherlands (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
2013), p. 111. 
870 Article 2:162, DCC. However, the general meeting of shareholders still has the power to appoint the 
supervisory board, but this appointment shall be based on the nomination of the supervisory board according 
to Article 2:158 (3), DCC. 
871 Resolutions which require supervisory approval prescribed in Article 2:164 DCC cover the issuance and 
acquisition of shares, the issuance of depository receipts, the listing or withdrawal of shares or depository 
receipts, the start or termination of a fundamental alliance or partnership, the acquisition of at least 
on-quarter of the company's share capital, investments amounting to at least one-quarter of share capital, an 
amendment of the articles of association, the dissolution of the company, bankruptcy or an official 
moratorium, termination of the employment of a substantial amount of employees, a significant change in 
employment conditions for a substantial amount of employees and a reduction in issued capital.  
872 Article2:164a, DCC. 
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and 2:155a DCC,873 the majority of large listed companies are exempted from 
the abovementioned structure regime.874 It may be interesting to note that 
the exemption rate from this regime has grown from 40% in 1996 to 70% in 
2010.875 
Fiduciary duties and the right of inquiry 
By and large, directors’ fiduciary duties consist of the duty of care and the duty 
of loyalty. The DCC does not directly incorporate these two concepts. Instead, 
it provides two Dutch substitutes.876 The Dutch version of the “duty of loyalty” 
is reflected through the “reasonableness and fairness” standard, one of the 
most fundamental principles of Dutch corporate law, mandated by Article 2:8 
DCC. Moreover, the Dutch “stakeholder” model, which requires both the 
managing and monitoring directors to be guided by the interests of the 
company and its undertaking,877 has been interpreted as an implicit 
declaration of the “duty of loyalty”, namely, directors’ personal interests ought 
not to prevail over the interests of the company.878 In addition, the “duty of a 
proper performance”, as the Dutch alternative to the “duty of care”, can be 
found in Article 2:9 DCC, which states that every director owes the company 
the duty to properly perform his or her tasks, and he or she should be held 
liable for the entire results caused by poor performance, unless there is neither 
“serious personal blame” nor “negligence”.879 However, the fiduciary duty is 
 
873 Article 2:153 (3), DCC clarifies exemptions to the statutory regime, e.g. if the company is merely a 
managing or financing company, and the majority of its employees are not resident in the Netherlands, Articles 
2:155 and 2:155a prescribe partial exemptions to the statutory supervisory board requirement, e.g. if more 
than 50% capital of a company is held by a legal person, and the majority of this legal person’s employees are 
not resident in the Netherlands, Article 2:156, DCC endows the Minister of Justice with the dispensation power 
of the statutory two-tier structure under the request of the company, and Article 2:157, DCC provides 
companies the opportunity to opt-in voluntarily into the statutory two-tier structure.  
874 Jaron van Bekkum, Steven Hijink, Michael C. Schouten and Jaap W. Winter, ‘Corporate Governance in the 
Netherlands’, 14 (2010) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 1-35. 
875 Richard G. J. Nowak, ‘Corporate Boards in the Netherlands’, in Paul Davies, Klaus J. Hopt, Richard Nowak 
and Gerard van Solinge (eds.), Corporate Boards in Law and Practice: A Comparative Analysis in Europe (Great 
Britain: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 429-509. 
876 Maarten Muller (ed.), Corporate Law in the Netherlands (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2013), 
p. 95. 
877 Article 2:129 (5) and 2:140 (2), DCC. Principle 1.1 of the DCGC stipulates that the board concentrates on 
creating long-term value for the company and its undertakings. 
878 Supra. 874. 
879 Article 2:138 DCC prescribes the joint and several liabilities of directors in a bankruptcy, if improper 
performance is the predominant cause of the bankruptcy of a listed company. 
Article 2:149 DCC confirms that the liability of an improper performance also applies to supervisory directors. 
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considered as the duty towards the company, which is the only eligible 
applicant that can bring a breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit.880  
To enforce fiduciary duties, Dutch law accords as a judicial remedy a right of 
inquiry, which allows shareholder(s)881 to file a mismanagement claim at the 
Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Appeal Court. The inquiry proceedings 
are specified in Section 2.8.2 (Articles 2:344-359) of the DCC. According to 
Article 2:346 DCC, for companies with a nominal share value of less than €22.5 
million, shareholder(s)882 who individually or collectively hold(s) a 
shareholding of at least 10% or a nominal share value of €225,000,883 and 
companies with a nominal share value of more than €22.5 million, 
shareholder(s)884 who individually or collectively hold(s) a shareholding of at 
least 1% or a market share value of €20 million,885 is/are entitled to file a 
written request to the Enterprise Chamber for an inquiry proceeding, to review 
the policy and the state of affairs886 of the company.887 However, it should be 
noted that this right to request an inquiry proceeding is under the precondition 
of the “exhaustion of existing internal remedies”, i.e. the request should first 
be submitted to the board of directors and the supervisory board, and a 
reasonable period should have passed without any effective correction.888  
After the request has been filed, the Enterprise Chamber can award an inquiry 
proceeding, but only if there are “well-founded reasons” to believe the policy 
 
880 In the case of bankruptcy, Article 2:138, DCC confirms the liquidator’s capability to bring an action based 
on the breach of fiduciary duty of a director.  
881 Based on Article 2:346 and Article 2:347, DCC, the company itself, any other person to whom the articles of 
association grants this right and also the labour union may enjoy the right to inquiry, if relevant conditions are 
fulfilled.  
882 The term “shareholder” mentioned in this section also includes holders of depositary receipts. Likewise, 
the term “share” in this section also covers depositary receipts. See: Article 2:346, DCC. 
883 A lower amount is also possible if specified in the articles of incorporation of the company. See: Article 
2:346, DCC. 
884 The term “shareholder” mentioned in this section also includes holders of depositary receipts. Likewise, 
the term “share” in this section also covers depositary receipts. See: Article 2:346, DCC. 
885 A lower amount is also possible if specified in the articles of incorporation of the company. See: Article 
2:346, DCC. 
886 Article 2:345, DCC stipulates the scope of the inquiry proceeding is to review “the policy and the state of 
affairs”. 
887 Based on Article 346:1(d), legal persons as identified in Article 344 have the right to request an inquiry 
proceeding. Article 2:345, DCC prescribes that the Advocate General of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal can 
also request an inquiry proceeding based on public interest. Pursuant to Article2:344, DCC, the inquiry 
proceeding covers not only listed companies, but also other legal entities, such as closed companies, mutual 
insurance societies, cooperatives, foundations and associations.  
888 According to Article 2:349, DCC, if the request of an inquiry proceeding is made by the labour union, then 
this request shall be submitted to the Works Council first, so it can express its opinion on the discussed issue. 
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or state of affairs of the listed company is improper.889 If the inquiry 
proceeding is awarded, the Enterprise Chamber must announce the maximum 
costs for such an inquiry, and these will be borne by the listed company.890 On 
the contrary, if the request is rejected by the Enterprise Chamber, the listed 
company may file a claim against the applicant for compensation.891 
The Enterprise Chamber does not conduct the investigation itself in the first 
stage.892 After the request is accepted, the Enterprise Chamber appoints 
investigators and a commissioner-judge.893 These investigators have the 
power to inspect the “books, records and other data” of the company, while 
the board of directors and the supervisory board are obliged to provide all 
necessary information to the investigators upon their request.894 When it is 
necessary, the Enterprise Chamber may extend this inspection right to cover 
also subsidiaries of the company, upon request of the investigators.895 To 
ensure the enforcement of this inspection power, the investigators may 
request the commissioner-judge issues orders that instruct the police to assist 
in obtaining the information.896 The investigators also have the right to 
request the Enterprise Chamber facilitates a witness hearing.897 After the 
investigation, investigators should draft a report and submit it to the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal,898 and a copy of this report should then be sent 
to the Advocate-General, the company and the applicant. The Enterprise 
Chamber may also decide to make this report public.899 Besides, upon request, 
the Enterprise Chamber may take provisional measures at any stage of the 
proceeding, when it is required by the company’s state of affairs or in the 
interests of the investigation. The Enterprise Chamber has broad discretion to 
take any necessary provisional measure that may last, at the most, for the 
duration of the proceeding.900  
 
889 Article 2:350 (1), DCC. 
890 Article 2:350 (3), DCC. 
891 Article 2:350 (2), DCC. This provision may prevent the “abuse of the right of inquiry” on the one hand, but it 
may deter minority shareholders from exercising their right to request an inquiry proceeding on the other.  
892 Pursuant to Article 2: 349a, DCC, upon the request of the applicant, the Enterprise Chamber is entitled to 
take provisional measures throughout the entire proceeding. 
893 Article 2:350 (4), DCC. 
894 Article 2:351 (1), DCC. 
895 Article 2:351 (2), DCC. 
896 Article 2:352, DCC. 
897 Article 2:352a, DCC. 
898 Article 2:353 (1), DCC. 
899 Article 2:353 (2), DCC.  
900 Article 2:349a, DCC. 
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The second stage of the inquiry proceeding is also initiated by the applicant. If 
the investigation report confirms the existence of mismanagement, 
shareholders, within 2 months after depositing the investigation report at the 
Registry of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal,901 may request the Enterprise 
Chamber to order appropriate measures for corrections,902 namely: to 
suspend or nullify a resolution, to suspend or dismiss director(s) or 
supervisor(s), to temporarily appoint director(s) or supervisor(s), to 
temporarily derogate provisions of the articles of association, to temporarily 
transfer shares for administrative reasons and to dissolve the company.903 The 
company has the appeal right in cassation against the above orders.904 In spite 
of the above discretions, the Enterprise Chamber neither touches upon the 
director’s liability issue nor awards damages in the inquiry proceeding. Instead, 
shareholders should refer these issues to the general District Court, in which 
the Enterprise Chamber’s judgment, though not binding, may serve great value 
in the court proceeding.  
From 1971 to 2001, there were about 260 inquiry proceeding requests, and 
205 of these were accepted by the Enterprise Chamber based on 
“sound-grounded reasons”. From 1997 to 2001, 60 cases were awarded with 
provisional measures by the Enterprise Chamber.905 Furthermore, between 
2000 and 2007, there were 23 proceedings regarding listed companies, and 
more significantly, 19 of these were filed by minority shareholders.906 From 
2013 to 2016, the rate of provisional measures awarded increased from 52% to 
64%.907 The popularity of the inquiry proceeding has turned it into a helpful 
 
901 Article 2:355 (2), DCC. 
902 Article 2:355 (1), DCC. Alternatively, according to paragraph 5 of the same Article, the Enterprise Chamber 
may suspend its order if the company promises to take measures to amend mismanagement. 
903 Article 2:356, DCC.  
904 Article 2:359, DCC.  
905 Levinus Timmerman and Alexander Doorman, ‘Rights of Minority Shareholders in the Netherlands’, 6 
(2002), Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, pp.1-100. Available at http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-12.html. 
Last visited February 2019. See also C. Cools, P.G.F.A. Geerts, M.J. Kroeze, and A. C. W. Pijls, ‘Het recht van 
enquete: Een empirisch ondersoek’, Deventer: Kluwer 2009. 
906 Institutional investors and the Dutch Investors’ Association played a big role in minority 
shareholder-initiated proceedings. Furthermore, it has been claimed that despite the high 10% shareholding 
threshold, the inquiry proceeding did not lose its popularity, and it may even have prevented the abuse of the 
right of inquiry. See: Martin Gelter, ‘Why do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?’, 
37 (2012) Brooklyn Journal of International Law, pp. 842-892. 
907 A.J.F. Lafarre, B.C.J. Schippers, S.F.W. van den Bosch, C.F. Van der Elst and G.J.H. van der Sangen ‘. 
Doelbereiking en effectiviteit van de wet aanpassing enquêterecht in de praktijk’, (2018) WODC-rapport 2791, 
p. 136. 
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information channel908 which grants minority shareholders access to inside 
information with regards to the policies and the state of affairs of a company. 
Moreover, the inquiry proceeding provides minority shareholders the chance 
to influence company policies. By invoking external supervision through the 
Enterprise Chamber, minority shareholders manage to compensate for their 
weak position within the company. Decisively, minority shareholders are 
allowed to request the Enterprise Chamber to take provisional measures, 
which normally calls for adjustments to the company.909  
Finally, shareholders are not entitled to bring a derivative action on behalf of a 
company in the Netherlands.910 The Dutch context is further characterised by 
the absence of a “class action”.911 In the Dutch context, class action is 
addressed once again with a Dutch substitute, which can be found in Article 
3:305a DCC. Accordingly, minority shareholders may establish a foundation or 
an association912 with full legal capacity, to bring a claim against the company 
in the court for their collective interests. However, this collective claim cannot 
be made to request compensatory damages,913 so after obtaining the 
declaratory judgment from the court, a minority shareholder can file another 
individual proceeding for compensation based on the judgment. As an 
alternative, minority shareholders can authorise the foundation or association 
to negotiate a fair settlement, which can later be declared by the court to be 
binding for the entire “class”.914 
Other shareholder rights 
 
908 Generally speaking, the minority shareholders’ information right mainly relies on three mechanisms, 
namely mandatory disclosure, the right to ask questions at the general meeting and the inquiry proceeding. 
See: supra. 874. 
909 Levinus Timmerman and Alexander Doorman, ‘Rights of Minority Shareholders in the Netherlands’, 6(2002), 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, pp.1-100. Available at http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-12.html. Last 
visited February 2019. 
910 A shareholder has the right to file an action against a director if the director breaches his or her duty and 
this directly affects the shareholder. For example, pursuant to Article 2: 139 DCC, shareholders can bring a 
lawsuit against directors for any damage caused as a result of misleading information in annual accounts, 
interim reports or annual reports. However, case law is rarely found in this regard. See: supra. 874. 
911 See, for a proposal from the European Commission for a harmonised class action in member states, 
COM(2018) 184 def. 
912 This foundation or association whose articles of association have the objective of protecting similar 
interests of other persons. See: Article 3: 305a (1), DCC. 
913 On 1 April 2019 a law (the ‘Wet afwikkeling massaschade in collectieve actie (WAMCA)’ which makes this 
possible as from 1 January 2020, has been published in the Official Gezette. See for the proposal nr. 34608. 
914 Article 7:907, DCC. See also: supra. 874. 
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In addition to the rights described above, the Dutch legislative framework 
comprises other additional shareholder protection measures. Article 2:92 DCC 
prescribes the “equal treatment” of shareholders/holders of depository 
receipts. Moreover, every shareholder has the right to vote.915 Dutch 
corporate law facilitates shareholder participation by recognising the right to 
attend, to address and to vote (including proxy voting) at the general 
meeting.916 Additionally, to reduce the cost of being present at the meeting, 
Article 2:117a DCC provides shareholders with the possibility to attend the 
general meeting through electronic means. However, Article 2:118 DCC allows 
deviations to “one share, one vote”. Various legal devices are available for such 
a deviation, for example “dual-class shares”,917 “loyalty shares”,918 
“depositary receipts”,919 “priority shares”920 and “preference shares”.921 In 
the case of capital increases, a shareholder is entitled to the “pre-emption 
right” to subscribe to newly issued shares in proportion to the amount of 
shares he or she owns.922  
Furthermore, Dutch corporate law gives shareholders who pass certain 
thresholds the chance to influence the direction of the company. In general, 
 
915 Article 2:118, DCC stipulates shareholders’ right to vote at the general meeting, and Article 2:118a, DCC 
further clarifies holders of depository receipts are also entitled to vote at the general meeting. However, 
Article 2:118 also allows deviation from “one share, one vote”, such as “dual-class shares” or “loyalty shares”, 
which may be damaging to minority shareholder protection.  
916 Article 2:117 (1)(7) and 2:119, DCC. 
917 The dual-class shares may consist of two A and B classes, and normally one class is issued to public 
shareholders, while the other is issued to founders and executives. The prior has limited voting rights and the 
latter ensures the control of founders and executives by granting more voting power.  
918 Loyalty shares reward long-term shareholders, who consistently hold their shares for a certain period, with 
extra voting rights. In the Netherlands, the DSM case focused on the dispute over whether a loyalty dividend 
breached the equality of shareholders. The Enterprise Chamber adhered to the equal treatment of 
shareholders. However, the Supreme Court overruled this view and held that a loyalty dividend is permissible 
as long as conditions are satisfied to guarantee the equal treatment of shareholders who are in the same 
position. Finally, the DSM did not follow up on its loyalty dividends in practice. See: Alessio Pacces, Loyalty 
shares in the Netherlands, report by Tom Vos at the ECGI Roundtable, available at 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/events/ecgi_roundtable_report_on_loyalty_shares_by_tom_vos_0.pdf. 
Last visited February 2019. 
919 The depositary receipt is a mechanism whereby the company automatically deposits the voting rights of 
shares in a trust office. Corresponding to each deposited shares, a depository receipt will be issued on the 
exchange market. Hence, a depositary receipt holder loses his or her voting right, which will be exercised by 
the trust office, but still enjoys the right to a dividend. Nevertheless, a depository receipt holder may regain his 
or her voting right under conditions based on Article2: 118a, DCC. 
920 The priority share is a device which grants special voting privileges to management-friendly foundations in 
major decision-making, as well as in nominating or dismissing managing and monitoring directors. 
921 The preference share, which has the same voting right as the common share, can be sold to a friendly trust 
office or outside shareholders at a lower cost. 
922 Article 2:96a (1), DCC. 
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the right to convene a general meeting lies with the board of directors and the 
supervisory board.923 Nevertheless, a shareholder, or several shareholders 
who solely or jointly hold at least one-tenth of the issued share capital, may be 
authorised by the provisional relief judge of the District Court to convene a 
general meeting.924 Yet, if requirements of Article 2:108 or 2:108a are not met, 
namely at least one general meeting once a year or when a dramatic decrease 
in equity happens, then any shareholder may be authorised by the District 
Court to convene a meeting.925 Besides, shareholder(s) who individually or 
collectively hold(s) at least 3% of the issued share capital is/are entitled to the 
right to put items on the agenda.926 For a voidable resolution, a shareholder 
can submit a request to the District Court for its nullification.927 
Last but not least, in takeovers, special attention has been paid to minority 
shareholders in several aspects, such as the mandatory bid rule and the 
sell-out right. More elaboration on this issue will be found in 5.4 of this 
chapter. 
5.2.3 Analysis 
The Dutch corporate governance system is built on the “stakeholder model”. 
Different from the shareholder model, in the stakeholder model the board of 
directors and the supervisory board are guided by the interests of the company 
and its undertaking.928 In the same vein, shareholder interest is not the 
exclusive goal; instead, other stakeholders’ interests should also be deemed 
valuable. Distinctively, Dutch corporate law underscores employees’ 
interests.929 These structural designs, to a certain extent, increase the impact 
of other stakeholders on Dutch listed companies.  
 
923 Article 2:109, DCC. 
924 However, the application will be rejected by the relief judge if the applicant does not request the board of 
directors or the supervisory board in writing first. See: Article 2: 110, DCC. 
925 Article 2:112, DCC. 
926 Article 2:114a, DCC. In the Boskalis case, the disputed issue concerned a corporate strategy which should 
be decided by the board of directors. Thus, the court rejected the applicant’s claim based on the right to put 
an item on the company agenda. Exercising this right to put an item to vote, the item must fall within the 
discretion of the general meeting. For more discussion, see section 5.4.2  
927 Article 2:15 (3)(a), DCC. 
928 Articles 2:129 (5) and 2:140 (2), DCC. Principles 1.1 and 2.4 of the DCGC require that the board of directors 
and the supervisory board should make decisions based on long-term value, and also take into account the 
interests of stakeholders. 
929 Article 2:144a (1) and 2:158 (6), DCC. 
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With the internationalisation of share ownership, increasing demand for 
strengthened shareholder powers emerged in the Netherlands. After the 
introduction of the euro in 1999, Dutch listed companies witnessed enormous 
growth in foreign shareholders. The proportion of foreign shareholders, the 
majority of which were US and UK investors, grew from 37% in 1995, to 75% in 
2005,930 to 70% in 2007,931 to 72% in 2009,932 to 76% (AEX companies) in 
2010933 and to 80% in 2016.934 Responding to the pressure caused by foreign 
shareholders and directors, the Tabaksblat Code and the Act on the change of 
the Structure Regime granted more powers to shareholders in 2004, including 
but not limited to: the right to appoint and dismiss supervisors of companies 
under the structure regime, the right to put an item on the agenda (1% 
shareholding or more than EUR 50 million),935 the veto right on major 
decisions and a simplified procedure surrounding the right to inquiry. In 
addition, the Tabaksblat Code restricted the use of takeover defences.936 
This “shareholder-in-favour” direction did not last long, due to another 
prominent characteristic of the Dutch securities market, namely its dispersed 
ownership structure.937 In 2009, the Netherlands was identified as the least 
concentrated country in Europe when it comes to ownership structure. 
Averagely, shareholders with 5% or more than 5% shareholdings collectively 
held 20.8% of the market capital in comparison with the European average of 
35%.938 This dispersed ownership, plus the prevalence of foreign shareholders, 
 
930 Supra. 619. 
931 Richard G. J. Nowak, ‘Corporate Boards in the Netherlands’, in Paul Davies, Klaus J. Hopt, Richard Nowak 
and Gerard van Solinge (eds), Corporate Boards in Law and Practice: A Comparative Analysis in Europe (Great 
Britain: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 429-509. 
932 Supra. 619, p. 281. 
933 Supra. 619. 
(the number of foreign directors in the biggest Dutch companies expanded to more than one-third in the same 
period. See: supra. 619, p. 281. 
934 Eumedion’s 2016 position paper has recorded that, averagely speaking, foreign investors hold more than 
80% of shares of a Dutch listed company. See: Eumedion, “Position of Minority Shareholders in Companies 
with A Controlling Shareholder”, available at 
http://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/position-papers/2016-06-position-paper-minority-sha
reholders-final-version.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
935 This threshold had been amended in 2008. 
936 Supra. 619, p.281. 
937 However, it is important to be aware that, according to the 2016 Eumedion Position Paper, an increasing 
trend in concentrated ownership structures has been observed on the Dutch market in recent years. See: 
Eumedion, “Position of Minority Shareholders in Companies with A Controlling Shareholder”, available at 
http://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/position-papers/2016-06-position-paper-minority-sha
reholders-final-version.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
938 Supra. 874. 
106B_BW_Fu_stand.job
202 
 
inevitably made Dutch listed companies more vulnerable to shareholder 
activism.939 Companies such as Stork, ASMI and ABN AMRO940 were a few 
examples of this aggressive shareholder “revolution”, and so proactive 
proposals were announced in 2008 to restrain activist shareholders. Measures 
taken included but were not limited to: a reduction in the threshold of 
ownership disclosure from 5% to 3%, an increase in the threshold for the right 
to put an item on the agenda (from 1% to 3%) and relief from restrictions on 
takeover defences.941 
Nevertheless, the latest change to the ownership structure of Dutch listed 
companies may create the possibility for more intensive shareholder 
engagement in the future. According to recent data, an ownership 
concentration trend has been established: until 27 June 2016, 29% Dutch AEX 
companies had a controlling shareholder with more than a 30% 
shareholding.942 This appearance of stronger shareholders may align with the 
recent amendments made to both the Shareholder Rights Directive and the 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code. In order to strengthen “checks and 
balances” within a company, the former underlines “long-term shareholder 
engagement” and the latter calls for “fully-fledged shareholder 
participation”.943 Moreover, under the influence of EU Directives, numerous 
minority shareholder protection measures, especially in takeovers, have been 
incorporated into Dutch corporate law. To name a few, the DCC confirms the 
equal treatment of shareholders, the pre-emptive right, the right to put items 
on the agenda, the mandatory bid rule and the sell-out right. Considering the 
transformation from dispersed to relatively concentrated ownership structure, 
Dutch listed companies may provide an opportunity in the future to test 
whether or not shareholder engagement is positively related to corporate 
governance and minority shareholder protection. 
 
939 Supra. 874. 
940 Companies such as Stork, ASMI and ABN AMRO were subjected to the hedge fund activism. See: supra. 
874. 
941 In implementing the Thirteenth Directive, the Netherlands made numerous reservations on provisions 
which would restrict the use of anti-takeover measures. See: supra. 619. 
942 For more details, see: Eumedion, “Position of Minority Shareholders in Companies with a Controlling 
Shareholder”, available at 
http://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/position-papers/2016-06-position-paper-minority-sha
reholders-final-version.pdf. Last visited February 2019. 
943 Principle 4.1, DCGC, version 8th December 2016.  
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Another distinctive characteristic is that shareholders are not entitled to the 
legal remedy of derivative actions in the Netherlands. Generally speaking, 
directors’ fiduciary duty is considered a duty towards the company, and the 
company is the only claimant qualified to bring an action. Alternatively, Dutch 
law grants shareholders the right to request the Enterprise Chamber for an 
inquiry proceeding. If mismanagement has been confirmed, the Enterprise 
Chamber will make a declaratory judgment, which leaves the issue of damages 
and director liability to the District Court.944  
In brief, despite the recent concentration trend, the Dutch securities market is 
traditionally a dispersed one. As far as the conflict between shareholders and 
management is concerned, a Dutch listed company’s general meeting has less 
governing powers in comparison with the powers of its board. Moreover, 
Dutch corporate law allows legal instruments to deviate the one share, one 
vote rule. These instruments may encourage shareholder engagement under a 
dispersed ownership structure, but they may also raise the risk of minority 
shareholder expropriation, if abused. An inquiry proceeding is another weapon 
for shareholders to redress their agents’ misbehaviours. However, if the Dutch 
market transforms into a concentrated one in the future, the existing 
conditions to exercise the right of inquiry may in many cases be too high for 
minority shareholders.  
 
5.3 Minority shareholder protection through monitoring 
mechanisms in the Netherlands 
The elaboration above has depicted a general picture of shareholder rights in 
the Netherlands. However, prescribing the rights of shareholders in legislation 
does not necessarily mean that these rights will receive full respect in practice. 
In fact, monitoring mechanisms have a high value in implementing such 
protection. Accordingly, this part will focus on two pillars, respectively, 
disclosure and supervision, and will illustrate how the law is prescribed in the 
Netherlands and what Dutch characteristics apply. 
 
944 For more details, refer to 5.4 of this chapter. 
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5.3.1 Disclosure 
Below, the discussion on disclosure rules will follow three steps: the first step 
will examine EU Directives and Regulations, the second step will focus on the 
Dutch Financial Supervision Act and the final step will illustrate the main 
characteristics of disclosure rules in the Netherlands.  
5.3.1.1 Disclosure in EU Directives and Regulations 
After the creation of the euro, the IAS-regulation945 was promulgated by the 
European Union to govern the financial statements of listed companies 
alongside the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter 
“IFRS”).946 The notion of disclosure can improve shareholder protection, 
increase shareholder confidence and ultimately achieve an effective securities 
market.947 Such a notion has been affirmed on the EU level by a number of 
directives. To safeguard the right to information,948 Directive 2001/34949 
demands sufficient and objective disclosure on entering the stock exchange950 
and a regular information flow for the full listing period.951 Furthermore, 
disclosed documents should be sent to the competent authorities before 
publication.952  
The Prospectus Regulation953 pursues shareholder protection and market 
efficiency.954 Based on the belief that information is the key factor for 
shareholder protection,955 the Directive demands that the prospectus should 
be sufficient for shareholders to make informed assessments and 
full-knowledge decisions,956 and the prospectus should cover essential 
 
945 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/company-reporting/ias-regulation/index_en.htm. Last visited 
February 2019. 
946 The Annual Accounts in the Netherlands: A Guide to Title 9 of the Netherlands Civil Code, available at 
http://www.iasplus.com/en/publications/netherlands/annual-accounts-2014. Last visited February 2019. 
947 Recital (31), Directive No. 2005/1.  
948 Recital (21), Directive No. 2005/1. 
949 Directive No. 2001/34, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L184) 1 (2001), amended by Directive No. 2005/1, 
O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L79) 9 (2005). 
950 Recital (9), Directive No. 2005/1. 
951 Recital (25), Directive No. 2005/1.  
952 Recital (24), Directive No. 2005/1. 
953 Prospectus Regulation 2017/1129, repealing Directive No. 2003/71, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L345) 64 (2003). 
954 Recital (7), Prospectus Regulation. 
955 Recital (3), Prospectus Regulation. 
956 Recital (54), Prospectus Regulation. 
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characteristics and risks to issuers and the securities.957 The prospectus should 
be published in “an easily analysable, concise and comprehensive form”.958 To 
assure this easy access, the prospectus’ summary should use non-technical 
language and be limited to a certain length.959 Moreover, competent 
authorities have the power to demand supplementary information and the 
disclosure of all material information, when it is essential to shareholders’ 
interests.960  
In addition, the Transparency Directive961 calls for “accurate, comprehensive 
and timely” disclosure of information,962 and it stresses particularly the 
periodical and ongoing disclosure of listed companies.963 Specifically, the 
Directive demands the “annual financial report”,964 the “half-yearly financial 
report”965 and the notification of major changes to shareholdings or voting 
rights.966 The notification should include voting rights, controlled undertakings, 
shareholder identities as well as dates.967 For minority shareholder protection, 
the Directive clarifies that the issuer is obliged to ensure the equal treatment 
of shareholders. To facilitate minority shareholders in the exercise of their 
rights, the issuer should disclose all relevant information regarding the 
shareholder meeting, proxy voting, dividends and the issuance of new shares. 
 
957 Recital (28) and Article 6, Prospectus Regulation. 
958 Recital (27) and Article 6, Prospectus Regulation. 
959 Recital (30) and Article 7, Prospectus Regulation 2017/1129, the maximum length of the summary is seven 
A4 pages and should be fewer than 15 risk factors. 
960 Article 32, Prospectus Regulation. 
961 Directive No. 2004/109, O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L390) 38 (2004), amended by Directive No. 2013/50, 
O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L294) 13 (2013). 
962 Recital (1), Transparency Directive. 
963 Article 1, Transparency Directive. 
964 Article 4 of the Transparency Directive requires the publication of the annual financial report to be no later 
than four months after the end of the financial year. Moreover, the public shall have access to the annual 
report for at least 10 years. The annual financial report shall include audited financial statements, the 
management report and statements concerning the truthfulness and fairness of the financial statements and 
the management report.  
965 Article 5 of the Transparency Directive requires the publication of the half-yearly financial report to be no 
later than three months after the end of the first six months of the financial year. And it shall be available for 
at least 10 years. The half-yearly financial report shall cover the condensed set of financial statements, an 
interim management report and statements concerning the truthfulness and fairness of the financial 
statements and the management report. In addition, Article 8 prescribes exemptions to Articles 4 and 5.  
966 Articles 9 and 10 Transparency Directive, according to which thresholds such as 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 
30%,50% and 75% will trigger the notification obligation. 
967 Article 12 Transparency Directive, which also prescribes that the notification shall be conducted promptly, 
at latest within four trading days.  
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Moreover, disclosure through electronic means is highly recommended for a 
the better delivery of information to shareholders.968 
Based on the above Directives, the EU legislator further promulgated the 
Prospectus Regulation 2004969 with 19 Annexes, to provide more detailed 
guidance on the disclosure of the prospectus. The Regulation covers subjects 
such as format,970 minimum information requirement,971 incorporation by 
reference,972 publication methods and the dissemination of advertisements.973 
Last but not least, the Directive No.2017/828,974 which amended the 
Shareholder Rights Directive, strongly highlights transparency as one of the two 
core solutions for better corporate governance. It underlines various issues, 
including but not limited to: heightened transparency of related-party 
transactions, disclosure of the remuneration matter, disclosure of the proxy 
advisor’s voting and the transparency of institutional investors and asset 
managers. 
5.3.1.2 Disclosure in the Netherlands 
On the domestic law level, the majority of disclosure rules prescribed in the EU 
Directives have been implemented in the Dutch Financial Supervision Act 
(hereinafter “FSA”, Wet op het financieel toezicht).975 Section 5:2 of the FSA 
specifies that the publication of the prospectus is the precondition for a 
company to issue or trade shares on an exchange market.976 This prospectus 
should include all necessary information, depending on the nature of the issuer 
and the issued securities, so that shareholders can make informed assessments. 
 
968 Article 17, Transparency Directive.  
969 Regulation No. 809/2004,O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L149) 3 (2004), amended by Regulation No.759/2013, 
O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L213) 1 (2013). 
970 Article 25, Prospectus Regulation. 
971 Article 3, Prospectus Regulation. 
972 Article 28, Prospectus Regulation. The main advantage of the “incorporation by reference” mechanism is 
that it can lower the cost of the prospectus. In the meantime, the provision also makes suggestions on the 
protection of shareholders’ information right. Article 28 (5) specifically clarifies that the application of the 
mechanism shall not degrade the comprehensibility and accessibility of the prospectus to shareholders.  
973 Article 1, Prospectus Regulation.  
974 Directive No. 2017/828, O.J.EUR.COMM.(No. L132) 1 (2017). 
975 The cited English version of the Wet op het financieel toezicht here refers to Warendorf Legislation 
Chapter 5.3 FSA, available at 
https://www.navigator.nl/document/id59f5ecc848fff312db7621678b5161a2?ctx=WKNL_CSL_1754. Last 
visited February 2019. 
976 Section 5:3 and 5:4 stipulate exemptions of Section 5:2, FSA. 
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Besides, the prospectus should be formulated in such a format that is 
comprehensible to a reasonable and diligent person.977 In addition to the 
prospectus, the FSA requires the publication of annual financial reports978 and 
semi-annual financial reports.979 The annual financial report, which consists of 
the annual account, management report and a truth and fairness certificate, 
plays a vital role in updating shareholders on a regular basis. Moreover, the 
adoption of the annual account does not necessarily discharge directors or 
supervisory directors from their liabilities.980 In other words, the general 
meeting can choose to adopt the annual account but reserve the ability to hold 
directors or supervisors liable at a later stage. Moreover, the FSA consistently 
updates shareholders through the notification obligation, if there is a change in 
voting rights, capital and major shareholdings, etc.981                                                              
To implement the Transparency Directive’s 2013 amendment, which attempts 
to lower the burden and to facilitate the disclosure of small and medium listed 
companies, the Dutch FSA has correspondingly gone through several changes. 
These changes include but are not limited to: the abolishment of the quarterly 
financial report requirement, the availability of both annual and semi-annual 
financial reports being prolonged from 5 to 10 years, the publication time limit 
for the semi-annual financial report extended to three months, changes to 
shareholdings or voting rights which have reached or crossed the thresholds of 
3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 75% or 95% having to be 
notified to the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (hereinafter “AFM”) 
within four trading days and abolishing the notification obligation of an 
intended amendment to articles of association.982  
 
977 Section 5:13, FSA. 
978 Section 5:25c, FSA. 
979 Section 5:25d, FSA. 
980 Article 2:101, DCC.  
981 Section 5:34, FSA an issuer’s obligation to notify changes of capital, Section 5:35 an issuer’s obligation to 
notify changes of voting rights, section 5:38 shareholders’ obligation to notify changes in major holdings 
whenever a threshold is reached, section 5:48 a director or supervisor’s obligation to notify changes to his or 
her shareholdings of the company.  
982 See: Amendments to the Transparency Directive implemented in the Netherlands, available at 
http://www.elexica.com/en/legal-topics/corporate-governance-and-compliance/30-amendments-to-the-trans
parency-directive-implemented-in-the-netherlands. Last visited February 2019.  
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5.3.1.3 Analysis 
Disclosure rules in the Netherlands, to a large extent, are shaped by EU 
Directives, in particular the aforementioned Prospectus Directive and the 
Transparency Directive. Historically speaking, the issue of Dutch listed 
company disclosure was not in a leading position when compared with its 
European counterparts. Research has shown, for instance, that disclosure in 
the UK was more comprehensive than in the Netherlands, and this difference 
was notable.983 The reasons behind this can be ascribed to the following. First, 
a permissive financial reporting framework which grants extensive freedom of 
accounting choices in the Netherlands.984 Second, the prevalence of 
anti-takeover measures constrains the growth of the corporate control market 
in the Netherlands. As a matter of fact, it has been shown that an effective 
takeover market provides incentives for broader disclosure so that the market 
price can properly reflect the company value.985 Without sufficient external 
supervision of the market, “private access” unsurprisingly becomes the main 
channel of information flow.986  
However, thanks to the harmonisation of disclosure rules at the EU level, and 
the establishment of the official AFM supervision organ, disclosure in Dutch 
listed companies has been improved.987 Before the establishment of the AFM 
in 2006, the supervision of financial reports was conducted by the Enterprise 
Chamber. Nevertheless, the Enterprise Chamber did not have the power to 
actively dig into a company’s disclosure but could only base its investigation on 
the complaint of a party whose interest was related to the disclosure.988    
 
983 Kees Camfferman and Terence E. Cooke, ‘An Analysis of Disclosure in the Annual Reports of UK and Dutch 
Companies’, 1 (2002) Journal of International Accounting Research, pp. 3-30. 
Another research study found that Swedish listed companies had higher compliance levels with disclosure 
requirements than Dutch companies. However, the research’s data also demonstrated that there was no 
significance difference in accounting compliance between the Netherlands and Sweden in 2008. See: Fredrik 
Hartwig, ‘Swedish and Dutch Listed Companies’ Compliance with IAS 36 paragraph 134’, 12 (2015) 
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, pp. 78-105.                                                                                                                      
984 Ibid.  
985 This capital market difference has been regarded as one of the reasons why disclosure is better in the UK 
than in the Netherlands. See: Kees Camfferman and Terence E. Cooke, ‘An Analysis of Disclosure in the Annual 
Reports of UK and Dutch Companies’, 1 (2002) Journal of International Accounting Research, pp. 3-30. 
986 Ibid. 
987 Fredrik Hartwig, ‘Swedish and Dutch Listed Companies’ Compliance with IAS 36 paragraph 134’, 12 (2015) 
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, pp. 78-105. 
988 Different from the Netherlands, an active review system of financial reports was adopted in Sweden, 
consisting of several layers from the Monitoring Panel, the Stockholm Stock Exchange and ultimately the 
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Since 2006, the AFM has become the foremost supervision organ of the 
financial market. For example, in 2015, the AFM announced 52 formal 
enforcements and 575 informal enforcements.989 More specifically, it is 
entitled to take diverse measures, varying from warnings, incremental penalty 
payments, administrative fines, the withdrawal or limitation of licences and 
referrals to the public prosecution service.990 When looking at the prospectus 
liability, for example, the AFM plays a role in its public enforcement, namely by 
approving the prospectus before they can be published or distributed.991 The 
AFM also has the power to impose a fine regarding any breach of prospectus 
obligations.992 In addition to public enforcement, the private enforcement is 
also available in the Netherlands. Dutch law bases the prospectus liability on 
tort law993 or unfair commercial practices994 so that investors are entitled to 
bring a claim on the spreading of misleading information.995 
5.3.2 Supervision 
Supervision has traditionally taken place in the Netherlands through a two-tier 
board structure. It was not until 2013 that the Dutch Civil Code officially 
integrated the one-tier board structure. Within the concept of supervision, 
independence is deemed the key element for internal “checks and balances” 
and has a fundamental impact on shareholder protection. Focusing on the 
above issues, the analysis below will examine EU legislation as the first layer, 
 
Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. This difference is considered one of the reasons why Swedish listed 
companies were more compliant than Dutch companies. However, the compliance levels of the Swedish and 
Dutch listed companies were found to be indistinguishable in 2008, which demonstrated convergence and 
learning. See: supra. 983. 
989 The total amount of the 17 fine decisions was €9,616,250 in 2015. In 2014, the amount of 31 fine decisions 
was €7,327,287, and there were 106 formal enforcements and 417 informal enforcements. See: AFM Annual 
Report 2015, available at: 
https://www.afm.nl/~/profmedia/files/afm/jaarverslag/2015/samenvatting-jaarverslag-engelstalig.ashx. Last 
visited February 2019. 
990 Other measures that can be taken by the AFM also cover instructive conversations, public warnings, 
notices and disciplinary complaints., available at: 
https://www.afm.nl/en/over-afm/werkzaamheden/maatregelen. Last visited February 2019. 
991 Tomas Matthieu Christiaan Arons, Cross-border Enforcement of Listed Companies’ Duties to Inform (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Deventer, 2012), p.50. 
992 Article 1:80, FSA. 
993 Article 6:162, DCC. 
994 Section6:3.3A, DCC. 
995 Pursuant to Article 3:305a DCC, shareholders are able to bring a collective action. And after the declaratory 
judgment of the collective action, investors shall refer to individual proceedings for compensation. For more 
details, see 5.3.3 of this chapter. 
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and the Dutch Corporate Governance Code and the Dutch Civil Code as the 
second layer, and it will end with an analysis and evaluation of the issue of 
supervision in the Dutch context.  
5.3.2.1 Supervision in EU recommendations 
The monitoring mechanism of independent directors, as identified by the 
Commission Recommendation on the Role of Non-Executive or Supervisory 
Directors of Listed Companies and on the Committees of the (Supervisory) 
Board (hereinafter “Recommendation 2005/162”),996 is seen as a key vehicle 
for the protection of shareholders and other stakeholders’ interests.997 
Independent directors in dispersed and concentrated listed companies face 
different challenges.998 In the case of dispersed companies, the issue is mainly 
about the accountability of management to shareholders. In the case of 
concentrated companies, the main issue is the protection of minority interests. 
Responding to these challenges, Recommendation 2005/162 underlines two 
vital responsibilities of the supervisory board, namely to ensure the accurate 
disclosure of information and to evaluate and manage risks.999 In particular, 
the Recommendation emphasises the importance of non-executive directors or 
supervisors in the daily monitoring of management and resolving conflicts of 
interest.1000 Three areas have been marked as the highest potential conflicts 
of interest: nomination, remuneration and auditing.1001 Correspondingly, three 
special committees have been established for enhanced supervision.1002 These 
special committees are not exclusively composed of independent directors; 
instead they consist of a majority of independent non-executive directors or 
supervisors (with extra expertise requirements for the audit committee1003).1004  
Likewise, there is no rigid proportion requirement of independent directors on 
the supervisory board, as long as this amount is sufficient.1005 Concerning 
 
996 Recommendation No. 2005/162,O.J.EUR.COMM. (No.L52) 51 (2005). 
997 Preamble (7), Recommendation 2005/162. 
998 Preamble (7), Recommendation 2005/162. 
999 Preamble (14), Recommendation 2005/162. 
1000 Preamble (3), Recommendation 2005/162. 
1001 Preamble (9), Recommendation 2005/162. 
1002 Article 5, Recommendation 2005/162. 
1003 Preamble (16), Recommendation 2005/162. 
1004 Annex I, Article 2.1 (2), 3.1 (2), and 4.1, Recommendation 2005/162.  
1005 Preamble (8) and Article 4, Recommendation 2005/162. However, Preamble (18) asserted that member 
states generally require a significant proportion of independent directors in their corporate governance codes.  
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“independence”, Article 13.1 precludes any relationship that may cause a 
conflict of interest, such as a connection with the company, the controlling 
shareholder or management. Additionally, Annex II provides detailed 
independence criteria.1006 Even if all of these criteria are fulfilled on paper, the 
supervisory board should still have a final say on the independence issue, i.e. it 
has the power to reject a director based purely on substance.1007 This 
provision reveals that more attention should be given to the essence instead of 
the form.1008 Furthermore, Recommendation 2005/162 discourages CEO 
duality unless safeguards have been prepared.1009 The supervisory board is 
obliged to conduct an annual self-evaluation at both the macro level of the 
board and the micro level of board members and committees.1010 Last but not 
least, member states are encouraged to implement the Recommendation 
through either “comply or explain” or domestic legislation.1011  
In addition to Recommendation 2005/162, the Commission issued 
Recommendation as Regards the Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of 
Listed Companies (hereinafter “Recommendation 2009/385”)1012 in 2009. To 
address problems such as the prioritisation of short-term interests and 
excessive remuneration,1013 Recommendation 2009/385 underlines long-term 
sustainability and performance-based remuneration policy.1014 Specifically, 
share options are forbidden as remuneration for non-executive directors or 
supervisors, due to the consideration of independence.1015 The remuneration 
 
1006 Namely, a non-executive director or supervisor shall not have been an executive or managing director of 
the company in the previous five years, shall not have been an employee of the company in the previous three 
years, shall not have received an excessive amount of additional remuneration from the company, shall not be 
related to the controlling shareholder, shall not have had a material business relationship with the company in 
the previous year, shall not have been related to the current or former external auditor within the past three 
years, shall not be linked to executive directors or supervisors, due to his or her participation in another 
company, shall not be employed as a non-executive director or a supervisor by the company for more than 
three terms, shall not have a close family relationship with an executive or managing director. 
1007 Article 13.2, Recommendation 2005/162. 
1008 Annex II.1, Recommendation 2005/162.  
1009 The CEO and the chairman of the supervisory board or the one-tier board are encouraged to be separated, 
or the conflicts of interest has been cleared following a certain amount of time. See: Article 3.2, 
Recommendation 2005/162.  
1010 Article 8, Recommendation 2005/162. 
1011 Preamble (4) and Article 1.1, Recommendation 2005/162. Article 1.2 further commands that “comply or 
explain” be conducted annually. 
1012 Recommendation No. 2009/385,O.J.EUR.COMM. (No. L120) 28 (2009). 
1013 Preamble (2), Recommendation 2009/385. 
1014 Preamble (6), Recommendation 2009/385. 
1015 Article 4.4, Recommendation 2009/385. 
111B_BW_Fu_stand.job
212 
 
committee should have at least one expert in remuneration policy,1016 should 
conduct a regular review of executive or managing directors’ remuneration 
based on the proportionality1017 standard,1018 should report its performance 
and be present at the annual shareholder meeting.1019 Particularly, 
institutional investors are encouraged to actively hold the board accountable 
to shareholders regarding remuneration issues.1020 
5.3.2.2 Supervision in the Netherlands 
Historically speaking, Dutch listed companies have followed the two-tier board 
structure. However, since 2013, the one-tier board structure has also become 
possible in the Netherlands.1021 The DCC provides various provisions to 
regulate the supervisory board, clarifying that supervision and advice are its 
two main responsibilities.1022 For certain resolutions made by the board of 
directors in a structure regime, the DCC requires the approval of the 
supervisory board.1023 The DCC also clarifies that a person who serves as a 
supervisor or non-executive director for five or more than five legal persons is 
regarded as unqualified for a supervisory position in a non-small or medium 
listed company.1024 Furthermore, the DCC affirms the role of the works council. 
Generally speaking, the proposal to appoint, suspend or dismiss a supervisor or 
non-executive director should first be submitted to the works council. After the 
works council gives its opinion, the proposal, together with the viewpoint of 
the works council, can be presented to the general meeting for a decision.1025 
 
1016 Preamble (11) and Article 7.1, Recommendation 2009/385. 
1017 Article 9.3, Recommendation 2009/385. 
1018 Article 8.1, Recommendation 2009/385. 
1019 Article 9.4, Recommendation 2009/385. 
1020 Preamble (10), Recommendation 2009/385. 
1021Corresponding to this change, supervision in Dutch listed companies can be divided into four categories, 
namely supervisors on two-tier boards, supervisors on two-tier boards under the structure regime, 
non-executive directors on a one-tier board and non-executive directors on a one-tier board under the 
structure regime. Articles 2:129a and 2:164a, DCC and Principle 5.1, DCGC. 
1022 Article 2:140 (2), DCC. 
1023 Article 2:164 of the DCC specifies 12 different resolutions covering issues such as the issuance and 
acquisition of shares or debentures; collaboration regarding the issuance of depository receipts; admissions of 
shares, debentures, depository receipts to a regulated market, the start or termination of a long-lasting 
alliance, the acquisition of a participating interest (no less than one-quarter of the nominal value of the share 
capital and reserves), and investment of no less than one-quarter of the nominal amount of share capital and 
reserves, amendments to articles of association, dissolution of the company, bankruptcy, termination of the 
contracts of a substantial amount of employees, a significant change in employment conditions that involves a 
substantial amount of employees and a decrease in share capital.  
1024 Article 2:142a, DCC. 
1025 Article 2:144a (1), DCC. 
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For a company under the structure regime, the works council enjoys the extra 
power to recommend one-third of the supervisory board.1026 A supervisor or 
non-executive director of a company under the structure regime should not 
have an employment relationship with the company or its dependent company, 
and he or she should not be a director or employee of the labour union 
constantly involved in the employment of the company or its dependent 
company.1027  
In addition to the DCC, the Dutch Corporate Governance Code (hereinafter 
“DCGC”) is another important piece of legislation regulating internal 
supervision in Dutch listed companies.1028 In 1996, the first corporate 
governance committee, the Peters Committee, was established in the 
Netherlands. In order to tackle issues such as transparency, accountability and 
shareholder control, the Peters Committee issued 40 Recommendations in 
1997, which can be considered as the antecedent of the DCGC.1029 In 2003, the 
Tabaksblat Committee published the first official DCGC, which was revised by 
the Frijns Committee in 2008.1030 The latest amendment of the DCGC was 
published in December 2016.1031 The DCGC focuses on coordinating the 
relationship between the board of directors, the supervisory board and 
shareholders.1032 It provides detailed board standards and elaborates on 
independence issues.1033 The DCGC implements the “comply or explain” 
approach prescribed in the EU Recommendations by demanding a listed 
company explains any non-compliance to the DCGC, either in a separate 
chapter of its management report or on its website.1034 The board of directors 
and the supervisory board are held accountable to shareholders concerning 
 
1026 Article 2:158 (6), DCC. 
1027 Article 2:160, DCC 
1028 The Dutch Corporate Governance Code mentioned in this chapter is based on the latest 2016 amendment, 
available at http://www.mccg.nl/?page=4738. Last visited February 2019. 
1029 More information available at http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl/commissie-peters. Last 
visited February 2019.  
1030 More information available at 
http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl/dutch-corporate-governance-code. Last visited February 2019. 
1031 The revised Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2016, available at 
http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl/download/?id=3367. Last visited February 2019. 
1032 Preamble: contents of the code, DCGC.  
1033 Stefan C. Peij, Pieter-Jan Bezemer and Gregory F. Maassen, ‘The Effectiveness of Supervisory Boards: An 
Exploratory Study of Challenges in Dutch Boardroom’, 7 (2012) International Journal of Business Governance 
and Ethics, pp. 191-208. 
1034 Preamble: compliance with the code, DCGC.  
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the compliance of the DCGC, and they are required to support any deviation 
from the Code with a “substantive and transparent” explanation.1035 
In the Netherlands, independence is determined through the exclusion of 
dependence. The section on Best Practice Provisions 2.1.8 DCGC lists seven 
“dependence criteria”: a supervisor or non-executive director1036 i) who has 
had an employment relationship with the company in the past five years; ii) 
who receives additional “out-of-business” compensation from the 
company;1037 iii) who had a substantial business relationship with the 
company in the previous year; iv) who has a conflict of interest, due to 
cross-board membership in another company; v) who has played a temporary 
management role in the company in the past 12 months; vi) who has at least a 
10% shareholding in the company and vii) who has board service or a 
representation relationship with another legal entity which has at least a 10% 
shareholding in the company.  
In addition, Best Practice Provisions 2.1.7 DCGC states that the supervisory 
board can have a maximum one non-independent director, as prescribed in i) 
to v) of 2.1.8; the number of non-independent directors as prescribed in 2.1.8 
should be less than half and each shareholder or shareholders who directly or 
indirectly own(s) a shareholding of more than 10% can have a maximum one 
non-independent director as prescribed in vi) to vii) of 2.1.8 to represent 
his/her or their interests. This provision also applies to non-executive directors 
in one-tier board structures.  
Moreover, shares or rights to shares may not be used as a form of 
remuneration for supervisors or non-executive directors in the Netherlands.1038 
A Dutch company in general is not allowed to provide any personal loans, 
guarantees or anything similar to its supervisors or non-executive directors.1039 
For a supervisory board which has more than four members, three special 
 
1035 The explanation should include: details on the departure, reasons for the departure, intention to comply 
in the future and alternative measures taken. See: Preamble: compliance with the code, DCGC.  
1036 Including his or her wife/ husband, registered partner, other companion, foster child, relative by blood or 
marriage up to the second degree.  
1037 The “company” mentioned in this section includes its associated companies.  
1038 Best Practice Provisions 3.3.2, DCGC. 
1039 Best Practice Provisions 2.7.6, DCGC. The exception of this article requires two preconditions, namely 
under normal business and with the approval of the supervisory board.  
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committees1040 (the audit committee,1041 the remuneration committee and 
the selection and appointment committee) should be established.1042 The 
diversity of the board, such as gender and age, is another element to be 
considered in the Netherlands.1043  
Lastly, the supervisory board can decide how to resolve a conflict of interest 
transaction between the company and its directors, supervisors or major 
shareholders.1044 DCC Art. 2:129 states that a director should not participate in 
the deliberation and decision-making if such a director has conflicts of interest 
with the company and its connected business; if a management decision can 
not be made due to this reason, then the supervisory board will make such a 
decision.1045 The DCGC also confirms the supervisory boards’ role in resolving 
conflicts of interest transactions. For a transaction which causes a (potential) 
conflict of interest1046 between the company and a supervisor or director, the 
supervisor or director is obliged to make an immediate report,1047 and the 
resolution to enter the transaction should be approved by the supervisory 
board1048 (the supervisor who has a direct or indirect interest should be 
excluded from the decision-making).1049 Likewise, for a material conflict of 
interest transaction between the company and a major shareholder who owns 
at least 10% of the shares, the approval of the supervisory board is 
necessary.1050 
 
1040 Best Practice Provisions 2.3.4, DCGC prescribes that independent directors should account for more than 
half of the committee. Furthermore, the chairman of the supervisory board or a former director of the board 
of directors should not chair the remuneration or audit committee  
1041 Best Practice Provisions 2.1.4, DCGC requires the audit committee has at least one financial expert. 
1042 Principle 2.3.2, DCGC. 
1043 Principle 2.1.5, DCGC. 
1044 Principle 2.7, DCGC. DCC Article 2:129 (6) also prescribed that the supervisory board has the power to pass 
a resolution which involves any conflict of interest between a director and the company. 
1045 In the absence of the supervisory board, the general meeting will make the decision unless the articles of 
association prescribe otherwise.  
1046 According to Best Practice Provisions 2.7.3, DCGC, it refers to a transaction between the company and a 
legal entity in which a supervisor or director owns a substantial financial interest, a director or supervisor who 
has a family relationship with a supervisor or a director of the company.  
1047 Best Practice Provisions 2.7.3, DCGC. 
1048 Best Practice Provisions 2.7.4, DCGC, according to which such a transaction should be disclosed in the 
management report.  
1049 Article 2:140 (5), DCC. 
1050 Best Practice Provisions 2.7.5, DCGC. 
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5.3.2.3 Analysis 
According to Dutch law, supervisors and non-executive directors should be 
independent from directors and executive directors.1051 Moreover, the 
supervision body is designed to consider genuinely the interests of all 
stakeholders, without being too vulnerable to the general meeting.1052 
Representatives of shareholders who individually or jointly own(s) more than 
10% shares is/are considered “non-independent” according to 2.1.8 DCGC. 
However, shareholder representatives are not strictly forbidden based on 2.1.7 
DCGC. Shares or rights to shares may not be awarded as remuneration for 
supervisors or non-executive directors pursuant to 3.3.2 DCGC, but 3.3.3 DCGC 
permits supervisors or non-executive directors to hold shares of the company 
as long as they are long-term shareholders. All of these provisions converge 
into a “Dutch” definition of independence as independence from major 
shareholders. Meanwhile, in order to encourage shareholder engagement, the 
DCGC allows non-independent shareholder representatives on the supervisory 
board or the one-tier board, if other conditions are satisfied. Accordingly, it 
could be argued that the concept of independence in the Netherlands implies 
independence from management and semi-independence from major 
shareholders. 
Scholars have examined the differences between one-tier and two-tier board 
models in the Netherlands. One big division concerns differences between 
non-executive directors and supervisors. The core of the division between the 
one-tier and two-tier models can be summarised by the following question: is 
it good practice to allow monitors to be involved in decision-making?1053 In 
other words, the biggest difference between non-executive directors and 
supervisors is that on the one-tier board, non-executive directors play the 
double role of managing directors and monitoring directors, while on the 
two-tier board, supervisors play a solo monitoring role.1054 Another main 
difference relates to access to information, which concerns both content and 
timing. Non-executive directors, as part of the managing board, are able to 
 
1051 Best Practice Provisions 2.1.8, DCGC. 
1052 Nicolaas Johannes Mattheus van Zijl, The Importance of Board Independence-A Multidisciplinary Approach 
(The Netherlands: Kluwer Deventer, 2012), p. 239.  
1053 Pieter-Jan Bezemer, Stefan Peij, Laura de Kruijs and Gregory Maassen, ‘How Two-Tier Boards Can Be More 
Effective’, 14 (2014) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business In Society, pp. 15-31. 
1054 Supra. 619. 
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access insider information and obtain information faster than their 
counterparts in the two-tier system. In contrast, supervisors’ information right, 
in most circumstances, passively relies on the disclosure of the board of 
directors.1055 Furthermore, regarding issues that require the supervision 
body’s approval, the two-tier board merely asks for a simple majority of its 
supervisory board to accept or reject the management board’s resolution. In 
the meantime, non-executive directors’ opinions only count if they can 
outweigh executive directors by voting.1056 Grounded on distinctions between 
the two board structures, some scholars have posited that non-executive 
directors are burdened with more liability than supervisors,1057 and 
supervisors on a two-tier board are more independent than non-executive 
directors on a one-tier board.1058  
Despite the differences between these two board models, some research has 
shown that there is no substantial distinction between one-tier and two-tier 
boards in practice.1059 As a matter of fact, the newly imported one-tier board 
 
1055 Supra. 619, p. 371. 
1056 Supra. 619, p. 338. 
In addition, a more detailed discussion demonstrated that differences between supervisors and non-executive 
directors can be found in areas: involvement in decisions, veto on major decisions, giving instructions to 
executive directors, extra powers, co-management, chairman, more information and at an early stage, 
representing the company, knowledge attribution, representation in case of a conflicting interest, legal person 
as a director, calling meetings, appointments, remuneration, structure regime and committee membership. 
See: supra 619, pp. 338-342.  
1057 On the one hand, it has been claimed that non-executive directors are facing increased liability, due to 
their extra role as managing directors and the joint and several liabilities rule. See: supra. 626, pp. 310 and 404. 
See also: Maarten Muller (ed.), Corporate Law in the Netherlands (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 
2013), p. 153. On the other hand, the opposite opinion argued that case law has demonstrated that the 
adoption of the one-tier board does not increase non-executive directors’ liability: a director is held liable only 
in the case of serious personal blame, and the liability is found on the case-by-case analysis; there is clearly a 
distinction between non-executive and executive directors in the legislation and in situations where directors 
have been found accountable, more than often, supervisors are also responsible for failing in their monitoring 
role. See: supra. 619, pp. 404-405.  
1058 Supra. 619, p. 371.  
1059 Dirk Jan Zom’s article, published in 2017, pointed out that the differences between the one-tier and 
two-tier boards are getting smaller in practice. See: Dirk Jan Zom, One-tier model niet populair: ‘Onbekend 
maarkt onbemind’, available at: https://cfo.nl/artikel/onetier-board-niet-populair-onbekend-maakt-onbemind 
Last visited February 2019. 
The 2010 data on average numbers of board meetings in AEX and AMX Dutch listed companies showed: on 
average, 10.7 supervisory board meetings (8.8 with the board of directors) for the two-tier board, and 10.6 
board meetings on average (8.6 with executive directors) for the one-tier board. See: Nicolaas Johannes 
Mattheus van Zijl, The Importance of Board Independence-A Multidisciplinary Approach (The Netherlands: 
Kluwer Deventer, 2012), p. 218.  
See also: supra. 874. 
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may not solve problems that have been faced by the two-tier board.1060 
Regardless of the board model, the issue of Dutch company supervision still 
faces diverse challenges, such as information asymmetry,1061 dominant CEOs 
and ineffective board interactions.1062 As a result, scholars have pointed out 
that boardroom problems go beyond the simple one-tier or two-tier 
alternatives.1063 The current legal and economic regulatory approach attempts 
to improve board efficiency through reforms, such as increasing the 
independence of monitoring directors, rejecting CEO duality and creating 
special committees.1064 However, the DCGC, as an example, has been criticised 
for its “checking-the-box” proposition in assessing independence, which lists 
seven specific dependent relationships, without giving the supervisory board 
the power to make a substantial judgment.1065 This exclusive focus on 
technical requirements would deny the essence of the board as a social and 
organisational entity, in which the interaction of members plays a big role in its 
success.1066 Consequently, academics have called for more “internally-driven 
initiatives”1067 as a supplement to “externally-driven measures”.1068 The 
regular board evaluation has been individuated by some as another useful tool 
that should be encouraged.1069 
 
 
1060 In total, 78.7% of the non-executive director interviewees had doubts about the argument that a one-tier 
board can solve existing problems. See: Pieter-Jan Bezemer, Stefan Peij, Laura de Kruijs and Gregory Maassen, 
‘How Two-Tier Boards Can Be More Effective’, 14 (2014) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of 
Business in Society, pp. 15-31. 
1061 Information asymmetry between managing directors and monitoring directors is apparent in two ways: 
one is the lack of substantial information, and the other is overloading of useless information. This information 
deficiency has negatively influenced monitoring directors’ ability to ask compelling questions of management. 
See: ibid. 
1062 The relationship between monitoring directors and managing directors is vital to communication, 
decision-making and group interactions. See: ibid. 
1063 Ibid. 
1064 Ibid. 
1065 Nicolaas Johannes Mattheus van Zijl, The Importance of Board Independence-A Multidisciplinary Approach 
(The Netherlands: Kluwer Deventer, 2012), p. 235.  
1066 Jaap Winter and Erik van de Loo, ‘Board on Task Towards a Comprehensive Understanding of Board 
Performance’, in Massimo Belcredi and Guido Ferrarini (eds.), Boards and Shareholders in European Listed 
Companies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 225-250.  
1067 For example, the role of the chairman was highlighted in facilitating communication with the CEO, 
lowering the cost of task processing within or outside the boardroom as well as problem-solving. See: supra. 
1060. 
1068 Ibid. 
1069 Supra. 1066, pp. 225-250. And supra. 1060. 
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5.4 Minority shareholder protection in takeovers: especially 
by courts 
This final part of this chapter will examine the issue of minority protection by 
Dutch courts in takeovers. It will review what special takeover protection has 
been granted to minority shareholders by Dutch legislation, and it will discuss 
how the Dutch judiciary adjudicates in these transactions. 
5.4.1 Special protection for minority shareholders in takeovers 
Merger resolutions 
In order to protect minority shareholders in legal mergers, a supermajority rule 
has been set in Dutch law. Article 2:330 DCC prescribes that a two-thirds 
supermajority is required for the general meeting to pass a merger resolution, 
if shareholders who are present at the meeting represent less than half of the 
issued capital. Pursuant to Article 2:331 DCC, the board of directors of the 
acquiring company can decide on a merger. The precondition for such a 
resolution is that the company has disclosed the issue in the inspection 
announcement of the merger proposal. However, within one month after the 
board of directors’ announcement of a legal merger resolution, shareholder(s) 
who individually or collectively hold at least one-twentieth of the issued share 
capital may request the board to convene a general meeting, to decide on the 
issue. In addition, according to article 2:325 DCC, a cash-out merger is not 
possible.1070 
Mandatory bid rule 
To protect better minority shareholders’ interests in takeovers, a “mandatory 
bid rule” has been implemented in the Netherlands. Such a rule imposes the 
obligation to issue a public bid for all remaining shares of the target company 
at a fair price, once the acquirer, individually or jointly, has acquired 30% of 
voting rights in a Dutch listed company.1071 Moreover, the Enterprise Chamber 
 
1070 Article 2:325, DCC limits the amount of shares that can be traded on a cash basis in a merger, namely the 
total joint amount should not be more than one-tenth of the nominal amount of shares. 
1071 Article 5:70, Financial Supervision Act. 
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has the authority to enforce such an obligation based on the request of the 
target company.1072 
Sell-out right 
Article 2:359d DCC grants minority shareholders the “sell-out right” to sell all 
remaining shares at a fair price fixed by the court, if the acquirer possesses at 
least 95% of the issued share capital and voting rights of the target company 
after the public bid.1073  
Squeeze-out 
Two statutory squeeze-out proceedings exist in the Netherlands: one is the 
general squeeze-out proceeding and the other is the special squeeze-out 
proceeding following a public offer.1074 Both proceedings share the same 
threshold of 95%, but the general squeeze-out may be denied by the court in 
three specific circumstances,1075 while the special squeeze-out must be 
enforced within three months after the termination of the tender offer.1076 
Moreover, the Enterprise Chamber will rule on the claim and determine a fair 
price in cash for the squeeze-out. However, in practice, a lower threshold of 80% 
is common through a pre-wired freeze-out.1077  
 
1072 For more details, see: 
https://www.afm.nl/en/professionals/doelgroepen/effectenuitgevende-ondernemingen/openbare-biedingen/
proces. Last visited February 2019. 
1073 Corresponding to minority shareholders’ “sell-out right”, the acquirer also enjoys the “squeeze-out right” 
in Article 2:359c, DCC, according to which an acquirer who obtains at least 95% share capital and voting rights 
of the target company is entitled to request a forced transfer of shares to squeeze out all remaining minority 
shareholders at a fair price fixed by the court. In addition, both the squeeze-out right and the sell-out right 
shall be exercised within three months following the public bid. 
1074 Duco de Boer, The Netherlands Squeeze-out Guide IBA Corporate and M&A Law Committee 2014, 
available at 
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=46B885F0-82CC-43AE-BCE1-779CF5F62535. 
Last visited February 2019. 
1075 Article 2:92a, DCC prescribes the buy-out of minority shareholders, i.e. a shareholder who owns at least 95% 
of the share capital may file a claim to demand other shareholders transfer their shares at a fair price 
confirmed by the court. However, the court will reject such a claim if it causes tremendous loss for a 
shareholder, or if it damages a shareholder’s control privilege granted by the preferred shares or if the plaintiff 
has previously waived the right to file such a claim against one of the shareholders. 
1076 Article 2:359c, DCC prescribes that the acquirer who owns at least 95% of the issued capital and at least 95% 
of the voting rights of the target company after a public bid has the right to file a legal claim within three 
months, to squeeze out the remaining shareholders. 
1077 A pre-wired freeze-out refers to a transaction in which the bidder intends to circumvent additional 
procedural requirements by negotiating beforehand with the board of directors of the target company about 
the post-acquisition freeze-out. Furthermore, this post-acquisition freeze-out will be submitted to the general 
meeting for approval, before the takeover ends. See: Tom Vos, ‘Baby, it’s Cold Outside-A Comparative and 
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Appraisal right 
Article 330a of the DCC prescribes that if the acquiring company is not a 
private company, dissenting holders of non-profit shares or holders of 
non-voting shares may submit a written request to the company for 
compensation. This compensation will be determined by one or more 
independent experts, unless the articles of association prescribe otherwise. 
Meanwhile, Article 330a does not apply in a cross-border merger. According to 
Article 333h, dissant shareholders or holders of non-voting shares of the 
disappearing company in a cross-border merger may request for compensation 
within one month after the merger decision. 
5.4.2 Judicial protection in takeovers 
Mergers and acquisitions in the Netherlands are normally conducted through 
legal mergers or public offers.1078 Judging from the steps in a transaction, they 
can be categorised as one-step mergers or two-step mergers.1079 
In the Versatel case,1080 Tele 2 announced in its offer document that should 
the takeover bid fail to reach the 95% threshold, it would conduct a triangular 
merger as a freeze-out method, in order to thin out the remaining minority 
shareholders. The Enterprise Chamber affirmed the legislative purpose of the 
squeeze-out provision prescribed in Art. 2:92a DCC, which serves the interests 
of the majority shareholder. The Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the 
Enterprise Chamber by acknowledging that a triangular merger, if properly 
used, could in fact serve as a means to squeeze out minority shareholders. 
However, the Supreme Court also clarified that if a merger is used for no other 
reason but to freeze out minority shareholders, it may violate the 
reasonableness and fairness standard. In Shell,1081 another relevant case, the 
 
Economic Analysis of Freeze-outs of Minority Shareholders’, 15 (2018) European Company and Financial Law 
Review, pp. 148-196. 
1078 Public offers can be full offers (100%), partial offers (<30%) or tender offers (<30%, considerations 
individually determined). See: 
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I2ef128e71ed511e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?cont
extData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1. Last visited February 2019. 
Full offers are more common than partial and tender offers in the Dutch practice. See: 
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/112/jurisdiction/17/public-m-a-netherlands/. Last visited February 
2019. 
1079 Two-step mergers are normally structured as a public offer followed by a merger. 
1080 Supreme Court 14 September 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4117, JOR 2007/237,Centaurus/Versatel I). 
1081 Enterprise Chamber 20 December 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:BC0800, JOR 2008/36 (Trafalgar/Shell). 
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dispute concerned a legal merger which forced minority shareholders of the 
target company to exit with only payment in cash. Based on Article 2:8 DCC, 
the Enterprise Chamber held the opinion that such a legal merger, designed for 
the exclusive purpose of squeezing out minority shareholders by cash and 
circumventing the statutory squeeze-out procedure as prescribed in Article 
2:92a DCC, constituted misuse and breached the reasonableness and fairness 
standard. These two rulings imply a “purpose” test adopted by the Dutch 
judiciary, namely that a merger should not solely pursue the purpose of 
squeezing out minority shareholders; otherwise, it may be found in violation of 
Article 2:8 DCC.1082 
The intention to protect minority shareholders’ interests is also illustrated by 
other Versatel decisions made by the Enterprise Chamber. In the case,1083 
after a successful public offer, Tele 2 became the controlling shareholder of 
Versatel. In a subsequent merger, Tele 2 intended to squeeze out minority 
shareholders of Versatel. To achieve this goal, Tele 2 attempted to use its 
controlling position to replace three out of four members of Versatel’s 
supervisory board with its own executive directors. It also planned to pass a 
corporate policy that would allow “interested” supervisors to vote on the 
squeeze-out merger. The Enterprise Chamber believed that such a 
non-independent supervisory board, which was dominated by the controlling 
shareholder, would greatly harm minority shareholders’ interests. To correct 
the conflicts of interest, the Enterprise Chamber took a provisional measure to 
appoint three independent supervisors with full authority over the 
squeeze-out merger.1084 Subsequently, Tele 2 and Versatel considered 
speeding up the squeeze-out merger by proposing a share structure plan, 
which, it was claimed, would protect minority shareholders after the merger. 
The supervisory board passed this proposal. Thus, Versatel’s minority 
shareholders brought a claim requesting the Enterprise Chamber to reject the 
merger. The Enterprise Chamber ruled that there was no sufficient justification 
for the share structure proposed by Tele 2 and Versatel. Furthermore, a 
general description of the merger conditions should have been provided to 
 
1082 Tom Vos, ‘Baby, it’s Cold Outside – A Comparative and Economic Analysis of Freeze-outs of Minority 
Shareholders’, 15 (2018) European Company and Financial Law Review, pp. 148-196. 
1083 Enterprise Chamber 14 December 2005, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2005:AU8151, JOR 2006. 
1084 Maarten J. Kroeze, ‘The Companies and Business Court as a Specialized Court,’ available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976277. Last visited February 2019. 
And supra. 874. 
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minority shareholders before the completion of the merger. In the case at 
hand, the controlling shareholder’s behaviour, in squeezing out minority 
shareholders without proper information, had breached the “reasonableness 
and fairness” requirement in Article 2:8 DCC.1085 Accordingly, besides the 
purpose test, the Dutch court intends to safeguard minority interests in 
mergers by emphasising elements such as independence and transparency.  
In addition, the Dutch court has demonstrated a lenient attitude towards 
takeover defences and often deferred to board authority. In RNA v. Westfield, 
for instance, after obtaining 23.9% of RNA’s shares, Westfield attempted to 
interfere with the composition of RNA’s board of directors. As a response, RNA 
adopted several defensive measures. In reviewing the case, the Dutch 
Supreme Court justified defensive measures through three conditions: first, 
that the measures were taken to create a certain space for further consultation, 
second, that the temporary measures were necessary to sustain the status quo 
of the company, and to shield the continuity of the company from substantial 
changes before deliberation, and finally, that the measures were adequate and 
proportional to the impending threat.1086 
In the Boskalis case, Boskalis held more than 20% of shares in Fugro NV, a 
Dutch listed company. Fugro adopted three takeover defences: the first was 
conducted through the device of depository receipts, and the other two were 
in the form of preference shares. In response, Boskalis particularly considered 
the defence device, which enabled two subsidiaries of Fugro to issue 
preference shares, as disproportionate. On 18th February 2015, Boskalis 
exercised the right to put items on the agenda so that Fugro must incorporate 
the decommissioning of the “subsidiaries” defence into the next general 
meeting. However, this request was rejected by Fugro. Subsequently, Boskalis 
brought a claim to The Hague district court to request a provisional measure to 
force Fugro to include the “subsidiaries” defence in the agenda. The court 
ruled against the claim of Boskalis based on the opinion that the right to put an 
item on the agenda prescribed in Article 2:114a DCC does not cover a 
corporate strategy issue that exclusively belongs to the discretion of the board 
 
1085 Maarten J. Kroeze, ‘The Companies and Business Court as a Specialized Court’, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=976277. Last visited February 2019. 
1086 For more details, see: https://www.studytubelaw.nl/nl/arresten/788-rna-westfield. Last visited February 
2019. 
Marcel C. A. Nieuwenhuijzen (ed.), Financial Law in the Netherlands (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 2010), p. 215.  
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of directors.1087 The Court of Appeal and the Dutch Supreme Court upheld the 
decision of the court.1088 
In another case, ABN AMRO was negotiating a merger proposal with Barclays. 
Meanwhile, the RBS Consortium expressed its willingness to takeover LaSalle, 
which was a valuable division of ABN AMRO on the US market. Subsequently, 
the VEB1089 communicated its opinion to the board that the RBS Consortium 
offer was better than that of Barclays. Consequently, ABN AMRO agreed to 
enter into negotiation with the RBS Consortium during an exclusionary period. 
Surprisingly, ABN AMRO sold LaSalle to Bank of America, before the end of the 
exclusionary period set up with the RBS Consortium. This decision to sell 
LaSalle without the approval of the general meeting of ABN AMRO profoundly 
offended shareholders. The VEB filed an inquiry proceeding request to the 
Enterprise Chamber, claiming that the sale of LaSalle had constituted a crown 
jewel defence, which aimed to hinder the takeover bid made by the RBS 
Consortium. Hence, it requested the Enterprise Chamber take provisional 
measures to stop the sale of LaSalle unless shareholders’ voting rights were 
being respected. The Enterprise Chamber held that the sale of LaSalle was 
connected to the merger between ABN AMRO and Barclays, and thus it 
supported the claim of prior shareholder approval and asserted that the board 
was obliged to maximise shareholder returns if the company was “up for 
sale”.1090 The case was subsequently submitted to the Dutch Supreme Court. 
Referring to Dutch legislation and the articles of incorporation, the Supreme 
Court held that the board was not obliged to seek shareholders’ approval; 
rather, the board should be guided by the interests of the whole company 
instead of those of shareholders alone. In addition, the Supreme Court 
emphasised the concept of “legal certainty” and the authenticity of written law. 
Specifically, expanding the power of shareholders as claimed by the applicant 
goes against the consistency of Article 2:107 (a) DCC, which lists issues that 
require shareholder approval. In the end, the Supreme Court rejected the 
 
1087 Case C/09/484302/KG ZA 15-310, March 17, 2015. See: Cees de Groot, Shareholders’ Rights to Have an 
Item Put on the Agenda of the General Meeting, available at 
http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/shareholders-rights-to-have-an-item-put-on-the-agenda-of-the-general-meeti
n. Last visited February 2019. 
1088 Supreme Court 20 April 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:652. 
1089 VEB is the Dutch Shareholders’ Association, which serves as a main information source for shareholders 
and also represents those seeking to pursue collective redress by filing VEB actions. More details see: 
https://www.veb.net/over-de-veb-menu/about-the-veb. Last visited February 2019. 
1090 Danielle Quinn, ‘Dutch Treat: Netherlands Judiciary Only Goes Halfway Towards Adopting Delaware 
Trilogy in Takeover Context’, 41 (2008) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, pp. 1211-1249.  
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judgment of the Enterprise Chamber and ruled in favour of the board instead. 
It has been claimed that this judgment, again, affirmed the Dutch “stakeholder 
model” and unveiled the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to expand shareholder 
power at the expense of other stakeholders.1091 
Following the ABN case, minority (activist) shareholders of ASMI Company filed 
an inquiry proceeding request before the Enterprise Chamber concerning 
company strategy. The Enterprise Chamber ruled in favour of the shareholders 
on grounds that the board of directors excluded minority shareholders from 
participating in setting company strategy, and the supervisory board failed the 
duty to mediate. Subsequently, the Dutch Supreme Court rejected this ruling. 
Instead, the Supreme Court affirmed that the strategy of the company lies 
within the authority of the board of directors. It is the board’s discretion to 
decide to involve shareholders or not, as well as to decide the degree of 
shareholder involvement. Moreover, the court clarified that there is no active 
mediation duty for the supervisory board to resolve conflicts between 
management and shareholders.1092 The decision seems to imply that the 
Supreme Court intends to constrain the influence of activist shareholders and 
to underline the long-term interests of the company.1093 
This deference to board authority was again confirmed in a recent case, 
AkzoNobel v. Elliott, whereby Akzo Nobel received three unsolicited takeover 
offers from PPG. After both boards of Akzo Nobel rejected these offers, 
shareholder Elliott brought an inquiry proceeding request before the 
Enterprise Chamber. The Enterprise Chamber stated that the strategic 
response to an unsolicited takeover offer is within the authority of the board 
as long as it is monitored by the supervisory board. The stakeholder model 
applies in takeovers that the board of directors should be guided by the 
company and its stakeholders’ interests.1094 In other words, the board may 
reject an unsolicited bid even if (a majority of) shareholders support such a bid, 
 
1091 Ibid.  
1092 Harm-Jan de Kluiver, Martin van Olffen, Bernard Roelvink and Berto Winters, Dutch Supreme Court ruling 
in ASMI: no duty to mediate for supervisory boards, available at 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=597b5e5c-c6cd-4749-a2f5-3c0e5cfa3162. Last visited 
February 2019. 
1093 Louis Bouchez and Bart-Adriaan de Ruijter, Order in ASMI case: Corporate Governance put on edge with 
respect to activist shareholders, available at 
https://kvdl.com/news/order-in-asmi-case-corporate-governance-put-on-edge-with-respect-to-activist-shareh
olders/. Last visited February 2019. 
1094 Francis J Aquila (ed), Shareholder Rights and Activism Review (United Kingdom: Law Business Research, 
2017), p70. 
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or even if the acceptance of such a bid would bring more shareholder value 
than rejection.1095 The boards have no active obligation to consult 
shareholders in relation to decision-making. However, both the board of 
directors and the supervisory board are responsible to shareholders for 
company decisions, and the shareholders should be fully informed. In order to 
ensure that the board decision can reflect the long-term interests of the 
company, the Enterprise Chamber further provided guidance to determine 
whether the decision-making of the board is diligent, as well as whether 
negotiation with the bidder is necessary.1096 
Last but not least, a prominent freeze-out transaction is exemplified in the EVC 
case.1097 Specifically, Ineos was the controlling shareholder of EVC with a 
shareholding of 86.4%. After a takeover bid, Ineos successfully held 92.8% of 
EVC’s shares. Ineos then continued with an asset sale at the same price, to 
squeeze out minority EVC shareholders. Subsequently, Trafulgar filed a request 
before the Enterprise Chamber for an inquiry proceeding. The Enterprise 
Chamber claimed that despite the majority of supervisors not being 
independent from the controlling shareholder, this mere fact was insufficient 
to rebut the company’s decision, since the transaction was approved by EVC’s 
independent director with a veto right and supported by the fairness report 
provided by Ernst & Young. As a result, the Enterprise Chamber rejected the 
plaintiff’s request.  
5.4.3 Analysis 
To squeeze out minority shareholders, Dutch law has established a threshold 
of 95%. In practice, if the acquirer fails to reach the 95% threshold after the 
offer, the transaction normally will be followed by a merger or asset sale, to 
squeeze out the remaining shareholders.  
Besides statutes, Dutch courts play a vital role in regulating takeover 
transactions. The court justified in the Shell and the Versatel rulings that it is 
legitimate to use a merger to squeeze-out minority shareholders, if the 
 
1095 ECLI: NL: GHAMS: 2017: 1965, para. 3.34. 
1096 De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, AkzoNobel v. Elliott: landmark case on board conduct in takeover 
situations, available at 
http://www.debrauw.com/alert/akzonobel-v-elliott-landmark-case-board-conduct-takeover-situations/#. Last 
visited February 2019. 
1097 Enterprise Chamber 21 December 2005, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2005:AV1585, ARO 2006, 6 (Trafalgar/EVC). 
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transaction also serves “other business purposes”. In another Versatel decision, 
the court further affirmed that minority shareholders should be informed of 
merger conditions, and the participation of independent directors should be 
emphasised. Based on Dutch case law, research has summarised the 
conditions that can justify an alternative freeze-out measure, such as a merger. 
The conditions include: the transaction should also serve other business 
purposes, the transaction should involve the participation of independent 
directors, the freeze-out intention should be revealed in the offer documents 
beforehand, the post-acquisition freeze-out price should be (or almost) equal 
to the bid price, the investment bank should issue an opinion on the fair price 
to the minority shareholders, and for a pre-wired freeze-out, a threshold, 
normally 80%, should have been agreed beforehand, in order to trigger the 
agreed legal merger or asset sale after the offer.1098 
Concerning takeover defences, various mechanisms, such as depositary 
receipts,1099 priority shares,1100 preference shares1101 and the option for a 
third party to buy new shares, are widely available in the Netherlands. In 
particular, the depositary receipt, i.e. the act of transferring the shares to a 
trust office, is a common practice in the country. The negative view claims that 
the trust office normally holds a management-friendly view at voting,1102 and 
that the holders of depository receipts may not have a significant say at the 
general meeting. Moreover, defence devices, such as the depositary receipt, 
may limit shareholders’ rights – even without the threat of a hostile 
takeover.1103 In contrast, the positive view argues that the depositary receipt 
is not a takeover defence; rather, it can be used to protect minority interests 
by preventing a majority shareholder from dominating the voting by taking 
advantage of absenteeism.1104  
 
1098 Tom Vos, ‘Baby, it’s Cold Outside – A Comparative and Economic Analysis of Freeze-outs of Minority 
Shareholders’, 15(2018) European Company and Financial Law Review, pp. 148-196. 
1099 See section 5.2.2. 
1100 The priority share is a device which grants special voting privileges to management-friendly foundations in 
major decision-making, as well as in nominating or dismissing managing and monitoring directors. 
1101 The preference share, which has the same voting right as the common share, can be sold to a friendly 
trust office or outside shareholders at a lower cost. 
1102 Abe de Jong, Gerard Mertens and Peter Roosenboom, ‘Shareholders’ Voting at General Meetings’, 10 
(2006) Journal of Management & Governance, pp. 353-380. 
1103 For the above reason, the Netherlands can also be held as an example of weak shareholder protection in 
continental European countries. See: ibid. 
1104 Principle 4.4, DCGC, version 8 December 2016.  
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Academics have also noted that the lenient Dutch attitude towards takeover 
defences has already been demonstrated in the implementation of the 
Takeover Directive. As a matter of fact, the Netherlands opted out of many 
provisions which limit the application of defence measures.1105 For example, it 
opted out of Article 9 of the Directive, which imposes shareholder approval as 
a precondition for boards to adopt defence measures. Alternatively, instead of 
a mandatory status, it followed an “opt-in” approach in Article 2:359 b DCC by 
giving the company the freedom to execute the “shareholder approval” 
precondition in articles of incorporation.1106  
Dutch case law seems to confirm such a friendly attitude towards takeover 
defences. As seen previously, in the RNA case, the court justified the adoption 
of defence measures in three situations. Or again, in the ABN case, the court 
rejected the claim of a shareholder approval to sustain the legal certainty of 
the written law. Moreover, the court applied the stakeholder model and held 
that the board of directors was not obliged to seek the highest price. Instead, 
the board’s decision-making had to pursue the company and its stakeholders’ 
interests. In the Boskalis, the ASMI and the AkzoNobel cases, the court has 
similarly shown deference to board authority and rejected activist 
shareholders’ claims.  
There are various motivations behind the Dutch “free” spirit in takeover 
defences, such as maintaining the attractiveness of the Dutch market in line 
with its US counterpart, and preventing shareholder activism.1107 On the one 
hand, this pro-defence and pro-board attitude could be beneficial to minority 
shareholders, since it may allow directors to focus on the long-term interests 
of the company without worrying about hostile takeovers, or directors may use 
the defence device as a bargain chip in exchange for a higher premium in the 
tender offer.1108 On the other hand, it may restrict the development of the 
corporate control market and reduce the external supervision of Dutch listed 
companies.  
Last but not least, the EVC case seems to demonstrate that independent 
director approval and the fairness opinion of a third party have a cleasing 
 
1105 Supra. 619, p.282 
1106 Danielle Quinn, ‘Dutch Treat: Netherlands Judiciary Only Goes Halfway Towards Adopting Delaware 
Trilogy in Takeover Context’, 41 (2008) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, pp. 1211-1249.  
1107 Supra. 619, p. 282. 
1108 Rezaul Kabir, Dolph Cantrijn and Andreas Jeunink, ‘Takeover Defenses, Ownership Structure and Stock 
Returns in the Netherlands: An Empirical Analysis’, 18 (1997) Strategic Management Journal, pp. 97-109. 
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effect on “self-dealing” between the company and its controlling shareholder. 
Nevertheless, according to some dissenting scholars, the EVC ruling fails to 
mirror an at-arm’s-length transaction to protect minority shareholders.1109 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Based on the analysis above, this chapter has made the following findings. First, 
Dutch corporate law follows the stakeholder model, which guides board 
decisions in line with the interests of the company and its stakeholders, rather 
than the shareholders alone, and nurtures ideas of co-determination and 
structure regime. The general meeting is entitled to a number of fundamental 
rights, such as the appointment right, the approval right on major decisions 
and the right to adopt annual accounts. However, some of these rights may be 
constrained by the structure regime and co-determination. Dutch corporate 
law affirms the equal treatment of shareholders, but it also allows various 
mechanisms that deviate from the one share, one vote rule. In addition, special 
legislative protection is provided to minority shareholders, such as the right to 
convene a general meeting or the right to put items on the agenda, if the 
respective threshold is reached, as well as the mandatory bid rule and the 
sell-out right in takeovers. 
Second, Dutch listed company disclosure has not had a good record in the past. 
Reasons behind this underperformance may be ascribed to too much 
discretion in accounting options, the underdeveloped market of corporate 
control and the lack of an institutional supervisory body. However, disclosure 
in the Netherlands has been improved in recent times thanks to the influence 
of EU disclosure rules and the establishment of the AFM.  
Third, the Dutch statutory concept of “independence” refers to “independence” 
against management and “semi-independence” against major shareholders. 
The latter can evidently be seen in the latest revision of the DCGC, which labels 
representatives of major shareholders as “non-independent” but does not 
strictly forbid the participation of such non-independent directors. To 
encourage shareholder participation, Dutch legislation allows certain 
 
1109 Tom Vos, ‘Baby, it’s Cold Outside – A Comparative and Economic Analysis of Freeze-outs of Minority 
Shareholders’, 15 (2018) European Company and Financial Law Review, pp148-196. 
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shareholder representatives to act as supervisors or non-executive directors, if 
other conditions prescribed in the law are fulfilled.  
Fourth, the Enterprise Chamber plays an important role in regulating takeover 
transactions and protecting minority interests. In viewing takeovers, 
“reasonableness and fairness” and the “stakeholder model” are two main 
guiding principles. Companies usually refer to alternative squeeze-out methods 
if the 95% threshold is not reached. Dutch case law has established conditions 
to justify such methods. In terms of takeover defences, the Dutch court 
confirms the authority of the board of directors and also applies the 
stakeholder model to guide board decisions in line with the interests of the 
company and its stakeholders, rather than the shareholders alone. This lenient 
attitude towards takeover defences may implicitly reveal a certain level of 
“shareholder activism” suspicion in the Netherlands. In addition, the court 
seems to hold the opinion that the approval of independent directors and the 
fair opinion of a third party can clear the self-dealing element of a transaction. 
In brief, minority shareholders, as one group of stakeholders, are protected by 
the “stakeholder” model. In line with this model, both Dutch legislation and 
case law support “director primacy”, which constrains the possibility of a 
super-powerful general meeting. Moreover, shareholder participation is 
encouraged by the latest revision of the DCGC, which calls for “fully-fledged” 
shareholder participation in regard to checks and balances within a company. 
Last but not least, through inquiry proceedings, the Enterprise Chamber 
effectively redresses minority oppressions in takeover transactions, mainly 
based on the “reasonableness and fairness” standard. 
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Chapter 6 Comparative Chapter 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Chinese listed companies are known for two prominent characteristics: their 
concentrated ownership structure and the state as the controlling shareholder. 
Under this structure, minority shareholders may face double threats from both 
the controlling shareholder and management, if balanced corporate 
governance fails to be achieved. In fact, minority shareholder protection has 
become a pressing issue for Chinese listed companies. In contrast, the US 
market is known for its dispersed ownership structure. Similarly, Dutch listed 
companies mostly have dispersed ownership structure. However, recent data 
reveal a concentration trend among Dutch listed companies. 
To understand better and address how these three jurisdictions safeguard 
minority interests under different ownership structures and legal systems, this 
chapter will compare Chinese, US and Dutch corporate laws in three steps. The 
chapter will first examine minority shareholder protection through shareholder 
rights in legislation. Second, it will go into protection that minority 
shareholders can obtain from monitoring mechanisms, such as disclosure and 
independence. As a third and last step, it will focus on takeover transactions, 
particularly courts’ role in guarding minority interests. This analysis reveals 
certain similarities and dissimilarities between minority shareholder protection 
in the three countries.  
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6.2 Comparison of minority shareholder protection through 
shareholder rights in the three countries 
As mentioned in previous chapters,1110 corporate law systems in China, the US 
and the Netherlands are based on different ownership structures. In the highly 
concentrated Chinese ownership structure controlling-minority conflicts are 
the main issue.1111 In a dispersed ownership structure, one of the main issues 
is the potential conflicts of interest between the board of directors and 
shareholders.  
Table 6.1 Main agency costs in China, the US and the Netherlands 
Countries Ownership 
structure 
Types of companies Conflicts of interest Agency costs 
China  Concentrated State-owned State vs. minority 
shareholders 
Principal-principal 
Management vs. 
minority 
shareholders 
Principal-agent 
Non-state-owned Controlling 
shareholder vs. 
minority 
shareholders 
Principal-principal 
US & NL Dispersed Companies without 
a controlling 
shareholder 
Management vs. 
shareholders 
Principal-agent 
 
Comparing China with the US and the Netherlands, this research has found 
that all three countries provide general shareholder rights and specific 
mechanisms to protect minority interests. Simply judging from legislation, it 
seems that China provides the most rights and instruments to shareholders, 
followed, respectively, by the Netherlands and then the US.1112  
 
1110 Chapter 1 section 1.1, chapter 3 section3.2.1, chapter 4 section 4.1 and chapter5 section 5.1. 
1111 Controlling-minority conflicts refer to both the principal-principal cost and the principal-agent cost. See 
Chapter 2.  
1112 It is summarised in this chapter that there are 20 shareholder rights and instruments in Chinese legislation, 
i.e. the right to vote, the right to a dividend, the appointment right, proxy voting, the right to transfer shares, 
the dissolution right, the supermajority rule, shareholder approval on certain issues, the right to propose a 
shareholder meeting, the remote participation of shareholders, group voting, cumulative voting, the 
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Table 6.2 Legislative shareholder rights in China, the US and the Netherlands 
Shareholder rights China US (focus on Delaware) The Netherlands 
Right to appoint directors Y Y (may be limited by 
board nominations, 
plurality voting, proxy 
rules and staggered 
boards) 
Y (transferred to the 
supervisory board under 
structure regime) 
Right to vote Y Y (may be limited by 
dual-class shares) 
Y (may be limited by 
loyalty shares, depositary 
receipts etc.) 
Right to dividend Y Y (board decides) Y 
Right to inspect Y Y Y 
Right to dissolve the 
company 
Y (both general meeting 
and shareholders with 
more than 10% shares) 
Y (normally board 
decides) 
Y 
Shareholder approval Y Y Y 
Proxy voting Y Y Y 
Right to transfer Y Y Y 
Supermajority rule Y Y (articles of association)
  
Y 
Remote participation Y (only prescribed in 
regulatory documents) 
Y Y 
Right to sue Y (derivative action) Y (derivative action) Y (inquiry proceeding) 
Group voting  Y (only prescribed in 
regulatory documents) 
Y N 
Cumulative voting  Y Y N 
Appraisal right  Y Y Y (only holders of 
non-voting shares or 
non-profit shares) 
Right to put items on the 
agenda 
Y Y (but it is 
17CFR§240.14a-8 that 
prescribes the right to 
proposal, not in DGCL) 
Y 
Right to call a Y (10%) Y (if it is prescribed by 
the articles of association 
Y (if authorised by the 
articles of association or 
 
inspection right, the right to suit, the appraisal right, the right to put items on the agenda, the right to nullify 
voidable resolutions, the mandatory bid, the pre-emption right and the sell-out right. There are 18 in Dutch 
legislation and 16 in Delaware (there is no group voting, cumulative voting and derivative action in the 
Netherlands, and there is no nullification of voidable resolutions, the mandatory bid rule, the pre-emptive 
right and the sell-out right in Delaware).  
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shareholder meeting or bylaws) the court) 
Right to nullify voidable 
resolutions 
Y N Y 
Mandatory bid Y N Y 
Pre-emptive right Y (only in closed 
companies, not in listed 
companies) 
N Y 
Sell-out right Y N Y 
(Y=yes, N=no) 
From the above table, it is evident that some similar shareholder rights are 
prescribed in China and the US, in China and the Netherlands and even in all 
three countries. However, shareholder rights prescribed in one country are not 
necessarily identical to their foreign counterparts. Legislative distinctions are 
typically reflected as follows. 
Government interventions 
The first major difference between China and the other two countries is that 
minority shareholder expropriations in China are tackled by not only legislative 
shareholder rights, but also political interventions. The party organisation is a 
governing body in Chinese listed companies, and recent developments have 
further strengthened the role of the party in corporate governance. For 
instance, the newly revised 2018 Chinese Corporate Governance Code added a 
provision to demand Chinese listed companies establish a party organisation, 
and state-owned listed companies should incorporate relevant policies and 
regulations of the party organisation into their articles of association.1113 In 
2016, 91% of SOEs and 68% of non-SOEs established party organisations, and 
up to mid-2017, 100 large SOEs were reported to have amended their articles 
of association to incorporate the party organisation.1114 This change can 
certainly be viewed as a symbolic way of deepening party interference in 
Chinese listed companies, but it can also be viewed as providing more 
transparency to lift the mysterious veil of party organisations that have long 
existed in Chinese listed companies.1115 Besides, several quasi-state 
 
1113 Article 5, revised 2018 CCGC. 
1114 Jamie Allen, Li Rui, Guo Peiyuan, Li Zhaowen, Zhang Zhengjun, and Zhou Chun, Awakening governance: 
The Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, Asian Corporate Governance Association China Corporate 
Governance Report 2018, available at https://www.acga-asia.org/specialist-research.php. Last visited February 
2019. 
1115 Ibid. 
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institutions have been formed to assist and safeguard minority shareholders. 
Particularly, the Incestor Service Center is portrayed as representative of 
minority shareholders, to encourage their engagement. This political 
protection of minority shareholders shows that China has opted for a peculiar 
path of its own. 
Powers of the general meeting 
Based on the Chinese Company Law, the Delaware General Corporate Law and 
the Dutch Civil Code, one of the most prominent differences between China 
and the other two countries lies in the power disparities between the general 
meeting and the board of directors. In a Chinese listed company, the general 
meeting, according to the law, is significantly more powerful than the board of 
directors. The Chinese general meeting is the governing body and has powers 
to decide on operating guidelines and investment plans, which conversely are 
powers of the board of directors in the US and the Netherlands. Furthermore, 
the Chinese general meeting can appoint and remove directors and is in charge 
of their remuneration, whilst in the US, the removal right of the general 
meeting may be limited by the staggered board structure. For appointments, 
generally it is the current board that nominates candidates, and if the company 
does not adopt proxy access, shareholders may have to go through a much 
tougher proxy contest. In the Netherlands, the power to appoint directors may 
be transferred to the supervisory board, if the company falls into the structure 
regime. In addition, the Chinese general meeting has the authority to review 
and approve the distribution of dividends. Conversely, the DGCL endows the 
board of directors with the power to declare and distribute dividends rather 
than the general meeting.1116 The Dutch general meeting has the power to 
adopt annual accounts, related to the distribution of dividends. 
Right to sue 
Shareholders in all three countries have the right to bring a direct claim to 
redress personal grievances; however, only shareholders in China and the US 
have the right to file a derivative action. Comparing derivative actions in these 
two countries, the Chinese threshold is higher than the US one. China imposes 
requirements in two respects, i.e. only shareholders who individually or jointly 
hold at least 1% shares for at least 180 consecutive days are entitled to file a 
 
1116 §170(a), DGCL. 
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derivative action. Softer than China, the US adopts the “continuous ownership” 
demand, i.e. a shareholder who is qualified to file a claim should be a 
shareholder of the company at the time of the transaction as well as at the 
time of filing the action. In addition to the threshold requirement, both China 
and the US impose a pre-suit demand that shareholders should request the 
board to bring a lawsuit before exercising their right to a derivative action. The 
exception is that Chinese shareholders can directly file a lawsuit if there is an 
emergency, and in the US, this pre-suit demand can be exempted if 
shareholders can prove the futility of such a demand. Different from China, US 
boards may designate a special litigation committee to investigate and 
recommend the court continues or dismisses the case. To balance minority 
interests, US courts do not necessarily grant business judgment protection to 
the recommendations of the special litigation committee but set up a two-step 
examination of the action’s dismissal.  
In contrast, there is no derivative action in the Netherlands. Alternatively, the 
DCC provides shareholders with the right to file an inquiry proceeding in the 
Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. Shareholders face a 
shareholding or a capital requirement but with no demand to hold the shares 
consecutively for a certain period of time to exercise the right of inquiry. Upon 
the request, the Enterprise Chamber has the power to review the policy and 
the state of affairs of the company, and also to take provisional measures, but 
the inquiry proceeding does not rule on issues of damage and directors 
liability. 
Additionally, neither China nor the Netherlands provides the same type of US 
class action. In China, class action has been clearly ruled out since 2002 for 
private securities litigation related to false statements. Instead, such litigation 
can be filed individually or jointly. Very recently, a trial to test the standard 
adjudication mechanism in solving mass securities litigation was started. The 
CSL, which was amended on 28th December 2019 and will come into force on 
1st March 2020, added Article 95 in the same direction as argued by this 
research to authorize shareholders to appoint a representative to proceed a 
securities compensation action and the verdict or ruling of the court applies to 
registered shareholders. Hence, a Chinese “representative action” will be 
available in the very near future. In the Netherlands, a foundation or 
association may bring a collective action and subsequently reach a settlement 
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with the defendant, if the action prevails, and apply to the court to declare this 
settlement to be binding on the “class”, except for those who opted-out. 
Appraisal right  
Comparing appraisal rights in the three countries, the Dutch appraisal right has 
the narrowest scope, in that only dissenting holders of non-profit and 
non-voting shares may request compensation determined by independent 
experts. In China, the CCL prescribes that a shareholder is entitled to request 
the company acquires his or her shares, if he or she disagrees with a merger or 
division.1117 Comparatively speaking, the DGCL attaches a shareholding or 
value threshold and further clarifies that the appraisal of the fair value of 
shares shall be conducted by the Court of Chancery.1118 More discussion on 
this instrument, which sets out to protect minority shareholders in takeovers, 
can be found in 6.4 of this chapter.  
Group voting  
Despite both China and the US prescribing “group voting”, various distinctions 
exist. First, the subject is different. Separate approval applies to all minority 
shareholders in China, and meanwhile, group voting only applies to a certain 
class or series of shareholders in the US. Second, the scope is different. In 
China, separate approval is required for major decisions that cause notable 
issues for minority shareholders. However, this group voting is prescribed only 
in regulatory documents, without being incorporated into the CCL. This 
non-mandatory status may substantially degrade its influence in practice. On 
the contrary, the DGCL stipulates that group voting applies to a proposed 
amendment of the amount, the par value, the powers, preferences or special 
rights that adversely affect the interests of a certain class or series of 
shareholders.  
Cumulative voting  
As an instrument which is peculiarly created to strengthen minority 
shareholders’ representation on boards, cumulative voting is not a default rule 
in either China or the US. The CCL prescribes that it can be adopted by either 
the articles of association or the general meeting. The CCGC moves a step 
further by demanding Chinese listed companies to adopt cumulative voting if 
 
1117 Article 142(4), CCL. 
1118 §262, DGCL. 
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one of its shareholders and persons acting in concert have more than a 30% 
shareholding. Nevertheless, this provision is in conflict with Article 105 of the 
CCL. Consequently, the low legal effect of the CCGC casts doubt on the 
practical influence of cumulative voting in Chinese listed companies. In the US, 
cumulative voting must be stated in the articles of association.  
The right to nullify a voidable resolution 
Both China and the Netherlands bestow shareholders with the right to request 
a court to nullify a voidable resolution.1119 The difference is that in China, 
shareholders have the right to request a court not only to nullify a flawed 
resolution, but also to confirm a resolution that has never been formed or is 
invalid.1120 This right has to be exercised within 60 days following the adoption 
of the resolution. In the Netherlands, the right to request a court to nullify a 
voidable resolution exists for one year after the publication or awareness of 
the resolution.1121 
Last but not least, both China and the Netherlands offer minority shareholders 
special protection through the “mandatory bid rule” and the “sell-out right” in 
mergers and acquisitions. More discussion can be found in 6.4 of this chapter. 
 
6.3 Comparison of minority shareholder protection through 
monitoring mechanisms in the three countries 
This part will examine two important monitoring mechanisms, disclosure and 
independence, in the three countries. Based on observations, the 
characteristics of each country will be revealed, and differences will be 
outlined.  
 
1119 Article 2:15(3)(a), DCC and Articlet 22, CCL.  
1120 Article 2, CCL Provisions IV. 
1121 Article 2:15(5), DCC. 
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6.3.1 Comparison of disclosure in the three countries 
The previous chapters1122 demonstrate that the three countries have 
respectively established their own comprehensive disclosure system. A 
noteworthy difference on the macro level is the disclosure regulatory regimes 
in the three countries. The US disclosure system stands out from China and the 
Netherlands, due to its peculiar “federal-state” regulatory structure. Disclosure 
in the US is mainly regulated by federal securities regulations and 
supplemented by state corporate laws. On the federal level, disclosure is 
identified by “rule-based” regulations and the “market-oriented” dimension. 
US federal disclosure rules are very detailed and technical, and they highlight 
values of shareholder protection and market transparency. On the state level, 
disclosure is defined by “principle-based” case law and the “business-oriented” 
dimension, which intensifies the supremacy and discretion of the board.1123 In 
other words, disclosure presents the interplay between federal and state 
corporate laws. In the Netherlands, disclosure rules are highly influenced by EU 
Directives and are incorporated in the Financial Supervision Act. However, the 
relationship between EU Directives and Dutch disclosures rules is nothing like 
the US “federal-state” regime. Similarly, disclosure in China is regulated 
through one-dimention, namely Chinese disclosure legislation, for instance, the 
Chinese Securities Law. 
In terms of specific rules, all three jurisdictions demand initial disclosure and a 
continous information flow. For periodical reports, the US law prescribes 
quarterly and annual reports, with a “rapid and current” disclosure of any 
material change. The Dutch law demands annual and semi-annual reports with 
notification obligation regarding any change in voting rights, capital and major 
shareholdings etc. The Chinese law requires interim, annual and provisional 
reports, which regulate disclosure of major events. On top of the similarities, 
the Dutch annual financial report, which consists of the annual account, 
management reports and the certificate of truth and fairness, is worthy of 
mention. Different from the US, the Dutch general meeting has the power to 
adopt the annual accounts. The adoption of the annual accounts does not 
 
1122 Chaper 3, section 3.3.1, chapter 4, section 4.3.1 and chater 5, section 5.3.1. 
1123 Pieter A. Van der Schee, Regulation of issuers and investor protection in the US and EU: A Transatlantic 
Comparison of the Basics of Securities and Corporate Law, p. 230, available at: 
https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1383065/Vanderschee_regulation_20-05-2011.pdf. Last visited February 2019.  
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discharge directors or supervisors from their liabilities by default. Similarly, the 
Chinese general meeting also has the power to approve the final accounts, but 
there is no such concept similar to the Dutch “discharge” in China. In other 
words, the Dutch general meeting can choose to adopt the annual accounts 
but reserve the chance to hold directors or supervisors liable if the disclosure is 
found to be unqualified at a later stage.1124 Such provisions soften director 
primacy and may stimulate directors to draft annual accounts diligently, in 
order to avoid any future liability. 
Another important distinction of the three jurisdictions is the shareholding 
thresholds that trigger disclosure. In the US, any person who directly or 
indirectly holds more than 5% shares is obliged to file a statement, including 
clarification on the transaction purpose1125 (Chinese and Dutch legislations do 
not require this confession). If such a transaction concerns no sale of control, 
then a simplified statement is sufficient. In the Netherlands, the thresholds are 
specifically listed in the legislation, namely a lower minimum threshold of 3% 
has been adopted, supplemented by thresholds of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 
30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 75%, and 95% to activate the notification obligation. In 
China, the 5% shareholding threshold leads to the obligation to submit a 
written report within three days. Different from the US and the Netherlands, 
this Chinese disclosure obligation also comes with the obligation to stop 
trading during the above period. After reaching the first 5%, every subsequent 
increase or decrease of 5% voting shares will also trigger the disclosure and 
non-trading obligations. The latest revision of 2020 CSL further added two 
requirements, one is that after reaching the initial 5%, every subsequent 1% 
increase or decrease in shareholding will trigger the obligation to inform the 
company and to make an announcement. The other is that shares bought 
breaching the first 5% and every subsequent 5% requiremrents, for the part 
that is beyond the prescribed proportion is not allowed to vote for 36 months 
since the purchase.  
Moreover, to safeguard minority interests in going-private transactions, all 
three countries impose a disclosure obligation. The US federal regulations set a 
broad scope of disclosure. It is commanded to not only report the purpose of 
the transaction, but also to specify whether there is an alternative to fulfill the 
 
1124 There is also no such “discharge” in the US, so directors may seek shelter from the “business judgment 
rule”.  
1125 17CFR 240.13d-1 (a). 
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transaction purpose, and if there is indeed one, why this alternative was ruled 
out, what are the reasons behind such a going-private transaction at such a 
moment, how this transaction will affect the target company, its subsidiaries 
and minority shareholders and also whether it is fair to unaffiliated 
shareholders.1126 Comparatively, both China and the Netherlands require the 
disclosure of going-private transactions, but they do not set down such 
detailed explanations.  
In addition to disclosure rules, a bigger gap probably lies at the implementation 
between China and the other two countries. On the one hand, China has a 
comprehensive disclosure regulatory system, which covers listing documents, 
annual, semi-annual and provisional reports, substantial shareholdings, 
remuneration, financial and accounting reports, corporate governance 
information, shareholder information and related-party transactions. On the 
other hand, the Chinese accounting practice is still rather immature, despite 
legislative attempts to converge with IFRS and ISA.1127 Due to the immature 
accounting and the lack of auditor independence, the quality of Chinese annual 
accounts falls far behind the international standard.1128 Besides, the 
conservative view that more disclosure equates to more risks still lingers 
among Chinese companies.1129 Some companies disclosed only the “good” 
instead of the “bad”.1130 Accordingly, the implementation of disclosure rules 
still remains a challenging issue in the country.1131 
 
1126 17CFR 240.13e-3. 
1127 IFRS stands for “International Financial Reporting Standards” and ISA stands for “International Standards 
on Auditing”. See: Jamie Allen, Li Rui, Guo Peiyuan, Li Zhaowen, Zhang Zhengjun, and Zhou Chun, Awakening 
governance: The Evolution of Corporate Governance in China, Asian Corporate Governance Association China 
Corporate Governance Report 2018, available at https://www.acga-asia.org/specialist-research.php. Last 
visited February 2019. 
Empirical research has found that Chinese listed companis’ disclosure remains insufficient even after the 
convergence of disclosure standards. On average, less than 50% of the listed companies disclosed sufficiently 
according to the standard. See: Li Yingqi, Chen Chunhua and Yu Junli, ‘我国上市公司内部控制评价信息披露 
(Internal Control Evaluation Disclosure: Issues and Improvement-Evidence from 2011 Evaluation Reort on 
Internal Control of Chinese Listed Companies)’, 8 (2013) 会计研究 ( Accounting Research), pp. 63-68. 
1128 Lin Z. Jun and Wang Liyan, ‘Financial Disclosure and Accounting Harmonization: Cases of Three Listed 
Companies in China’, 16 (2001) Managerial Auditing Journal, pp. 263-273. 
Wang Zhen, 近 3 月中国 19 家在美上市公司遭停牌或摘牌 (New York Exchange sanctioned 19 Chinese 
Companies for Stock Suspension or Delisting in the Past 3 Months), available at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/c/20110608/12369958941.shtml. Last visited on February 2019. 
1129 Supra. 1125. 
1130 Li Fenglian, ‘美中两国上市公司自愿性信息披露的比较 (Comparison of Voluntary Disclosure of Listed 
Companies between China and the United States)’, 12 (2011) 求索(Search), pp. 36-38. 
1131 Li Jianwei and Li Jia qi, ‘中美股票市场比较分析与启示( The Comparative Analysis and its Enlightenment 
of China-US Stock Market)’, 33 (2019) 湖南大学学报(Journal of Hunan University), pp.37-51. 
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Generally speaking, disclosure rules are mainly implemented through public 
enforcement and supplemented by private enforcement. For public 
enforcement, institutional supervision bodies in these three countries are the 
SEC in the US, the AFM in the Netherlands and the CSRC in China. Specifically, 
SEC enforcement actions cover a wide spectrum,1132 including the 
administrative aspect,1133 the civil aspect1134 and the criminal aspect.1135 In 
addition, SEC sanctions may inflict extensive costs, i.e. monetary penalties, 
management job losses, economic and reputational damage to auditors and a 
decline in share prices.1136 The AFM, as the Dutch supervision body, is entitled 
to take diverse measures, amongst which are warnings, incremental penalty 
payments, administrative fines, the withdrawal or limitation of licences and 
referral to the public prosecution service.1137 In China, the CSRC has the 
enforcement power to impose administrative sanctions or to deprive a 
company of market entry.1138 Comparing these three institutional supervision 
bodies, the CSRC case rate seems rather marginal. The Annual Report found 
that the CSRC had dealt with 199 cases, imposed “fines and disgorgements” for 
a total amount of RMB 7.479 billion and also made 44 “ban of market entry” in 
2017.1139 Meanwhile, the SEC reported 446 independent enforcement actions, 
119 secondary proceedings, 112 delinquent filing proceedings, 309 trading 
suspensions, with 3.8 billion USD disgorgement and penalties in 2017.1140 The 
AFM announced 81 formal measures and 450 informal measures in 2017.1141  
 
1132 See: https://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml. Last visited February 2019.  
1133 The consent decree and disciplinary action. 
1134 The injunctive relief. 
1135 The SEC can refer criminal offences to the Department of Justice. 
1136 Rebecca Files, ‘SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really Matter?,’ 53 (2012) 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, pp. 353-374.  
1137 Other measures that can be taken by the AFM also cover instructive conversations, public warnings, 
notices and disciplinary complaints. Available at: 
https://www.afm.nl/en/over-afm/werkzaamheden/maatregelen. Last visited February 2019. 
1138 See: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/regulatory/BanMarketEntry/. Last visited February 2019. 
1139 See: 2017 CSRC Annual Report, available at: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhjs/zjhnb/201809/P020180907609864959832.pdf. Last visited 
February 2019.  
1140 See: 2017 Agency Financial Report, available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-agency-financial-report.pdf#mission. Last visited February 2019.  
1141 Formal measures taken in 2017 also included 12 incremental penalty payments, 21 public warnigs, and 
assessed 104 prospectuses etc. Informal measures taken in 2017 included 345 instructive consultations or 
letters, and 105 warning letters or conversations. See: AFM Annual Report 2017, available at: 
https://www.afm.nl/en/verslaglegging/jaarverslag-archief. Last visited February 2019. 
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In addition, private enforcement is still largely restricted in China.1142 This 
restriction not only increases the difficulty in shareholder supervision, but it 
also decreases the flexibility of law. Taking the disclosure standard as an 
example, Chinese legislation advocates the “truthfulness, accuracy and 
completeness” of information. Comparatively, the US refers to the concept of 
“materiality”, and the Netherlands demands that disclosure is 
“comprehensible to a reasonable and diligent person”. Though all three 
countries opt for a general description of the standard, the difference lies in 
the fact that both the US and the Dutch rules are regularly updated and 
substantiated by their courts. US courts have established a general “materiality” 
standard based on case-by-case analysis, diligently scrutinised the duty of 
disclosure to safeguard minority shareholders in takeovers and also recognised 
the procedural value of disclosure in avoiding unnecessary interference with 
board autonomy. Dutch courts are also active in the interpretation of a 
comprehensible third person standard. On the contrary, the courts’ role in 
substantiating the legislation is still currently lacking in China. 
6.3.2 Comparison of statutory independence in the three countries 
The three countries have three different board structures. The US system 
settles on the one-tier board structure, which consists of inside and outside 
directors, the latter of which can be further divided into non-independent and 
independent directors. The Dutch system has traditionally followed the 
two-tier board but has also embraced the one-tier since 2013. Specifically, the 
Dutch one-tier board comprises non-executive directors and executive 
directors, and the two-tier covers the board of directors and the supervisory 
board. In China, the two-tier board has been prescribed in the CCL, namely in 
the guise of the board of directors and the supervisory board. Distinguished 
from the Dutch two-tier option, the Chinese board of directors consists of not 
 
1142 In 2001, the Supreme Court issued a notice to temporarily stop accepting any civil securities compensation 
cases. See:最高人民法院关于涉及证券民事赔偿案件暂不予受理的通知 (Notice on Temporarily Stop 
Accepting Civil Securities Compensation Cases), Supreme People’s Court, date of issue 21st September 2001, 
invalid. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court marginally loosened the above restriction by allowing civil compensation cases 
caused by false securities statements, but only to those that had previously been sanctioned by the CSRC or its 
agencies, or the Ministry of Finance or the Criminal Court. See: 最高人民法院关于审理证券市场因虚假陈述
引发的民事赔偿案件的若干规定 (Provisions on Adjudicating of Civil Compensation Cases based on Securities 
False Statement), Supreme People’s Court, date of issue 9th January 2003. 
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only directors, but also independent directors. In other words, China opts for a 
mixed system that incorporates both independent directors and the 
supervisory board. Under the influence of the stakeholder model, both the 
Netherlands and China intend to achieve a certain degree of co-determination 
in their supervision bodies. Dutch law prescribes that the proposal to appoint, 
suspend or dismiss supervisors or non-executive directors should be submitted 
to the works council first, and together with the opinion of the works council, 
the proposal is then submitted to the general meeting for a decision.1143 For a 
company under the structure regime, the works council enjoys the extra power 
to recommend one-third of the supervisory board or non-executive 
directors.1144 In China, the supervisory board is required to have employee 
representatives. The articles of association may freely decide the specific 
proportion, but employee representatives should not make up less than 
one-third of the supervisory board.1145  
Besides board structure, the statutory definitions of independence are 
different in the three countries. In the US, for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
underlines the role of independent directors in corporate governance, 
particularly in shareholder protection. Listing rules for stock exchanges have 
specified requirements concerning majority independent boards and 
mandatory special committees. Specifically, the statutory definition of 
independence explicitly expels the “executive officer” and the “employee”, but 
not “shareholders”.1146 US listed companies have to form nominating, 
compensation and audit committees,1147 composed of only independent 
directors.1148 However, controlled companies are exempted from majority 
 
1143 Article 2:144a(1), DCC. It is to be clarified that many listed companies have works councils on the Dutch 
level but not on the global level. 
1144 Article 2:158 (6), DCC. 
1145 Article 117, CCL. 
1146 Share ownership is not considered an element which may disqualify a candidate from being found as 
independent. NASDAQ Rules IM-5605, see: 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_1_4_
3_8_5&CiRestriction=independent+director&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F. Last 
visited February 2019. 
1147 The NYSE Manual specifically demands three special committees: the “nominating/corporate governance 
committee”, the “compensation committee” and the “audit committee”. Meanwhile, the NASDAQ Rule does 
not strictly require a nomination committee. 
1148 §303A.04 NYSE Manual, the NASDAQ Rule does not straightforwardly call for a nominating committee but 
prescribes independent directors’ oversight function on nomination in 5605(e) (1); §303A.05 (a) NYSE Manual, 
5605 (d)(2)(B) NASDAQ Rule states that for “the best interests of the company and its shareholders”, and 
under the “exceptional and limited circumstances”, the board can approve the appointment of a 
non-independent director to a compensation committee. NYSE Manual §303A.06, NASDAQ Rule, 5605 (c) 
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independent board, nominating committee and compensation committee 
requirements. The rationale behind these exemptions can be attributed to the 
consideration that the controlling shareholder is able to secure his or her 
interest by dominating the board. The independent director mechanism loses 
its charm in a controlled company, though, due to the affiliation of the board 
and the controller.1149 Furthermore, the NASDAQ Rule proposes that 
representatives of significant shareholders serve on the compensation 
committee as good practice.1150 These provisions have shown that 
independent directors, to a large degree, can be considered shareholder 
representatives. In a nutshell, the US concept of independence in listing rules 
primarily focuses on being independent from management. Supplementary, 
state courts further define independence from controlling shareholders in 
going-private transactions based on case-specific facts. In Delaware, approval 
of an independent special committee may shift the burden of proof, or even 
the judicial review standard, if other conditions are also fulfilled, in a 
going-private transaction. Considering the conflicts of interest between the 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders in such a transaction, clearly, 
members of the special committee are required to be independent from the 
controller.1151  
Compared with the US, the Dutch independence definition in the Dutch 
Cororate Governance Code (comply or explain) excludes both management and 
major shareholders, but representatives of the latter are allowed under certain 
conditions. The Netherlands establishes the 10% threshold, in that whomever 
has at least a 10% shareholding of the company, or has board service or a 
representation relationship with another legal entity with at least 10% 
shareholding of the company, is viewed as non-independent. However, the 
Dutch Cororate Governance Code permits shareholders who directly or 
indirectly own more than a 10% shareholding to have a maximum one 
 
demands the audit committee shall be composed of at least three independent directors, except under 
“exceptional and limited circumstances”, as stated in 5605 (c)(2)(B). 
1149 Exemptions for controlled companies, to a certain extent, illustrate the notion that the independent 
director instrument is chiefly organised around the conflicts of interest of shareholders and management, 
without specifically addressing minority shareholders. Nevertheless, it does not mean minority interests are 
simply being ignored in the US. In fact, the case law system also makes a big contribution to defining and 
regulating the independent director mechanism, as well as correcting minority expropriations. For more 
discussion, see 6.4 of this chapter. 
1150 NASDAQ Rule IM-5605-6. 
1151 The DGCL§144 (a)(1) also affirms the procedural value of independent directors in related-party 
transactions. 
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representative on the board, in order to encourage shareholder participation. 
Also, the Netherlands prescribes that shares or rights to shares are not 
permissible as a form of remuneration for supervisors or non-executive 
directors, albeit supervisors or non-executive directors may hold shares as long 
as they are long-term shareholders. From these provisions, it is notable that 
the Dutch concept of independence generally demands independence from 
major shareholders, but it also compromises this standard in facilitating the 
goal of long-term shareholder participation. Moreover, three special 
committees – the selection and appointment committee, the remuneration 
committee and the audit committee – are required by the Dutch Cororate 
Governance Code for listed companies whose supervisory board has more than 
four members. Conversely to the US, Dutch special committees are not 
exclusively composed of independent members,1152 and there is no exemption 
for controlled companies. Moreover, the supervisory board or non-executive 
directors play an important role in conflict of interest transactions. For a 
material conflict of interest transaction between the company and a major 
shareholder who owns at least 10% shares, the approval of the supervisory 
board or non-executive directors is necessary. Under the influence of the 
stakeholder model, Dutch independence is defined as being independent from 
both management and major shareholders.1153 Nevertheless, to encourage 
shareholder participation, non-independent major shareholder representatives 
are allowed, as long as certain conditions are met.  
In comparison, China seems to be the country that ties most closely the 
independent director mechanism with minority shareholder protection. 
Different from the majority independent board requirement, Chinese listed 
companies require only one-third of independent directors on the board.1154 
The Chinese definition of independence refers to independence from both 
management and major shareholders.1155 Different from both the US and the 
Netherlands, Chinese independent directors are identified as the “guardians” 
 
1152 Best Practice Provision 2.3.4, DCGC prescribes that independent directors should account for more than 
half of the committee. Moreover, the chairman of the supervisory board or a former director of the board of 
directors should not chair the remuneration or audit committee. 
1153 EU Recommendation 2005/162, Article 13.1 explicitly states that the concept of independence shall 
preclude any connection with the controlling shareholder. In addition, its Annex II of the independence criteria 
also clarifies that a non-executive director or supervisor shall not be related to the controlling shareholder.  
1154 Article 1 (3), Independent Director Opinion. Both US and Dutch listed companies have the majority 
independent director requirement, but the US also prescribes the controlled company exemption.  
1155 Articles 34, 35 and 36, CCGC. 
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of minority shareholders.1156 For minority infringements, independent 
directors are entitled to give their independent opinion to the board of 
directors or the general meeting.1157 Qualified minority shareholder 
representation is also encouraged in China, i.e. shareholder(s) who either 
independently or jointly hold(s) more than 1% of the issued shares of a listed 
company have the right to nominate independent director candidates, but the 
final decision depends on the general meeting. In addition, despite Chinese 
legislation stipulating special committees, such as strategies, audit, nomination, 
remuneration and assessment committees, these special committees (except 
the audit committee)1158 are not mandatory for Chinese listed companies.1159 
Different from the US, Chinese nomination, remuneration, audit and 
assessment committees merely demand a majority of independent directors, 
chaired by independent directors, and there is no exemption for controlled 
companies. In sum, the definition of independence in China covers not only 
independence from management and major shareholders, but also the 
representation of minority shareholders.  
Comparing the statutory independence concepts in the three countries, the 
Chinese independence concept is congruent with the US and the Dutch 
experiences at first sight. In the US, independent directors are held 
accountable to the principal. Regarding the highly concentrated ownership 
structure in China, it seems reasonable that Chinese independent directors are 
portrayed as guardians of minority shareholders. The Netherlands highlights 
the importance of shareholder engagement by exceptionally allowing 
non-independent major shareholder representatives. Correspondingly, Chinese 
legislation endows qualified minority shareholders with the right to nominate 
independent directors. However, on the other side of the coin, the internal 
supervision of Chinese listed companies in practice is not as effective as those 
in the other two jurisdictions. Compared with the US and the Netherlands, 
 
1156 Article 37 of the CCGC explicitly states that independent directors shall “focus on protection of the lawful 
rights and interests of small-and-medium shareholders”. Besides, Articles 34 and 35 of the CCGC specify that a 
listed company shall be equipped with independent directors, which shall be independent of the company 
they work for, as well as the big shareholders of that company. 
1157 Besides, independent directors are granted a wide range of special powers, which cover issues of major 
related-party transactions, the employment of accounting firms, interim general meetings, meetings of the 
board of directors, the engagement of external auditing and consulting institutions and solicitation of proxy 
voting. See: Article 5, Independent Director Opinion. 
1158 The audit committee became mandatory for Chinese listed companies after the 2018 revision of the CSRC 
came into effect. 
1159 Instead, they are left to the resolution of the general meeting of listed companies. 
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independent directors have only limited influence within Chinese listed 
companies. Different from the mandatory special committee requirement, 
most special committees are optional in Chinese listed companies.1160 
Furthermore, proposals made by special committees should be submitted to 
the board of directors for a final decision.1161 Conversely to their US and Dutch 
peers, Chinese independent directors merely have soft powers. US courts grant 
high value to the procedural protection of “approval of independent directors”. 
which may shift the burden of proof or even the judicial review standard under 
different circumstances. In the Netherlands, material conflict of interest 
transactions and self-dealing transactions involving major shareholders require 
the approval of a supervisory board or non-executive directors. In contrast, 
Chinese independent directors only have soft powers to acknowledge major 
conflict of interest transactions or to give an independent opinion on issues 
that are likely to infringe minority interests.  
6.4 Comparison of minority shareholder protection in 
takeover transactions in the three countries, especially by 
courts  
This part will compare minority shareholder protection in takeovers in two 
respects: legislative special protection and judicial remedy. 
Legislative protection of minority shareholders in takeovers 
Generally speaking, minority shareholders face a more severe risk of 
expropriation in takeover transactions, and legislation in the US, the 
Netherlands and China all demonstrate this consideration. In the US, for 
instance, the main legislative provision that relates to minorities in takeovers is 
the appraisal right, whilst the Netherlands prescribes the mandatory bid rule 
 
1160 Article 38, CCGC. Special committees are mandatory for US listed companies and for Dutch listed 
companies whose board has more than four members. 
1161 Article 38, CCGC. Different from the US and the Netherlands, the audit committee is the only mandatory 
special committee for Chinese listed companies. Chinese audit committee’s proposals should be decided by 
the board of directors (special committees’ proposals also need to be submitted to the board of directors for 
decision in the Netherlands). Additionally, the audit committee can only propose to appoint or remove an 
external auditor. Meanwhile, the US audit committee is in charge of the appointment, compensation and 
oversight of external auditors. 
130A_BW_Fu_stand.job
249 
 
and the sell-out right.1162 Chinese legislation seems to combine both 
jurisdictions by stipulating the appraisal right, the mandatory bid rule and the 
sell-out right. However, it is necessary to clarify that these pro-minority 
instruments provided in China are not exactly the same as those found in the 
US and the Netherlands. 
Specifically, the US appraisal right involves the court deciding on a fair share 
price. Case law confirms that if the controlling shareholder fails in his or her full 
disclosure duty in a short-form merger, minority shareholders are entitled to 
the “quasi-appraisal” remedy. Legislation affirms appraisal rights in both 
one-step and two-step transactions. In contrast, the Chinese “equivalent” is 
more like an “exit” right, which allows minority shareholders who disagree 
with the merger or division to request the company to buy back their shares, 
without appointing the court as the institution to ascertain a fair price.  
As for the mandatory bid rule, the Chinese provision varies from the Dutch one 
in two ways, i.e. the Chinese mandatory bid allows the acquirer to issue part 
tender offers and can be exempted (exempt the obligation to issue a tender 
offer in China instead of exempt simply the mandatory bid) if the acquisition is 
conducted through negotiation,1163 and the securities regulatory authority 
under the State Council decides so. Moreover, tender offers are not as popular 
as negotiated acquisitions in China, and even for takeovers that trigger the 
mandatory bid threshold, it is common practice that the obligation to issue a 
tender offer is exempted.1164 In addition, the threshold of the sell-out right in 
China is different from the one in the Netherlands.1165  
Last but not least, in the second phase of takeovers, a US controlling 
shareholder can freeze-out remaining minority shareholders of a target by cash, 
normally through a long-form merger or a tender offer plus a short form 
merger (90% threhold). The Netherlands prescribes both the general 
squeeze-out and the special squeeze-out following a public offer (within 3 
months). Both proceedings follow the 95% threshold to invoke the right to file 
 
1162 The Dutch appraisal right only applies in very limited situations, as discussed in 6.2 of this chapter. 
1163 Or indirect takeovers as prescribed in Article 56 of the Takeover Measures. 
1164 See Chapter 3 section 3.4.3.  
1165 The Dutch threshold for the sell-out right is 95%. According to the 2014 CSL, when the acquirer possesses 
more than 75% shares of a Chinese listed company, or more than 90% shares of a Chinese listed company 
whose total share capital exceeds 400 million RMB, then the remaining shareholders of the target company 
are competent enough to exercise their sell-out rights. However, this provision was deleted in the revised 2020 
CSL. After 1st March 2020, shareholders should refer to regulations of the stock exchange on which the 
company is listed for guidance.  
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a claim to squeeze out minority shareholders. Besides the threshold difference 
(90% v. 95%), eliminating minority shareholders by cash is more difficult in the 
Netherlands than in the US for the reason that Article 2:325 DCC limits the 
amount of shares that can be traded by cash in a merger, in that the total joint 
amount should not be more than one-tenth of the nominal amount of the 
shares. In China, the US style of short-form mergers are not permitted since 
the CCL specifically prescribes that shareholder approval is necessary for 
mergers (netheir the Dutch style squeeze out). A merger’s consideration can 
be cash, securities or a combination of both in China.1166 When an acquirer 
intends to delist the target through a full offer or fails to receive a CSRC 
exemption from the mandatory bid rule, then the consideration should be in 
cash or at least a cash option should be provided if the consideration is any 
tradable securities.1167 
Judicial protection of minority shareholders in takeovers 
Comparatively speaking, the American and the Dutch courts play a greater role 
in looking after minority interests in takeovers than the Chinese courts. To 
examine judicial influence, entry is the starting point. Comparing the three 
jurisdictions, minority shareholders in the US face the lowest “continuous 
ownership” entrance demands. Meanwhile, the Netherlands imposes a 
minimum shareholding or share value on the right of inquiry. In China, minority 
shareholders have to overcome both shareholding and timing obstacles to 
exercise the right to a derivative action. Statistics have shown that most 
shareholders on the Chinese securities market, especially individual minority 
shareholders, fail to overcome the 1% shareholding and 180-consecutive-day                                                                                                 
requirements.1168                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
To lower the cost of judicial remedy, both the US and the Netherlands have 
confirmed the “company pay” rule. In the US, class actions are very popular for 
shareholder litigation. Minority shareholders in the same “class” do not need 
to go through the turmoil of a trial personally, in order to make their voice 
heard; instead, they are entitled to the same protection, once their peers 
succeed in the legal proceeding. The “contingent fee” is another factor that 
 
1166 When the securities provided as consideration are unlisted, then a cash option should also be provided to 
the target’s shareholders; when providing cash consideration, a deposit of at least 20% of the total                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
price is required. See: Article 36, the Takeover Measures. 
1167 Article 27, Takeover Measures. 
1168 See Chapter 3 section 3.4.3 
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motivates US lawyers to pursue minority shareholder litigations. Though the 
Netherlands does not prescribe the class action, an alternative has been 
provided, i.e. a settlement agreement can be reached between a foundation or 
association and the company, and this agreement can be declared by the court 
to be binding for the entire class of minority shareholders. In China, Litigation 
Costs Measures stipulate that the loser takes on the burden of litigation costs, 
albeit the plaintiff has to pay his or her own lawyer’s fee and the cost of court 
enforcement. The CCL Provisions IV in 2017 affirmed that if the court partly or 
fully supports the plaintiff’s claims, the company should pay all reasonable 
costs of the derivative action. This provision does not change the fact, however, 
that shareholders still have to pay expenses first, in order to bring a derivative 
action. However, the country does innovatively assign a semi-governmental 
institution, the Investor Service Center, as the representative of minority 
shareholders, in order to exercise shareholder rights, including the right to 
bring a derivative action. The ISC is in charge of the lawyers’ fees if it decides to 
bring an action on behalf of minority shareholders. After the revised 2020 CSL 
coming into force on 1st March 2020, the ISC, if it is a shareholder of the 
company, can directly bring a derivative action without restrictions of the 1% 
shareholding and the 180 consecutive days. Besides, for private securities 
litigation, with 50 or more shareholders’ authorizations, the ISC can act as a 
litigation representative and the result will be valid for registered shareholders. 
In addition to litigation cost, the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Dutch 
Enterprise Chamber are both highly specialised in commercial cases, and 
judges are well-known for their professional knowledge in resolving business 
and financial disputes. Relatively, the Chinese securities market is considered a 
newborn, and Chinese judges are also rather inexperienced when it comes to 
securities cases. In this regard, it is not a surprise that Chinese courts are still 
lagging behind their US and Dutch counterparts in resolving minority 
oppression in takeovers.  
In the US, minority shareholder expropriations are regulated by the case law of 
fiduciary duties. US courts have established three judicial standards. 
Depending on the risk of minority expropriation, these three standards vary 
from being the least strict, medium, to the strictest. In specific, the business 
judgment rule, as a default rule, applies to a good faith, fully informed and 
independent board decision. The enhanced scrutiny standard targets at sale of 
control transactions in which the conflicts of interest may cause the board to 
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take unnecessary defensive measures or accept a sub-optimal bid at the 
expenses of shareholders. This standard consists of a two-pronged test of 
“reasonability” and “proportionality”, i.e. the board should prove that there is 
a reasonable ground to support the belief of an existing company threat and 
the board’s reaction to this threat is reasonable and proportional.1169 The 
board also has the obligation to negotiate the highest price available for 
shareholders in front of an inevitable or imminent sale or break-up of the 
company,1170 or in other situations confirmed by courts.1171 Meanwhile, US 
courts affirm that uncoerced, fully informed and independent shareholder 
approval has the cleansing effect in both one-step transactions and two-step 
DGCL §251(h) transactions to shift the review standard from the enhanced 
scrutiny to the business judgement rule. For freeze-out transactions with the 
controlling shareholder, US courts impose the strictest entire fairness standard 
to ensure minority shareholders are protected by fair dealing and fair price. 
Courts also confirm that if the transaction is approved by both a special 
independent committee and a majority of minority shareholders under full 
disclosure, then the business judgment rule applies no matter whether the 
transaction follows the merger or the tender offer route.   
An overview of the US experience indicates that courts act as a pendulum 
which intends to achieve a balance between the “board primacy” and 
“shareholder protection” values. (also between “controller authority” and 
“minority shareholder protection” in freeze-out transactions). In general, 
board primacy is the norm, under which US corporate law builds on the 
assumption of “good faith” directors. Shareholders are well protected by 
shareholder rights, disclosure and independent directors. Consequently, the 
court prioritises shareholder interests over the discretion of the board when 
the transaction involves a conflict of interest. US case law is not a rigid and 
static system but an evolving and enabling one which continuously attempts to 
strike a balance between the two values. Namely, when procedural protection 
is sufficiently provided, the judicial review standard may shift from the strict 
standard to the lenient standard. It is evident that legal instruments such as 
disclosure and independent directors are portrayed as a “double-edged sword”, 
in that they may monitor directors (or the controlling shareholder) in the 
 
1169 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493, A.2d 946 (Del.1985). 
1170 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506A.2d 173(Del.1986), Paramount Communications, 
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.1989). 
1171 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). 
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interests of shareholders (or minority shareholders) and may also serve as a 
shield to discharge directors (or the controlling shareholder) from strict review 
standards in certain conditions. In brief, US corporate law pursues a balanced 
system, in which the court functions as the mediator, by swinging various legal 
mechanisms to achieve equilibrium in board primacy (controller primacy) and 
shareholder protection (minority shareholder protection). 
Comparing with the US, there is not a clear division of the duty of care and the 
duty of loyalty in the Netherlands. Alternatively, DCC Art.2:8 prescribes the 
“reasonableness and fairness” principle and Art.2:9 states the “duty of a 
proper performance”. Moreover, the stakeholder model of the DCC guides 
both directors and controlling shareholders to take into account other 
stakeholders’ interests, including minority shareholders. 
When it comes to the judicial review standard, Dutch courts do not apply a 
beforehand protection of the business judgment rule as the US courts do. 
Instead, DCC Art.2:9 implies that director liability should be the general rule in 
front of mismanagement unless there is neither “serious personal blame” nor 
“negligence”. The “serious personal culpability” and “reasonable and 
competent third person” standards have enabled Dutch courts to respect the 
board’s discretion on the one hand and to incriminate director malfeasances 
on the other. In other words, the end result of the Dutch rule may not be 
substantially different from the “business judgment rule”, but it does not 
assume “innocent” directors by default.  
Taking a deeper dive into the Dutch case law, it has been found that the 
“reasonableness and fairness” principle plays a fundamental role in regulating 
takeovers. Targeting minority interests, Dutch courts established a “purpose” 
test, namely if a merger pursues no other purpose but squeezing out minority 
shareholders, this transaction may violate the reasonableness and fairness 
principle.1172 Dutch courts further clarified two elements of the principle, i.e. 
“independence” and “transparency”. In the Versatel case,1173 the court 
emphasized that a non-independent supervisory board, which was dominated 
by the controlling shareholder, would greatly harm the minority interests. And 
 
1172 Supreme Court 14 September 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA4117, JOR2007/237,( Centaurus/Versatel I), and 
Enterprise Chamber 20 December 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:BC0800, JOR2008/36(Trafalgar/Shell). 
1173 Enterprise Chamber 14 December 2005, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2005:AU8151, JOR2006. 
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the controlling shareholder has the duty to properly inform minority 
shareholders of the merger agreement.   
Under the stakeholder model, Dutch courts demonstrate a lenient attitude 
towards takeover defenses and deference to board authority. In the RNA case, 
the court justified defensive measures under three conditions, namely the 
measures are to create further consultation, necessary for the company’s 
continuity before further deliberation, and adequate and proportional. The 
Akzo Nobel case stated that the strategic response to an unsolicited takeover 
offer is within the authority of the board, governed by the stakeholder 
model.1174 The Boskalis case rejected the applicant’s request to incorporate 
the disputed takeover defense into the agenda based on that the right to put 
items on the agenda does not include corporate strategies which exclusively 
belong to the board.1175 Again, the ASMI case affirmed that company 
strategies are within the authority of the board and the board can freely 
decide to involve shareholders or not.1176 In the ABN case, the Dutch Supreme 
Court rebutted the Enterprise Chamber’s ruling, which claimed that 
shareholder approval was needed and the board was obliged to maximize the 
return of shareholders if the company was “up for sale”.1177 Instead, the Dutch 
Supreme Court held the opinion that the board should be guided by the 
interests of the whole company instead of shareholders alone.1178 In addition, 
the Enterprise Chamber confirmed in the EVC case that certain procedural 
protection, i.e. the approval of independent directors with veto right and the 
fairness report of accounting firm, has a cleansing effect in freeze-out mergers. 
The Dutch case law has shown that courts mainly rely on two powerful 
weapons to guard minority shareholders’ interests in takeovers: the 
 
1174 De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek, AkzoNobel v. Elliott: landmark case on board conduct in takeover 
situation, available at 
https://www.debrauw.com/alert/akzonobel-v-elliott-landmark-case-board-conduct-takeover-situations/. Last 
visited December 2017.  
1175 Cees de Groot, Shareholders’ Rights to Have an Item Put on the Agenda of the General Meeting, available 
at 
http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/shareholders-rights-to-have-an-item-put-on-the-agenda-of-the-general-meeti
n. Last visited December 2017. 
1176 Harm-Jan de Kluiver, Martin van Olffen, Bernard Roelvink and Berto Winters, Dutch Supreme Court Ruling 
in ASMI: no duty to mediate for supervisory boards, available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=597b5e5c-c6cd-4749-a2f5-3c0e5cfa3162. Last visited 
December 2017. 
1177 Danielle Quinn, ‘Dutch Treat: Netherlands Judiciary Only Goes Halfway Towards Adopting Delaware 
Trilogy in Takeover Context’, 41(2008), Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, pp. 1211-1249.   
1178 Ibid. 
133A_BW_Fu_stand.job
255 
 
“reasonableness and fairness” principle and the stakeholder model. Dutch 
corporate law has been known for its flexibility, and the reasonableness and 
fairness principle performs as a scale to ensure this flexibility is not abused and 
to maintain the balance of the entire system. To examine the reasonableness 
and fairness of a takeover transaction, minority shareholder oppression is one 
of the most influential elements in determining the final result. Moreover, 
Dutch corporate law was built on the stakeholder model. In takeovers, 
minority shareholders, as stakeholders who are under the most serious attack, 
should be offered the intensive care of law. It is evident that a qualified and 
capable court is indispensable for these two shelters to function in practice. 
The inquiry proceeding, under the authority of the Enterprise Chamber, has 
been considered a success for its efficiency, which, to a greater extent, can be 
attributed to the power to take broad “provisional measures”. Though the 
Dutch inquiry proceeding does not touch upon compensation and director 
liability, it still appreciably serves the interests of minority shareholders, or at 
least from two perspectives, i.e. acting as an information channel for minority 
shareholders and granting minorities the chance to have an impact on 
company policies. At the same time, Dutch courts also demonstrate deference 
to the board’s authority, as well as a lenient attitude towards takeover 
defences. On the one hand, this stance can be beneficial to minority 
shareholders if directors manage to use defence measures as a bargaining chip 
in exchange for a higher premium. On the other hand, it may damage minority 
interests if takeover defences block the monitoring of an active market of 
corporate control.  
In comparison, Chinese minority shareholders’ rewards for bringing an action 
do not seem as prominent as in the US or the Netherlands. The most 
fundamental reason for this is that there is neither a case law tradition nor a 
strong judicial system in China. Due to this inexperience, Chinese courts are 
reluctant to accept securities cases, and Chinese minority shareholders 
therefore face unpredictable results. Accordingly, it is necessary to set a 
long-term goal to enhance the independence, professionalism and the 
experience of judges in China. Furthermore, the US and the Dutch experiences 
have shown that it is possible to take care of minority interests properly, if 
corporate law can maintain a balanced system. In the US takeover context, 
shareholder-driven litigation is a powerful weapon to redress any breach of 
fiduciary duties and to safeguard minority shareholders’ interests. The 
Netherlands relies on the inquiry proceeding and ex ante legislative protection, 
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such as the mandatory bid rule and the exclusion of cash-out mergers. 
Referring to these two systems, it is rather impractical for China, at the current 
stage, to follow the US path and transform its system into a litigation-driven 
one. Rather, China may resemble the Netherlands by striking a balance 
between legislative protection and judicial protection.  
Different from both the US and the Netherlands, takeover practice on the 
Chinese market has certain visible characteristics. Particularly, trading 
suspension as a defence measure is rather popular among Chinese listed 
companies, though it not only interrupts the stability of the securities market, 
but it also causes big losses for minority shareholders. It is thus necessary for 
legislation to regulate and clarify the scope and the procedure of trading 
suspensions. Moreover, government intervention as a byproduct of the 
Chinese political system should be limited in certain urgent circumstances, and 
an announcement should be made to explain why such government 
intervention is necessary. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion and Recommendations for China 
The relationship between a listed company and its minority shareholders 
presumably depicts a win-win situation in which, on the one hand, the 
company affords to expand its business and develop further by relying on 
funds raised through the exchange market, while, on the other hand, minority 
shareholders may receive economic returns by investing in the company. 
However, this theoretical idealism easily falls apart when minority 
shareholders’ interests are ignored, and, more than often, minority 
shareholders are too weak to protect themselves. Thus, a country’s corporate 
law system should sustain such equilibrium and prevent minority shareholder 
expropriations.  
China has very distinctive corporate governance due to state ownership and 
government intervention. Guided by Chinese Communist Party policies, the 
Chinese socialist market economy is continuously dominated by state 
ownership, while different ownerships are allowed to develop side by side. 
Correspondingly, corporate governance with Chinese characteristics combines 
party leadership through state ownership of shares with the corporate 
governance of a modern company.1179 In addition to legal protection, 
semi-governmental institutions, especially the Investor Service Center, were 
designed to safeguard investors’ interests through the government’s visible 
hand. According to the idiosyncratic vision theory, the peculiar Chinese 
ownership structure is not necessarily bad for minority shareholders, if the 
controlling shareholder can practice firm leadership, show effective 
supervision and continuously push the company forward. Meanwhile, a 
corporate governance structure based on an imbalance of power implies a big 
risk of minority shareholder expropriation. This research is conducted to 
answer one central research question, namely, how could minority 
shareholder protection in Chinese listed companies be improved in comparison 
to that in the US and the Dutch systems? To answer this central question, four 
sub-research questions were raised as follows. Based on the descriptive 
 
1179《上市公司治理准则》（征求意见稿）修订说明 (Revision Statement of the Consultation Draft of the 
Chinese Corporate Governance Code), issued by the CSRC, date of issue 16th June 2018. Available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/zjhpublic/zjh/201806/P020180615655618058597.pdf. Last visited October 2018. 
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comparison of the three jurisdictions in chapter 6, the discussion below will 
provide answers from a more analytical point of view, with a focus on China. 
Sub-question 1: How are minority shareholders protected by shareholder rights 
according to the law in China, the US and the Netherlands? 
This research has found that all three countries positively recognise 
fundamental shareholder rights, such as the appointment right, the dividend 
right and the exit right. In particular, the Chinese system has granted more 
statutory rights to shareholders than the Dutch and the US systems (20 in 
China, 18 in the Netherlands and 16 in the US). To better understand this 
difference, two major factors have been identified, namely the ownership 
structure and the principal-agent power equilibrium. 
Ownership structure 
This research has shown that the US and the Dutch corporate law systems are 
based on the dispersed ownership structure, which focuses on the main 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and directors. In a dispersed 
company, shareholders’ interests normally are in alignment with one another. 
By protecting shareholders as a group, the US and the Dutch corporate laws 
also intend to protect each shareholder’s interest. However, in special 
situations such as a freeze-out, minority shareholders’ interests are in conflict 
with those of the controlling shareholder, i.e. the protection of shareholders as 
a group no longer equates to the protection of minority shareholders. 
Accordingly, both the US and the Dutch laws underline minority interests in 
these contexts. In contrast, Chinese listed companies are characterised by their 
highly concentrated ownership structure. This distinction gives rise to different 
agency problems. The concentrated ownership structure causes conflicts of 
interest between the controlling and minority shareholders. Moreover, the 
special nature of the state controller, which may cause the absence of owner 
and insider control problems, determines that the conflicts of interest may also 
exist between management and minority shareholders. These conflicts may be 
found not only in takeovers but also in normal corporate operations. Thus, 
when analysing Chinese corporate law, it is necessary to distinguish between 
the protection of shareholders as a whole and the protection of minority 
shareholders.  
The principal-agent power equilibrium  
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In the US, the Delaware General Corporate Law depicts the board of directors 
as the governing body of a company and underlines the value of “managerial 
authority”. 
The board of directors is entitled to very broad discretion and power in a 
US-listed company. On the contrary, the DGCL does not grant much power to 
the general meeting of shareholders.1180 To ensure balanced power between 
the principal and the agent, Delaware corporate law encourages shareholders 
to hold directors accountable through litigation and fiduciary duties; in other 
words, directors should fulfill their fiduciary duties and make the best decisions 
in the interests of shareholders.  
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Civil Code accords the governing power to the 
board of directors while bestowing the general meeting with certain 
fundamental rights. In alignment with EU Directives, the DCC prescribes various 
rights with a threshold to broaden shareholder participation, as well as specific 
protection for minority shareholders in takeover transactions. Compared with 
the DGCL, the DCC stipulates more shareholder rights, whereby a Dutch listed 
company’s general meeting has more powers than its counterpart in the US. To 
strike a balance, Dutch corporate law demands the board of directors consider 
the interests of the company as a whole, namely the interests of shareholders 
and other stakeholders. Guided by the stakeholder model and the equal 
treatment principle, the board of directors has the obligation to protect 
minority shareholders.  
In China, the Chinese Company Law portrays the general meeting as a 
governing body with extensive powers. Opposite to the US and the 
Netherlands, the Chinese general meeting is more powerful than the board of 
directors, and in some circumstances, the “absence of owner” phenomenon 
turns a powerful general meeting into a powerful board, which exacerbates 
the “insider control” problem. In other circumstances, the board of directors 
functions as an extended hand of the controlling shareholder, who in turn 
dominates the general meeting. This affiliation further enlarges the power 
discrepancy between the company controller/management and minority 
shareholders in China. 
 
1180 Besides state corporate law, such as the DGCL, shareholder protection in the US is also achieved through 
federal securities regulations. For instance, the right to proposal is prescribed on the federal level, not in the 
DGCL. 
135B_BW_Fu_stand.job
260 
 
To reduce this conflict, the CCL adopts the “stakeholder model”, which guides 
the board to also consider other stakeholders’ interests. Under the 
concentrated ownership structure, minority shareholders are considered one 
group of stakeholders. As such, the board of directors should also take care of 
minority interests; however, the stakeholder definition covers not only 
minority shareholders but also other stakeholders, such as employees. Namely, 
company decisions should go beyond commercial interests to look after 
employees, fulfill social responsibilities and so on. The stakeholder model may 
make sense for minority shareholder protection in non-state-owned listed 
companies, but it would probably lose its charm in state-owned listed 
companies. If the state misuses the company resources to raise employment 
rates, develop other industries or save other SOEs from bankruptcy, this 
pursuit of political interests, despite the risk to violating minority shareholders’ 
economic interests, still find its justification under the stakeholder model. 
Therefore, there is little evidence to prove that the stakeholder model alone is 
the panacea for minority shareholder expropriations in China. 
In addition to the stakeholder model, Chinese legislation attempts to 
compensate minority shareholders’ fragile position with multiple shareholder 
rights. Besides the “shareholder primacy”, this is another reason why Chinese 
legislation stipulates more shareholder rights than the DGCL and the DCC. 
However, it is still questionable whether these shareholder rights in the books 
add up to proper protection for minority shareholders in reality. This research 
has found that many of these legislative shareholder rights, (e.g., the right to 
dividend and the right to question management and supervisors) are exercised 
through the general meeting, which may serve the convenience of the 
controller rather than minority shareholders. Different from the general 
meeting, the powers of which are confirmed by the CCL, instruments designed 
to safeguard minority interests, such as online voting and the separate 
vote-counting rule, are either prescribed merely in lower regulatory 
documents or on a voluntary basis. For those minority rights that have been 
formally recognised in the CCL, problems still exist in that some provisions 
continue to be still controversial (e.g., high thresholds, partial mandatory bid 
and the guarantee precondition), and also the CCL does not take any further 
steps to supply relevant ancillaries for effective implementation, such as 
appointing the court to decide the appraisal price.  
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Sub-question 2: How are minority shareholders protected by monitoring 
mechanisms, focusing on disclosure and independence, in China, the US and the 
Netherlands? 
Relating to the first sub-research question, examinations of the US and the 
Netherlands have demonstrated that disclosure and independence, as 
monitoring mechanisms, intend to balance the power between shareholders 
and management. The Chinese system also prescribes detailed disclosure rules 
as well as a supervisory board and independent directors, yet implementation 
still faces various challenges.  
Disclosure  
In the US, federal disclosure rules protect shareholders by imposing strict 
disclosure obligations in order to limit broad directorial powers granted by 
state corporate law. This disclosure equilibrium has also been found in the 
Netherlands, for example, the management board is the governing body that 
has the power to draft the annual accounts. Considering that the annual report 
is closely related to shareholders’ interests, Dutch law restricts the directorial 
power in this case by giving adoption power to the general meeting and 
cancelling the automatic discharge of directors (also supervisors). Additionally, 
both the US and the Dutch regulatory authorities, respectively the 
U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission and the Dutch Authority for the 
Financial Markets, vigilantly govern the securities markets. The US and Dutch 
courts also play an important role in the clarification, interpretation and 
modernisation of disclosure rules. 
Different (in principle) from the shareholder-management conflict in the US 
and the Netherlands, Chinese listed companies have to deal with 
controlling-minority conflicts. If the controlling shareholder attempts to 
withhold or misuse information, or if the controlling shareholder fails to 
monitor the board breaching the disclosure duty, in both situations minority 
shareholders will be the victims. Comparatively, the Chinese securities market 
and the court, currently, are rather immature and cannot afford minority 
shareholders the same level of protection as their US or Dutch counterparts.  
To change this status quo, adding more disclosure rules may not solve the 
problem, and it may even worsen the “information overload” phenomenon, 
which has been reported in both China and the US. In this regard, efforts 
should concentrate on enhancing disclosure monitoring. The 2018 revision of 
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the Chinese Corporate Governance Code underlined the importance of the 
audit committee by upgrading it to a mandatory requirement. Though the new 
provisions1181 clarify its scope of obligations, the audit committee merely has 
the right to propose but not decide on the appointment and dismissal of 
external audit firms, and its proposals are submitted to the board of directors 
for decisions. Research has found that the more powerful management is, the 
less effective the audit committee is.1182 The audit committee consists of a 
majority of independent directors, yet it remains unclear whether the existing 
legislative design is sufficient to ensure independence from management and 
the controlling shareholder. Besides, the accounting system should also be 
improved to achieve the unified implementation of accounting rules and to 
enhance the credibility of intermediate agencies, such as accounting firms and 
law firms.1183  
In addition, the “secretary of the board of directors”, as a special design to 
connect various company organs, communicate with diverse interest groups 
and have wide access to company information, may serve as a bridge to relieve 
the information asymmetry between the board and minority shareholders. 
Shareholders’ right to know can be traced back to the first version of Chinese 
Company Law in 1993. But how to exercise this right to inspect company 
documents has been rather unclear in practice. The 2018 revision of the CCGC 
added Article 28 to specify the board secretary’s obligations, which include the 
preparation and reservation of company documents and investor coordination. 
The 2017 CCL Provisions IV confirmed that shareholders have the right to seek 
compensation from responsible directors and senior management for the 
failure of the right to know.1184 By making the secretary (also directors and 
managers)1185 accountable to minority shareholders, the vulnerability of 
minorities in disclosure may be avoided to a certain extent. Last, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission should play a more active role in the 
 
1181 The revised 2018 CCGC emphasises the role of the audit committee through Articles 38 and 39.  
1182 Liu Yan and Yao Haixin, ‘高管权力，审计委员会专业性与内部控制缺陷(Chief Executive Power, 
Professional Competence of Audit Committee and Internal Control Weakness)’, 17 (2014) 南开管理评论
(Nankai Business Review), pp. 4-12. 
1183 The revised 2018 CCGC underlines the role of intermediate agencies through Article 81, which states that 
intermediate agencies should actively monitor the corporate governance of the company and promote better 
corporate governance. 
1184 Articles 7 and 12, CCL Provisions IV.  
1185 According to Article 12 of the CCL Provisions IV, directors or senior managers who fail their obligations to 
prepare or reserve documents prescribed in Article 33 and 97 and caused damages to shareholders, 
shareholders are entitled to bring an action against these directors or managers for compensation. 
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securities market through its rule-making and sanction powers. Taking into 
account the dominance of the state controller on the Chinese securities market, 
the CSRC should equally regulate state-owned and non-state-owned listed 
companies and be transparent about its decisions and the reasons behind 
them. The newly revised 2020 CSL added Article 199 to impose sanctions on 
illegal vote solicitations; raised the sanctions against controlling shareholders, 
directors, supervisors or managers for breach of disclosure duties in Article 197; 
and also affirmed sanctions against intermediate agents, such as auditing and 
law firms in Article 213. The CSRC should effectively enforce these provisions 
to have a deterrent effect on non-compliance, especially higher sanctions 
against individuals and intermediate agents. 
Independence   
In the US and the Netherlands, independent directors or supervisors, with the 
main task of monitoring management, are another mechanism to level the 
principal-agent power. The case law also affirms the value of independent 
approval.  
In China, the mixed structure of independent directors and supervisors 
confuses their respective roles, represented by the overlapping1186 vs. 
supplementary1187 debate. Generally speaking, academic opinion on the 
coexistence of the supervisory board and the independent director system can 
be divided into the “opponent” and “proponent” groups.1188 The opponent 
group asserts that the overlapping of supervisors and independent directors 
not only causes confusion and imposes an extra cost but also reduces 
monitoring effects. Moreover, in 2003, some scholars proposed abolishing the 
supervisory board or leaving it to company discretion.1189 On the contrary, the 
proponent group claims that the supervisory board is necessary for Chinese 
 
1186 Yan Xuefeng, ‘监事会制度生死之辩 (Dispute on the Dead or Alive of the Supervisory Board)’, 11 (2012) 
董事会 (Directors& Boards), pp. 52-55. 
1187 Shen Sibao and Jia Jing, ‘Will the Independent Director Institution Work in China?’, 27 (2005) Loyola of Los 
Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, pp. 223-248. 
1188 Xi Chao, ‘In Search of an Effective Monitoring Board Model: Board Reforms and the Political Economy of 
Corporate Law in China’, 22 (2006) Connecticut Journal of International Law, pp. 1-46. 
1189 Supra. 1186. 
The “rejection” opinion finds its support in the experience of Japan, which abolished its supervisory board 
system in the 2002 reform. For more details, please refer to Wang Peng, ‘The Effectiveness and Independence 
of Supervisory Board: Evidence from China 2000-2009’, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2223990. Last visited February 2019. 
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listed companies,1190 in that supervisors and independent directors 
supplement each other, and the only thing required is to further improve the 
system.1191 Referring to the Dutch debate on the one-tier and two-tier 
structures, non-executive directors reportedly enjoy an informational 
advantage in terms of content and timing aspects, and they are directly 
involved in decision-making. Meanwhile, supervisors are more independent 
than non-executive directors. In other words, the Dutch experience illustrates 
that both structures (i.e., non-executive directors and supervisors) have their 
own advantages.  
Recognising the above findings, the “supplementary” argument seems more 
reasonable. It is important to understand that the supervisory board and the 
independent director system, respectively, serve different functions within a 
Chinese listed company, and they can compensate for each other’s 
weaknesses.1192 In China, part of the independent directors’ role is to act as 
minority shareholders’ “guardian”, and the independence standard clearly 
distances itself from the controlling shareholder.1193 This is very different from 
the statutory definition of independent directors in the US, which largely 
targets management.1194 To a certain extent, the focus of the US independent 
director system is comparable to that of the Chinese supervisory board, which 
seeks to oversee its executives. Meanwhile, one of the key rationales behind 
the Chinese independent director system emphasises the protection of 
minority shareholders.1195 Accordingly, it is important for Chinese legislation 
to specify the division of tasks between the supervisory board and 
independent directors so that “overlapping” can be avoided and the 
“supplementary” relationship between supervisors and independent directors 
optimised. 
 
1190 Supra. 1186. 
1191 Supra. 1187. 
1192 It has been claimed that the supervisory board has a postmortem characteristic, in that supervision starts 
after actions have been finished. Meanwhile, independent directors’ monitoring functions during the 
decision-making process. Furthermore, supervisors are external to company operators, namely directors and 
managers. While independent directors sit on the board, they are closer to insider information. For more 
details, please refer to Shen Sibao and Jia Jing, ‘Will the Independent Director Institution Work in China?’, 27 
(2005) Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, pp. 223-248. 
1193 See paragraph 3.3.2.1  
1194 Zhou Ling, ‘The Independent Director System and its Legal Transplant into China’, 6 (2011-2012) Journal of 
Comparative Law, pp. 262-291. 
1195 Ibid. and supra. 1187. 
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After confirming independent directors’ role as minority shareholder guardians, 
they should be held accountable to the principal. Considering the 
controlling-minority conflicts, this promise seems rather empty given that the 
general meeting appoints independent directors. Although qualified minority 
shareholders have the right to nominate some independent directors, the 
Independent Director Opinion still chooses to leave the final say to the general 
meeting, which may, in fact, deprive minority shareholders of any real chance 
to appoint their own representatives. 
To alleviate this complete dependence on the company controller, one option 
is to hold some of the independent directors truly accountable to minority 
shareholders.1196 Specifically, this research has pinpointed four aspects that 
may be relevant in ensuring the effective functioning of the independent 
director system. First, minority independent directors (i.e., independent 
directors appointed by minority shareholders) may become possible either by 
upgrading existing minority nomination right to an appointment right, or 
combining the nomination right with the cumulative voting. Minority 
independent directors can guarantee that there will be independent directors 
who represent minority interests, and they may also prevent arbitrary 
rejections made by the controlling shareholder. To prevent minority 
expropriations, these minority independent directors may have certain 
approval powers that mainly focus on monitoring executive directors and 
conflict of interest transactions.1197 Additionally, legislation may consider 
granting minority shareholders the right to a private cause of action in order to 
remove unqualified independent directors.1198 Currently, the Chinese 
Company Law only has one article stating that a listed company should have 
independent directors. The rest of the independent director system is 
stipulated by regulatory documents, the lower legal effect of which may 
devalue the practical impact. Hence, some thought should be given to 
establishing a comprehensive independent director system on the level of 
national law.  
Second, the Equity Incentive Plans permits a listed company to award shares to 
its supervisors but not to independent directors. Under the hypothesis of 
 
1196 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, ‘Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders’, 165 (2017) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 1271-1315. 
1197 Minority independent directors’ powers should be limited to minority-related issues, to avoid excessive 
interference in the governing of the company. See: ibid. 
1198 Supra. 1187. 
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minority independent directors, share rewards may be regarded as an 
instrument to bundle minority interests with the interests of independent 
directors. Reasonably, these share rewards should be limited to a small 
proportion; otherwise, they would have the opposite effect of aligning 
independent directors with the company controller. In the Netherlands, share 
rewards for supervisors or non-executive directors are generally prohibited. 
However, supervisors or non-executive directors’ share ownership is eligible as 
long as it constitutes a long-term investment. Thus, the “long-term” element 
may be another variable that stimulates minority independent directors’ 
monitoring if small share rewards are allowed.  
Third, the China Securities Regulatory Commission may assist in temporarily 
filling the case law vacuum on the independence issue. In the US, besides the 
independence definition established by listing rules, courts play an important 
role in developing this concept on a case-by-case basis. Courts examine not 
only whether independent directors have faithfully fulfilled the task but also 
whether independent directors are indeed independent from the company. In 
contrast to the US, China does not have this case law tradition. Alternatively, 
the Independent Director Opinion, issued by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, confirms that the CSRC has the power to examine the 
qualifications of independent directors.  
Fourth, Chinese legislation has underlined the value of cooperation between 
the secretary of the board of directors and independent directors.1199 The 
board secretary has wide access to company information and is in charge of 
many disclosure issues. By aligning the board secretary with independent 
directors, the provision aims to enhance the latter’s right to know and to 
ensure they receive equal information as executive directors. Research 
highlights that cooperation between the supervisory board and other 
supervision mechanisms is beneficial to internal supervision.1200 Similarly, in 
the Dutch one-tier and two-tier debate, scholars have argued that the 
“interaction of members”1201 may provide internally-driven initiatives,1202 
 
1199 Public Shareholder Provision. 
1200 Tian Xiangang, ‘Analysis of the Functions of Supervisory Board System in Modern Chinese Companies’, 51 
(2009) International Journal of Law and Management, pp. 153-168. 
1201 Jaap Winter and Erik van de Loo, ‘Board on Task Towards a Comprehensive Understanding of Board 
Performance’, in Massimo Belcredi and Guido Ferrarini (eds.), Boards and Shareholders in European Listed 
Companies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2013), pp. 225-250.  
1202 Pieter-Jan Bezemer, Stefan Peij, Laura de Kruijs and Gregory Maassen, ‘How Two-Tier Boards Can Be More 
Effective’, 14(2014) Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, pp. 15-31. 
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which are crucial for increasing board efficiency. Accordingly, it is proposed to 
encourage cooperation between independent directors and supervisors. 
Cooperation among the secretary, independent directors, and the supervisory 
board may reduce information asymmetry both within the board of directors 
and between the two boards. If this three-party cooperation could be achieved, 
it may strengthen the supervision of Chinese listed companies and benefit 
minority shareholders. 
Sub-question 3: How are minority shareholders protected in takeovers, 
especially by courts, in China, the US and the Netherlands? 
Generally speaking, the conflicts of interest between the company controller 
and minority shareholders are severe in takeover transactions. Although all 
three countries provide special protection to minority shareholders in 
takeovers, such as the mandatory bid rule and the appraisal right, this research 
has found that the Chinese version of these rules are still problematic, and the 
biggest distinction between China and the other two countries lies at the level 
of the judicial protection.  
US courts constantly weigh up the options between the two core values of 
director primacy and shareholder protection, relying on the two weapons of 
fiduciary duty and the shareholder model. The first endeavour can be found in 
the business judgment rule. For a standard transaction, which involves neither 
sale of control nor self-dealing, courts apply the business judgment rule, with 
deference to directorial authority. Meanwhile, courts’ rulings consistently hold 
directors accountable for the singular goal of shareholder welfare.1203 The 
second endeavour lies in the rebuttal of the business judgment rule. For a sale 
of control transaction, in which the board’s interest may conflict with 
shareholders’ interests, courts apply a stricter enhanced scrutiny standard. For 
a self-dealing transaction, courts apply the strictest entire fairness standard to 
protect minority interests. The third endeavour points to the shift of judicial 
review standard. If sufficient procedural protection has been provided to 
mimic an at-arm’s-length transaction, courts shift the review standard from 
entire fairness to the business judgment rule. Besides, courts actively partake 
in implementing the appraisal right.  
 
1203 Leo E. Strine, Jr., ‘The Danger of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and 
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporate Law’, 50 (2015) Wake Forest Law 
Review, pp. 761-803. 
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Correspondingly, the Enterprise Chamber has great value in levelling out 
minority interests with other interests in the Dutch system. One of its most 
prominent weapons is the extensive power to take provisional measures, such 
as to suspend or nullify a resolution, and to suspend, dismiss or even appoint 
directors or supervisors. Through these provisional measures, the Enterprise 
Chamber can protect shareholders from danger by correcting any 
mismanagement. Moreover, Dutch courts actively apply the reasonableness 
and fairness principle to redress minority oppression in takeovers. Grounded 
on the stakeholder model, they show a lenient attitude towards takeover 
defence and deferring to board authority. This stance seems to imply the 
courts’ intention to discourage the cultivation of a super-controlling 
shareholder or active major shareholders.  
In comparison, Chinese courts are in the initial stages of resolving highly 
complex commercial cases. Hardly any fiduciary duty cases are raised by 
shareholders of listed companies. To address this problem, the newly revised 
2020 Chinese Securities Law has adopted some litigation-friendly rules to 
motivate shareholder litigation. In the direction also been proposed in this 
research, the Chinese “representative action” is established and the ISC is 
endowed with the right to bring derivative actions (the ISC will also provide 
support for shareholder litigation in general). For these rules to make a 
difference in practice, the key question is whether the ISC or other qualified 
minority shareholders will take an active role in leveraging the judicial 
remedies to redress minority expropriations and whether Chinese courts will 
be more involved in reviewing securities cases. In addition, the lack of clear 
judicial review standards is another reason behind the ineffective judicial 
protection in Chinese takeovers. An example can be found in the US courts, 
which require both approval of independent directors and approval of a 
majority of minority shareholders to shift the review standard from the entire 
fairness to the business judgment rule in self-dealing cases. These “double 
approval” procedures are not unheard of in China. In fact, Article 5 of the 
Independent Director Opinion states that material related-party transactions 
should be recognised by independent directors before they can be sent to the 
board of directors for discussion. Article 1 of the Public Shareholder Provision 
prescribes that major issues should be approved not only by the general 
meeting but also by a majority of public shareholders. For self-dealing 
transactions, which cause a direct conflict of interest between the controlling 
and minority shareholders, it would be helpful if a clear judicial review 
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standard could be written into the law by combining the above two articles. 
Subsequently, Chinese courts should gradually improve judges’ capability, thus 
opening the gates to more securities cases. Chinese Courts should also take 
advantage of the very recent innovation of using standard adjudications to 
guide securities group actions, to enrich their experience in handling mass 
litigation.  
Sub-question 4: What can China learn from the US and the Netherlands to 
improve minority shareholder protection in Chinese listed companies?  
By analysing the above three sub-questions, this research has found that 
minority shareholder protection is a common goal in all three corporate law 
systems. In the US and the Dutch systems, shareholders are protected by an 
efficient securities market that underlines high-quality disclosure under the 
supervision of the SEC/AFM. Moreover, both systems strive for “checks and 
balances” through two key intermediaries, namely courts and the board of 
directors. By designating the board of directors as the governing body, and 
together with the coordination of the court, both systems attempt to sustain a 
balance between the agent and the principal. The task of corporate law is to 
maintain this equilibrium. In comparison, the main concern in China is how to 
establish a balanced system by transforming protection in the books into 
protection in action. Learning from US and the Dutch experiences, minority 
shareholder protection in China should focus on implementation to address 
three main areas: market supervision, judicial supervision and the internal 
supervision within a listed company. Regarding the first two areas, what China 
can learn from the other two countries has been answered in above three 
sub-research questions. Certainly, a mature and efficient securities market and 
judicial system cannot be built in the short term, and scholarly opinions, such 
as the legal origin and the path dependence theories, to a certain extent 
recognise that the transformation from a traditional Chinese court system to 
an active and efficient one as well as the formation of a more developed 
securities market will be costly and time-consuming. Before achieving the 
long-term goal of effective judicial supervision and market supervision, 
another option would be to strengthen the internal checks and balances of a 
Chinese listed company. The analysis below will focus on how to strengthen 
supervision inside a company.  
In the US, directors serve as an intermediary to compensate for weak 
shareholder power in the books with pro-shareholder decisions in action, while 
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in the Netherlands, directors serve as an intermediary to neutralise 
shareholder power in the books with pro-stakeholder decisions in action. Thus, 
a direct answer drawn from the US and the Dutch experiences will be that the 
board of directors is the solution to internal checks and balances. 
When exploring this “board solution” in the Chinese context, several 
fundamental differences are worthy of analysis. Different from the dispersed 
ownership structure, the highly concentrated ownership structure in China 
generates controlling-minority conflicts. Different from director primacy, the 
general meeting is the governing body of a Chinese listed company. The 
controlling shareholder, however, may effortlessly dominate any directorial 
appointments, so it is unrealistic to expect a controller-dominated board to 
safeguard minority interests by acting against the controlling shareholder. If 
the controlling shareholder fails to supervise management, insiders may usurp 
power to exploit minority shareholders rather than to protect them.  
Besides the “board solution”, “shareholder activism” is a phenomenon in both 
the US and the Dutch markets. Traditionally speaking, both the US and the 
Dutch laws have taken a somewhat cautious attitude to shareholder activism, 
and academics hold mixed views on the issue. However, recent scholarly 
opinion proposes distinguishing “good activists” from “bad activists”.1204 The 
debut in 2017 of the Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance,1205 the 
amendment of the Shareholder Rights Directive in 2017,1206 the revision of the 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code in 20161207 and the promulgation of the 
Dutch Stewardship Code in 20181208 have demonstrated a positive attitude 
towards shareholder engagement in corporate governance. In other words, 
another alternative can be to establish the checks and balances through the 
“principal solution”.  
Applying the “principal solution” in China involves the “controller solution” and 
the “qualified minority shareholder solution”. Concerning the “controller 
solution”, discussions in Chapter 2 acknowledge both the advantages and the 
 
1204 Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes’, 41 (2018) Seattle 
University Law Review, pp. 497-524. 
1205 Available at https://www.isgframework.org/corporate-governance-principles/. Last visited February 2019. 
1206 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017L0828. Last visited February 
2019. 
1207 Available at http://www.mccg.nl/?page=3779. Last visited February 2019. 
1208 Available at 
https://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/best-practices/2018-07-dutch-stewardship-code-fina
l-version.pdf. last visited February 2019. 
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disadvantages of the concentrated ownership structure. According to the 
optimal reward theory, the controlling shareholder is positively related to the 
better monitoring of management, which reduces the principal-agent cost and 
increases company efficiency. As a result, minority shareholders also benefit 
from this enhanced corporate governance.1209 Hypothetically, this controller 
advantage is possible in non-state-owned and state-owned listed companies 
with good corporate governance. However, some Chinese state-owned listed 
companies fail to match the ideal theoretical scenario, due to the “absence of 
owner” and “insider control” problems. To address this, the state controlling 
shareholder, in order to be fully present and to monitor management actively, 
should mandate its representatives and the party organisation in every 
state-owned listed company to behave like private investors. Despite obvious 
political connections, the state controller and the party organisation should 
keep a closer eye on former government officials acting as directors or 
managers of a state-owned listed company so that the insider control problem 
can be avoided.  
The “qualified minority shareholder” solution, whereby minority shareholders 
are protected through qualified minority shareholders, may supplement the 
controller’s supervision of management and also oversee the self-supervision 
of the controlling shareholder in both state-owned and non-state-owned listed 
companies. As presented in Chapter 2, numerous research studies have 
pointed to the alignment of multiple, relatively “big” minority shareholders as 
a legal strategy to form a considerable force in counteracting the controlling 
shareholder, so that internal “checks and balances” may become possible. 
Particularly, it has been claimed that qualified minority shareholders may 
conquer the notorious “rational apathy” and “collective action” problems and 
effectuate minority shareholder monitoring.1210 
There are two main reasons why the “qualified minority shareholder” solution 
may address the minority issue of Chinese listed companies. First, the 
affiliation between the board and the superpowerful controlling shareholder, 
or the “absence of owner” problem, inflicts great obstacles on a balanced 
corporate governance system, and the appearance of qualified minority 
 
1209 See Chapter 2 of this research.  
1210 Edward B. Rock, ‘The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism’, 79 (1990) 
Georgetown Law Journal, pp. 445-506.  
Julian Velasco, ‘Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously’, 41 (2007) U.C. Davis Law Review, pp. 605-682. 
Julian Velasco, ‘The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholders’, 40 (2006) U.C. Davis Law Review, pp. 407-468. 
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shareholders may force a change to this status quo. Specifically, research 
claims that neither the board of directors nor the supervisory board is effective 
in counterbalancing the controlling shareholder.1211 The immature 
institutional environment and the underdeveloped financial market have 
prevented monitoring mechanisms from making a real difference in Chinese 
listed companies.1212 It has been found that internal mechanisms may be more 
important than external mechanisms in impeding minority expropriations,1213 
and shareholders’ incentives may play a bigger role than governance 
mechanisms in monitoring.1214 In comparison with retail minority shareholders, 
qualified minority shareholders may have both the competence and the 
incentive to participate actively in the governance of a Chinese listed company.  
Second, the negative effects of the “qualified minority shareholder” solution 
may be restricted in China. The two biggest concerns of shareholder activism 
are short-termism1215 and the conflicts of interest between qualified minority 
shareholders and other retail minority shareholders.1216 Several parties can 
play the qualified minority shareholder role in China, such as foreign strategic 
investors, institutional investors1217 and the Investor Service Center. Chinese 
regulations on “strategic investors” demand that foreign shareholders should 
hold A shares of a Chinese listed company for at least 3 years (the latest 
Amendment Consultation Draft propose to change it to 12 months).1218 
 
1211 Victor Zitian Chen, Jing Li and Daniel M. Shapiro, ‘Are OECD-Prescribed “Good Corporate Practices” Really 
Good in An Emerging Economy?’, 28 (2011) Asia Pacific Journal of Management, pp. 115-138. 
1212 Jiwei Wang, ‘A Comparison of Shareholder Identity and Governance Mechanisms in the Monitoring of 
CEOs of Listed Companies in China’, 21 (2010) China Economic Review, pp. 24-37. 
1213 Nancy Huyghebaert and Lihong Wang, ‘Expropriation of Minority Investors in Chinese Listed Firms: The 
Role of Internal and External Corporate Governance Mechanisms’, 20 (2012) Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, pp. 308-332. 
1214 Supra. 1211. 
1215 John C. Coffee, Jr. and Darius Palia, ‘The Wolf At The Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on 
Corporate Governance’, 41 (2016) Journal of Corporation Law, pp. 545-608. 
Xin Tang, ‘Protecting Minority Shareholders in China: A Task For Both Legislation and Enforcement’, in Hideki 
Kanda, Kon-Sik Kim and Curtis Milhaupt (eds.), Transforming Corporate Governance in East Asia (London: 
Taylor & Francis Books, 2008), pp. 141-167. 
1216 Bernard S. Black, ‘Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice’, 39 (1992) UCLA 
Law Review, pp. 811-893. 
1217 The revised 2018 CCGC emphasised the positive role of institutional investors by adding Chapter 7 (Article 
78-80) to encourage institutional investors to participate actively in corporate governance. 
1218 Article 5 originally set a minimum requirement of three years. But the latest Consultation Draft of the 
Amendment of Measures for the Administration of Strategy Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign 
Investors, issued on 30th July 2018 changed it to 12 months. See: 外国投资者对上市公司战略投资管理办法
(Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors), Ministry of 
Commerce, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Taxation, State Administration for 
Industry & Commerce, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, date of issue December 31st 2005. 
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Chinese regulations also require the ISC to consistently hold 100 A shares in 
most Chinese listed companies. If a qualified minority shareholder of a Chinese 
listed company is a foreign strategic investor or the ISC, then the provision 
overcomes short-termism and turns it into a mid- or a long-term 
shareholder.1219 In state-owned listed companies, qualified minority 
shareholders, such as foreign strategic investors and institutional investors, 
and retail minority shareholders may share the same interest in pursuing 
economic returns and fighting against insider control and tunnelling.1220 In 
non-state-owned listed companies, qualified minority shareholders, such as 
the ISC and retail minority shareholders, may share the responsibility of 
supervising the controlling shareholder to prevent minority shareholder 
expropriations.  
The recent development of the ISC seems to match best with the profile of 
qualified minority shareholders.1221 The ISC fits the long-term requirement, 
because its shares are not for sale in general. Besides, the ISC is an innovation 
“tailor-made” for minority shareholders by the Chinese government, 
particularly for retail minority shareholders. Though the state-affiliated ISC 
project is still at a very initial stage, the ISC can be further promoted to truly 
represent minority shareholders in exercising their rights, monitoring 
management and seeking compensation through judicial remedies.  
In parallel, recent SOE reform calls for a mixed ownership structure that 
encourages the joint governing of both the state and private shareholders in 
Chinese listed companies. With the further development and privatisation of 
Chinese listed companies, private qualified minority shareholders, such as 
foreign strategic investors and institutional investors, might own a bigger 
shareholding and gradually engage in sustaining the internal checks and 
 
1219 It has been found that Western jurisdictions also encourage long-term shareholders by granting them 
preferential treatment. See: Andrea Sacco Ginevri, ‘The Rise of Long-Term Minority Shareholders’ Rights in 
Publicly Held Corporations and Its Effect on Corporate Governance’, 12 (2011) European Business Organization 
Law Review, pp. 587-618. 
1220 Research has found that qualified foreign insititutional investors imposed better monitoring on Chinese 
state-owned companies during the split-share reform, thanks to the absence of political pressure. See: Huang 
Wei and Zhu Tao, ‘Foreign Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: Evidence of 
A Split-share Structure Reform in China’, 32(2015) Journal of Corporate Finance, pp. 312-326.  
1221 Currently, foreign strategic investors and institutional investors jointly only occupy a small portion of the 
Chinese market. Moreover, the peculiar party state economic system may further increase difficulties in the 
governance of foreign strategic investors and institutional investors in China. In comparison, the ISC, as a 
non-profit company designed by the Chinese government particularly to serve minority shareholders, has a 
better chance of having an impact in practice. See: Tamar Groswald Ozery, ‘Minority Public Shareholders in 
China’s Concentrated Capital Markets-A New Paradigm’, 30 (2016) Columbia Journal of Asian Law, pp. 1-50. 
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balances of Chinese listed companies in the future. Existing empirical research 
demonstrates mixed results in terms of institutional investors’ impact on 
Chinese listed companies. Proponents hold the opinion that the coalition of 
institutional investors may substantially empower small and medium 
shareholders and allow minority shareholders to participate in governing the 
company,1222 while the other side of the coin claims that institutional investors 
may collude with the controlling shareholder.1223 Neither the ISC nor private 
qualified minority shareholders are perfect, thus it is necessary to encourage 
the growth of both so that they can compensate for each other and create 
better supervision. For the “qualified minority shareholder” solution to work in 
China, it is also important for Chinese law to prescribe explicitly certain 
participation-friendly instruments, such as cumulative voting, separate 
vote-counting rule and minority independent directors.1224 
On the basis of the previous four sub-questions, this research will conclude by 
returning to the central research question: How could minority shareholder 
protection in Chinese listed companies be improved in comparison to that in the 
US and the Dutch systems? 
To answer the central question, this research has analysed the Chinese context 
and highlighted three key obstacles to minority shareholder protection in listed 
companies. (1) the lack of independence and strong powers of independent 
directors reduces the essential protection that Chinese minority shareholders 
could receive; (2) without sufficient internal supervision, the imbalanced 
corporate governance of a super-controller with a powerful management team 
is easily formed within Chinese listed companies; and (3) the immature 
 
1222 Lu Tong and Yu Baoliang, ‘格力电器中小股东何以胜出-加强机构投资者参与公司治理的意愿和能力 
(How Could the Small-and-Medium Shareholders of Gree Electric Win-Enhancing the Willingness and the 
Capacity of Institutional Investors to Participate in the Corporate Governance)’, 7 (2012) 资本市场 (Capital 
Markets), pp. 116-119. 
Li Wei’an and Li Bin, ‘机构投资者介入公司治理效果的实证研究 (An Empirical Study on the Effect of 
Institutional Investors Participating in Corporate Governance: Based on the Data of 2004-2006 CCGINK)’, 1 
(2008) 南开管理评论 (Nankai Business Review), pp. 4-14. 
1223 Li Wenjing, Kong Dongmin, Liu Shasha and Xing Jingping, ‘中小股东仅能搭便车么？-来自深交所社会公
众股东网络投票的经验证据(Are Small-and-Medium Shareholders Merely Free-Riders?- Empirical Evidence of 
Online Voting of Public Shareholders of SZSE)’,3 (2012) 金融研究 (Financial Research), pp. 152-165. 
1224 Referring to the US experience, research has found that the shareholder engagement approach also works 
in controlled companies. Furthermore, one of the ways to effectuate this approach in controlled companies is 
to empower activist shareholders with the right to select minority directors. See: Kobi Kastiel, ‘Against All Odds: 
Hedge Fund Activism In Controlled Companies’, 60 (2016) Columbia Business Law Review, pp. 101-172. 
143A_BW_Fu_stand.job
275 
 
institutional environment restrains protection from the market and the judicial 
system.  
Referring to the US and Dutch experiences, it is notable that minority 
shareholder protection is achieved through balanced corporate governance in 
general, with special attention given to takeovers. Particularly, the 
principal-agent power equilibrium that is sustained by the court and the board 
of directors, alongside a mature securities market, are vital to a balanced 
system. Under the Chinese socialist market economy, this research argues that 
the Chinese concentrated ownership structure with a state controller could be 
efficient, if balanced corporate governance with Chinese characteristics can be 
established to protect minority shareholders. To reach such balance, the first 
two obstacles should be addressed by creating internal “checks and balances” 
through both the “principal” and the “agent”. Internal and external protections 
are two inseparable parts that a mature institutional environment is to be built 
by progressively overcoming the third obstacle, alongside an enhanced internal 
supervision. In specific, this research concludes with four main 
recommendations for the Chinese corporate system, in particular with respect 
to the protection of minority shareholders.  
1. The “agent solution” proposes reducing the affiliation between the board 
of directors and the controlling shareholder by: 
 
- increasing the proportion of independent directors in the board from 
one-third to a simple majority; 
- allowing a number of minority independent directors, either by replacing 
qualified minority shareholders’ existing nomination right with 
appointment right or by bundling the nomination right with a mandatory 
cumulative voting; 
- underlining minority independent directors’ role in exercising “special 
powers” provided by the Independent Director Opinion regarding material 
related-party transactions, vote solicitation or other situations that may 
damage minority shareholders’ interests, by granting such independent 
decisions a cleansing effect in judicial proceedings.  
 
2. The “principal solution” is proposed from both the “controller” and the 
“qualified minority shareholder” perspectives.  
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(1) The controller solution: 
 
- the controlling shareholder should dramatically increase its supervision of 
management and eliminate the “absence of owner” problem by exercising 
the appointment and removal rights to replace unqualified staffs when 
necessary;  
- the party organisation within a Chinese listed company should respect the 
autonomy of the company and focus on monitoring instead of corporate 
decision-making––its powers, obligations and procedures for 
decision-making should be stipulated in the articles of association;  
- government interference in business decisions should be limited to urgent 
and necessary circumstances, and any intervention should be fully 
disclosed. If the government pursues non-commercial interests, its reasons, 
potential impacts and measures adopted to protect investors should be 
disclosed in a timely manner to minority shareholders. 
 
(2) The qualified minority shareholder solution: the Investor Service Center, 
as the government’s most recent innovation, seems to be the most suitably 
qualified minority shareholder at the current time. The ISC should play a 
more active role and fully fulfil its mission to represent minority 
shareholders, exercise shareholder rights (such as appointment and 
removal rights), supervise management and the company controller and, 
especially litigate in the name of minority shareholders (especially for the 
distribution of dividends, for breach of disclosure duties, and breach of 
fiduciary duties). Considering the ISC’s semi-governmental identity, which 
casts doubt on its neutrality in supervising the state controller, 
participation of private qualified minority shareholders, such as foreign 
strategic investors and institutional investors, should also be encouraged.   
 
3. The “disclosure solution” proposes to protect minority shareholders by 
reducing information asymmetries. 
 
- minority independent directors should actively exercise the “equal 
information right” provided by Article 2 Public Shareholder Provision by 
requesting the cooperation of the secretary of the board of directors; 
- qualified minority shareholders should facilitate the implementation of 
minority shareholders’ right to know prescribed in Article 97 Chinese 
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Company Law by bringing actions to seek compensations from responsible 
directors, board secretaries or senior managers based on Article 12 Chinese 
Company Law Provisions IV;  
- the China Securities Regulatory Commission should enhance its supervision 
on disclosure by strictly enforcing the non-compliance sanctions prescribed 
in the newly revised 2020 Chinese Securities Law, particularly Article 197 
(sanctions against the controlling shareholder, directors, supervisors or 
managers) and Article 213 (sanctions against intermediate agents); 
- qualified minority shareholders should make good use of the newly added 
“representative action” (Article 95, 2020 Chinese Securities Law) to redress 
securities disclosure infringements, such as false statements, and to seek 
compensations on behalf of other minority shareholders. 
 
4. The “judicial solution” proposes minority shareholder protection in 
takeovers, especially by courts. 
 
- provisions of the mandatory bid prescribed in the Takeover Measures 
should be amended to remove different treatments between negotiated 
takeovers and indirect takeovers, and to be in consistent with Articles 65 
and 73 of the 2020 Chinese Securities Law; 
- appraisal right provisions should add specific procedural rules, and affirm 
courts to decide a reasonable appraisal price; 
- the newly revised 2020 Chinese Securities Law exempts the Investor Service 
Center from the threshold of 1% shareholding plus 180 consecutive days 
for bringing a derivative action. It is reasonable to grant this preferential 
treatment to also private qualified minority shareholders; 
- Chinese Company Law should specify the controlling shareholder’s fiduciary 
duty instead of providing a general list of shareholders’ prohibited 
behaviours in Article 20; 
- for self-dealing transactions with a company’s controlling shareholder, the 
law can consider combining Article 5 of the Independent Director Opinion 
and Article 1 of the Public Shareholder Provision to require approval from 
both independent directors and minority shareholders. This “double 
approval” requirement will function better if it is prescribed in the law 
instead of regulatory documents; 
- Chinese courts should gradually build a more efficient judicial system with 
qualified judges who are independent and highly versed in handling 
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sophisticated and sensitive commercial cases. The Shenzhen Financial 
Tribunal and the Shanghai Financial Court provide a unique opportunity to 
experiment and test the effectiveness of a Chinese commercial court. If this 
pilot project proves to be a success in practice, the outlook is bright that 
minority shareholders will receive enhanced judicial protection in the 
future. 
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Summary  
The securities market is a platform through which listed companies can raise funds for further 
development and shareholders can pursuit more economic returns by investing in listed 
companies. The characteristics of modern listed companies have determined that it is 
infeasible for shareholders, especially minority shareholders, to participate or supervise every 
company decision. In the Chinese context, the concentrated ownership structure and the state 
controlling shareholder cause evident conflicts of interest between minority shareholders and 
controlling shareholders/management. To prevent minority shareholder expropriation, the 
Chinese corporate law system should sustain a balanced relationship between a listed 
company and its minority shareholders. To achieve this goal, this research intends to resolve 
the central research question: how could minority shareholder protection in Chinese listed 
companies be improved in comparison to that in the US and the Dutch systems?   
To answer this question, a systematic comparative study of minority shareholder protection in 
China, the US and the Netherlands has been conducted through three main aspects, namely 
shareholder rights, monitoring mechanisms of disclosure and independence, and protection in 
takeover transactions (especially by courts), under the theoretical framework of 
“principal-agent conflict” and “principal-principal conflict”. Traditionally speaking, a 
dispersed ownership structure mainly faces the principal-agent conflict between shareholders 
and directors. A concentrated ownership structure mainly faces the principal-principal 
conflict between the controlling and minority shareholders. Taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the Chinese market, the principal-agent conflict mainly refers to the 
conflicts of interest between minority shareholders and management. Principal-principal 
conflict in State-owned listed companies has been identified more often as political conflicts 
between the State controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, while 
principal-principal conflict in non-State-owned listed companies matches with the traditional 
understanding of economic conflicts between private controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. 
This research has found that in the US, minority shareholder protection is not a separate goal 
of some specific minority-friendly rules, but the collective result of balanced corporate 
governance which establishes checks and balances among different parties within a company. 
Based on the dispersed market, US corporate law constantly strikes a balance between 
shareholder protection and director primacy. The federal securities regulations pursue the 
goal of shareholder protection through two main weapons, i.e. disclosure and independent 
directors. The state corporate law advocates the value of director primacy by portraying a 
powerful board of directors but also restrains directorial powers through fiduciary duties to 
guard shareholders’ interests. Two elements, namely market supervision and judicial 
protection, are essential in preventing the board from going astray. In particular, the court 
plays a fundamental role in guarding minority interests in takeover transactions. Minority 
shareholders are protected by easy access to judicial remedies, a fair appraisal price decided 
by the court, and strict judicial review standards. By balancing between shareholder 
protection and director primacy, such corporate governance benefits shareholders as a whole. 
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In special situations where the risk of minority shareholder expropriation is high, for example 
in takeover transactions, minority shareholders are protected by both legislation and case law.  
Guided by EU directives, Dutch corporate law follows a stakeholder model and designates 
the board of directors as the governing body of a company. This design, to a certain extent, 
averts a general meeting with many decision rights. Shareholders are generally protected by 
shareholder rights, transparency and independent supervision. In takeover transactions, 
minority shareholders’ interests are underlined by special legislative protection. Moreover, 
the Enterprise Chamber is entitled to take provisional measures in an inquiry proceeding, 
which substantially improves its effectiveness in redressing minority shareholder oppressions. 
Minority interests are mainly protected in Dutch case law through the “reasonableness and 
fairness” principle and the “stakeholder model”. 
Comparing China with the US and the Netherlands, this research has identified five main 
differences between China and the two jurisdictions. First, different ownership structures 
create different conflicts of interest. The dispersed ownership structure mainly faces the 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and directors. The Chinese concentrated ownership 
structure deals with both conflicts of interest between management and minority shareholders 
and conflicts of interest between the controlling and minority shareholders. Second, both US 
and Dutch corporate laws designate the board of directors as the governing organ of a 
company, while Chinese corporate law designates the general meeting as the governing organ. 
Third, despite all three countries have adopted comprehensive disclosure rules and have 
appointed a regulatory institution to oversee the securities market, disclosure qualities and 
market transparencies of the US and the Dutch markets are generally higher than the Chinese 
securities market. Fourth, the three jurisdictions have different board structures, with a 
one-tier board in the US, a choice between one-tier and two-tier boards in the Netherlands 
and two-tier board (with independent directors) in China. Fifth, due to the lack of a case law 
tradition and the lack of experience of Chinese judges in adjudicating securities cases, 
Chinese courts still lag behind the US and the Dutch counterparts in proficiency and 
efficiency. 
Taking into account these differences, this research further analyzes the Chinese context, 
examines key obstacles and provides specific recommendations on minority shareholder 
protection in Chinese listed companies. These recommendations concentrate on four main 
solutions. (1) The “agent solution” proposes measures to reduce the affiliation between the 
board of directors and the controlling shareholder. (2) The “principal solution” is proposed 
from both the “controller” and the “qualified minority shareholder” perspectives. (3) The 
“disclosure solution” proposes to protect minority shareholders by reducing information 
asymmetries. (4) The “judicial solution” suggests concrete measures to strengthen judicial 
protection of minority shareholders, particularly in takeovers. 
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Samenvatting 
De effectenmarkt is een platform waar beursgenoteerde vennootschappen kapitaal kunnen 
aantrekken voor verdere ontwikkeling en waar aandeelhouders economisch rendement 
nastreven door te investeren in beursvennootschappen. De kenmerken van moderne 
beursgenoteerde vennootschappen maken dat het voor aandeelhouders, met name 
minderheidsaandeelhouders, niet haalbaar is om deel te nemen aan of toezicht te houden op 
elke ondernemingsbeslissing. In de Chinese context veroorzaken de geconcentreerde 
eigendomsstructuur en de staat als controlerende aandeelhouder evidente belangenconflicten 
tussen enerzijds de minderheidsaandeelhouders en anderzijds controlerende 
aandeelhouders/het bestuur van de vennootschap. Om benadeling van 
minderheidsaandeelhouders te voorkomen, moet het Chinese vennootschapsrecht een 
evenwichtige relatie zien te vinden tussen een beursgenoteerde vennootschap en haar 
minderheidsaandeelhouders. Om dit doel te bereiken, staat in dit onderzoek de volgende 
onderzoeksvraag centraal: hoe kan de bescherming van minderheidsaandeelhouders van 
Chinese beursgenoteerde vennootschappen worden verbeterd in vergelijking met die in de VS 
en Nederland? 
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, is een systematisch rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek verricht 
naar de bescherming van minderheidsaandeelhouders in China, de VS en Nederland op basis 
van drie hoofdaspecten, namelijk 1) aandeelhoudersrechten, 2) monitoringmechanismen van 
openbaarmaking en onafhankelijkheid, en 3) bescherming bij overnametransacties (vooral 
door de rechter). Het theoretische kader van het "principaal-agent conflict" en het 
"principaal-principaal conflict" vormt daarbij het uitgangspunt. Traditioneel gezien is bij een 
wijdverspreid aandelenbezit vooral sprake van een principaal-agent conflict tussen 
aandeelhouders en bestuurders. Bij een geconcentreerd aandelenbezit is vooral sprake van 
een principaal-principaal conflict tussen de controlerend aandeelhouder en de 
minderheidsaandeelhouders. Gelet op de kenmerken van de Chinese markt is het 
principaal-agent conflict voornamelijk terug te voeren op de belangenconflicten tussen 
minderheidsaandeelhouders en het bestuur. Het principaal-principaal conflict bij 
beursvennootschappen die in handen zijn van de Chinese staat, wordt doorgaans gezien als 
politieke conflicten tussen de (Chinese staat als) controlerend aandeelhouder versus de 
minderheidsaandeelhouders, terwijl het principaal-principaal conflict bij 
beursvennootschappen die niet in handen zijn van de Chinese staat, overeenkomt met het 
traditionele begrip van economische conflicten tussen controlerend aandeelhouders en de 
minderheidsaandeelhouders. 
Uit dit onderzoek is gebleken dat bescherming van minderheidsaandeelhouders in de VS geen 
afzonderlijk doel is van een aantal specifieke ‘minderheidsvriendelijke’ regels, maar het 
resultaat is van een evenwichtige corporate governance, die checks and balances tussen 
verschillende partijen binnen een beursvennootschap tot stand brengt. Gelet op het 
wijdverspreide aandelenbezit bij beursvennootschappen bewerkstelligt het Amerikaanse 
vennootschapsrecht voortdurend een evenwicht tussen bescherming van aandeelhouders en 
director primacy. De federale effectenwetgeving streeft naar het doel van 
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aandeelhoudersbescherming via twee belangrijke instrumenten, namelijk openbaarmaking en 
onafhankelijke bestuurders. Het vennootschapsrecht van de deelstaten benadrukt enerzijds het 
belang van director primacy door een krachtige raad van bestuur, maar beperkt anderzijds de 
bestuursbevoegdheden door fiduciary duties om de belangen van de aandeelhouders te 
behartigen. Twee elementen, namelijk markttoezicht en rechterlijke bescherming, zijn 
essentieel om te voorkomen dat het bestuur de verkeerde kant op gaat. Met name de rechter 
speelt een fundamentele rol bij het beschermen van minderheidsbelangen bij 
overnametransacties. Minderheidsaandeelhouders worden beschermd door gemakkelijke 
toegang tot rechtsmiddelen, een eerlijke prijs die door de rechter wordt vastgesteld en strikte 
normen voor rechterlijke toetsing. Door een evenwicht te vinden tussen 
aandeelhoudersbescherming en het primaat van het bestuur komt een dergelijke corporate 
governance de aandeelhouders als geheel ten goede. In bijzondere situaties waarin het risico 
op benadeling van minderheidsaandeelhouders hoog is, bijvoorbeeld bij overnametransacties, 
worden minderheidsaandeelhouders beschermd door zowel wetgeving als jurisprudentie. 
Het Nederlandse ondernemingsrecht, beïnvloed door EU-richtlijnen, gaat uit van het 
stakeholdermodel en wijst de raad van bestuur aan als het leidinggevende orgaan van de 
vennootschap. Dit ontwerp voorkomt tot op zekere hoogte een algemene vergadering met 
veel beslissingsrechten. Aandeelhouders worden over het algemeen beschermd door 
aandeelhoudersrechten, transparantie en onafhankelijk toezicht. Bij overnametransacties 
worden de belangen van minderheidsaandeelhouders onderstreept door speciale wettelijke 
bepalingen. Bovendien kan de Ondernemingskamer voorlopige voorzieningen treffen in een 
enquêteprocedure, wat haar effectiviteit bij het terugdringen van de onderdrukking van 
minderheidsaandeelhouders aanzienlijk verbetert. Minderheidsbelangen worden in de 
Nederlandse jurisprudentie voornamelijk beschermd door het beginsel van “redelijkheid en 
billijkheid” en het “stakeholdermodel”. 
Door de rechtsvergelijking met de VS en Nederland heeft dit onderzoek vijf belangrijke 
verschillen tussen China en de andere twee rechtssystemen aan het licht gebracht. Ten eerste 
zorgen verschillende eigendomsstructuren voor verschillende belangenconflicten. Een 
wijdverspreid aandelenbezit leidt voornamelijk tot belangenconflicten tussen aandeelhouders 
en bestuurders. De Chinese geconcentreerde eigendomsstructuur leidt zowel tot 
belangenconflicten tussen het bestuur en minderheidsaandeelhouders als tot 
belangenconflicten tussen de controlerende aandeelhouders en minderheidsaandeelhouders. 
Ten tweede wijzen zowel het Amerikaanse als het Nederlandse vennootschapsrecht de raad 
van bestuur aan als het leidinggevende orgaan van de vennootschap, terwijl het Chinese 
vennootschapsrecht de algemene vergadering van aandeelhouders aanwijst als het 
leidinggevende orgaan. Ten derde, ondanks dat alle drie de landen uitgebreide 
openbaarmakingsregels hebben aangenomen en een toezichthouder hebben aangesteld om 
toezicht te houden op de effectenmarkt, is de kwaliteit van openbaarmaking en de 
markttransparantie van de Amerikaanse en de Nederlandse markten over het algemeen hoger 
dan die van de Chinese effectenmarkt. Ten vierde hebben de drie rechtssystemen 
verschillende bestuursstructuren, met een one-tier board in de VS, een keuze tussen one-tier 
en two-tier boards in Nederland en two-tier board (met onafhankelijke bestuurders) in China. 
Ten vijfde blijven Chinese rechtbanken door het ontbreken van een rechtspraaktraditie en het 
gebrek aan ervaring van Chinese rechters bij de beslechting van effectenzaken, achter op hun 
Amerikaanse en Nederlandse tegenhangers wat betreft bekwaamheid en efficiëntie. 
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Rekening houdend met deze verschillen wordt in dit onderzoek een nadere analyse gemaakt 
van de Chinese context, worden de belangrijkste obstakels onderzocht en worden specifieke 
aanbevelingen gedaan betreffende bescherming van minderheidsaandeelhouders in Chinese 
beursgenoteerde vennootschappen. Deze aanbevelingen concentreren zich op vier 
hoofdoplossingen: (1) De "agent-oplossing" stelt maatregelen voor om de verbondenheid 
tussen de raad van bestuur en de controlerend aandeelhouder te verminderen; (2) De 
"principaal-oplossing" stelt maatregelen voor vanuit het perspectief van zowel de 
controlerend aandeelhouder als de gekwalificeerde minderheidsaandeelhouder; (3) De 
"disclosure-oplossing" stelt voor om minderheidsaandeelhouders te beschermen door 
informatieasymmetrie te verminderen; en (4) De "gerechtelijke oplossing" stelt concrete 
maatregelen voor om de rechtsbescherming van minderheidsaandeelhouders te versterken, 
met name bij overnames. 
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